Cost of government and firm value
Journal of Corporate Finance
Cost of government; Firm value; Efficiency; Productivity; Grabbing hand; Political economy
Do high expenditures incurred in running the government benefit or hurt firms? Using Chinese data between 1999 and 2006, we find that higher administrative expenditures in provincial governments are associated with lower firm value, lower stock and financial performance, and lower labor productivity. Local governments that spend more on public administration tend to collect more fees from companies and spend less on social welfare and infrastructures. Our evidence is consistent with the “grabbing hand” hypothesis and has important policy implications.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Firth, M., Gong,S. X., & Shan, L. (2013). Cost of government and firm value. Journal of Corporate Finance, 21, 136-152. doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.01.008