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SINO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS:
A PERCEPTUAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

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The rise of China's economic power and the end of US-Soviet rivalry has highlighted the importance of overall Sino-US relations and has made Sino-US interrelations in terms of security become more sophisticated and complicated. Although there obviously exist a number of issues in the Sino-US strategic relationship, my research takes two case studies for particular analysis. One issue, missile defense (MD), started during the presidency of Bill Clinton, but because of George W. Bush's tough approach to China has become a critical issue in current Sino-US relations.

The Taiwan issue is another crucial case study in my research. Because of limitations of time and length, I will concentrate my analysis on the run-up to the Taiwan straits mini-crisis in 1996 in which intensive interactions and changes in the foreign policies of both sides can be observed. By analyzing these two cases, more can be known about the complex nature of the contemporary Sino-US relationship.

The psychological-perceptual approach, which borrows theories and concepts from psychology, has been one of the enduring and influential approaches in studying international relations. However, it is a new perspective for discussing the missile defense issue and the Taiwan crisis in 1996.

The circular flow of how the stimulus from the United States affects the perception of China, then its attendant foreign policies towards the United States, which in turn affects the perception of the United States and its consequent foreign policy towards China on both the MD issue and the Taiwan crisis forms the main research framework in my thesis. Moreover, combining the attribution theory from psychology and the security dilemma theory from the traditional Realist paradigm gives us new perspectives in viewing the interactions between the United States and China.

The missile defense issue showed that the linkage with the Taiwan issue remains important in changes in perception of the Chinese decision-makers. During the Clinton presidency, the joint effort of China and Russia resulted in the changes in perception of US decision-makers on the missile defense issue and to a large extent, caused the delay in the development of the national missile defense. Then during President Bush presidency, the possible selling of Aegis-equipped naval ships to Taiwan softened the stance of Chinese decision-makers on the MD issue, but the granting of a visa to Taiwanese President Chen caused the Chinese leadership to return to a tough stance on the MD issue.

The Taiwan issue is nevertheless an important case in my research and particular focus is given to the background of the 1996 Taiwan straits crisis. The 1992 US arms sales to Taiwan started the process but the 1995 granting of a visa to Taiwanese President Lee was the prime stimulus that reinforced China's hostile image of US decision-makers, which resulted in the changes in the foreign policies of the Chinese leadership. In turn, the Chinese military tests also shaped the perception of US decision-makers and hence US policies towards the Taiwan straits situation also changed. Decision-makers' changes in perception and foreign policies led to the formation of the 1996 Taiwan straits crisis in consequence.

Judging from my findings, the basic theoretical framework is useful in analyzing the dynamics of both issues, but nevertheless there needs to be some modification to my framework. In particular, my analysis shows that the existence of a stimulus with a "credible threat" is necessary to produce a change in core belief and in perception. Moreover, the two theories of the security dilemma and attribution match rather well with the origin and development of the two issues in certain aspects and hence the combination of the three could produce a more comprehensive analysis.

I declare that this thesis 《Sino-American Strategic Relations: A Perceptual-Psychological Approach》 is the product of my own research and has not been published in any other publications.

(WONG Hon Yui Eric)

September 2002

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WONG, Hon Yui Eric
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CHAPTER ONE

MAIN THEME OF THIS STUDY

(a) Introduction

Sino-US relations have started to become a particular focus of attention since the late 20th century as the rise of China's economic power has made its interactions with the United States become more sophisticated and more complex. They have common interests in some areas, such as economic and trade issues. However, they have certain divergences in other aspects, in particular about human rights and security issues.

The time-frame of my research is Sino-US relations since the end of the Cold War, in particular during the US administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The bilateral relationship covers economic, political and security dimensions and it is difficult to separate cleanly these dimensions, but the emphasis here will as far as possible be on security issues.

The focus of my research is an analysis of two key security issues, the missile defense (MD) development and the 1996 Taiwan straits crisis in which intensive confrontations and interactions between the decision-makers from the United States and China could be observed. Not only are China and the United States clearly deeply involved in the Taiwan situation but also, in 1998, China became the first country that vowed to oppose the US theatre missile defense system.

The aims of my research are to test out whether the theoretical model utilized is fully in accord with the developments in my two case studies. Can it provide

insights into how these two confrontations developed? If not, what other factors are important in changing the foreign policies adopted by each nation in these two cases?

This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. The perceptual-psychological model will be used in order to analyze my two case studies. I will analyze the content and context of speeches and other official documents of the highest decision-makers and their senior officials so as to try to understand their perceptions on any particular issue. My major perceptual-psychological framework, in conjunction with the security dilemma theory and the attribution theory, could provide a more comprehensible way to analyze the dynamics of the Sino-US interactions. The perceptual-psychological approach is the pillar of my theoretical framework and the other two theories are used to complement and to add richness to the explanations of the cases.

After in-depth research on the two cases, it is expected that either the findings could be found to be fully in accord with my model or new materials should be added so that the framework could be more comprehensive in analyzing the two cases.

In this thesis, the remainder of this chapter introduces the purpose of my research, the different levels of analysis in International Relations (IR) and the importance of the perceptual-psychological approach. The second chapter outlines the literature review of the perceptual-psychological approach. The third chapter is the literature review on the security dilemma theory and the attribution theory. The fourth chapter discusses the main theoretical framework of my thesis. The fifth chapter sets the background of Sino-US relations before the 1990s. The sixth

chapter outlines the background of the missile defense issue. The seventh chapter introduces the dynamics of missile defense issue during Clinton presidency. The eighth chapter discusses the dynamics of missile defense issue during Bush presidency. The ninth chapter focuses on the application of the security dilemma theory and the attribution theory into my case studies on the development of the missile defense. The tenth chapter is a large and comprehensive chapter discussing the dynamics of the Taiwan straits crisis during Clinton presidency. The final chapter is the conclusion which summarizes my whole research on the above two cases. Three appendices and the references of my research would be attached at the back.

(b) Purpose of the research

There have been many researchers studying Sino-US relations, ranging from economic to political as well as strategic relations, since Sino-US relations have been influential in affecting the world situation since 1978 when China embarked on its open door policy.

The Missile Defense (MD) issue has arrested the concerns of Chinese decision-makers in recent years and the confrontations and interactions between decision-makers from both sides are explicit and have lasted for several years. In analyzing the delay in the introduction of the MD program by US President Bill Clinton in the last year of his presidency, it is worth noting the degree of importance of Chinese decision-makers' opposition in altering the perception of US decision-makers on this issue. Moreover, the dynamics of the Sino-US interactions in this case could also demonstrate certain changes in perception of Chinese

decision-makers on this issue.

Although many scholars have written articles on the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the fact is that not many of them have used a detailed perceptual-psychological approach in analyzing the changes in perception on both sides in this case and hence the importance of decision-makers' perception in shaping the outcome of the crisis.

Being a student in international politics, the research in using a perception approach in analyzing the above two cases are necessary and new.

(c) Different levels of analysis in international relations (IR)

“A level of analysis is a perspective on international relations (IR) based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggests possible explanations to “why” questions” (Goldstein, 1999, p.16).

One of the most important works on levels of analysis was entitled “Man, State and War”. Kenneth Waltz argued that “Man’s behaviour, his very nature, which some have taken as cause is in great part a product of the society in which he lives. Any society, he avers, is inseparable from political organization” (Waltz, 1959, p.5).

His idea that man will shape society and the society will also confine the nature of man’s behaviour gives insights into the factors that influence the perception of decision-makers on certain issues. Therefore it is not only the individual level should be discussed, but consideration should be given to the national level as well as the international level. It is because the perception and misperception of decision-makers would be influenced by factors of other two levels of analysis.

The international level of analysis concerns the influence of the international system upon outcomes. This level of analysis therefore focuses on the interactions of states themselves, without regard to their internal makeup or the particular individuals who lead them. Moreover, it puts emphasis on the relative power positions in the international environment (Goldstein, 1999, p.18).

The domestic level of analysis concerns the aggregations of individuals within states that influence state actions in the international arena. They include interest groups, political organizations and government agencies (Goldstein, 1999, p.17). In the United States, for example, the role of Congress as a domestic level of analysis is important in shaping the foreign policies outcomes.

Individual level of analysis, as outlined in the previous section, is also an important approach in explaining international relations. My research focus would be put onto this specific perspective.

(d) The importance of perceptual-psychological approach in international relations (IR)

The individual level of analysis concerns the perceptions, choices, and actions of individual human beings. Different people have different belief systems and so they perceive things in a different ways. The importance of cognitive variables has long been recognized in the analysis of politics in general and of international relations in particular and “since 1950s, following the behavioural revolution in the study of world politics, the perceptual-psychological approach has become pervasive

in various research areas such as foreign policy decision-making, arms control, crisis management, conflict resolution, diplomatic negotiations and cross-national interactions” (Wang, 1994, p.6).

Harold and Margaret Sprout were pioneers who regarded the perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers as important for students of international relations. They point out that “what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how actually is” (Sprout & Sprout, 1969, p.49). They distinguished the “psychological environment” from the “operational environment” and concluded that in most cases the above two concepts are not equal.

David Singer further distinguished two levels of analysis in foreign policy. They are the international level of analysis and the national level of analysis. He claimed that the latter one mainly focused on the decision-makers’ goals, values and perceptions of foreign policy-makers. He even warned “the omission of the cognitive and perceptual linkage would be disastrous” (Singer, 1969, p.26).

Robert Jervis was another scholar who put much emphasis on the importance of perception and he used a systematic approach to incorporate the perceptual factor in foreign policy making analysis. Of his various writings concerning the perception and the foreign making analysis, his book “Perception and Misperception in International Politics” is the most comprehensive book in which perception was discussed in detail (Jervis, 1976).

Besides the perceptual-psychological approach, the security dilemma and the attribution theory would also be use to complement the explanations of the

development of my two cases studies. I am aware that “constructivism” is another paradigm that is related to perception and misperception in international politics, however, due to the fact that I am unable to include all theoretical paradigms into my thesis, I will only borrow some of the ideas from the traditional security dilemma theory and apply them logically into my thesis.

From the above works from various scholars, it is clear that the perceptual approach should be one of the important approaches for studying and exploring mutual relations between states and the foreign policies they deploy. As Goldstein (1999, p.152) said, “Individuals are the only true actors in IR. Every international event is the result, intended or unintended, of decisions made by individuals.”

The importance of perception by decision-makers on a particular issue should exert a certain weight in affecting their policies towards it. A more detailed literature review of scholars’ writings on political psychology and perception would be outlined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW OF PERCEPTUAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

(a) Literature review of the psychological approach in international relations

In the past two decades, political psychology has become of increasing interest to scholars engaged in the study of politics and this unique field started to develop since mid-1950s. However, according to Margaret Hermann, due to the fact that political psychology draws researchers from a variety of disciplines and covers topics ranging, for instance, from ethnic conflict to leaders' decision to use force, it has been rather difficult to arrive at a consensus about the nature of the field and how to train its future professionals (Hermann, M. G, 2002, p.43).

Although the study of political psychology only developed in the middle of the twentieth century, a number of significant empirical studies have been published. Amongst them, those pioneer scholars in contributing in this field would be Irving Janis, who tried to develop his so-called "groupthink" in analyzing the importance of group dynamics in foreign policy outcomes, and Charles and Margaret Hermann, who worked on the psychological dimensions of leadership and foreign policy (Deutsch & Kinnvall, 2002, p.15). Moreover, Alexander George's "operational code" was also another means to assess the attitude of political leaders by using ten questions given that their attitude would be important in affecting the foreign policy outcomes. Since my research will only focus on the role of decision-makers in

affecting their foreign policy outcomes, literature review on the importance of “groupthink” and the personal traits of a group of leadership in nations will be examined.

In an article entitled “Groupthink” (Janis, 1993, p.360), the author selected three different cases to draw intensive studies and found that whenever a decision was made in the form of group, the outcome of a decision would be affected by the symptom of “groupthink” to a certain degree. He said “members tend to evolve informal objectives to preserve friendly intra-group relations, and this becomes part of the hidden agenda at the meetings and the groups involved in these fiascoes [his case studies] adhered to group norms and pressures toward uniformity, even when their policy was working badly and had unintended consequences that disturbed the conscience of the members” (Janis, 1993, p.362). Hence, it is logical to conclude that even though members in a small elite group have incongruent ideas on an issue, they would try to make a consensus on it since they fall into the symptom of “groupthink”. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the speeches from different decision-makers in an elite group in order to reflect their belief systems as a whole. This provides a significant insight for my thesis in trying to analyze the speeches of a elite group of decision-makers in a particular nation.

Hermann and Hermann examined the prime factor in determining the foreign policy decisions making of a nation. They argued that in general, there are three kinds of actors that have the ultimate power in making the decision. Firstly, there are predominant leaders, a single individual who has the power to make the choice and to stifle opposition. Secondly a single group, a set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, collectively select a course of action in face-to-face

interaction and obtain compliance. The last one is multiple autonomous actors, they are separate actors like individuals, groups and coalitions but none of them have the ability to decide and force compliance on the others (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p.364). They said that in the political structure in the United States, different issues might be decided by different actors. For instance, for a military issue, the decision may be made by the joint Chiefs of Staff (a single group) and in response to a press conference, they might have the ultimate power to decide the answer. Therefore, it is rather difficult to know who and which groups have the ultimate power in making decisions. But in order to simplify my research methodology, I would try to focus on a single group of elite in the United States, including the President, which I think should exert the largest weight in shaping the foreign policy outcomes.

Hermann and Hermann also argued that the personal characteristics of the predominant leader should be important in affecting the foreign policy outcomes. “If the ultimate decision unit is a predominant leader, the key question is whether or not the leader’s orientation to foreign affairs leads him to be relatively sensitive or insensitive to information from the political environment. If the leader is relatively insensitive, knowledge about the leader’s personality will provide us with cues about what his government’s foreign policy behavior is likely to be. If the leader is more sensitive, we need to understand other aspects of the political system in order to suggest what the government will do in response to a foreign policy problem” (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p.366).

They argued that if the ultimate decision was made in a form of single group, “groupthink” might be prevailing in the foreign policy making. That means “the members reinforce each others’ predispositions and feel secure in their collective

decision. Should disagreement persist, however, other force outside the group can become influential, as members of the group seek supporting information for their positions, reinterpretation of the problem, or ways to resolve the conflict” (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p.367).

Therefore, if a single group can achieve consensus quickly, we can focus exclusively on the group’s internal dynamics in estimating how the group is likely to deal with the foreign policy problem – the single group becomes a self-contained decision unit. But if not, then we need to pay attention to the external factors that might exert influence on the foreign making decisions (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p.367).

“In sum, when multiple autonomous actors are the ultimate decision unit, the key to ascertaining the nature of any foreign policy behavior is whether the political relationship among the actors is zero-sum or non-zero sum with respect to recognizing the legitimacy of each entity to seek and share power (Hermann & Hermann, 1989, p.369). If they interacted in a zero-sum game, then they might be easily to run into conflict with each other. When they ran into a non-zero sum game, there is basis for agreement and hence it is necessary to examine the bargaining power of each unit of actor in shaping the foreign policy outcomes.

In brief, they tried to use the role of psychological factors of predominant leader, single group and multiple actors to analyze how they might affect the foreign policy outcomes. In my research, I will consider that a single group will be much more important in shaping the foreign policy outcomes in China and the United States because in most cases speeches or statements on particular issue would be given by

several senior decision-makers and so it is possible and necessary to use a group of elite's speeches to analyze the cases.

In an article entitled "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders" Margaret Hermann in 1980 used content analysis to examine 45 heads of government on the foreign policy behavior of their nations. Her research showed that the psychology of decision-makers should bear weight in affecting the decision-making outcomes (Hermann, 1980, p.7).

In 1969 Alexander George formulated two sets of general questions to effectively address all relevant underlying issues of political reality and action, in any historical context (Stone & Schaffner, 1988, p.174). In his article, George listed out the questions in two sets in order to assess the political leader's belief system and attitude towards a political issue. For instance, one question is "Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?" (George, 1969, p.203). Then researchers will try to assess their belief systems from their answers. It is another kind of method to assess the belief systems of decision-makers and hence how their psychology affects the decision-making outcomes.

(b) Literature Review of the perceptual approach in international relations

Since World War II, the predominant approach in studying international relations theory has been realism. The basic assumption is that states intend to maximize their national interest and power in an anarchic world system in which no world government exists. The unit of analysis is the state and therefore the

interactions between states are assumed to be a function of the distribution of capabilities, mainly in terms of military power among the states. The paradigm assumes that the increase in one state's interest will lead to the decrease in another state's interest and hence states interact in a zero-sum game formula. In brief, the realist approach mainly focuses on the national interest and power amongst states (the structure amongst states) in driving the foreign policies but seldom discusses the importance of the role of states' decision-makers' perception in shaping the foreign policy outcomes.

However, the structure amongst states could only be considered as one of the constituents that affect the decision-makers' outcomes, rather, we need to pay attention to other factors such as perception, personality, bureaucracy as determiners (Voss & Dorsey, 1992, p.4). Hence, it will be an oversimplification to assume that the structure amongst states is the prime and the sole factor that determines the foreign policy outcomes. So in this sense, the perception and belief system of a specified nation's decision-makers should be measured in order to realize how they perceive the world and the external environment.

The most traditional writings on the perception and foreign policy outcomes should be dated back to the work of Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. In their article entitled "The Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics", they used a diagram which was called "State "x" as Actor in a situation". "Situation is comprised of a combination of selectively relevant factors in the external and internal setting as interpreted by the decision-makers" (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1969, p.201).

External setting refers to factors and conditions beyond the territorial boundaries of the state – the actions and reactions of other states (decision-makers) and the societies for which they act and the physical world. Relevance of particular situations will depend on a number of factors, such as the attitudes, perceptions and the purpose of State X’s decision-makers and on how they react to the outside stimuli. Moreover, the external setting is constantly changing and will consist of *what the decision-makers decide is important* (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1969, p.203). The internal setting will be composed of elements such as “domestic politics” and “public opinion” (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1969, p.203).

In brief, the decision-makers of a particular nation might change their perception on certain important issues when faced with various factors and that might change their policies. However, all internal and external factors should be filtered by the decision-makers subjectively and hence it is essential to realize their belief systems.

Moreover, they added the importance of the role of decision-makers in a nation. “It is also one of our basic choices to define the state as its official decision-makers – those whose authoritative are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. *State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state.* Hence, the state is its decision-makers. State X as *actor* is translated into its decision-makers as actors. It is also one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of the “world” of the decision-makers as *they* view it. The way they define situations becomes another way of saying this is the way the state oriented to action and why. This is a quite different approach from trying to re-create the situation and interpretation of it *objectively*” (Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, 1969, p.202).

Harold and Margaret Sprout were another two scholars who contributed on the importance of perception in international relations. In their article entitled “Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics”, they stated that cognitive behaviorism draws a sharp distinction between the psychological environment (with reference to which an individual defines choices and takes decisions) and the operational environment (which sets limits to what can happen when the decision is executed) (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p.314).

The decision-makers’ psychological environment (that is, his image, or estimate, of the situation, setting, or milieu) may or may not correspond to the operational environment (in which his decisions are executed). But in policy-making, what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p.318). Hence, excluding the special problem of self-analysis by the policy-maker himself, the first step in linking environmental factors to policy decisions is to find out how the given policy-maker, or policy-making group, conceives the milieu to be and how that unit interprets the opportunities and limitations (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p.319).

Robert Jervis is a pioneer that tried to undertake a systematic and indepth research on how the perceptions of decision-makers influence the foreign policies of nations. In his book entitled “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”, he outlined that “it is impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers beliefs about the world and their images of others” (Jervis, 1976, p.28). From his perspective, objective conditions such as the international environment as well as domestic determinants do not directly affect foreign policies if the decision-makers do not perceive them in accord with the

objective environment. So that means a decision-maker will filter the external conditions and stimulus so as to make his own judgements on what he or she needs to response. Suffice it to say that, foreign policy is the result of the decision-makers perceived conditions.

