Title
Knowledge is not enough
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publication Date
1-15-2017
Volume
Advance online publication
Publisher
Routledge
Keywords
experimental philosophy, intuition, metaphilosophy
Abstract
Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.
DOI
10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959
Print ISSN
00048402
E-ISSN
14716828
Funding Information
The work described in this paper was fully supported by a Grant from the Research Grants Council ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU 359613). {LU 359613}
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 Routledge. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Nado, J. (2017). Knowledge is not enough. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Advance online publication. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959
