The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.
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Sauchelli, A. (2018). The future-like-ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism. Bioethics, 32(3), 199-204. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12417