This accords with Harold and Margaret Sprout's argument that "in policy-making, what matters is how the policy maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is" (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p.318). This implies that what is more important is how the decision-maker and his/her government perceive the external situations, but not in fact what the reality and actual environment is. Moreover, "social interaction, such as foreign policy, is best described not only as a process of strategic interaction but also as one of symbolic interaction in the sense that human beings interpret or define each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's actions" (Vertzberger, 1990, p.7).

So from the above well-known scholars' writings, it is more appropriate to examine the perceived environment rather than the actual environment. The difference between the actual environment and the perceived environment is the misperception. Misperception can then be defined and measured in terms of the discrepancy between the real world and the mental world (Vertzberger, 1990 p.7). But this definition has inherent biases because it is in fact not possible to realize what the real environment is. For instance, the United States perceives that China is going to threaten US interests in the 21st century but China denies this. How can we decide which one is the real situation, as it is obviously depends on which perspective you will take? Hence, it is better to take another more appropriate definition, in which I will not put my focus on the discrepancy between the mental

environment and the real environment, but rather on the idea that “misperceptions may account for failure to discern a real discrepancy among the interest, goals, and options of competing actors” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.7). That means misperception is the inability to perceive the counterpart’s core values in an anarchic world system, so conflicts will eventually arise.

At the same time, “the study of attitudes and interactions of diplomats and national decision-makers obviously has more direct relevance to international politics than the study of average citizens contemplating foreign policy questions or traveling abroad by elite” (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p.316). Moreover, states are not abstract entities; they are composed of human beings and in order to understand the foreign policy behaviour of a given nation, one must comprehend the images of those concerned elites who make the policy decisions that help shape their state’s action in the international arena (Shambaugh, 1991, p.17).

After reviewing the above literature, two important aspects could be drawn out. Firstly, most of the important works concerned with how perception affects foreign policy are limited to analyzing only wars and crises. “By definition they are activities that take place in a short or finite time” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.11). This means that scholars have put less effort into analyzing how the perception and perceptual changes of decision-makers affect foreign policies over the long-term with intensive interactions between decision-makers. So it is worth doing research on that particular field and see how the perceptions of decision-makers attributed to the policies changes. Therefore in this thesis, although one case study does include an analysis of a “crisis”, in 1996, over Taiwan, even there an attempt is made to set it in the context of longer-term perceptual change.

Secondly, earlier studies have clearly showed that the perception from decision-makers and their governments have a certain weight in affecting the making of foreign policies. Hence we can conclude that the minds (belief system) of the decision-makers will affect their perceptions towards a country and so too their attendant foreign policies towards it.

(c) What is information processing?

In developing the psychological-perceptual approach we need to appreciate the mechanisms of information processing. Information processing, according to Vertzberger Yaacov, is the “plethora of activities, performed individually and collectively, through which decisionmakers strive for an accurate and sophisticated understanding of their social, political, and physical milieu in terms of the issues they face and the environmental constraints on the range of available responses open to them” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.8). Moreover, it involves recognizing and attending to information, interpreting it, assessing its relevance to problems at hand, evaluating the importance of new data within the existing information set, interpreting the various information ingredients into the knowledge base by synthesizing, updating, expanding, abstracting, or transforming them substantially (Vertzberger, 1990, p.9).

More importantly, information processing is symbiotically related to the issues of cognition, perception, misperception, and image formation and transformation. Hence, an analysis of information processing and the evaluation of its quality should deal with the image of the world the decisionmaker has at a given time and its change overtime (Vertzberger, 1990, p.9). So from the above basic procedures of information processing, we can see that stimuli that were considered as important

will penetrate the decision-makers perceptual lenses, and then the belief system of the decision-makers will be responsible for interpreting the stimuli and finally affecting the perception of a country. So once a new stimulus takes place, the perception of one country towards their counterpart will change. Hence, in order to accurately measure the perception, we should be carefully look at the stimuli that can penetrate the cognitive lenses of the decision-makers in US.

(d) What is stimulus and why it is important in information processing?

The literature on stimulus is extensive and I will only abstract those materials that are related to and suitable for my thesis.

Basically, there are various types of information that happen everyday and they can be grouped as (a) Occurrence (b) Act (c) Message and last but not least (d) Stimulus. Occurrence is defined as anything happening in the actor's environment (Vertzberger, 1990, p.23). Act is defined as a specific behavior stemming from a decision by an actor with the authority and power to commit resources for carrying out the specific behavior. So every act is an occurrence, but not all occurrences are acts (Vertzberger, 1990, p.24). Message is an act or occurrence that results from a decision of the actor and that has a specific target. So every message is an act, but not all acts are messages (Vertzberger, 1990, p.24).

Stimulus is defined as an occurrence, act, or message that penetrates the cognitive system of a given actor and so the decision-makers must allocate attention and give meaning to the information in question so that it makes sense (Vertzberger,

1990 p.24). Stimulus in my thesis will not be constrained by its size, for uncertain response from the counterpart could also be a stimulus in my thesis.

There are basically two factors affecting whether information occurred can successfully become a stimulus that penetrates the cognitive system of decision-makers. The first is “the extent to which it meets preset criteria for attracting attention” and “the second type involves raising or lowering the level of the existing attention threshold” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.56). By the same token that means that before occurrence can become a stimulus it is required to be either successfully matched with a decision-maker’s criteria in his/her belief system or attracting attention at a given point of time. It is due to the fact that decision-makers cannot respond to every occurrence and so he must select some of the most imperative happenings to respond to (Vertzberger, 1990, p.57).

On balance, the more extreme or dramatic the content of information, the less likely it is to go unobserved. Another important attribute of stimuli is the less ambiguous the information, the harder it is to ignore it or discount its relevance when interpreting it. (Vertzberger, 1990, p.57) Hence, the more dramatic and more detailed a stimulus is, the less likely that the stimulus will be go unnoticed.

Besides the unambiguous and dramatic stimuli being counted as relevant and important, repetitive information is not likely to be ignored. Information that has already gained attention in the past and penetrated the perceiver’s cognitive system continues to attract attention, so that information of a similar kind, even if its informative value has declined, is likely to be noticed when it reappears (Vertzberger, 1990, p.60). Hence, the sequence of distinct occurrences will affect the image of

one country towards the other. “The misperception may relate, not to the misinterpretation of a single event, but to the pattern seen emerging from a set of events; in this case it involves covariation judgement” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.46). Hence, a numbers of similar stimuli that happen consecutively and continually in a short period of time will be regarded as being in the same category and decision-makers may not view them individually.

Moreover, a stimulus that is consonant with prior expectations, beliefs, or theories is likely to be noticed. Even when it is noticed, a selective process may operate to determine which particular aspects of the stimulus will be attended to. Furthermore, consistent information, once stored in long-term memory, becomes more available in judging future information and therefore more influential over its processing (Vertzberger, 1990, p.60).

From the above characteristics of the stimulus that links up to the perception theories, we can realize that there are several aspects in the perceptual mind of human being that will influence the interpretation of the stimulus. Firstly, the importance of the stimulus; if it happens unexpectedly and its consequences are dramatic, then it should draw decision-makers’ attention. Moreover, if the issue is unambiguous, it would be easier to be considered as relevant and important in affecting the cognitive mind and shaping the images of the country. Moreover, adding the fact that a similar situation interpreted by the decision-makers had happened before, decision-makers will go straight to the conclusion of the interpretation of the case without searching for any more information to attest. They will assume that that particular information fits into their existing schemata, that is cognitive structures of organized prior knowledge abstracted from specific

experiences (Vertzberger, 1990, p.60). Also, decision-makers categorize and label the stimulus that is perceived as belonging to the same type under without further analyzing and interpreting. “Categorization by issue area is basic and useful in organizing information and providing a broad and yet simple conceptual basis for judgement and inference” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.71). Once an object or situation is classified in a particular category, the choice of response pattern calls for little further search for information (Vertzberger, 1990, p.128).

(e) What is the belief system in information processing?

Belief system of the decision-makers is very difficult to assess. For instance, Alexander L. George has used the concept of “the operational code” which involves questions that can be used to assess the belief system of a decision-maker (George, 1969, p.201-219), Besides the operational code, cognitive mapping is another method that can be used to find out the belief system of a particular person. However, in my research, I am not intending to use these various methods to measure belief systems.

In the view of the difficulties and the time constraints and the unavailability of direct interviews with the decision-makers in the United States and China, I am not going into an in-depth analysis of individual decision-maker’s belief systems by using various scholars’ methods, such as “the operational code”. Instead, I would like to have a detailed analysis on their speeches on my two concerned issues, which are the missile defense issue and the Taiwan straits issues, which by my argument and definition, could reflect their belief system and perception on those issues. Therefore, responses to events and policy statements that are published in the official

websites, newspapers and electronic journals and official comments on my concerned issues will be regarded as important materials in my thesis writing.

(f) What is the cognitive system of a decision-maker and how does it affect the foreign policy?

The most elementary cognitive tools with which the decisionmaker approaches, and attempts to clarify and impose meaning on, the complex and uncertain environment are beliefs, values, and stereotypes. Beliefs are the building materials for experience-based scripts, values are the bases for normative scripts, and stereotypes are the sources of persona-type scripts (Vertzberger, 1990, p.113-114).

The linkages between the belief system and the outside stimuli are if the stimuli accord with the core belief of a human being, through interpretation and expectations, then he will consider them as relevant and important for his decision making and vice versa. So the importance and relevance attached to information is largely determined by its location on the belief-disbelief continuum (Vertzberger, 1990, p.117).

Central beliefs about the self and adversary underlie major strategic assumptions that guide political-military thinking. For example, “Kissinger’s attitudes concerning the role of negotiations were tied to his operational code beliefs that decision-makers have no control over history and hence negotiations play a pivotal role in the least risky path to goal attainment” (Vertzberger, 1990, p.119). So from this example and the earlier illustrations, we can see that the operational code, as a part of belief system, guides the decision-makers strategic and political

thinking towards a nation as well as the policies regarding it. Moreover, decision-makers are reluctant to change their central beliefs and so dissonant information may not be considered as relevant and important.

The extent to which a particular value or value system is brought to bear on the judgement and evaluation of particular information depends on a number of factors. (Vertzberger, 1990, p.124) The most important criteria for judging the relevance of a stimulus is whether it is associated with decision-makers' value system. If the content of the stimulus is in accord with his value system, then the decision-maker will regard it as relevant and important.

So once a country forms a particular value judgement towards another country, then "there is an increased sensitivity to stimuli that are compatible to one's value at the expense of attention to other stimuli" (Vertzberger, 1990, p.125). Also, the value system bears certain kinds of relations with the attitude. "People adopt attitudes seem to them congruent with their values, particularly their core values" (Vertzberger, 1990, p.132).

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA

THEORY AND THE ATTRIBUTION THEORY

I would draw in part on the theory of security dilemma, which comes from the paradigm of Realism, and attribution theory, which comes from psychology, to illustrate and help to explain certain aspects of my two case studies. The below two theories would be used as a supplement for my main theoretical framework to give a more comprehensible explanation of my two cases studies.

a) The Security Dilemma Theory

In the original article written by Robert Jervis, he gave a definition of the security dilemma. It means “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 1978, p.169). So, as he mentioned, “In international politics, however, one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others” (Jervis, 1978, p.170). Also, he defined “most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its security have the unintended effect of decreasing the security of others” (Jervis, 1988, p.317). In addition, he mentioned “Many of the policies that are designed to increase a state’s security automatically and inadvertently decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 1982, p.358). The emphasis of these definitions is on how the state inadvertently reduces the security of its neighbors by the actions it takes (Snyder, 1985, p.153).

The definition from Robert Jervis clearly showed that in an anarchic world system without a world government, a state tends to increase its national power in order to protect itself, however, this is usually perceived as a kind of threat by other

nations' decision-makers. It is logical for states to assume the worse intention from their counterparts because they might be afraid that other states might deceive them and would undertake actions that might harm their national interests. It seems that states which exist in an anarchic world system would come into a unresolvable situation. This accords with what Herbert Butterfield said about the "unresolvable uncertainty".

The security dilemma also puts emphasis on the "uncertainty of intention". Herbert Butterfield (1951, p.21) wrote "You know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; yet it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have." So from this definition, "unresolvable uncertainty" is thus an extremely important precondition for states fall into the security dilemma.

Moreover, we can look at the book written by Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, in which their example described on the security dilemma theory are more complete and clear, for they stated that in a self-help and anarchic world system, "State A may sincerely increase its level of defense spending only for defensive purposes and self-preservation, but it is rational for others to assume the worst and impute aggressive intentions to State A. They therefore also increase their level of arms, leading State A to feel insecure and contemplate a further increase in military spending. Hence, by initially trying to enhance its own security, State A sets in motion a process that results ironically in its feeling less secure. Moreover, "A security dilemma exists when the military preparations of one state create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether they are for defensive

purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)” (Wheeler, & Booth, 1992, p.30). In another usage, the term merely refers to the security problem faced by all states in world without central authority or lack of common government among states” (Viott & Kauppi, 1993, p.121).

The above explanations were clearer on how the security dilemma theory could be applied into the interactions between states. The boost of military power for defensive purpose from one state would be regarded as aggressive from the other concerned party and hence the concerned party might also increase its military power or other means to against it in an anarchic world system. This definition can be applied to the Sino-US strategic relationship in that they often fall into the security dilemma over some important strategic issues. The theory predicts that the two states that fall into the security dilemma which would finally lead to an arms race.

Basically, due to the unresolvable uncertainty of states’ intentions in an anarchic world system, one state which increases its own military might inadvertently lead to the increase of its counterpart’s insecurity. This is an extremely important feature of the security dilemma since the unintentional effect of reducing the security of others does not indicate that the state has the will to do so, thus although other states may regard the action as aggressive this is actually a misconception (Collins, 1996, p.183).

The definitions from the above scholars carried out an important point is that state tend to commit misperception when they misperceive the cause of others’ intention to carry out a particular policy since states do not realize the real cause of

others' foreign policies. Since decision-makers perceived the external environment and make the decision by themselves, they might suffer from misperception in making wrong judgement. I would argue that countries' decision-makers would commit misperception if they misperceived other countries' core values and intention in employing a particular policy.

Moreover, Jervis (1976, p.68) stated that contemporary spiral theorists argue that psychological pressures explain why arms and tension cycles proceed as if people were not thinking. "Once a person develops an image of the other---especially a hostile image on the other---ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image... ..People perceive what they expect to be present. If they think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity."

This particular kind of human behavior was also reflected in a country's decision-makers, for once a decision-maker from a nation established a particular kind of image over another nation, he or she might regard the reason for the employment of policies by the other nation as fitting the image he/she holds and hence other incongruent information might be considered as unimportant. This might be a kind of misperception that decision-makers might commit when faced with other nations that they perceived as hostile beforehand. In the case of Sino-US strategic relations, for example, once China adopted an image that the US decision-makers were hostile towards China on a particular issue, they might consider any information as identical to the hostile image and hence suffer from a misperception.

Last but not least, "decision-makers" of a specific country were replaced so that

the explanations are still at the individual level of analysis. Instead of saying that a country views its counterpart more hostile, I would say the decision-makers of a nation view its counterpart as more hostile in order to maintain the same level of analysis.

b) The Attribution Theory

Since 1950s psychologists have been interested in understanding how people perceive the causes of human behaviour, resulting in the generation of a body of knowledge known as attribution theory (Haney & Hey & Neack, 1995, p.57). The part that I would utilize from the attribution theory is called “Dispositional and Situational Attribution of Causality”.

In general, the effective interpretations of others’ behaviour and inferences of their intentions require that participants be aware of the causes of their own as well as other’s behaviour. This is a prerequisite for choosing among alternative interpretations of their behaviour and correctly inferring their intentions (Vertzberger, 1990, p.160). For instance, as coded by the author, a military alert by an adversary has one meaning to the observer if attributed with inherently aggressive intentions and a totally different one if attributed with a reaction to a real or imagined external threat. This can be actually called as “fundamental attribution error”, which is the tendency to attribute our own behavior in terms of external and situational causes (Haney & Hey & Neack, 1995, p.57).

In the view of perception and misperception, the formation of fundamental attribution error could be regarded as a kind of misperception. Since according to my definition, the inability to perceive the core beliefs and intentions of its

counterpart's nation could be regarded as misperception and so the wrong perception of the other's real intention in adopting a foreign policy could be regarded as a kind of misperception.

By the same token, social psychologists have found that when actors attribute their own behavior to situational environment, observers attribute the same behavior to the actor's disposition characteristics (Larson, 1985, p.37). So, the observer is inclined to infer that the actor's behavior is intentional and represents his personality.

In the case of Sino-US relations, it is important to find out whether they have attributed differently the real intention of the other's foreign policy. Since as the literature review said, it is easy for a state to regard the real cause of its counterpart's policy as being due to its aggressive nature but not due to an outside threat. That means due to the aggressive personality of the decision-makers themselves but not due to the situational environment. Hence, they might misperceive each other's foreign policy intention and hence misperception would occur.

Moreover, people's awareness of their own causes of behavior affects the way they think observers should interpret their behavior and, as a result, influences their expectations of how the observers should or might react to it and this in turn affects how they interpret the actual response (Vertzberger, 1990, p.160).

Furthermore, the occurrence of attribution bias is mediated by the level of ambiguity of ignorance about the true causes of an adversary's behavior or about the nature of situation to which the adversary responds and by the level of dislike for or empathy with other actors. Ambiguous information is likely to be interpreted as

consistent with prior hypotheses about an actor's motivations and hence used to support a dispositional attribution involving the other actor (Vertzberger, 1990, p. 162).

This is rather similar to what the security dilemma theory suggested in that once a country's decision-makers adopted a kind of image of another country, then they perceive the incoming information as supporting material to reinforce the image of that country.

As a result, decision-maker biases in detecting the correct causes of adversaries as well as their own behaviour lead to serious failures to understand and to properly adapt responses to actual requirements of the situation, and so hinder learning from feedback and acting based on misperceptions (Vertzberger, 1990, p.163). Hence, failing to realize the real cause of a foreign policy outcome from its counterpart would be considered as having misperception.

CHAPTER FOUR


MAIN THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THESIS

(a) The basic structure of information-processing flows

The following basic propositions are important for an understanding of the theoretical framework.

1. Perception of country A towards country B will be mainly affected by the belief system of country A's decision-makers at the very beginning.
2. Perception will be affected by stimuli through information processing.
3. When a stimulus occurred, the information processing system will be analyzed as follows, (a) Is it informative? (b) Is it relevant? (c) Is it important?
4. Meantime, the belief system will be responsible for the analysis in the information processing. The decision on whether the stimuli is informative, relevant and important will be based on and influenced by decision-makers' (a) domestic political situation, (b) past experience or base rate information (Vertzberger, 1990 p.147), (c) international history and via these filters, the decision-makers will interpret those stimuli's meanings and once again establish their own images. So stimuli can be defined as those that can penetrate the cognitive system of a given actor (Vertzberger, 1990, p.24) and influence the image of one country.
5. Perception of country A towards B will affect its foreign policies towards country B.
6. By the same token, changes in perception will result in changes in foreign policies.

(b) The main research model of my thesis



The explanation of the above flow is that stimulus from country A will affect the perception of country B towards A and so its attendant foreign policies. The resultant foreign policies from country B will become the stimulus that in turn affects the perception of country A. Owing to the time and data constraints, this research is not going to use model and theory to assess the belief system of related decision-makers in detail, but since the belief system is crucial to my theoretical framework, I would draw an in-depth and detailed research on their speeches and statements in order to assess in general terms their belief system and hence how they perceived a particular issue.

Stimulus is defined as an occurrence, act, or message that penetrates the cognitive system of a given actor and the decision-makers must allocate attention and give meaning to the information in question so that it makes sense. Moreover, stimulus in my thesis will not be constrained by its size, uncertain responses and actions from the counterpart could also be a stimulus in my thesis.

“Foreign policies are the strategies used by governments to guide their actions in the international arena. They spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation as well as the general means by which they intend to pursue those objectives” (Goldstein, 1999, p.148).

Decision-making is a steering process in which adjustments are made as a result of feedback from the outside world (Goldstein, 1999, p.149).

