Two conceptions of response-dependence

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

Publication Date

1-1-2002

Volume

107

Issue

2

First Page

159

Last Page

177

Publisher

Springer Netherlands

Abstract

The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.

DOI

10.1023/A:1014708132150

Print ISSN

00318116

E-ISSN

15730883

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

De Clercq, R. (2002). Two conceptions of response-dependence. Philosophical Studies, 107(2), 159-177. doi: 10.1023/A:1014708132150

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