Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Synthese
Publication Date
9-1-2013
Volume
190
Issue
14
First Page
2821
Last Page
2834
Keywords
A priori thesis, Achinstein, Confirmation, Evidence, Working assumptions
Abstract
This paper responds to Achinstein's criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as 'e is evidence for h' (or 'e confirms h to degree r') is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein's objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them.
DOI
10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x
Print ISSN
00397857
E-ISSN
15730964
Publisher Statement
Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Additional Information
The same paper is presented at the 2011 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, Manchester, United Kingdom, 7-8 July 2011.
Full-text Version
Pre-print
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. P. (2012). Empirical evidence claims are a priori. Synthese, 190(14), 2821-2834. doi: 10.1007/s11229-012-0087-x