(c) Basic assumptions in my research

1. It is an anarchic world system, where no world government exists and every state needs to depend on self-help. (Basic assumption of the realist paradigm)
2. All decision-makers are rational. They seek to maximize their states interests and glory.
3. There is an overall tendency for decision-makers to view other states as more hostile than they are, as it is possible to be deceived by others.
4. In both presidential and authoritarian governments, power is in the hands of several decision-makers through election and by appointment. In United States, the president is elected through the election by states. He will then be the head of the executive branch and has the right to appoint all the department heads. The president and his senior officials would be the most influential persons in the US decision-making processes. On the other hand, the authoritarian government in China has also resulted in the centralization of power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). There is still no popular election to elect the government and the decision-making power is in the hands of several chairmen and senior officials in the CCP. Hence it is important for my thesis to analyze the small group elite in

decision-making process. As discussed in Chapter Two, Irving Janis has illustrated that “groupthink” is a kind of psychological phenomenon in which people within a group will tend to have an identical decision on a specified issue. Since it is rather difficult to measure and observe the perception of only the President or leader in a particular nation and also there might be not sufficient publicly-available material to realize the attitude of particular nation’s decision-makers on a issue, I would utilize the concept of “groupthink” in order to illustrate the belief system of decision-makers in a particular nation in a specified time period.

5. Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images.
6. It is rather difficult to change the core belief and value system of the decision-makers since the change necessarily requires change in some or other belonging beliefs in the subset. So people tend to fit incoming information into their pre-established perception of one country. They may ignore the dissonant information or just adapt the part of information that is congruent to their existing perception.

CHAPTER FIVE

SINO-US RELATIONS FROM 1945 TO THE EARLY 1990s

In order to set the background for my case studies, it is necessary to examine concisely the key characteristics of Sino-US relations during the Cold War.

The period from 1945 to 1990 could be called as post-World War II period or the Cold War period. The central characteristic of the Cold War system was bipolarity, which was dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to balance against each other, the Western European countries formed into two blocs which was called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Eastern block countries formed the Warsaw Pact. During the cold war period, there was no “hot war” between the two blocks in the European areas, but two wars did break out in Asia, which were the Korea War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1954-75). Some scholars explained this prevailing peace as the result of balance of power from the two sides and some attributed it to the nuclear deterrence that prevented either one of the nations from taking a first strike.

It is difficult to describe Sino-US relations during the Cold War without involving the role of Soviet Union. It was due to the fact that China, which was regarded as the weakest power amongst the three nations, had different strategic values in different periods during the Cold War, so it could be considered as one of the powers with significant influence during the Cold War period. The strategic value of China in the Cold War period enabled it to perform a role beyond its actual

strength so as to influence the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.

I will divide the Cold War period into two phases, which were from 1945 to 1970 and from 1970 to the end of the Cold War. The reason is because during the first phase, China and the Soviet Union were in a positive relationship and both sides would like to use each other to balance against the threat from the United States. The Soviet Union was the first state to officially recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949 and declared the establishment of the diplomatic relations with the PRC on the next day after its formation (Medvedev, 1986, p.21).

On the other hand, the Sino-American relations in the above period were basically in a stage of hostility with each other until China ended its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. At that time, the United States considered China as one of the puppet states of the communist Moscow and was not willing to establish diplomatic relations with China. So at the end of 1949, the United States recalled all its diplomats from China and banned the sale of strategic goods to China (Medvedev, 1986, p.81). Furthermore, through the whole period from 1949 to 1970, the United States adopted a suspicious attitude towards the recognition of the new China.

Increasing differences of interest between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, however, led to frontier disputes in March 1969 which resulted in armed clashes in the Jamboo Island between China and the Soviet Union (Keesings' research report). This fighting resulted in the collapse of the relations between the Soviet Union and China and this led to a sudden change of the foreign relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. So we could say that

“more than any other factor, the Sino-Soviet split was the force which drove the United States and China towards a new relationship” (Schaller, 1990, p.171).

The second phase started from 1970 and ended in 1990. This period was the second phase in my definition since the two superpowers and China's relations had an enormous change. Some scholars might even argue that the 1971 to 1989 period saw a tripolar situation emerge between the Soviet Union, the United States and China. (Bridges, 1999) But instead of arguing it as a tripolarity, I will consider this period as the rising and the sharpening of the existence of the “strategic triangle” between China, the United States and the Soviet Union starting from the 1970's.

Strategic triangle can be defined as “an international game-it is fictive insofar as its “strategic” aspect is concerned because it is limited to the shuffling of different prewar contingencies without actually engaging in full-scale warfare” (Dittmer, 1987, p.30).

“The impetus within the triangle was the Chinese attack on the Soviet border outposts in early 1969 and the Soviet diplomatic and military reaction that followed, that led to the transformation of the triangle from within by the middle of 1970s” (Robinson, 1987, p.16). Moreover, its attributes also included “Dynamism within the triangle is supplied by the wide swings in Chinese policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union. Because China has always been the weakest of the three, it has been able to find security only by swinging from one extreme to the other, from Washington to Moscow and then against Washington” (Robinson, 1987, p.8).

We could know that the break up in relations between the Soviet Union and

China in the late 1960's resulted in the rise of the so-called "strategic triangle" in the early 1970's. China was not a strong economic and military power when compared with the United States and the Soviet Union. But its swings in policies gave it enormous benefit in maintaining its status amongst the three nations.

Also, we could argue that in the middle of the 1960's China developed its nuclear devices. In October 1964, China had exploded its first nuclear device (and by 1967, it had developed a hydrogen bomb) and in 1970 it sent into orbit its first earth satellite (Schaller, 1990, p.170). So the United States would like to align with China against the imposing threat from the Soviet Union. Also, faced with the increasing threat imposed by the Soviet Union after the break up in their alignment, China would like to ally with the United States so as to reduce the immediate threat from the Soviet Union.

American's ping-pong foreign policy initiated by President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s boosted the contacts between the Americans and the Chinese. "Richard Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 ended twenty years of confrontation and isolation between the United States and China" (Harding, 1992, p.23). There were an increasing number of student and cultural exchanges between the two and these significantly facilitated the resumption of their relationship. Moreover, utilizing the secret mission by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to Beijing, the United States resumed its official relations with China in 1979. On February 1972, Chinese and American leaders issued the "Shanghai Communiqué" which was the first official treaty signed by them after the formation of the new China. This was also one of the important treaties between the United States and China. According to the treaty, both sides would conduct their relations on the principle of respect for

sovereignty and territorial integrity (Schaller, 1990, p.187).

During the time of restoring the normal relationship between the United States and China, China itself was suffering from its Cultural Revolution (1966-76), so the first several years were not conducive to further improving their relations since China had its domestic problems.

On December 15, 1978, US President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States and the PRC have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979 (Schaller, 1990, p.207). This showed that their relations were moving in a positive direction. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping, leader of the PRC, also vowed to visit the United States. The opening up of the Chinese economy under Deng's reforms brought closer economic links but on some delicate issues, such as the Taiwan issue tensions remained. The United States still insisted on protecting Taiwan and supplying it with sufficient defensive weapons and protecting Taiwan in case the PRC used force. Nonetheless, the joint communiqué which was signed by the United States and China on 1 January 1979 showed that they could have mutual agreements on certain points.

During the 1980 presidential election in the United States, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan bitterly criticized the way President Carter had dealt with China and he even suggested declaring a "two China policy" if he became president (Schaller, 1990, p.215). He did not believe that the consolidation of Sino-American ties warranted the sacrifice of the US relationship with Taiwan. "Reagan while calling for the peaceful elaboration of Sino-American relations, also declared that Republicans deplore the Carter Administration's treatment of Taiwan, our longtime

ally and friend” (Harding, 1992, p.109). The policies carried out by President Reagan seemed to coincide with his declaration during the election. Even though a joint communiqué was signed on the 17 August 1982 which settled part of the altercation between the United States and China on the Taiwan issue, Reagan was keen on selling arms to Taiwan despite with the opposition from the China and this policy restrained China and the United States from improving their relations. As one scholar said, “Insistence on military sales to Taiwan, to interfere in China’s affairs, is irreconcilable with the desire to develop Sino-US relations” (Kitts, 1991, p.235). In brief, there were instabilities between the United States and China during the presidency of Reagan, in particular over the Taiwan issue.

In November 1988 George Bush, a Republican was elected President of the United States. At the very beginning, it seemed that Sino-US relations could improve since President Bush had previously acted as the head of the US liaison office in Beijing. President Bush was considered as an “old friend” by the Chinese leaders. However, the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre alarmed the US government as it clearly showed that the Chinese government was totally against the demand for reforms and democracy by the Chinese citizens. After the massacre, sanctions were imposed on China by the United States and at that time, China’s human rights become one of the issues that the United States was most concerned with and this also gave rise to some grievances from China.

In the 1992 US presidential election Bill Clinton, the Democratic Party candidate, was elected as the President of the United States. During his election campaign, Clinton seemed to have a hostile perception of China, but what was to be the reality after he came into office? The following two cases may help to answer this question.

CHAPTER SIX

THE CASE OF MISSILE DEFENSE

(a) What is missile defense (MD)?

“Tonight, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for close consultation with our allies, I am taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles...Our purpose – one all people share – is to search for way to reduce the danger of nuclear war” (US Defense Department, March 9, 2001). Furthermore, this statement obviously showed that the US president believed that it was necessary to develop a full-protection missile system for the United States.

The US military often uses the generic term Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) to describe these defensive systems. The abbreviation of Missile Defense, MD, would be used in my thesis. The term MD would include National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). Basically the two terms are composed of various elements and concepts, but I do not intend to explain their full technical meanings and definitions in my thesis and instead I would confine myself to a general definition. To summarize briefly the NMD would refer to the missile defense system which is deployed to protect the 50 states within the United States. That means the NMD system aims at protecting US national security against the long-range missiles from “rogue” nations. Hence, TMD is an affiliation of the NMD. It is used to protect US allies and its overseas military stations against shorter and medium-range missiles in order to have a full protection of US armies

outside the sovereignty of the United States. For instance, the United States has been developing the TMD system together with Japan and the system might protect Japan in the future. Moreover, the United States has also stated that it did not rule out the possibility of deploying the technology to Taiwan, which stir up the grievances from China.

While military specialists do distinguish between TMD and NMD, many politicians – including US leaders – and observers often do not clearly distinguish them when speaking and writing. In my research, except for those sources which clearly identify the type of the missile system, I would use the general term MD to simplify the whole concept.

(b) History of the US planning for MD before August 1998

If we look back the history of the development of the Missile Defense, we should realize that it is not a new concept. The concept of Missile Defense first appeared in the World War II when the British had tried to devise a defense against Hitler's V-2 rockets (US Dept of Defense, March 11, 2001). Hence, we could know that it is not a new concept initiated by the US government against the rogue nations at the present.

In the 1960s, the United States devised a system to protect population centers from the ballistic missiles, but the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented either party from working on a continent-wide missile defense programme. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and a ballistic missile shield for the

United States (US Dept of Defense, March 11, 2001).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the SDI changed into the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization for continuing the research on the possibility of deploying a missile defense. However, the missile defense system has been changed from Reagan's impenetrable shield to today's more realistic defense against missiles (US Department of Defense, March 11, 2001).

Clearly missile defense is not a new concept that first appeared at the end of 20th century. However, what role did the August 1998 missile launch from North Korea play in accelerating the development of the missile defense shield? Before analyzing that question, however, it is necessary to try to outline the core belief of the decision-makers on both sides.

(c) Core beliefs of the US and Chinese decision-makers on the missile defense issue

(1) US decision-makers' core beliefs towards China on the missile defense issue

1. The predominance of power in the world. "The motivation is not simply the desire to be top dog, but a more complex belief that a unipolar distribution of power in America's favour is a force for stability in the world." (Smith & Khoo, 2001, p.1) and also "Underlying the strategy is a fear of what might happen in a world no longer shaped by predominant US power" (Layne, 1998, p.10). This belief applies when the United States looks at Asia just as much as in other parts of the world, for faced with the rising power of China, the United States needs to maintain its predominance in world politics. "The United States for at least one

hundred years has pursued a consistent goal in Asia, which is to prevent any single country from dominating Asia” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p.5). This is the basic argument of Realism where a state’s top priority is to preserve its national interest and security. Even though the missile defense technologies are mainly for defensive purposes, they can also be one part of the system to maintain the predominance of US military power.

2. The necessity of the development of the missile defense shield. Basically the idea of missile defense was started during the presidency of Ronald Reagan with his idea of “Star War” in the 1980s. Then 1991 Persian Gulf War highlighted the threat of short-range missiles. The 1996 China missile tests in the Taiwan straits also showed that China has the ability to send missiles to threaten other areas in order to counter interference. Furthermore, the growing number of missiles held by anti-US regimes such as North Korea and Iraq also reinforced the belief of US decision-makers that it is necessary to develop such defensive technologies.
3. The maintenance of the balance of power between China and Taiwan by selling military weapons to Taiwan. The United States on every occasion ensures that it would adhere to the three joint communiqués signed with China in 1972, 1979 and 1982. However, in 1979, the US Congress also passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), pledging that Taiwan’s future should only be decided by peaceful means and the US government has the responsibility to provide sufficient weapons for defending Taiwan. Also, the United States declared that it had not ruled out the possibility of deploying the missile defense technologies to Taiwan. This obviously showed that the United States wanted to maintain the

military balance between China and Taiwan.

(2) Chinese decision-makers' core beliefs towards the United States on the missile defense system

1. Chinese decision-makers consider that the United States wants to dominate the whole world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chinese decision-makers' core belief is that US wants to be the sole superpower since the collapse of the Soviet Union and so want to extend its power in Asia Pacific as well. This can also reflect fact that the Chinese decision-makers are strongly opposed to "hegemonism". Chinese decision-makers regard the development of missile defense as one kind of means for the United States to achieve its dominance over the world.
2. Chinese decision-makers do not share the belief of the US side that the missile defense program is purely defensive in nature, since the development of such technologies could undermine the military capability of other nations. They see the real intention of President Bush in developing the missile defense system was aimed at China and Russia (徐博東, 2001, p.65). The inclusion of Taiwan into the TMD would seriously reduce China's military power towards Taiwan since the systems are supposed to be able to intercept the missiles in the air if successfully deployed. Chinese decision-makers are afraid that this would undermine the pace of unification with Taiwan if the United States develops such technologies for Taiwan. In the same sense, the development of the national missile defense, which aims at protecting the areas within the United States, could also undermine the military effect of Chinese's missiles even though the United States' decision-makers vowed their system does not target at

China and Russia.

3. Chinese decision-makers regard the possibility of the United States providing the TMD system to Taiwan as having the same intention as US arms sales to Taiwan. US has a long traditional record of selling advanced technologies to Taiwan (敦震遠, 2000, p.7). According to US decision-makers, TMD will restore and maintain the military balance in the Taiwan straits, but from the perspective of Chinese decision-makers, either one of the above policies could neutralize the military capabilities of China and hinder reunification and hence China would be strongly against it. Moreover, we could realize besides opposing the national missile defense issue, Chinese decision-makers were against the theatre missile defense issue since it closely linked to Taiwan issue in the mind of Chinese decision-makers. The deployment of the missile defense technologies would boost the resolve of those people supporting Taiwan independence to speed up the independence processes (閻學通, 2000, p.87).

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DYNAMICS OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUE DURING THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY

(a) Introduction

William S. Cohen, the former US Secretary of Defense, said “we are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat is growing, and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home. On 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a Taepo Dong 1 Missile... ..The Taepo Dong 1 test was another indicator that the United States in fact will face a nation missile threat to our homeland against which we will have to protect the American people” (US Dept of State, January 2000). Moreover, on another occasion, he said, “The primary mission of NMD (national missile defense) system being developed is the defense of the US – all 50 states – against a limited strategic ballistic missile attack such as could be posed by a rogue nation” (US Dept of State, January 2000).

The experience of the Gulf War (when missiles had been used against US and Israeli forces) and the Chinese missile tests near Taiwan in 1995-96 contributed to continued interest in a missile defense program during President Clinton’s time in office, but the circular flow within the missile defense issue started from the sudden missile launch test by North Korea in August 1998 which was the prime reason for the United States to accelerate its own missile defense, since this test was beyond the expectation of the United States’ decision-makers.

This unexpected stimulus obviously penetrated the United States decision-

makers' belief system so as to affect the US perception of North Korea – and other potential missile – developing states - and its attendant foreign policies. Besides affecting the US perception towards North Korea, that launch also affected Japan's perception towards that issue.

(b) Analysis of policies on the missile defense issue during Clinton's presidency *(Please refer to Appendix One for detailed sources)*

In **late August 1998**, the abrupt missile launched from North Korea was a stimulus that affected the belief system of the US and Japan decision-makers and this issue was so dramatic that it arrested the attention of the US and Japan decision-makers. This was a credible threat to Japan and the United States and hence they changed their perception of the situation in North Korea and accelerated the development of the missile defense issue in response to the threat from North Korea and potentially from other states as well.

On **20 September 1998**, senior officials from Japan and the United States gathered to discuss cooperation against the missile threat from North Korea. Firstly, they agreed on joint development of the ballistic missile defense system (basically other countries called it TMD). Secondly, the United States reiterated the importance of the US-Japan alliance as “the cornerstone of our strategic policy in Asia” and claimed that “the security relationship between the United States and Japan has never been stronger” (US Dept of State, September 21, 1998). This was certainly a response towards the abrupt missile from North Korea.

In response to this, China on **6 October 1998** condemned the tentative plans for

Japan and the United States to develop the TMD. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao clearly identified that China opposed the TMD and hoped that the United States government would not make it a law that might harm the relationship with China (Agence France Presse, October 6, 1998).

The joint meeting between the US and Japanese government officials in September 1998 reflected the changed perception of both governments since the abrupt missile launch by North Korea. This was of course a credible threat to the national security of the United States and Japan and hence they accelerated the development of the TMD issue. This was a means of increasing their national security since the TMD aimed at intercepting any missiles launched by rogue nations.

From the perspective of the United States and Japan, it was purely defensive type of technology, but as said, “most of the ways in which a country seeks to increase its security have the unintended effect of decreasing the security of other countries” (Jervis, 1978, p.169). It is logical to think in that way in an anarchic world system without a world government in existence. The decision-makers in the United States claimed that the missile defenses were purely defensive in nature and would not undermine the military capabilities of other nations, such as Russia and China.

From the perspective of the United States and Japan’s decision-makers, the intention to accelerate the development of the TMD was due to the outside threat of North Korea but not due to their disposition characteristics which wanted to dominate the world with high military technology.

However, China's decision-makers slammed the US-Japan joint development of the TMD program mainly because China decision-makers thought that the TMD system would be used to defend Taiwan and this would automatically undermine the military power of the Chinese side. It is not surprising to find that Chinese decision-makers thought that the missile defense was not purely defensive in nature, rather it was offensive.

In addition, the Chinese government would attribute the intention of the United States' decision-makers to develop the TMD to its dispositional characteristic but not to the outside threat from the North Korea. Chinese leadership argued that it was not necessary for a military superpower to boost its controversial TMD for deterring a poor and third world nation. Even though China might agree that there was a threat, it would not consider this as the prime reason for the United States to develop the TMD since Chinese decision-makers had established a hostile image of the United States over the missile defense issue.

On the **15 October 1998**, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, Kurt Campbell, said the United States would undertake "very close consultations with Taiwan on all aspects of its defense needs, including the TMD and will work closely with Taiwan counterparts" (Central News Agency, October 16, 1998).

Events happened and this reinforced the belief system of the Chinese leadership on the missile defense issue. US officials said that they would have very close consultations with Taiwan on the TMD in October. This again reinforced the belief system of the Chinese leadership that the missile defense was aimed at protecting

Taiwan against the military threat from China.

Faced with the opposition from China decision-makers at this preliminary stage, however, even that might arrest the attention of those US decision-makers but the protests from the Chinese decision-makers cannot change the perception of the United States' decision-makers towards this issue.

On **27 October 1998**, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Chen Jian again expressed opposition to the TMD system and said “under the current situation, Taiwan will not declare its independence without the support of foreign forces, especially from the US and Japan. So the attitude of the US and Japan toward Taiwan will play an important role in the final solution of the Taiwan question.” Hence, the Taiwan issue was linked up by the Chinese decision-makers with the TMD. From this sentence, we could realize that Chinese decision-makers were concerned about whether the TMD technology would include Taiwan and the Chinese leadership became seriously opposed to such initiation (Japan Economic Newswire, October 27, 1998).

