Title
Demythologizing intuition
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Publication Date
2017
Volume
60
Issue
4
First Page
386
Last Page
402
Publisher
Rouledge
Keywords
Intuition, metaphilosophy, epistemology, philosophical methodology
Abstract
Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project.
DOI
10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639
Print ISSN
0020174X
E-ISSN
15023923
Funding Information
This work was supported by grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, [Project No. LU 359613]. {LU 359613}
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Nado, J. (2017). Demythologizing intuition. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 60(4), 386-402. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639
