Title
The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Bioethics
Publication Date
3-2018
Volume
32
Issue
3
First Page
199
Last Page
204
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Abstract
Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.
DOI
10.1111/bioe.12417
Print ISSN
02699702
E-ISSN
14678519
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Sauchelli, A. (2018). The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism. Bioethics, 32(3), 199-204. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12417