On the **11 November 1998**, Taiwan 's Chief of the General Staff, Gen Tang Fei said the United States will explain to the Republic of China (ROC) at the earliest possible time plans for a possible TMD system. He added, “ the ROC Defense Ministry and military authorities are also continuing to study the prospect of participating the TMD project.” It showed that Taiwan was interested in joining the TMD program (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 13, 1998).

On **15 December 1998**, Sha Zukeng, director general of the Department of

Arms Control and Disarmament at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said “TMD will far exceed Japan’s legitimate defensive needs, and noting offensive and defensive capabilities are convertible in the TMD” (Japan Economic Newswire, December 16, 1998). Chinese decision-makers again showed their oppositions to the US and Japan’s cooperation on the TMD issue and Chinese decision-makers thought that TMD system was not only purely defensive in nature and would produce a threat to other nations. This was partially match with the security dilemma theory in which US’s defensive weapon would be perceived by the Chinese decision-makers as offensive in an anarchic world system.

So far, Chinese decision-makers had expressed serious concerns over the TMD issue, concerned that the TMD issue might involve Taiwan, and also that the TMD system was not purely defensive in nature and would enhance the offensive power of the United States, Japan and possibly Taiwan. From the oppositions of Chinese decision-makers, we could realize that the missile defense issue was becoming more and more important in the mind of Chinese decision-makers in response to the progressive policies from the United States’ decision-makers. Despite being faced with this opposition from Chinese decision-makers, US Defense Secretary Cohen vowed to hasten the missile defense program during an interview on **10 January 1999**.

He said, “We have, in fact, added substantial sums of money to our theatre missile programs and we’ re looking at a two or three year acceleration from what we had originally anticipated” (The Daily Yomiuri, January 12, 1999). It was the first time a high-ranking US official has stated that the US administration intended to develop the plan faster. Also, we could realize that in response to the initial protests

from the Chinese leadership, the United States had not change in their belief systems as well as their perception in its policies on the missile defense issue but rather accelerated its development.

The United States leadership on **12 January 1999** vowed to hasten the development of missile defense issue and added substantial sums of money to develop the TMD system and later that month, US leadership stated that it would add several billions of dollars to develop the NMD and will have a certain kind of modifications to the NMD.

China, on many occasions, tried to express its grievances towards the United States on the missile defense development issue, but the United States continued to discuss the TMD issue with Taiwan and reiterated that the United States would continue its development of both TMD and NMD.

This certainly reinforced the negative belief system of the Chinese leadership towards the United States. Jervis said, “once a person develops an image of the other --- especially a hostile image on the other --- ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image People perceive that they expect to be present. If they think that a state is hostile, behavior that others might see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity” (Jervis, 1976, p.68). The increase in military budget by the US leadership would certainly reinforce the hostile image of the United States from the mind of the Chinese decision-makers.

On the **20 January 1999**, Cohen announced plans to add \$6.6 billion to the

defense budget over five years to support the NMD program against rogue nations. Moreover, referring to the ABM treaty, he stated that the actual deployment “may require modifications to the treaty” and Clinton administration was currently examining “the nature and scope of these modifications.” He said, “ we see no reason why it cannot be amended again and it should be modified to allow for a deployment of an NMD system” (US Dept of State, January 20, 1999).

In order to facilitate the development of the missile defense system, therefore, the United State had suggested some modifications of the ABM treaty and added a budget for the development of NMD. These actions by the United States were becoming more aggressive and proactive in the face of China’s decision-makers’ oppositions. The United State decision-makers started to push forward plans to develop the NMD system and undertake the modifications to the ABM treaty. All these were expected to face more fierce opposition from China and those policies would also added weight in the hostile image of the United States decision-makers in the mind of Chinese decision-makers.

On **21 January 1999**, in response to the Cohen ‘s speech, Chinese spokesman Sun Yuxi reiterated that the MD ran “counter to the times and will not contribute to international arms control and disarmament efforts.” Moreover, regarding the TMD itself, he said, “ China believes that to develop, deploy and transfer anti-missile systems with strategic defense potential will not enhance security or stop the proliferation of missiles but will only undermine security” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1999).

On **11 February 1999**, Foreign minister spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue told a

weekly news briefing that, “we hope the US administration can... . . . refrain from the sales of TMD and other related technology to Taiwan so as to avoid the damage to bilateral relations.” Besides, China was concerned about whether Taiwan would be included into the TMD, for she said “the defense authorities in Taiwan have been studying the feasibility of joining the TMD scheme, a US-backed regional defense system” (Agence France Presse, February 11, 1999). The discussions between the United States and Taiwan over the missile defense issue would add weight in reinforcing the hostile image of the United States’ decision-makers.

On the **1 March 1999** during the visit of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to China, US state Department spokesman James Rubin said, “ The US decided to begin TMD research because of the potential threat of ballistic missiles, such as that posed by North Korea.” Moreover, he said, “ if China wants to avoid the situation where concern in the region over ballistic missiles grows, it should work with the US to prevent North Korea from advancing its missile program” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 1, 1999). Moreover, US Secretary of State Albright sent the same message to China, “we are concerned generally about the threat of missile proliferation, primarily from North Korea, and I think this is an issue that we have to work on together” (APP New Speed, March 2, 1999).

This meeting did not produce any concrete compromise on the missile defense issue, but rather Albright asked China to cooperate with the United States on the missile defense issue and not to transfer missiles to North Korea if it did not want Taiwan joining the TMD program. US decision-makers, facing the protests from Chinese decision-makers, did not change their perception on the missile defense issue but rather deployed a more proactive policy towards China.

China Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao rejected US ideas and said, “the current situation on the Korean Peninsula on the whole is stable” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 2, 1999).

The US-China meetings were not productive in solving the obstacles and problems between them on the missile defense issue.

China continued to express its grievances towards the United States on the missile defense issue. On the **7 March 1999**, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said, “the joint research and development of TMD by the US and Japan would enhance the overall offensive and defensive ability of the US-Japanese military alliance and far exceed legitimate defense needs” (The Straits Times, March 8, 1999).

On **8 March 1999**, US State Department spokesman Rubin responded to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang’s sharp criticism by saying. He said, “instead of worrying about a decision that has not been made to deploy defensive technologies that do not yet exist, the Chinese should focus on the regional and global proliferation of missiles.” Moreover, he said “the best way to avoid the problem they are concerned about is for them to work with us to stop the North Korea program from expanding and growing” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1999).

The United States decision-makers still emphasized the way that China required to act appropriately in order to prevent Taiwan from getting the TMD technologies. The protests from China to a large extent could not change the perception of the United States decision-makers on the missile defense issue at this stage and this could be attributed to the fact that Chinese could not produce a credible threat apart

from the continual opposition of the missile defense issue.

On the same day, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui said, “if China doesn’t treat us as an enemy, if it abandons its hegemonist attitude and renounces the deployment of missiles on its coast, then there is basically no need to deploy TMD” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1999).

In response to the assertive policies declared by the United States on the missile defense issue, the increase in military communications between the US and Taiwanese decision-makers and the Taiwan leaderships’ expressed interest in joining the TMD, China held talks with Russia in order to discuss their concerns over the missile defense system. They did not commit to any joint action on missile defense at this stage but Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu on **11 March 1999** did say, “China and many other countries, including Russia, are seriously concerned over the issue” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1999).

Subsequently, China had frequent discussion with Russia after the United States vowed to develop the TMD system. In March 1999, the China leadership explicitly talked over the issue with Russia. This was clearly a more proactive policy employed by the Chinese decision-makers towards the assertive policies employed by the US decision-makers. The US policies on the missile defense issue could be regarded as stimuli that contributed to the closer cooperation between the China and the Russia against the missile defense issue.

The cooperation between China and Russia could be a signal to counter the missile defense and increase their national security due to the aggressive nature of

the United States since both nations thought that the US actions were aggressive and would harm their national security. This was also match with the security dilemma theory in which states tend to enhance its national security due to the outside threat in an anarchic world system.

On **15 March 1999**, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji met the press and said, “We oppose the TMD and we firmly and particularly opposed to including Taiwan into the TMD” (People’s Daily, March 16, 1999).

On **18 March 1999**, China reacted negatively to approval on 17 March 1999 by the US Senate of a bill calling for the development of a national missile defense (NMD) system to shield the United States from long-range missile attack. In response to this, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said, “the NMD runs counter to the trend of seeking peace in the post Cold War period.” Moreover, “it is detrimental to international arms control and disarmament and will have an adverse effect on the global strategic balance for the 21st century” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 18, 1999). Chinese decision-makers continued to reinforce their stances on the missile defense issue.

It seemed that after Cohen raised an increase of 6.6 billion to do research on NMD, the US Congress finally passed a bill to approve the development of the NMD. This was again a stimulus that affected the perception of China because this could reduce the nuclear power of China. Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun on **23 March 1999** said “ In addition to possessing the world’s largest arsenals of the most advanced nuclear and conventional weapons, the United States is now devoted to developing the NMD and TMD and China is seriously concerned about this issue”

(BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 23, 1999). The opposition from China on the missile defense issue was still relatively weak and this did not create a credible threat to the US decision-makers on this issue so far.

On the **9 April 1999**, Taiwan premier Vincent Siew reiterated that Taiwan might be included in the TMD due to the mainland's military buildup, which posed a threat to the security of Taiwan.

On **16 April 1999**, China and Russia expressed concern over the TMD program in a joint communiqué at their subcabinet-level talks held in Moscow. They condemned the United States for the development of the TMD which would escalate tensions in their regions, criticized the joint TMD research between Japan and the United States and reiterated that the 1972 ABM treaty was essential in maintaining world peace (Jiji Press Ticker Service, April 17, 1999).

On **29 April 1999**, the United States revealed a report entitled "TMD Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region." Apart from covering Washington's plans to deploy the TMD system in South Korea and Taiwan, the report also revealed the danger of ballistic attacks from the Mainland China. China was seriously opposed to such report and its actions began escalating after the aggressive policies from the United States (Japan Economic Newswire, April 30, 1999).

On **6 May 1999** China Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu said, "Taiwan is purely an internal affair of China and no foreign country has the right to interfere and stop selling advanced weapons to Taiwan" (Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1999).

From the above evidence it was clear that, the United States was eager to develop the missile defense even though China was seriously opposed to it. Russia at this stage shared similar views with China in opposing the TMD and NMD system. However, at this stage, they were just opposed to it but could not produce a credible threat that could be a stimulus that affected the perception of the US decision-makers on this issue.

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on **8 May 1999** significantly damaged Sino-US relations and they resumed normality only after fourteen months. Even though there had been no direct official relations between the United States and Chinese military officials in this period. Chinese official through various occasions expressed their grievances towards the development of the missile defense. On the other hand, the US side conducted two missile tests within that period which stirred up the grievances from the Chinese decision-makers.

On **10 June 1999**, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian of China's Central Military Committee expressed their opposition to US plans for the development of the two missile defense systems. Zhang said "any country's supply of TMD systems to China's Taiwan province or attempt to include Taiwan in its TMD plans in any form, or directly or indirectly put China's Taiwan into the sphere of Japan-US security cooperation, will be considered moves that seriously infringe on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and grave interference into China's internal affairs, and will be confronted with strong opposition from all the Chinese people" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 12, 1999).

From the evidence, the cooperation between Russia and China on the opposition of the missile defense system was increasing in the face of the forward plans by the United States and the meeting between senior Russian and Chinese officials clearly showed that both nations were concerned about the aggressive development of missile defense by the United States.

Over the following several months, there were no useful official speeches from Chinese decision-makers except repetitions of their continued protests against the missile defense. But then the United States conducted its first missile test on **3 October 1999** and this resulted in renewed opposition from the Chinese side. On **25 November 1999**, Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun stated that China's stand on the TMD and NMD would not change. Also, he pointed out that China could never tolerate any country incorporating Taiwan into the TMD system (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 27, 1999).

On **11 January 2000**, it was reported that the US President Clinton would ask Congress in his 2001 budget for an increase of 2.2 billion US dollars in spending to develop the NMD (Xinhua News Agency, January 11, 2000). This resulted in great protests from the Chinese government and on **13 January 2000**, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu said, "Such move goes against the tide of our times and is detrimental to the global efforts of arms control and disarmament and it should be note that US's move has violated the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM)" (Xinhua News Agency, January 13, 2000).

On **18 January 2000**, the United States conducted the second missile test. From this, we could also realize that the opposition from the Chinese side did not

create an impact on the decision-making process of the United States. However, Chinese Foreign Ministry Zhu said, “We urge the relevant country to approach the will of the international community in real earnest, think before it takes action and abandon the above mentioned plans” (Agence France Presse, January 20, 2000).

On **11 May 2000**, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhang echoed comments made earlier by Ministry’s Director General for Arms Control Sha and warned that China could take measures to increase its small arsenal of nuclear weapons – estimated at 20 to 30 warheads – if the United States went through with its national missile defense plan. However, she added said, “We will still wait and see what kind of equipment and technologies the US side will develop with regard to TMD/NMD and then we will make our decision on the basis of analysis of this information” (Japan Economic Newswire, May 11, 2000). We could probably see that Chinese decision-makers reinforced their stance towards the missile defense and expressed the view that they might expand their nuclear weapons in case the United States developed and deployed the missile defense.

On **17 May 2000**, US Defense Secretary Cohen reiterated that the NMD system would not be directed against China and Russia. He said, “I would say to China, and to Russia, that this is not directed against them” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 17, 2000).

Even though President Clinton visited Moscow on **3 June 2000** in order to convince President Vladimir Putin that the missile defense project was not aimed at Russia, he was not successful and President Putin described the NMD as “a cure worse than the disease” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 5, 2000). Moreover, on **10**

June 2000 President Putin even threatened that Russia would break off the disarmament process if the United States continued to pursue plans for a new NMD system (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 11, 2000).

From the above evidence, we could realize that the policies deployed by the United States and Chinese decision-makers on the missile defense issue were still the same. Chinese decision-makers were still opposed to the missile defense issue, including the TMD and NMD issue and the United States decision-makers had been conducted its missile defense tests during that period. So after the accidental bombing of Chinese Embassy, both the United States and Chinese decision-makers still adhered to its position. After fourteen months, both sides resumed the interactions and discussions on the missile defense.

On **8 July 2000**, near to the timing of the resumption of military relations between the United States and China, senior US official John Holum, undersecretary of state for arms control, said, “we don’t rule out the possibility that some time in the future Taiwan may have TMD capabilities” (The Washington Post, July 9, 2000). Moreover, on the same day, the United States conducted a third missile test but that failed (CNN, July 8, 2000).

These two issues confirmed that the United States did not consider the protests from China were credible threat that could affect the perception of the US decision-makers and so its attendant foreign policies. Also, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy did not lead to the changes in policies on the missile defense issue from the United States decision-makers. However, the following evidence shows that the joining forces from Russia and China could produce a credible threat that

affected the perception of the US decision-makers.

On **17 July 2000**, the first visit by Russian President Putin to China was aimed at building up personal ties with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders. During their summit talks they discussed the NMD and TMD issues and on **18 July 2000**, Chinese President Jiang and visiting Russian President Putin extended their strategic partnership by signing joint statements opposing the proposed U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system and supporting each other's policies on Taiwan and Chechny. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 July 2000).

China and Russia “firmly opposed” the NMD program and urged Washington to adhere to the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was “vital” to international agreements on arms control and reduction. Through NMD the United States sought “unilateral military and security advantages” that threatened “grave consequences” for the national security of Russia, China, and other countries, the statement said (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 July 2000).

Putin said, “If the United States breaks this balance, Russia and China will act to maintain the balance. We will surely make some kind of response.” Putin said. (Japan Economic Newswire, July 18, 2000) Moreover, he said, “I think neither Russia nor China will just stand aside, and we will try to maintain this balance.” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000)

On the **27 July 2000**, Foreign Ministers from 22 countries joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting in Bangkok. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang expressed his concerns over the missile

defense issue and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said, “ further strategic offensive arms reduction would become impossible and the entire system of arms reduction and limitation agreements would be revised and would inevitably lead to an new arms races” (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

The Sino-Russian summit and the ARF statements issues explicitly showed the efforts of China and Russia against the assertiveness of the United States in developing the missile defense. The alarm from Russia that the US actions would definitely lead to a new arms race could be a real threat and credible stimulus that penetrated the belief system of US decision-makers. This is because Russia’s stockpile of nuclear weapons could be compared with that of the United States and so the extension of a Russia-China strategic alliance could be a real threat to US national security. The joint effort of China and Russia produced a credible threat that changed the perception of the leadership in United States and so its policy and their joint effort was mainly due to the stimuli that the United States would like to take assertive policies on the missile defense so far.

On **27 July, 2000**, Chinese and Russian senior officials condemned the missile defense system at the ASEAN Regional Forum. Russia said, “further strategic offensive arms reduction would become impossible and the entire system of arms reduction and limitation agreements would be revised and would inevitably lead to an new arms race” (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

The opposition from Russia and China could be regarded as a counter-measure against the missile defense in a anarchic world system in which all nations need to depend on self-help and through making alliances with other countries. But what

we could see here was that in response to the increasingly assertive and aggressive policies from US decision-makers on the missile defense issue and the possibility of inclusion of Taiwan into the missile defense shield, China increased its cooperation with Russia against the missile defense issue. This is a very important and prominent feature of the security dilemma theory in which a state would increase its own capability in response to the uncertain outside threat perceived by the decision-makers. China and Russia decision-makers clearly perceived a threat that would come from the United States if it continued its progressive policies on the missile defense issue.

On the **30 July 2000**, during a press conference in Tokyo, US Secretary of State Albright stated that President Clinton would be making a decision in “the near future” on NMD based on criteria of cost, practicality, threats and international security environment (US Dept of State, July 30, 2000). By simply suggesting that no final decision had yet been made, Albright statement could be regarded as change in US policies on the missile defense issue. Before the tough policies were declared by Russian and Chinese decision-makers, the United States decision-makers had been much more eager to develop the missile defense.

On **31 August 2000**, discussing President Jiang’s fourth coming speech at the United Nations, a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official Li Bandong said, “In (Jiang’s) address, he might bring up a new security concept, mainly stressing that in the post-Cold War world... .. there are still certain countries which seek so-called absolute security for themselves, and are speeding up the development and deployment of advanced antimissile systems.” Moreover, he would very likely discuss TMD and NMD when attending the September UN summit (Japan Economic

Newsire, August 31, 2000). China was seeking active participation in opposing the missile defense issue. This gave an implicit signal to the US decision-makers that President Jiang was seriously concerned about this issue.

On **1 September 2000**, US President Bill Clinton announced in a speech at Georgetown University that he would leave to his successor the decision on beginning the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system because there is not yet enough confidence in technology and the effectiveness of the system (People's Daily, September 3, 2000). Moreover, he said, “we need this time to determine whether the system – if deployed – would enhance national security” (CNN, September 1, 2000).

In response to the opposition from other countries, he said, “In time I hope the United States can narrow our differences with Russia on this issue and the course I have chosen today gives the United States more time to pursue that, and we will use it.” Also, he said, “The decision I have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies’ questions and consult further on the path ahead.”

In his speech President Clinton gave several reasons to delay the development of the missile defense but nevertheless the joint opposition from China and Russia undoubtedly created a considerable amount of weight to affect the perception of the United States leadership on the missile defense issue.

(c) Other factors that affected the decisions of President Clinton on the MD issue

Secretary of State Albright had mentioned various criteria in July 2000 for MD development. It is necessary to consider these briefly. The first concerns the practicality of developing such technology.

Prior to the announcement of the delay in development of the NMD issue, the United States had conducted three critical tests to verify the maturity of its technology.

The first test was held on the 3 October 1999. “The unarmed Minuteman missile carrying a dummy warhead and a decoy balloon was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on a flight over the Pacific” ([CNN](#), October 3, 1999). A US missile defense system was able to destroy and intercept the missile over the Pacific Ocean. Keith Englander from the US Department of State said, “It was a very good success. We did get the body-to-body contact we anticipated” ([CNN](#), October 3, 1999).

