On an apparent truism in aesthetics
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
British Journal of Aesthetics
Publication Date
7-2003
Volume
43
Issue
3
First Page
260
Last Page
278
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Abstract
It has often been claimed that adequate aesthetic judgements must be grounded in the appreciator's first-hand experience of the item judged. Yet this apparent truism is misleading if adequate aesthetic judgements can instead be based on descriptions of the item or on acquaintance with some surrogate for it. In a survey of responses to such challenges to the apparent truism, I identify several contentions presented in its favour, including stipulative definitions of 'aesthetic judgement', assertions about conceptual gaps between determinate aesthetic properties and even the most perfect descriptions, and claims about the holistic and sensibility-relative character of aesthetic qualities and values. With reference to considerations advanced by Frank Sibley, Alan H. Goldman, and particularists and anti-particularists in meta-ethics, I contend that strong versions of the apparent truism lack sufficient warrant. Two successors are proposed, however. One reframes the thesis in terms of our contingently limited descriptive and theoretical capacities with regard to a subset of the aesthetic qualities of extraordinary works; the second involves a shift from epistemic to axiological matters: what even the most perfect descriptions cannot provide, and in some cases spoil, is our gauging of an item's inherent, experiential value. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]; Copyright of British Journal of Aesthetics is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
DOI
10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.3.260
Print ISSN
00070904
E-ISSN
14682842
Publisher Statement
Copyright © British Society of Aesthetics Press 2003.
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Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Livingston, P. (2003). On an apparent truism in aesthetics. British Journal of Aesthetics, 43(3), 260-278. doi: 10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.3.260