Title
Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives : observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Synthese
Publication Date
6-21-2016
Volume
Advance online publication
First Page
1
Last Page
13
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Unconceived alternatives, Kyle Stanford, Anti-Realism, Science, Scientific realism, Scientific progress, Underdetermination of theories by evidence
Abstract
Stanford’s argument against scientific realism focuses on theories, just as many earlier arguments from inconceivability have. However, there are possible arguments against scientific realism involving unconceived (or inconceivable) entities of different types: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. This paper charts such arguments. In combination, they present the strongest challenge yet to scientific realism.
DOI
10.1007/s11229-016-1132-y
Print ISSN
00397857
E-ISSN
15730964
Funding Information
This paper was supported by: the Research Grants Council, Hong Kong (‘The Instrument of Science’, Humanities and Social Sciences Prestigious Fellowship); and also by the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University, in association with the European Union (COFUND Senior Research Fellowship).
Publisher Statement
Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D.P. (2016). Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives: Observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. Synthese. Advance online publication, 1-13. doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1132-y
