Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Synthese

Publication Date

9-1-2013

Volume

190

Issue

14

First Page

2821

Last Page

2834

Keywords

A priori thesis, Achinstein, Confirmation, Evidence, Working assumptions

Abstract

This paper responds to Achinstein's criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as 'e is evidence for h' (or 'e confirms h to degree r') is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein's objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.

DOI

10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x

Print ISSN

00397857

E-ISSN

15730964

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Additional Information

The same paper is presented at the 2011 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, United Kingdom, 7-8 July 2011.

Full-text Version

Pre-print

Recommended Citation

Rowbottom, D. P. (2012). Empirical evidence claims are a priori. Synthese, 190(14), 2821-2834. doi: 10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x