Title
Likelihood and consilience : on Forster’s counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophy of Science
Publication Date
12-2015
Volume
82
Issue
5
First Page
930
Last Page
940
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Abstract
Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. In this article, we refute Forster’s arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples. We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More important, we show that contrary to Forster’s contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable within the framework of the likelihood theory of evidence.
DOI
10.1086/683342
Print ISSN
00318248
E-ISSN
1539767X
Funding Information
This research was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under the General Research Fund LU342213. {LU342213}
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Additional Information
Paper presented at the Meeting of the Philosophy-of-Science-Association (PSA), Nov 06-09, 2014, Chicago, Illinois.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Zhang, J. & Zhang, K. (2015). Likelihood and consilience: on Forster’s counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 930-940. doi: 10.1086/683342