The second test was held on the 18 January 2000. The test was to launch a target missile from Vandenberg AFB in California and “The Pentagon hoped for a successful "integrated systems test," meaning that several elements -- interceptor rockets, radars and computerized command centers -- all work in harmony” ([CNN](#), January 18, 2000). However, the test failed when the kill vehicle’s infrared sensors lost the target at the last moment.

The third test was held on 8 July 2000. “The interceptor missile was launched from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean a few minutes after the launch of the Minuteman from Vandenberg Air Force Base and that missile put into space a "kill vehicle" designed to crash into the mock warhead and destroy it” (CNN, July 8, 2000). Early indications were that a problem occurred during the separation of the kill vehicle from the rocket carrying it. This test failed and this probably also had some impact on the September 1, 2000.

Another factor might have been the opposition from European countries. Even though they were allies of the United States, the Europeans feared that the NMD system would undermine the deterrent force of the 1972 ABM Treaty and trigger an arms race between the United States, Russia and even China. But China and Russia were the two main nations that were strongly opposed to the TMD and NMD.

Basically all the above factors would shape the perception of the US decision-makers on whether the missile defense program should continue or not. But from the sources available, the joint effort of China and Russia could produce a credible threat that shaped the perception of the US leadership on the missile defense issue and to a large extent led to Clinton’s decision to delay the development of missile defense.

(d) Research findings on missile defense issue during Clinton presidency

Firstly, from the sources available, we could realize that the abrupt missile from North Korea in August 1998 was a stimulus that accelerated US decision-makers’ in

developing the missile defense system, first the joint development with Japan on TMD and then in the wake of the threat in its national security, the United States also announced to fasten the development of the NMD system. Even though a lot of materials suggested that the missile defense issue was not a new concept in the mind of US decision-makers, the sudden missile launched from North Korea was nevertheless an important stimulus that affected the perception of the US decision-makers on the missile defense issue and hence US changed its policy.

Secondly, the initial protests from China created little change in the perception of the US decision-makers on TMD. After the United States started to accelerate the development of NMD, China remained opposed to it and increased its critical comments. However, at that time, Russia joined the opposition and the joint effort in opposing the missile defense (MD) to a large extent shaped the US decision-makers' perception on the issue. However, the United States only considered the NMD issue, which was opposed by both Chinese and Russian's decision-makers. Finally what US President Clinton delayed was the NMD, but none of the official materials mention the withdrawal of the TMD. I could conclude that China's opposition by itself did not produce change in the perception of US decision-makers, but when China cooperated with Russia against the United States' act, then they could produce a credible threat or stimulus that changed the perception of the United States and hence its policies on MD. But at least we could conclude that the policies carried out by the United States on the missile defense issue penetrated the belief system of Chinese and then Russia's decision-makers and hence their perception and foreign policies changed. Their joint effort could produce a credible threat that in turn penetrated the belief system of US decision-makers and to a large extent, changed US's perception on this issue and hence the policies in consequence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE DYNAMICS OF MISSILE DEFENSE ISSUE DURING THE BUSH PRESIDENCY

(a) Analysis of policies during Bush's presidency on the missile defense issue *(Please refer to Appendix Two for detailed sources)*

Starting from the very beginning, even before George W. Bush became the President of the United States, he declared that he would use rather tough policies towards China on the missile defense issue. On **22 November 2000** he stated that he might provide Taiwan with the TMD system. He said no matter which country owns the technologies of the TMD, the issue was that the United States would try to use those skills to prevent any country from posing a threat to its friends (Central News Agency, November 22, 1999).

It is easy to observe the difference in belief systems of President Clinton and George W. Bush and therefore their perceptions and foreign policies towards China. "Bush is more supportive and eager in developing the missile defense system than President Clinton" (夏立平, 2000, p.5). Scobell stated that "It is important to underscore the strong ideological foundation of Bush administration policy on China and North Korea and President Bush is a conservative Republican with firmly held beliefs and he has tended to surround himself with like-minded thinkers" (Scobell, 2002, p.344). He said that "the impact of ideology on the top policy makers may be so powerful as to impose a type of "ideological straitjacket" approaching the kind that fundamentally influenced the global outlook and he regards China as the implacable ideological foes of the US" (Scobell, 2002, p.345).

He stated, “the administration officials can be divided into two groups depending on the depth of their feelings on these two issues: conservative hawks and conservative pragmatists. A hawk is a hardnosed leader who is a firm believer in a strong defense and stands ready to use the instrument of military power in the practice of coercive diplomacy” (Scobell, 2002, p.346). Hawks, such as Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, believe that building missile defense is vital to US national security and no compromise is possible. They also believe strongly that the US has neglected its allies in recent years and instead has been pursuing closer ties with communist party-states (Scobell, 2002, p.347).

The new Bush administration seems to adopt a hardline approach towards China and on the missile defense issues, this could be attributed to the influence of his elite group, in which most of them seem to advocate the development of the missile defense system and be against the communist regime. These influential persons exert a large weight in affecting the belief system of President Bush as well as his perception in policy-making on the missile defense issue.

On **11 January 2001**, President-elect Bush’s nominee for Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, hinted that the US government would seek active development on the missile defense issue both on NMD and TMD system. Concerning about the TMD, he said, “in light of the wide deployment of ballistic missiles today, I believe it is imperative that the Department develop... .. TMD system”. The United States said “The American people, our forces abroad and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us” (Japan Economic Newswire, January 11, 2001).

Moreover, on **17 January 2001**, national security adviser-designate Condoleezza Rice also mentioned that the new US government would be eager to develop the NMD issue and would be in close consultation with Russia and other “interested” countries on this issue (US Dept of State, January 18, 2001).

So while departing President Clinton had delayed the development of the NMD issue, the new US President and his colleagues seemed have a different approach, since, even before becoming the President, Bush and some of his elite group had expressed their interest in developing the MD and TMD issue and attributed this to outside threats. This again would reinforce the belief system of the Chinese leadership that the United States would be aggressive in developing the missile defense system.

The Bush administration officials’ speeches could also reflect that they have rather different belief systems compared with the decision-makers during the Clinton presidency. In particular, the Bush administration took a stronger line on defense and support for allies. Since the two groups of decision-makers do not have identical belief systems, they would perceive differently the issues with China and hence their policies declared towards China would be incongruent.

Both Russia and China expressed their concerns about the new Bush administration. On **6 February 2001**, Russian Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov said, “Russia keeps meticulous and strict observance of the treaty, but we are already prepared for an adequate response to the US withdrawal”. Also, he warned that if the Pentagon “speeds up the implementation of the NMD program, the Russian side will surely take adequate and practical actions” (People’s Daily,

February 7, 2001). This was a signal to the new US government that Russia would not accept the US government withdrawing from the ABM treaty and the development of the NMD unilaterally.

China was quite worried about the future US's government's possible intentions on the missile defense issue. On **16 January 2001**, China Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu stated that China was concerned about the issue and hoped that the United States would adhere to the ABM treaty and maintain global stability (Agence France Presse, January 16, 2001).

On **9 February 2001**, US Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted on the US determination on missile defense. This was another signal from the US decision-makers of that the renewed assertiveness in the development of the missile defense (People's Daily, February 10, 2001).

On **24 February 2001**, Powell met with Russia Foreign Minister Ivanov in Cairo to discuss the NMD issue. However, differences over NMD issue remained unresolved even though they declared that it was an "excellent" meeting between both nations. Russia still adhered to the importance of the ABM treaty and the differences over the NMD system remained unresolved (Xinhua News Agency, February 24, 2001).

The increase of China's defense budget in the beginning of **4 March 2001** by 17.7 percent for 2001 in a bid to improve its 2.5 million-strong People's Liberation Army. Even though China's Military General Song Qingwei said the "military outlay is smaller than those of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan," and "the

budget increase will not constitute a threat to other countries” (CNN, March 5, 2001). Moreover, Chinese decision-makers denied that the dramatic increase in its military expenditure was due to the US missile defense system, US Secretary of State Powell said, “the Bush administration will ask in upcoming talks with China whether the buildup is defensive for modernization or has offensive potential” (CNN, March 6, 2001). Thus, while China saw its military buildup being for the defensive purposes (in part to protect itself against growing US power), the United States, as might be predicted under the security dilemma theory, was suspicious. It is the fact that US decision-makers perceived that the military expenditure rises might be offensive in nature and hence no matter how the distribution of the military budget actually was, the US decision-makers would pay more attention to the military boost in China.

On **14 March 2001**, China urged the United States to hold talks on missile defense system. Sha Zukang, Chinese director-general of arms control and disarmament for the Foreign Ministry said China was ready to have discussions and dialogue with the Americans. Concerning about the TMD issue, he said, “China is not against TMD per se, as it does not violate international conventions and the protection of US forces is legitimate but if TMD becomes a large deployment and extension of NMD, the consequence will be just as serious as NMD” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 14, 2001).

Moreover, he said that although “through research and development of TMD itself may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM treaty”, “the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of the TMD that the US is preparing to deploy in Asia” (People’s Daily, March 15, 2001). Compared with the previous evidence, China used a softened attitude towards both

the TMD and NMD issues.

This is basically a perception change from the Chinese government due to the policies declared by the new US President. China was in general opposed to both NMD and TMD development but China now using a softened attitude towards both issue.

In general, on the TMD issue, China admitted that protecting US forces overseas was legal as long as it did not involve Taiwan. China would severely oppose the TMD plan if it included Taiwan.

On the NMD issue, China was also again opposed to it but it admitted that both countries could discuss it through dialogue. Obviously, China's tough stance towards the NMD issue had changed slightly in response to the changes in policies by the new US President. Two pieces of evidences could be listed out in order to support the reasons behind the changes in perception from China.

Firstly, China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen was due to visit the United States from **18 to 22 March 2001**; this was the first time a senior Chinese official had visited the United States after Bush came into office. The changes in China's foreign policy towards the missile defense issue were aimed at alleviating the tight situation of the Sino-US relations due to the confrontation and disagreements on the missile defense issue.

Chinese government had been raising it grievances over proposed US arms sales to Taiwan since the middle of March 2001. Taiwan requested the US new

government to sell its naval ships equipped with the advanced Aegis radar system. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said the US President would make the decision according to the necessary level of military defense and finally the US did not sell the requested weapons to Taiwan. Hence, during these arguments, China would like to soften on its stance on the missile defense issue in order to have harmonious relations. China was in a relatively weaker side in its negotiations with the United States. From these exchanges, we could also see that the arms sales was still a very delicate issue between Sino-US relations and Chinese decision-makers were seriously opposed to such arms sales.

On **1 April 2001**, a Chinese aircraft crashed into a US spy plane and this resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot, so Sino-US relations deteriorated (US Dept of State, April 1, 2001).

On **1 May 2001**, President Bush of the United States again vowed to continue the missile defense development and move beyond the ABM treaty. Although Bush claimed that he would like to consult with Russia and China on the missile defense issue, clearly the US government had not changed its perception on the missile defense issue even after the spy plane crash that damaged the Sino-US relations. Bush said, “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defense to counter the different threats of today’s world, to do so we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty” (US Dept of State, May 1, 2001).

After the plane crash incident, on the **10 May 2001**, China again stated that it was willing to hold talks with the United States on the TMD and NMD issues. It

seemed that China was eager to discuss the issue with the United States. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “if the United States decides to send a special envoy here, we are willing to have consultations on the issue” (People’s Daily, May 11, 2001).

It was quite ironic that Chinese government seemed so willing to talk with the United States before, but finally it opposed and confirmed its stance on missile defense issue. On **15 May 2001**, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun said “China’s opposition to the US NMD program is consistent and will not change” (People’s Daily, May 16, 2001). Three reasons can be suggested. Firstly, it might be the fact that the US government made no change in its stance on NMD and hence the Chinese side could only reject its approach.

The second point was the announcement that Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian would visit the United States. On **14 May 2001**, US Secretary of State Powell said he would grant him permission to stop briefly in the United States on his way to and from Latin America. He said, “we will try to reassure the authorities in Beijing that there is nothing in the President’s transit they should find disturbing or in any way modifying or changing or casting any doubt on the policy that exists between us and the PRC” (The New York Times, May 15, 2001). This issue would revise Chinese decision-makers’ thinking that the new US president were facilitating Taiwan to become “independence” as well as increasing Taiwan’s international space and recognition.

Last but not the least, was the ranking of the person that was talking with Chinese in dealing with the missile defense issue. The Bush administration has

launched a major diplomatic trip in May 2001 to sell its controversial NMD plan to Europe and Asia. A team of senior American diplomats led by the Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, visited Europe for a general briefing and discussions on Bush's plan (The Hindu, May 11, 2001). However, the one that went to China was only the Assistant Secretary of State. This might have given China the impression that the United States was not serious about China's opposition.

On **12 July 2001**, US Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz said that the United States would like to develop a comprehensive missile defense system and that after that there would be no differences between the national and theater missile defense (US Dept of State, July 12, 2001).

On **16 July 2001**, US President Bush reiterated that he would stick to his position on missile defense issue. He said, "people shouldn't doubt where the United States stand". He also stated that it was important to develop a new strategic framework to make the world more peaceful. He said, "I have made my position clear. People shouldn't doubt where the United States stands" (People's Daily, July 17, 2001).

On **24 July 2001**, President Bush and Russian President Putin, in their bilateral meeting following the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Genoa. They discussed the issue of the missile defense, but they did not achieve any positive results after the meeting (US Dept of State, July 24, 2001). Finally on **3 September 2001**, US National Security Adviser Rice went to China to clarify the intention of the United States to deploy the NMD that was not aim at containing China but rather than some rogue nations that might pose a threat to the security of the United States.

(b) Impact on the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the missile defense issue

The unprecedented terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (9-11) had a rather contradictory impact on the US missile defense debate. The new “war on terrorism” meant increased concern about homeland defense. To some in the United States that implied going ahead with the missile defense, but others argued that the MD systems could not prevent 9-11 type of attacks. The Bush administration, however, decided to continue with the missile defense programme, with their determination reinforced by the events of 9-11.

CNN News on 4 December 2001 reported that the United States had tested its missile defense system the previous day and that the test had been successful. The Pentagon said “The test successfully demonstrated exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) flight performance and “hit to kill” technology to intercept and destroy a long-range ballistic missile target.” This was the first resumption of tests in the missile defense system since the terrorist attacks on the United States.

On 13 December 2001, “The United States has given Russia notice that it will withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in six months, President Bush said” (US Dept of State, December 13, 2001). This was basically the first official announcement of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty after Bush became president.

Even though the US government reiterated that the development and deployment of a missile defense system is not aim at restraining China’s missiles, on December 2001, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a report entitled

“Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015”. In this report, the CIA outlined the missile threats that the United States might face in the forthcoming years and which nation will be the most harmful to the United States. It said, “The Intelligence Community projects that Chinese ballistic missile forces would increase several-fold by 2015, but Beijing's future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United States—which will number around 75 to 100 warheads” (Report from the Central Intelligence Agency, December 2001).

Both China and the United States seemed to maintain their position on missile defense despite the 9-11 events. While the two sides did move into a more cooperative mode because of a coincidence of interest in terrorism and President Bush met President Jiang twice in China, at the APEC summit in October 2001 and on a state visit in February 2002, there was no detailed discussion of MD issues and no narrowing of their differences.

(c) Research findings on missile defense issue during the Bush presidency till September 2001

Judging from the statements made before the President Bush came into office, his belief system towards China was rather different from the President Clinton. He and his elite group on various occasions expressed the view that the United States would definitely develop and deploy the missile defense issue even if facing opposition from other nations.

Being faced with the tough policies from the United States, China changed its perception on both the TMD and NMD issue and it used a softer tone towards the

negotiations on both issues, saying it was ready to talk with the United States on both issues. As the timing of the issues match rather well the changes in perception of China could be attributed to the need to smooth Chinese Vice-Premier Qian visit to the United States and to the anxiety that the United States would sell Aegis-equipped ships to Taiwan. The arms sales of Aegis radar system created a credible threat to China since it would severely reduce the military deterrence of China in the Taiwan straits and this would also signal that the United States would support Taiwan in the case of conflict between China and Taiwan.

Even though China publicly stated that it was ready to hold talks with the United States on the missile defense issue, after the discussions China stated that it would not change its stance on the NMD issue. This result, from my previous analysis, could be attributed to three reasons, especially the announcement that Taiwanese President Chen would pass through the United States and meet Congressman while going to Latin America.

(d) The research findings on missile defense issue during the Clinton and Bush presidency

Even though a Chinese scholar argued that the prime reason for President Clinton to delay the development of the missile defense system was due to the China factor (阮次山, 2000, p.23), from my research findings during President Clinton's presidency, it is clear that China's opposition alone to the NMD and TMD issue could not change the perceptions of the United States and hence its policies on the missile defense. However, the joint effort of China and Russia could produce a credible threat that did change the perception of the United States decision-makers

and hence delayed its development of the missile defense on NMD. But on the TMD issue, the United States had never vowed to delay the development of it.

During Bush presidency, the US leadership was proactive in developing the missile defense even though senior US policy-makers declared that “the United States will consult with Russia, with China and with its allies in planning its missile defense system” (US Dept of State, March 7, 2001).

However, China’s perceptions towards the NMD and TMD both changed, even though China still opposed both NMD and TMD development in principle, it adopted a softened stance towards it and said it was ready to held the discussions with the United States. We could see that the changes in perception from China on the missile defense issue were mainly due to the policies declared by the United States towards Taiwan. When Chinese decision-makers changed their perception on both the NMD and TMD system on March 2001, one primary reason was because of the worry of the US decision-makers’ possible intention in selling Aegis-equipped arms ships to Taiwan. Moreover, after the meeting with US and Chinese senior-officials on 15 May 2001, the Chinese declared that it would not change its stance on the missile defense issue. One possible reason for its tougher reaction was the possible granting of visa to Taiwan President Chen to visit the United States. Hence, the Taiwan issue was still the focus in Chinese leadership’s foreign policy making.

Throughout the interactions of the United States and China on the missile defense issue, the United States had never changed its perception due to the sole opposition from China, but China had changed its perception on the missile defense

issue due to the tough stance of the new US President. I would say the model can be applied in the missile defense issue, but the categorization of the stimuli should be modified so as to provide a “credible threat” that can shape the perceptions of the decision-makers’ counterparts and hence the consequent foreign policies.

Suffice it to say, during the interactions between the US and China on missile defense up to the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States, China by itself could not produce a “credible threat” that could change the perception of the United States on the missile defense issue, whereas US foreign policies could shape the Chinese leadership’s perception on the missile defense issue.

CHAPTER NINE

THE DYNAMICS OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS

DURING THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY

(a) Historical background of the Taiwan issue in the US ---

China relationship

The Chinese government was forced to flee from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan in December 1949 when it was defeated by the Communist government. At that time, the US government was strongly opposed to communist governments and hence it only recognized Taiwan officially. Since 1949, the relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States has been to large extent affected by the relations between the US government and Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwan issue has been the most influential issue hampering the improvement of Sino-US relations.

Basically before President Nixon's administration, the preceding US presidents were committed to the non-recognition of the PRC and the support of the Nationalist government that fled to Taiwan. However, Nixon tried to expand contacts with China even though he had taken a tougher position during his election campaign. "The Nixon administration has gone farther than any previous administration in seeking to increase contracts with Peking without implying a lessening of commitment to Taiwan" and "Communist China has long been too isolated. This is one of the reasons we have been seeking to open up channels of communication" (Bueler, 1971 p.67). These clearly showed that during the presidency of President Nixon, he tried to reverse his policies by admitting the importance of communication

with the PRC.

In February 1972, Chinese and American leaders issued the “Shanghai Communiqué” which was the first official agreement signed by them after the formation of the new China. According to the agreement, both sides would conduct their relations on the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (Schaller, 1990, p.187). Moreover, concerning the Taiwan issue, the US government said, “The United States acknowledges that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes” (US Dept of State: <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/jtcomm.htm>).

On December 15, 1978, US President Jimmy Carter announced that the United States and the PRC have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979 (Schaller, 1990, p.207). This showed that their relations were working in a positive direction. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping, leader of the PRC, also vowed to visit the United States. But on some dedicate issues such as Taiwan issue, the United States still insisted on supplying Taiwan with sufficient defensive weapons and on protecting Taiwan in case China used force to invade. The next US-China joint communiqué, signed by the United States and China in 1979, showed that they has mutual agreements on certain issues and the US government reaffirmed that Taiwan is a part of China.

