Title

A note on the aesthetics of mirror reversal

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

Publication Date

2-1-2007

Volume

132

Issue

3

First Page

553

Last Page

563

Keywords

aesthetic properties, enantiomorphism, incongruent counterparts, mirror reversal

Abstract

According to Roy Sorensen [Philosophical Studies 100 (2000) 175–191] an object cannot differ aesthetically from its mirror image. On his view, mirror-reversing an object–changing its left/right orientation–cannot bring about any aesthetic change. However, in arguing for this thesis Sorensen assumes that aesthetic properties supervene on intrinsic properties alone. This is a highly controversial assumption and nothing is offered in its support. Moreover, a plausible weakening of the assumption does not improve the argument. Finally, Sorensen's second argument is shown to be formally flawed. As a result, the case for the aesthetic irrelevancy of orientation seems still open.

DOI

10.1007/s11098-005-4543-z

Print ISSN

00318116

E-ISSN

15730883

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer 2006

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Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

De Clercq, R. (2007). A note on the aesthetics of mirror reversal. Philosophical Studies, 132(3), 553-563. doi: 10.1007/s11098-005-4543-z