Author

Xiaofeng ZHAO

Date of Award

2013

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Philosophy (MPHIL)

Department

Finance and Insurance

First Advisor

Dr. Wong Man-lai, Sonia

Abstract

My thesis examines whether corporate accessibility for minority shareholders, defined as the ease with which minority shareholders are able to contact corporate insiders, can be a signal of the severity of a firm’s agency problems. Using Chinese public listed firms as the testing group, I find that accessible firms are associated with less serious agency problems than is the case for non-accessible firms. Specifically, accessible firms tend to be associated with lower agency costs, lower cost of equity, higher firm valuation, and better operating performance. I also find that accessibility can signal agency problems in firms with different ownership and corporate governance structures, though the signaling effects are weaker in the firms where the incentives of insiders are tied less closely to stock price performance. Overall, my results indicate that corporate accessibility for minority shareholders is a value-relevant signal for investors to detect the quality of the publicly listed firms in China.

Recommended Citation

Zhao, X. (2013). Hello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for minority shareholders as a signal of agency problems in China (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.14793/fin_etd.8