<http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/jtcomm3.htm>). But in the same year, the US government also released another important document, entitled Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). In this important document, the US government said “The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (US Dept of State: <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/taiwact.htm>). This act greatly constrained the relations between the United States and China as it seemed to give authority to the US government to sell arms to Taiwan and interfered in China’s internal affairs.

During the 1980 presidential election in the United States, the Republican candidate Reagan bitterly criticized the way President Carter dealt with China and he even suggested declaring a “two China policy” if he became a president (Schaller, 1990, p.215). The policies carried out by President Reagan seemed to coincide with his election declarations. Even though a joint communiqué was signed on the 17 August 1982, which it settled part of the altercations between the United States and China on the Taiwan issue, the communiqué outlined “the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization” (US Dept of State: <http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/jtcomm2.htm>). President Reagan was still keen on selling arms to Taiwan despite the opposition from the China and this policy restrained China and the United States from improving their relations. One scholar wrote, “Insistence on military sales to Taiwan, to interfere in

China's affairs, is irreconcilable with the desire to develop Sino-US relations" (Kitts, 1991, p.235). In brief, there were instabilities between the United States and China during the presidency of Reagan, in particular on the Taiwan issue.

In November 1988 George Bush, another Republican, was elected President of the United States. At the very beginning, it seemed that Sino-US relations could improve because President Bush had acted as the head of the US liaison office in Beijing previously. President Bush was considered as an "old friend" by the Chinese leaders. However, the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre alarmed the US government and sanctions were imposed on China by the United States. Since that time, China's human rights has been one of the issues that the United States has been most concerned with and the "emotional weight" given by the Americans to this also gave rise to some grievances from the Chinese side. From the Americans side, hostile perceptions of China began to re-emerge and China was seen as a repressive regime. On the other hand, China perceived that US policies were intended to keep China weak (Harding, 1997, p.15).

The basic Bush foreign policies and principles towards China on the Taiwan issue followed the precedent set by Reagan. Although he supported solving the Taiwan issue through peaceful means, he was also prepared, as will be discussed later, to sell advanced military weaponry to Taiwan.

In 1992 US presidential election the Democrat Bill Clinton was elected. During his first phrase of presidency, he adopted a rather tough policy towards China, especially linking the human rights issue with the most-favored-nation trading status. However, due to the beneficial trading relations with China, a change in perception

by President Clinton that resulted in a change in his policy towards China and he finally delinked the human rights issue from the MFN status. However, the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96 ensured that Taiwan remained a topic of contention and discussion, even when the Sino-US summit meetings took place in 1998-99.

Overall speaking, the Sino-US relations could remain stable under the Clinton presidency and he valued relations with China more than Taiwan relations, even though he still insisted on selling arms to Taiwan for its self-protection.

From the above brief basic historical background, we could realize that Taiwan issue is one of the most essential and precarious issues existing between the United States and China. “The Taiwan issue is an obstacle in the Sino-US relations” (熊玠, 2000, p.20 & 倪世雄、王義桅, 2000, p.22). The following passages will try to explore how the foreign policies of one party affected the perceptions of its counterpart and in turn affected the foreign policies of the other side on the Taiwan issue. Due to the length limit and the complexity of this issue, I will only start at the end of the first Bush administration and focus on the period in which Clinton was the President of the United States. But before starting the interactions of the issue, I will try to spotlight several core beliefs of China and the United States on Taiwan.

(b) Core beliefs of China and the United States towards Taiwan

On the side of China, it is essential for us to realize its several core beliefs in the decision-maker’s minds, as can be seen from the White Paper entitled “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China” (issued in August 1993).

The first part of China's belief system is its unwavering emphasis on Chinese sovereignty and legitimacy over Taiwan. In the 1993 White Paper the Chinese government clearly identified that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China"; "The international community has acknowledged the fact that Taiwan belongs to China" (<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-2.htm>). Moreover, "From the formal Chinese point of view, Taiwan was a renegade province and therefore a domestic matter for China, in more or less the same way that a dispute between the federal government and the state California would be for the United States" (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p.150). All of the above statements can show that China has never admitted Taiwan to be an independent state throughout Chinese history, even though it has been under the control of the Republic of China (ROC) since 1949.

The second part of the Chinese decision-makers belief system consists of the intention to peacefully unify Taiwan with the mainland (<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-4.htm>). The White Paper stressed that China would like to use peaceful method to resolve the Taiwan problem; for instance, the paper proposed adopting the so-called "One country, Two systems" approach in which Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy.

Basically before this White Paper, Chinese decision-makers on many occasions tried to express their sincere and non-coercive intentions to solve Taiwan problem. For instance, in January 1979, China's National People's Congress pronounced its basic position to be the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and called for talks to end military confrontations between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait (Zhang & Montaperto, 1999, p.10). Moreover, Deng Xiaoping and President Jiang Zemin on many occasions reiterated that China should use peaceful methods to settle the

Taiwan issue especially after the “One country, Two systems” model seemed to be successfully accepted for solving the problems Hong Kong’s handover to mainland China (Zhang & Montaperto, 1999, p.10).

The third part of the belief system towards Taiwan is that Chinese decision-makers are very opposed to any foreign intervention on the Taiwan issue, especially given the long tradition of US military forces influencing the Taiwan Straits relations and developments. “The United States plays the Taiwan card to interfere in the domestic affairs in China” (俞力工, 2000, p.48). In the White Paper published in 1993, it was stated that “any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese Government is under no obligation to undertake any commitment to any foreign power or people intending to split China as to what means it might use to handle its own domestic affairs” (<http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/10-4.htm>). Thus the rationale of using force remains within Beijing’s belief system: China is a sovereign state and Taiwan is part of China. If Taiwan declares its independence either under the support from foreign powers or by Taiwan’s decision-makers’ will, it is the right of the Chinese government to use any means including forces to restore order and maintain national integrity and the use of force would mainly target those people or organizations that support the independence of Taiwan, not every ordinary citizen in Taiwan (陳先奎, 2000, p.75).

From the above simple but important points, we can find out that two of the important core beliefs of the Chinese decision-makers are contradictory. Those are the second one, the intention to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully, and the last one in which China might use coercion to suppress Taiwan and unify it in case Taiwan

declares independence. In the following research, it can be seen that the core beliefs of the Chinese decision-makers do clash with each other and the latter core belief becomes more prominent and important than the first one.

After looking at the core beliefs of the Chinese decision-makers, it is necessary for us to analyze the US decision-makers' core beliefs towards Taiwan so that we could know the differences between their belief systems.

Some scholars have tried to examine the perceptions and core beliefs of the United States towards China and found that US perceptions towards China were very different from that held by the Chinese decision-makers. The US government has never viewed Taiwan as part of China's domestic issues because of its commitment to provide sufficient weapons for Taiwan's self-protection against China's forceful intervention (Zhang & Montaperto, 1999, p.14).

The first element in US decision-makers' core belief system is supporting Taiwan's democracy. The retreat of the Nationalist government to Taiwan did not bring about immediate democratic development in Taiwan, but starting from the mid-1980's, the democratic development in Taiwan was rapid and this has served the political interests of the United States. On many occasions, the US government has tried to impress its will on world politics and endorse all democratic regimes in the world. So even though the US government promised that it would only recognize Beijing government as the sole legitimate representative of China and no official relations would be established with the Taipei regime, the United States still tried every means to assist Taiwan in various ways, particularly as the Taiwanese governments of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui introduced more and more

democracy. For instance, the United States continued to sell arms to Taiwan and let senior officials from Taiwan visit or pass through the United States, stirring up altercations between China and the United States.

In connection with the previous point, in the American view, is the second core belief that the US government should be still committed to the defense of Taiwan's security and the military balance between Taiwan and mainland China. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) outlined that "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan" (US Dept of State: <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/taiwact.htm>). It clearly states the policies that US government will deploy to deal with the relations between the United States, Taiwan and China. Moreover, many times, the US government argued that it should continue to sell sufficient arms to Taiwan to enable it to defend itself against China. The United States has its strategic interest in safeguarding the national security of Taiwan even at the expense of a deteriorating relation with China.

The third element in its core belief system is the need to take into account the pressure from the US Congress on the President's decision-making process, especially on the Taiwan issue. In almost all of the issues that trigger grievances from China, US Congress has taken an active role in passing through those issues and decisions. For instance, the arms sales and the granting of visas to senior Taiwan's officials. Republicans in the US Congress traditionally used a tough attitude towards China on human rights and Taiwan issue and this has been realized by the US decision-makers.

The fourth element in the core belief of US decision-makers would be the economic interests in trade with Taiwan. “Supporting Taiwan’s economic prosperity and maintaining US-Taiwan economic relations have been a consistent and fundamental policy of all US administration” (Zhang & Montaperto, 1999, p.15). Furthermore, Taiwan was admitted to World Trade Organization recently right after the PRC had entered. This means that Taiwan’s economics ties with the United States would be closer and the US government has its interests in maintaining their sound economic relations.

(c) Analysis of policies during the Bush and Clinton presidencies on Taiwan *(Please refer to Appendix Three for detailed sources)*

“It was the political arena that both sides failed to achieve any meaningful breakthrough. In fact, in 1992, due to the tension created by the US sales of F-16 fighters and French sales of Mirage 2000-5 jets to Taiwan the political relations between China and Taiwan deteriorated to some extent” (Chiou, 1993). In justifying his decision to sell fighters to Taiwan, on **3 September 1992** Bush said, “the United States has provided Taiwan with sufficient defensive capabilities to sustain the confidence it needs to reduce these tensions [with China]. And that same sense of security has underpinned Taiwan's dramatic evolution toward democracy” (US Dept of State, September 8, 1992). Also, he said that his decision did not change the three communiqués with China (1972, 1979, 1982) and the arms sales were only aimed at promoting the stability of the area.

Although in one sense Bush was only following earlier Reagan policies of arms

sales to Taiwan, the F-16 fighters nonetheless marked a qualitative change in the nature of these arms sales. What had stimulated this change of policy? It has been argued that the main reason for the US selling such arms to Taiwan was “in response to China’s purchase of advanced Su-27 aircraft from Russia” (Tucker, 2000, p.162).

The Los Angeles Times on **3 September 1992** reported that “Administration officials said that the change in longstanding US policy prompted by China’s recent acquisition of sophisticated Su-27 fighters.”

Indeed, US Department spokesman Joseph Snyder argued that “the aging of Taiwan's air force and China's purchase of Russian SU-27 aircraft were among the factors considered in the president's decision.” Given that it is now impossible for the United States to provide spare parts for Taiwan's obsolescent U.S. warplanes and thus “we’re maintaining the quality of that air force in the only way we have available” (The Washington Post, September 4, 1992).

As expected, China responded critically on **3 September 1992**, China vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and Foreign Minister Qian both argued that the cooperation between the United States and Taiwan would cause a negative impact on Sino-US relations. Liu said “this will lead to a major retrogression in Sino-US relations and will inevitably casues a negative impact on Sino-US cooperation in the United Nations and other international organization” (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1992). Qian also stated that the US government would be held responsible for any serious consequences arising from the arms sales to Taiwan (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1992).

However, on **21 September 1992**, the US said that it would carry out another round of arms sales to Taiwan, this time military helicopters and this would not affect the military balance in the region. Again, Chinese Foreign Ministry Qian condemned the decision made by the US on **25 September 1992**. He said, “the US Government has repeatedly violated the Sino-US Communiqué of August 17, 1982, by continuously selling large quantities of arms to Taiwan and its acts are absolutely unacceptable as they constitute an infringement of China's sovereignty and interference in China's internal affairs” (South China Morning Post, September 26, 1992).

In response to these arms sales from the United States to Taiwan, Chinese officials during a trip to Russia in **December 1992** agreed to purchase additional arms from Russia. This clearly showed that China would like to purchase more arms to counter-balance against the arms sales from US to Taiwan (Sheng, 2001, p.11 & Cheng, 1995, p.27).

The initial phase of the run up to the crisis, namely the arms sales of 1992, can be seen as confirmation of the relevance of the security dilemma theory. The arms sales from Russia to China in 1992 acted a stimulus to the United States and this in turn became a stimulus that stirred up grievances from the United States towards China and so the United States decided to sell arms to Taiwan in consequence. It was because the acquisition of new advanced fighters by Taiwan would greatly reduce the military threat of China's military forces to Taiwan and this would definitely harm the national security of China. The Chinese leadership saw these F-16 fighter aircraft as qualitatively superior to early US arms sales to Taiwan. Sheng (2001, p.64) has argued that “in terms of quality, the F-16s far exceeded any weapons

sold by the United States to Taiwan.” Also, from the perspective of China, the sale was also a breach of the communiqués that had been signed with the United States beforehand, such as the 1982 joint communiqué which even stated that the United States would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan and eventually phase them out. The Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Liu summoned US Ambassador Roy to tell him that this act was in total violation of the “17 August” (1982) Sino-US communiqué, was rudely interfering in Chinese internal affairs, seriously damaging Sino-US relations and interfering with and hurting China’s peaceful reunification work (The Independent (London), May 24, 1995). From the perspective of China, its own purchase of arms from Russia was due to the increasing arms sales from the United States to Taiwan in earlier years.

However, from the perspective of the United States, the arms sales to Taiwan were mainly attributed to the arms purchases of China from Russia in early 1992 and the United States perceived these as a threat to the stability of the Taiwan Straits and hence it sold arms to Taiwan in order to maintain the security. “This is just another sign of the arms race in the region [Asia]”, “The tragedy of arms races is that each step is seen as a reaction to another one,” said Harry Harding, a scholar at the Brookings Institution (Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1992). The two nations attributed differently the prime cause of each other’s foreign policies and they by definition committed a fundamental attribution error and so they had misperceptions on the causes of each others’ foreign policies at the very beginning of the development of the Taiwan straits crisis. From the perspective of Chinese decision-makers, they attributed the acts of the United States as kinds of aggressive policies intended to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and back up Taiwan in case of any conflict in the Taiwan straits. That means they attributed this disposition to the US

decision-makers. However, the United States saw it as a consequence of China's purchase arms from Russia that a situation was created that resulted in such action.

After the inauguration of the Clinton presidency, the Taiwan issue remained comparatively quiet until the United States on **7 September 1994** tried to expand official ties with Taiwan, which definitely lead to more confrontation between the United States and China. A senior US official emphasized that the United States "is trying to promote and strengthen our unofficial economic and commercial ties by lifting the level of exchanges and visits and changing the nature of settings for those kinds of issues" (US Dept of State, September 7, 1994). This act was clearly showed that the United States would like to expand its official connections with Taiwan, it was also another step from the United States towards the expansion of Taiwan's international space. This move resulted in Chinese the leadership's perception that following on from the arms sales to Taiwan, the United States was making another aggressive move to try to recognize Taiwan. This would reinforce Chinese decision-makers' perception that the United States would like to use the Taiwan issue to increase its bargaining power in negotiations with China.

In response to this act, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang on **9 September 1994** said, "This act of the United States brazenly interferes with the internal affairs of China and is something we are firmly opposed to and this will seriously, adversely affect the further development of bilateral relations" (The New York Times, September 9, 1994). Chinese Vice Premier Qian on **13 September 1994** also attacked the United States for adjusting its policy on the Taiwan issue. He said, "We show our grave concern over the US government adjusting its policy on the Taiwan issue" (South China Morning Post, September 14, 1994).

Another important stimulus was that on **22 May 1995** the United States declared that it would allow Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui enter the US to attend an alumni reunion at Cornell University. US State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns said, “President Li will visit the US in a strictly private capacity and will not undertake any official activities. It is important to reiterate that this is not an official visit. The granting of a visa in this case is consistent with U.S. policy of maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan” (US Dept of State, May 22, 1995).

The obvious change in policies from the United States towards Taiwan resulted in various changes in policies from China’s decision-makers on both military and formal official aspects. Firstly, China issued a stiff formal protest to the US ambassador to China, Stapleton Roy on **23 May 1995**. China Foreign Minister Qian said, “We solemnly urge the US administration to seriously consider the consequences of allowing Lee's visit and immediately reverse its erroneous decision” (The Independent (London), May 24, 1995). Moreover, he added, “if the United States mistakenly appraises the situation and clings obstinately to this course, it will certainly bring serious damage to China-US relations and the United States will bear full responsibility for the consequences” (The Independent (London), May 24, 1995).

Secondly, China cut short Air Force Chief of Staff General Yu Zhenwu’s trip to the United States half-way through his tour of US airbases and consultations with US officials on **23 May 1995** (Deutsche Presse Agentur, May 24, 1995).

Thirdly, China postponed indefinitely a trip to the United States by its Defense Minister Chi Haotian on **26 May 1995**. Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen said,

“The U.S. has infringed upon China's sovereignty, violated the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués and brought serious damage to Sino-U.S. relations. The Chinese government therefore decided to postpone Chi's visit to the US” (Japan Economic Newswire, May 26, 1995).

Fourthly, on **28 May 1995**, it postponed talks between Chinese and US experts on nuclear energy cooperation and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which had been suspended after the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and had only resumed in October 1994. Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen said the United States, “infringed upon China's sovereignty, violated the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués and brought serious damage to Sino-U.S. relations” (The Washington Post, May 29, 1995).

Fifthly, China cancelled a visit to Washington by its State Councillor Li Guixian from **30 to 31 May 1995** (Sheng, 2001. P.26). Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said, “If the US side still refrains from returning to the correct course of the three Sino-US joint communiqués, China will make further response” (Agence France Presse, May 25, 1995).

Besides the above changes in China policies towards the United States, on **16 June 1995** the Taiwan Affairs Office and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) jointly declared that the second Koo-Wang meeting would be indefinitely postponed because Taiwan had recently taken a series of actions that harmed the cross-Straits relations (Chu, 1996). There had been expectations that a second meeting between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) chairman Koo Chen-fu and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Wang

Daohan to follow up on an earlier meeting in Singapore in 1993 was possible.

On **17 June 1995**, China recalled its ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu for consultations in Beijing in view of the current state of Sino-US relations. In announcing the decision in Beijing, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, “The Chinese Government has decided to recall Ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu to report on his work in view of the current state of Sino-U.S. relations” (The New York Times, June 17, 1995).

Despite the controversy aroused and the Chinese retaliation, the US Government allowed Lee’s visit to take place from 7 to 10 June 1995.

On **19 July 1995**, China announced that it would conduct missile tests near Taiwan and the tests would be phased into three stages from **21 July to mid-October in 1995** in response to the visit of Lee Teng-hui to the United States. (Please refer to appendix three for the detailed sources)

The announcement of the missile tests from China was in response to the arms sales from the United States in 1992, the upgrading of official relations with Taiwan in 1994 and the granting of visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in 1995. However, within the above three important stimuli, I would regard the granting of visa to President Lee Teng-hui was the most serious and important stimulus that shape the perception of Chinese decision-makers on the existing situation in the Taiwan Straits and hence changed the policies.

From the perspective of China, the upgrading the relations with Taiwan in 1994

was perceived by China as the tactic to broaden the cooperation and interrelations with Taiwan and the international space of Taiwan. The consecutive granting of a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was the empirical evidence to show that the United States leadership would like to engage Taiwan on various issues, especially giving up the traditionally enduring “One China” policy and the three communiqués signed with China before. Since the unification with Taiwan and the prevention of intervention by foreign forces in its domestic affairs were the core values in the belief system of China, faced with a stimulus with a credible threat, China felt the need to conduct missile tests from July to October 1995 in order to show the capabilities of China to prevent foreign intervention and to safeguard its territorial integrity. Since the arms sales to Taiwan in 1992 had created a rather hostile and unfriendly image amongst the Chinese decision-makers towards the United States, the continual policies employed by the US decision-makers over Taiwan would reinforce the image in the mind of Chinese decision-makers and this resulted in the missile tests starting from July 1995.

