Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publication Date
5-2009
Volume
78
Issue
3
First Page
646
Last Page
672
Abstract
An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
DOI
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x
Print ISSN
00318205
E-ISSN
19331592
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Marshall, D. (2009). Can ‘intrinsic’ be defined using only broadly logical notions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(3), 646-672. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00259.x