However, the US decision-makers perceived that they had not given up the “One China” principle and the three communiqués, since the upgrading relations with Taiwan was decided due to the increasingly complicated relations with Taiwan; hence it was necessary to redefine the relations with Taiwan. Moreover, the visit of Taiwan President Lee was only a “private” trip and no US officials met him during his trip. However, the United States perceived that the missile tests from China were a threat to Taiwan and to its own interests in the Asia-Pacific region, but were not seen as being due to its foreign policies towards China beforehand. China’s act would harm the security and dominance of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region and the US decision-makers would perceive it a credible threat to which they

would need to take actions to respond. From the interactions of both nations, we can see that they attributed differently on the causes of each others' actions and misperceptions occurred.

The missile tests stirred up the concerns from the United States and the States spokesman Nicholas Burns on **19 June 1995** questioned the intention of the Chinese's missile tests and hoped that the Chinese leadership would deal with it properly. Burns said, "We intend to discuss with the Chinese government the purpose of these tests, and the length and duration of these tests, and are seeking more information from the Chinese government on them" (Agence France Presse, June 19, 1995).

Before the meeting between the US and Chinese decision-makers at the 50th anniversary commemorations of the United Nations in New York, the US State Department spokesman Burns said on **19 September 1995** that the US would not make any promise about not giving visas to Taiwan officials in the future. He said, "We cannot give an ironclad promise, nor should we give an ironclad promise, that we will not issue a visa at some point in the future to Taiwanese who wish to enter the United States for official, private or personal reasons" (The Daily Yomiuri, September 20, 1995). This showed that the United States did not intend to change its policies towards Taiwan just because of the oppositions from China.

During their meeting, President Clinton only told President Jiang that the request for giving visas to Taiwan officials "would be considered on a case-by-case basis. They'd be unofficial, private and rare" on **24 October 1995**.

The conversations between the United States and China on the issue of Taiwan did not produce any concrete results. The reason was that the US decision-makers did not promise anything on the future visits of Taiwanese senior officials to the United States and China was seriously concerned about this. Moreover, after the summit meeting, the United States still continued to give visas to Taiwan senior officials.

On **3 January 1996**, the US hinted that it would grant visa to Taiwan vice President Li Yuan-zu, who applied for a transit visa allowing him to stop over in Los Angeles while on his way to attend Guatemala's presidential inauguration January 11, 1996. State Department spokesman Burns said "I would just note that we have issued such transit visas in the past and it certainly would not be inconsistent with our unofficial relationship with Taiwan were we to issue one in this case" (The Washington Post, January 6, 1996). The United States finally granted a visa to him. This received strong opposition from Chinese decision-makers on **4 January 1996**. China ministry spokesman Chen Jian said "we are resolutely opposed to the Taiwan authorities using so-called transit diplomacy and other means to engage in activities in countries which have diplomatic relations with China" (South China Morning Post, January 5, 1996).

The United States on **31 January 1996** granted Taiwan's Vice President another visa to travel to three US cities on his way to Haiti and El Salvador. State Department spokesman Burns said "We believe this is routine". He said, "I think it's reasonable. Taipei is a long way" (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

On **1 February 1996**, in response to this, China strongly opposed to the US

granted visa twice to Taiwan Vice-President. Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen said, “we are firmly against the activities conducted by the Taiwan authorities to create two Chinas, or one China one Taiwan, under the pretext of making a stopover” (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

In response to these proactive actions from the United States, China hinted that it would conduct military exercises during the first Taiwan direct presidential election scheduled for March 1996. In response to this, the US Defense Secretary William Perry in a speech to the Aspen Institute on **7 February 1996** said that the United States was concerned about the development of this issue and to see whether “military maneuvering that the Chinese are doing to, in not so subtle ways, threaten Taiwan, try to influence their election” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 7, 1996).

President Clinton on **7 February 1996** also stated that the US would try to work with the Chinese in order to solve this problem. He said, “I would just urge them to do what they have done, stake out clearly their various political positions but keep trying to work them out peacefully” (Agence France Presse, February 8, 1996).

The stance from the US seemed to be tougher on **13 February 1996** when the US State Secretary Perry stated that “it is time for China to start sending the right message to Taiwan” (Japan Economic Newswire). He said, “Ultimately, it is the responsibility of both Beijing and Taipei to build healthy relations, but it is in the abiding interest of Beijing, Taipei and Washington that relations maintain a healthy, peaceful course without provocation or overreaction by any capital, and to continue to follow China’s maxim of patience and caution in its dealings with Taiwan” (Japan Economic Newswire, February 14, 1996).

Before the conduct of the missile tests, Chinese Premier Li Peng on **4 March 1996** condemned the unwise policy of the United States which he saw as being responsible for the current Sino-US tense relations (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1996).

China declared that its missile tests would be conducted on March 8 to 15, 1996 and the PLA (People's Liberation Army) would conduct missile launch exercises in two areas in the East China Sea and South China Sea. (Please refer to appendix three for detailed information)

On **6 March 1996** US State spokesman Burns said that the missile tests were irresponsible and that China should refrain from further provocative actions. "We believe that the plans for these missile tests are irresponsible, and we have informed the Chinese government that there will be consequences should these tests go wrong." US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said (Japan Economic Newswire, March 7, 1996). The United States was seriously concerned about the proactive approach employed by the Chinese decision-makers.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen on **7 March 1996** said that the missile tests on March 8, 1996 would demonstrate that Taiwan was still a part of China and it also showed that China had the ability to defend and safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Moreover, he said, the United States had repeated its intervention in China's domestic affairs as well as through its arms sales to Taiwan. He said the missile tests were intended to "suppress the acts of pro-independence forces" (United Press International, March 7, 1996).

On **March 7, 1996**, the day before the Chinese missile tests began, US Department spokesman Burns said the US had deep concern over the missile tests and hoped that China could refrain from further military actions (The Washington Times, March 8, 1996).

On the same day, US White House spokesman Mike McCurry condemned the Chinese acts as provocative and reckless. He stressed that “We would be deeply disturbed by any tests of that nature and We believe...tensions in the Taiwan Straits...need to be addressed through direct, cross-strait dialogue” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1996).

In response to the missile tests which would be held on **8 March 1996**, the United States sent guided-missile cruiser “USS Bunker Hill” to the Taiwan Straits and then aircraft carrier “USS Independence” on **8 March 1996**. Defense Secretary Perry said, “the action they [the Chinese] took with these missile firings was reckless and it could only be viewed as an act of coercion” (The Associated Press, March 8, 1996). Moreover, the United States had “within a few hundred miles of Taiwan, a carrier, the Independence. We have a guided missile cruiser and a guided missile destroyer, also, nearby” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 9, 1996).

In response to the strong actions done by the United States to maintain the stability in the Taiwan Straits, China on **9 March 1996** announced a second round of live ammunition exercise by the PLA and navy drills close to Taiwan from March 12 to 20, 1996.

In response to the increasing tensions over the Taiwan Straits, Defense

Secretary Perry on **10 March 1996** stated that the Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier would move closer to Taiwan in coming days and that the precondition for following the “One China” policy by the United States was the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese leadership”. He said, “We’re concerned to make sure that those forces, that carrier battle group, are in a position to be helpful if they need to be.” Moreover, the “U.S.S. Independence” aircraft and its support ships “will be moved somewhat closer to Taiwan in future days” (United Press International, March 10, 1996).

Chinese Foreign Ministry Qian on **11 March 1996** warned that the US intervention on the Taiwan Straits issue would lead to a chaotic situation in Taiwan and he openly criticized that interference of the 7th Fleet to protect Taiwan as ridiculous. He said, “Should foreign forces refrain from conniving at or supporting the attempt at creating independence or the separation of Taiwan, then there is no need to worry about the tensions in the situation.” “If a chaotic situation prevails, I am afraid this will not serve the U.S. interests as well” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1996).

In response to the taught situation in the Taiwan Straits, the US leadership on **11 March 1996** ordered the carrier “USS Nimitz” to join the carrier “USS Independence” in order to make clear US interests. US State Department spokesman Burns said that this showed that the United States had great concern over China’s behaviour. He said, “This language is meant to signal our very great concern over the reckless behavior of China, and the disposition of these battle groups is meant to convey that concern” (Agence France Presse, March 11, 1996).

During the missile tests, the decision-makers of the United States and China frequently warned of the dangers of upgrading each other's actions in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese reiterated that the Taiwan issue was the domestic issue of China and the United States reiterated that it was unwise for China to continue the missile tests.

At this stage, we could view that after the Chinese declaration of the missile tests around the Taiwan straits before the first Taiwan presidential election, the foreign policy of the United States changed. Firstly, the US decision-makers sent guided-missile cruiser "USS Bunker Hill" to Taiwan straits on March 7 and aircraft carrier "USS Independence" on March 8. Then in response to the Chinese announcement of the new round of live ammunition exercise by the PLA, the United States sent the Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier closer to Taiwan straits on March 10. Then, on March 11, Clinton ordered the carrier "USS Nimitz" to join the carrier "USS Independence" against the military exercise near Taiwan straits.

Finally, on **15 March 1996**, China announced that third round of missile tests over the Taiwan Straits would be held from 18 to 25 March 1996. This came to the closest to Taiwan-held territory and it coincided with the Taiwan presidential election which would be held on 23 March 1996. Once the election was over and Lee Teng-hui returned to office, both sides sought to de-escalate the tension. China made no announcement of any further missile tests or military exercises, while the US naval forces were withdrawn from the area near Taiwan. This was the end of the 1996 Taiwan straits crisis.

(d) Research findings on the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis during the Clinton presidency

I would say the arms sales from the United States to Taiwan in 1992, the upgrading of relations with Taiwan in 1994 and the granting of a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in 1995 were the steps that resulted in the military tests by China during July to October 1995. The visit of Taiwanese President Lee was the most important and immediate stimuli that shaped the perception of China's decision-makers and hence it decided on having missile tests during the above period. The visit created a credible threat that changed the perception of Chinese decision-makers.

The United States continued to grant visas to the Taiwan Vice President twice during the period after the first round of missile tests and before the Taiwanese presidential election which caused great upset to China and it decided that it would have three phases of missile tests during the first Taiwanese presidential election.

It was a stimulus that shaped the perception of the United States on the Taiwan issue since the missile tests would harm the stability of the Taiwan Straits and this was definitely a "credible threat" that shaped the perception of the US decision-makers. The United States responded by dispatching carriers and guided-missile cruisers to observe the situation in the Taiwan Straits, but China considered it as a kind of interventionist policy from the United States.

(f) The role of Congress in shaping the perception of US decision-makers on Taiwan policies.

There have been many scholars arguing that the US foreign policies towards China were affected by the pressure from the Congress. From my examination of the evidence it is also true that the US Congress has exerted a certain weight in the policy-making processes of the United States. Hence, the perception of the US decision-makers would be affected by the opinions from the Congressman in order to finalize their foreign policies on the Taiwan issue.

There is convincing evidence that the changes in perception and policy of the US decision-makers so as to let the Taiwan President visited Cornell University in the United States was attributed to pressure from the US Congress. More than 39 members of the House of Representatives and the Senate submitted a joint resolution demanding the administration allow President Lee to travel to Cornell University to receive an honorary degree (Financial Times, 8 March 1995). In the beginning of May, the resolution passed the two concurrent with the largest possible majority – 97 to 1 in the Senate and 396 to 0 in the House (<http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc66-int.pdf>). Besides, US Congressman, especially the Republicans, support arms sales to Taiwan as Taiwan is a democratic country but China was not in reality.

Besides the role of Congress, the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) also exerted a certain weight in shaping the perceptions of US decision-makers especially on the issue of arms sales. Since the TRA stipulated that the United States has the right to provide sufficient defensive weapons to Taiwan and hence the Congressmen have the ground for persuading or enforcing the President to sell arms

to Taiwan on many occasions. So the US decision-makers needed to take into account various factors in order to decide their foreign policies towards other nations.

Suffice it to say, there were several factors affecting the perception of US decision-makers in determining the foreign policies towards other nations. In the United States, the Congress play does a significant role in shaping the perception of the US decision-makers. Nonetheless, the foreign policies declared would still decided by the US decision-makers themselves.

(g) After the Taiwan Straits crisis

Faced with the dramatic response from the Chinese decision-makers during the mini-crisis in the Taiwan Straits and aware of the need to prevent a further deterioration of Sino-US relations, the Clinton administration in late 1996 and 1997 was more constrained (Harding, 1997 p.19). The Clinton administration reaffirmed the “One China” policy.

Sino-US relations in 1997 continued to be affected by the Taiwan issue especially when Taiwanese senior officials went through the United States, but it seemed that it was a recovery year in their relations after the tensions of the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. Moreover as Lin has written, “Taipei’s diplomatic efforts in 1997 met with new pressures from the US. In early January, the US State Department granted a transit visa for Taiwan’s Vice President Lien Chan to spend a night in Los Angeles, en route to attend the inauguration of the Nicaraguan President. Yet, the visa for Lien Chan carried a restriction of no meetings with American officials and no public events” (Lin, 1998). The United States also adopted a rather

low key position in handling Lee Teng-hui's transit stopover in Hawaii in early September 1997. Despite China blasting the United States for allowing Taiwanese Vice President Lien to talk with some reporters in Los Angeles, the United States used a very low profile attitude towards the visit of senior Taiwan's officials. That approach clearly showed that the crisis in the Taiwan Straits had shaped the perception of US decision-makers on the Taiwan issue. As Harding has argued, the crisis "had a paradoxically salutary effect on thinking about China, at least in the short run" (Harding, 1997, p.18). Even when faced with pressure from the Congress, the US decision-makers tried not to anger Chinese decision-makers any more on the Taiwan issue. According to Lin, two months prior to the transit visit of Lee Teng-hui, US Assistant State Secretary Stanley Roth declared that Lee's trip two years earlier had been a "serious mistake". This could be regarded as a change in US perception towards the Taiwan issue after the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1996.

Arms sales to Taiwan did remain one of the main obstacles between the United States and Taiwan during the year of 1997. In April 1997, Liu Shunyan, the commander of the Chinese Air Force, pledged to acquire sophisticated weapons systems, airborne warning / control systems, electronic warfare aircraft and ground-to-air missiles by early the next century. According to him, Beijing was planning to import high-tech arms to boost its air force's capability to launch precision strikes and impose air blockades. All these aimed at enhancing China's deterrent force in the air as well as other force capabilities (Lin, 1998). In response to China's decision-makers' stimuli, Taiwan also showed its determination to upgrade its weapon systems by purchasing weapons from the United States. In July 1997, Washington agreed to sell Taiwan 21 Super Cobra attack helicopters, a very powerful combat fighter equipped with the most advanced missile-firing system (Lin, 1998).

Yet, at the same time, the United States and China tried to restore stability to the relationship by the use of summit diplomacy, and for the first time since the 1980s official state visits were made by the respective presidents. The October 1997 Sino-US summit meeting was described by both the Chinese and US decision-makers as successful and fruitful. Jiang and Clinton made agreements on many important aspects and they also talked about the Taiwan issue during the meeting. According to the China Daily on 24 October 1997, Clinton said he would “reiterate the America's continuing support for our one-China policy” and “The Taiwan question can only be settled by the Chinese themselves.” (<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/history/visit/clinton.htm>).

On 30 October during a speech in the United States, President Jiang put emphasis on several important points related to Taiwan, as he said “when China and the United States moved to establish diplomatic relations, the U.S. government made a farsighted decision to sever so-called diplomatic ties with Taiwan, withdraw American troops from there and abrogate the treaties it had signed with the regime.” Secondly, he stressed that “Whenever trouble crops up there, the relationship will stagnate or even suffer setbacks.” Thirdly, “the solution to the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair of China and should be worked out by the Chinese people on both sides of the Straits.” Fourthly, he noted “the basic policy of the Chinese government for the settlement of the Taiwan question is “peaceful reunification based on one country, two systems” (China Daily online, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/history/visit/jsinous.htm>).

However, China was not committed to giving up the use of force in this regard, he said, “adding that this does not target the Taiwan compatriots, but is directed

against any foreign force interfering in Taiwan affairs and against any scheme that would attempt to separate Taiwan from China” (China Daily online, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/history/visit/jcpress.htm>).

The October 1997 Sino-US summit meeting clearly showed that Clinton’s perception on Taiwan differed from his perception on China as a whole and China also realized this point. The Sino-US summit in 1997 was regarded as fruitful and successful and Clinton on that occasion expressed the hope that the Taiwan issue should be solved by the Chinese itself. It showed the United States did not want to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs. Even facing the stimuli from China in 1996, Sino-US relations were still in a constructive mood. President Clinton promised to visit China in 1998 and Premier Zhu Rongji also visited the United States in 1999.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

During the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, Sino-American relations contained elements of both cooperation and confrontation. While it is difficult to separate strategic issues from economic and broader political issues in this complex relationship, this thesis has focused on the strategic interactions between these two powers. The perceptual-psychological approach, in conjunction with the security dilemma theory and the attribution theory from psychology, could be used to explain the development of two key strategic issues: the missile defense program and the Taiwan Straits crisis.

My research findings on the missile defense issue obviously illustrated that China was the weaker side in the negotiations with the United States. Although the Chinese decision-makers verbally criticized the US missile defense program, they could not produce a credible threat that could really alert the US decision-makers to the possibility that the Chinese side would harm the interests of the United States. As shown in Chapter Seven, the changes in perception and the foreign policy of the United States during the Clinton administration only happened when China combined with Russia in order to fight against it. However, as shown in Chapter Eight, during the Bush presidency, the United States could produce a credible threat that could change the perception of Chinese decision-makers on the missile defense issue.

The United States could use the issue of Aegis-equipped ship arms sales to Taiwan and the granting of a visa to President Chen to Taiwan to change the

perception of Chinese decision-makers on the missile defense issue.

The Chinese government had been raising its grievances over the proposed US arms sales to Taiwan since the middle of March 2001. Taiwan requested the new US government to sell her naval ships equipped with the advanced Aegis radar system. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said the US President would make the decision according to the necessary level of military defense and finally the US did not sell the requested weapons to Taiwan. Hence, during these arguments, China softened its stance on the missile defense issue in order to have harmonious relations.


On 14 May 2001, US Secretary of State Powell said he would grant Taiwanese President Chen permission to stop briefly in the United States on his way to and from Latin America. He said, “we will try to reassure the authorities in Beijing that there is nothing in the President’s transit they should find disturbing or in any way modifying or changing or casting any doubt on the policy that exists between us and the PRC” (The New York Times, May 15, 2001). This issue would revise Chinese decision-makers’ thinking that the new US president were facilitating Taiwan to become “independent” as well as increasing Taiwan’s international space and recognition and hence this changed the perception of Chinese decision-makers on the missile defense issue and hence China shifted its stance after the meeting. From these actions, we could also note that US policies on the Taiwan issue could greatly affect Chinese perception and policies on the missile defense issue.

From my findings in Chapter Nine on the Taiwan straits crisis, it was clear that Taiwan issue was still the top priority in Chinese foreign policy making and the


Chinese were extremely opposed to foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue. In the Taiwan straits crisis, the visit of Lee to the United States in 1995 and the continual granting of visas to Taiwan senior officials were the prime reasons for China to conduct missile tests in the straits. China's decision-makers regarded the unofficial visit of Lee to the United States as a credible threat posed to China, preventing it from unifying Taiwan as well as facilitating Taiwanese independence under the auspices of the United States. This stimulated China to start military exercises and tests. On the other hand, the conduct of the missile tests around the time of the first Taiwanese presidential election was regarded by the US government as a sort of aggressive and reckless policy from the Chinese decision-makers. The continuation of Chinese missile tests near the Taiwan straits would adversely affect the stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the interests of the United States. This was a credible threat to the United States and hence its foreign policy changed and naval forces were sent to the seas close to Taiwan.

Hence, in re-considering the framework model described in Chapter Four it seems that a more precise definition of the stimuli in these cases can be given. Through my research on the above two case studies, I found that it is important that only a stimulus with a credible threat could produce perceptual and policy changes. So in order to make my definition of stimulus more precise, I would say that a stimulus that could produce a credible threat would be the kind of stimulus in my modified theoretical framework.

Original Model (1)



Model after research (2)



The security dilemma theory and the attribution theory were the two main theories that I used in order to reinforce the explanation of the two case studies. It is logical to find that based on part of the concept in the attribution theory, countries do not easily realize the real cause of others' policy-making intentions and hence they can easily have misperceptions of each other. Moreover, the security dilemma theory was also important in the interaction between two nations. In an anarchic world without a world government, it is logical for a nation's decision-makers to

perceive negatively the intention of others' boosts in military expenditure as this would pose harm to their own national security. This was seen, for example, in the Chinese reaction to US fighter aircraft sales to Taiwan. These two theories come from psychology and hence in conjunction with my psychological-perceptual model, enable a more thorough discussion of the development of the missile defense program and the Taiwan issue.

After finishing the whole research on the two case studies, it is necessary to note that Sino-US bilateral relations could not be discussed without the inclusion of other important nations, for instance Russia, North Korea and Japan etc. Moreover, in a decision-making process, there would be other factors that could contribute to the changes in foreign policy, for example in the United States the role of Congress is rather important in shaping decision-makers' perceptions in policy making.

To conclude, given China's growing economic and military power and the continuing US economic and military might, the Sino-US relationship will clearly grow in importance for defining peace in the whole world in general and the security of the Asia Pacific region in particular.

(Appendix One)

Important speeches and official documents of the missile defense issue during President Clinton Presidency

The speeches of US secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, secretary of defense William Cohen, Japan's foreign minister Masahiko Komura and defense minister Fukushiro Nukaga at the US-Japan security consultative committee meeting on 20 September 1998 in New York, after the missile launched by North Korea on 31 August 1998.

It was the most senior official meeting between Japan and the United States after North Korea launched abrupt missile over the space of Japan. This is a stimulus that affected the perception of US and Japan's decision makers and hence they hold a joint meeting to enhance their cooperation.

US secretary of State Albright said, "we agree, and we have let the North Koreans know in no uncertain terms, that the August 31 launch was a dangerous development" (US Dept of State, September, 21 1998).

Besides the emphasis on the seriousness of the missile launch by North Korea, she further described the US-Japan alliance as "the cornerstone of our strategic policy in Asia." and "the security relationship between the United States and Japan has never been stronger" (US Dept of State, September, 21 1998).

Secretary of Defense Cohen said, "This called for an urgent need to work together to develop a ballistic missile defense system to counter future threats" (US Dept of State, September, 21 1998).

On the other side, Japan's foreign minister Komura said, "For enhancing our bilateral security relationship, we intend to continue close cooperation with the United States on ballistic missile defense, or the so-called "BMD"" (US Dept of State, September, 21 1998).

China slammed US-Japan plan for missile defense in Asia on 6 October 1998 in response to the US-Japan joint development on the TMD

China on Tuesday slammed tentative plans for Japan and the United States to develop a theatre missile defense (TMD) programme, denouncing some of the clauses in a related US defense spending bill as "anti-China".

"China hopes that the government of the United States will take effective measures to prevent the anti-China clauses from becoming law," foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao told a news briefing in Beijing ([Agence France Presse](#), October 6, 1998).

"If this act becomes law, it will create obstacles to the improvement and development of Sino-US relations, and will also be detrimental to the security and stability of Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region" and "The Chinese side hereby expresses a deep concern and strong opposition to this." he said ([Agence France Presse](#), October 6, 1998).

US vowed to work with Taiwan on TMD study on 15 October 1998

Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, regarding the TMD study, he said the Defense Department has in the past held "very close consultations with

Taiwan on all aspects of its defense needs, including the TMD” (Central News Agency, October 16, 1998).

He also added “so we think that this is a logical step and I welcome it, and we will work closely with our Taiwan counterparts” (Central News Agency, October 16, 1998).

Chinese ambassador Chen opposed the TMD project on 27 October 1998

Chinese Ambassador to Japan Chen Jian said the proposed Japan-U.S. study to develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system is unwarranted and unwelcome by China and his comments were the first official expression of China's stance on the system, which is aimed at defending against ballistic missile attacks.

Concerning about the issue of Taiwan, he said, “But under the current situation, Taiwan will not declare its independence without the support of foreign forces, especially from the U.S. and Japan. So the attitude of the U.S. and Japan toward Taiwan will play an important role in the final solution of the Taiwan question” (Japan Economic Newswire, October 27, 1998).

Since the United States vowed that she would like to take close consultations with Taiwan on the missile defense issue, China Ambassador in Japan clearly stated that China would against the TMD especially the inclusion of Taiwan into it.

US gave briefing on proposed theatre missile defense system to Taiwan on 11 November 1998

Gen Tang Fei, chief of the General Staff, said that the United States will explain to the Republic of China (ROC) at the earliest possible time plans for a possible theatre missile defense (TMD) system (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 13, 1998).

Tang said, “adding that the ROC Defense Ministry and military authorities are also continuing to study the prospect of participating in the TMD project” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 13, 1998).

China rapped US, Japan on TMD cooperation on 15 December 1998

A Chinese Foreign Ministry official has criticized Japan and the United States for their recent agreement to jointly develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system.

Sha Zukeng, director general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha said cooperating in TMD development will upgrade military and technological security cooperation between the two countries to “a height not reached even during the Cold War” (Japan Economic Newswire, December 16, 1998).

Moreover, he said the TMD will “far exceed Japan's legitimate defensive needs,” and noting offensive and defensive capabilities are convertible in the TMD (Japan Economic Newswire, December 16, 1998).

US Defense Secretary Cohen vowed to hasten missile defense program on 10 January 1999 during an interview

During the interview, he said, “We have, in fact, added substantial sums of money to our theater missile programs and we’re looking at a two-or three-year acceleration from what we had originally anticipated” (The Daily Yomiuri, January 12, 1999).

It was the first time a high-ranking US official has stated that US administration intended to go ahead with a plan earlier that scheduled. Moreover, he also said that the US government would work out the details of the plan over the next two or three weeks, including an announcement concerning the target date for deployment of the TMD program and specific details of additional budget spending.

US Secretary of Defense Cohen said there was growing “rogue” missile threat on 20 of January 1999

On the one hand, Cohen announced plans to add 6.6 billion to the defense budget over five years to support the NMD program against rogue nations. Moreover, he stated that while the United States has pursued NMD while adhering to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, he indicated that the actual deployment “may require modifications to the treaty” and Clinton administration is currently examining “the nature and scope of these modifications” (US Dept of State, January 20, 1999).

Concerning about the ABM treaty, he said, “we see no reason why it cannot be amended again and it should be modified to allow for a deployment of an NMD system” (US Dept of State, January 20, 1999).

China against US plan to boost arms spending on 21 January 1999

In response to the US Secretary of Defense’s speech, Chinese Spokesman Sun Yuxi at a regular media briefing represented grave concern over the MD issue and condemned the decision of hasten the MD development, saying it ran “counter to the times and will not contribute to international arms control and disarmament efforts.” Moreover, “It will have a comprehensive and far-reaching impact upon the stability of the region and the world at large” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1999).

On the other hand, he said, “China believes that to develop, deploy and transfer anti-missile systems with strategic defense potential will not enhance security or stop the proliferation of missiles” and “on the contrary, it will only undermine security” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1999).

In response to the modifications vowed by the US secretary of defense, he said, “It also violates the ABM Treaty. This treaty is very significant in safeguarding the global strategic balance and stability and maintaining the momentum of nuclear-arms control” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1999).

In response to the possibility of including Taiwan into the TMD, he said, “any country's supply of any weapons system, including TMD, to china's Taiwan province will be considered a move that seriously infringes on china's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (People’s Daily, January 22, 1999).

China reiterated its stance towards the TMD and warned US not providing Taiwan with theater missile defense on 11 February 1999

Foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue told a weekly news briefing that, “We hope the US administration can ... refrain from the sales of TMD and other related technology to Taiwan so as to avoid the damage to bilateral relations” (Agence France Presse, February 11, 1999).

“I would like to reiterate China's position that to include Taiwan in any form in the TMD system would constitute a violation of international laws and the three Sino-US joint communiqués,” and “defense authorities in Taiwan have been studying the feasibility of joining the TMD scheme, a US-backed regional defense system” (Agence France Presse, February 11, 1999).

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited China to discuss various issues including the TMD issue with China on 1 to 2 March 1999

On the 1 March 1999 during the trip, US State Department spokesman James Rubin said, “The U.S. decided to begin TMD research because of the potential threat of ballistic missiles, such as that posed by North Korea” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 1, 1999).

Moreover, he said, “If China wants to avoid the situation where concern in the region over ballistic missiles grows, it should work with the U.S. to prevent North Korea from advancing its missile program” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 1, 1999).

On the 2 March 1999, Albright told a news conference, “nothing would be more stabilizing for the region than North Korean restraint on missile deployment and testing.” Moreover, “we are concerned generally about the threat of missile proliferation, primarily from North Korea, and I think this is an issue that we have to work on together” (AAP New Speed, March 2, 1999).

However, China rejected her ideas and, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said, “The current situation on the Korean Peninsula on the whole is stable” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 2, 1999).

Furthermore, on the 7 March 1999, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, summed up China's achievements in the diplomacy field and assessed the country's relations with other nations after the visiting with US Secretary of state Albright.

Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, made remarks on the missile defense issue at a press conference held in conjunction with the ongoing session of the National People's Congress on 7 March 1999

He reiterated China's objections to any attempt to include Taiwan in the TMD system. He maintained China's tough opposition to the TMD system despite talks last week on the issue with then visiting US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

It will also exert a negative impact on regional and global strategic balance and stability into the next century. He said “the joint research and development of TMD by the US and Japan would enhance the overall offensive and defensive ability of the US-Japanese military alliance and far exceed legitimate defense needs. “It will harm the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region” (The Straits Times, March 8, 1999).

The speech from foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan resulted in the response from the United States on 8 March 1999.

State Department spokesman Robert Rubin on 8 March 1999 made remarks in commenting on Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan's sharp criticism of the U.S. for its moves on TMD development for Taiwan

Robert Rubin told a news briefing and said, "Instead of worrying about a decision that has not been made to deploy defensive technologies that do not yet exist, the Chinese should focus on the regional and global proliferation of missiles." And "The less there is concern about Chinese missile deployment, the less likely that this development program needs ever materialize" (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1999).

Moreover, "The best way to avoid the problem they are concerned about is for them to work with us to stop the North Korean program from expanding and growing" (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1999).

Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui on 8 March 1999 said TMD participation depends on Chinese missiles

He said, "We are considering many factors in deciding whether to join TMD." referring to the theater missile defense (TMD) scheme being researched by the United States, and noted China's behavior toward Taiwan remains the most significant factor.

"If China doesn't treat us as an enemy, if it abandons its hegemonist attitude and renounces the deployment of missiles on its coasts, then there is basically no need to deploy TMD" (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1999).

China held talks with Russia on opposing TMD on 11 March 1999

China said it has held talks with Russia on the two countries' opposition to U.S.-Japan theater missile defense (TMD) research.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said China and Russia were concerned about U.S.-Japan cooperation in developing a TMD system (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1999).

Zhu said he could not say if any joint action on TMD has been planned between China and Russia. He said, "(The development of) TMD is related to global and regional security and stability. So China and many other countries, including Russia, are seriously concerned over the issue" (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1999).

Chinese Premier Zhu rongji told the press about the TMD issue on 15 March 1999

Premier Zhu Rongji met the press and said "We oppose the TMD and we firmly and particularly opposed to including Taiwan into the TMD" (People's Daily, 16 March 1999).

However, concerning about whether there was any agreement with Russia in the opposition of the TMD issue in last year, he stated that he did not discuss with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy M.

Primakov the question on jointly opposing the TMD system. However, he said, Russia supported china's position on opposing development of TMD. "But we did not have any discussion on this issue" (Xinhua News Agency, March 15, 1999).

China opposed to U.S. antimissile system on 18 March 1999

China reacted negatively to approval by the U.S. Senate of a bill calling for the development of a national missile defense (NMD) system to shield the United States from long-range enemy missile attack.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said, "The NMD 'runs counter to the trend of seeking peace in the post-Cold War world,'" using wording similar to its opposition to another system called the theater missile defense (TMD) being studied by the U.S. and Japan (Japan Economic Newswire, March 18, 1999).

Moreover, he said "It is detrimental to international arms control and disarmament and will have an adverse effect on the global strategic balance for the 21st century" (Japan Economic Newswire, March 18, 1999).

China spokesman said the US missile system would have far-reaching negative impact on 23 March 1999

Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said at a news conference that the bill passed at the US Senate and House of Representatives to build the National Missile Defense (NMD) system not only will directly affect the nuclear disarmament process, but will also have an extensive and far-reaching negative impact on the global strategic balance and stability in the 21st century.

He said, "In addition to possessing the world's largest arsenals of the most advanced nuclear and conventional weapons, the United States is now devoted to developing the NMD and TMD. Recently, the US Senate and House of Representatives also passed the bill of building the NMD. This move runs counter to the trend of seeking peace and promoting development and is against the treaties relevant to nuclear arms control and disarmament. China is seriously concerned about this Chinese" (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 23, 1999).

Taiwan Prime Minister reiterated possibility of joining TMD on 9 April 1999

Premier Vincent Siew reiterated that Taiwan would not rule out the possibility of joining the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system proposed by the United States.

He said, "But this cannot be decided unilaterally by ourselves, nor will our decision on this issue be affected by the opposition of Mainland China" (Central News Agency, April 13, 1999).

He said that Mainland China's military buildup, which poses a great threat to the security of Taiwan, is the main reason for Taiwan to consider joining the TMD.

China, Russia expressed concern over TMD scheme on 14 April 1999

China and Russia Friday expressed concern over the U.S.-proposed Theater Missile Defense

(TMD) program in a joint communiqué on their subcabinet-level talks held Wednesday in Moscow (Jiji Press Ticker Service, 17 April 1999).

The communiqué said the deployment of the TMD system in part of the Asia-Pacific region would escalate tensions in hot spots in the region, indirectly criticizing joint TMD research between Japan and the United States (Jiji Press Ticker Service, 17 April 1999).

China and Russia also said the U.S. National Missile Defense program is in violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (Jiji Press Ticker Service, 17 April 1999).

A report released on 29 April 1999, entitled TMD Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region, outlining concrete details in the deployment of the missile defense in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

The United States was considering four types of theater defense missile (TMD) systems to be deployed in Japan to counter possible missile attacks from North Korea.

The report, which has been submitted to Congress, also disclosed Washington's plans to deploy TMD systems in South Korea and Taiwan. For the latter, the report envisioned the danger of ballistic missile attacks from Mainland China (Japan Economic Newswire, April 30, 1999).

For Taiwan, the report said that either one land-based, upper-tier fire unit with a radar similar to that used by THAAD, or a system similar to NTW using a single position on the ocean could counter any ballistic missile attack from China (Japan Economic Newswire, April 30, 1999).

China expressed strong displeasure with and resolute opposition to the incorporation of Taiwan into the US Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system after the release of the report on 29 April 1999

China foreign ministry spokesman Zhu bangzao said, "it is purely an internal affair of china and no foreign country has the right of interfere" (Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1999).

The report, however, again spreads the so-call china's missile threat to Taiwan and dish up the so-called option to include Taiwan into TMD in an attempt to whip up public opinions and find pretext for selling more sophisticated weapons to Taiwan. He said, "the move has violated the principles set forth in the US-China August 17 communiqué and constituted a serious interference of china's internal affairs" (Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1999).

Moreover, "we urge the US side to observe the principles set in the three Sino-US joint communiqués and relevant commitments made by the US side, stop the sales of more advanced weapons to Taiwan, make explicit commitment not to transfer TMD and relevant technologies and equipment to Taiwan, and not do anything that may impede china's reunification." he stressed (Xinhua News Agency, May 6, 1999).

Russian, Chinese military chiefs opposed US anti-missile system plans on 10 June 1999

Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian of China's Central

Military Committee have expressed their opposition to US plans for the development of two missile defense systems.

On the planned US development of NMD and TMD systems, Zhang said the US move runs against the trend of the times and will have a major adverse impact on global and regional strategic balances and stability. China was gravely concerned about the US efforts in pursuing these systems.

Zhang said, “any country's supply of TMD systems to China's Taiwan province, or attempt to include Taiwan in its TMD plans in any form, or directly or indirectly put China's Taiwan into the sphere of Japan-US security cooperation, will be considered moves that seriously infringe on China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and grave interference into China's internal affairs, and will be confronted with strong opposition from all the Chinese people” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 12, 1999).

China reiterated stand on the missile defense system on 27 November 1999

Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi stated that China's stand on the TMD and NMD systems had not changed. However, it should be particularly emphasized that if the United States and some of its military allies engaged in the TMD system, which exceeded the normal self-defense requirement. Also, he reiterated that the TMD system announced by the United States did not conform with the trends of the development of the times, and that it was harmful to the international efforts exerted to military control and disarmament. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 27, 1999).

US President planned to spend more money on the NMD on 11 January 2000

US President Bill Clinton will ask Congress in his 2001 budget for an increase of 2.2 billion US dollars in spending to develop the NMD. (Xinhua News Agency, January 11, 2000)

China condemned the US missile program would be harmful on 13 January 2000

Zhu said, “Such move goes against the tide of our times and is detrimental to the global efforts of arms control and disarmament.” Moreover, He said, “we urged relevant countries to seriously consider the strong call from the international community and abandon the above-mentioned anti-missile development programs” (Xinhua News Agency, January 13, 2000).

China urged the US to abandon NMD on 20 January 2000

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said, “We have always maintained that as the country with the strongest military power in the world, the violation of the ABM treaty and the anti-missile defense system will do not good to the global and regional strategic balance” (Agence France Presse, January 20, 2000). Moreover, he added, “we urge the relevant country to approach the will of the international community in real earnest, think before it takes action and abandon the above mentioned plans [the second missile test]” (Agence France Presse, January 20, 2000).

China regarded the US missile plan as “dangerous” on 11 May 2000

A Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhang echoed comments made earlier by Ministry’s Director General for arms control Sha Zukang. Sha warned China could take measures to increase its small arsenal of nuclear weapons – estimated at 20 to 30 warheads – if the United States goes through with its national missile defense plan. Moreover, he said, “we will still wait and see what kind of equipment and technologies the US side will develop with regard to TMD/NMD and then we will make our decision on the basis of analysis of his information” (Japan Economic Newswire, May 11, 2000)

Furthermore, he said, “it is our view that the inclusion of TMD systems by any country or the sales of TMD-related technologies to Taiwan will all constitute gross violation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity and will inevitably meet with the strong opposition of the Chinese people” (Japan Economic Newswire, May 11, 2000).

US claimed that the missile defense system was not aimed at China and Russia on 17 May 2000

US Defense Secretary Cohen said, “I would say to China, and to Russia, that this is not directed against them” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 17, 2000).

“Our goal is to protect us against the kind of nations that would try to intimidate us or blackmail us from carrying out our international responsibilities as we did during the Gulf War” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 17, 2000).

China backed Russian objections to US nuclear shield plan on 5 June 2000

On 4 June 2000, Russian President Putin described NMD as “a cure worse than the diseases” and Chinese leadership represented their support of the objection to the US missile defense system after the talks between US President Clinton and Russia President Putin (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 5, 2000).

Russian threatened to break off disarmament process over NMD plans on 11 June 2000

Russian President Putin on 10 June 2000 threatened that Russia would break off the disarmament process if the United States continued to pursue plans for a new National Missile Defense system. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 11, 2000).

The resumption of talk between US and China officials after the bombing of Chinese Embassy on 8 May 2000

Fourteen months after the resumption of normality, the missile defense issue was again put on the table for discussion. On 8 July, near the timing of the resumption of normality in military relations between the United States and China, senior US official John Holum, undersecretary of state for arms control, delivered a bad news to China when report asked him whether the United States would include Taiwan in missile defense, he said, “We don’t rule out the possibility that some time in the future Taiwan may have [theater missile defense] capabilities” (The Washington Post, July 9,

2000).

New U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen, walked to a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian after a welcome ceremony in Beijing. The trip was mainly for talking about the missile defense for the first time since the bombing of the Chinese Embassy. Chi said, “We firmly believe that with the deployment of the American National Missile Defense Program, it will certainly affect the security of China”(CNN, July 13, 2000), and “So it is in that connection I can tell you China will not sit on one hand”.

Russia President Putin made his first visit to China on 17 July 2000

The visit provided an opportunity for Putin, who is in China for the first time since he became Russian President in May, to build personal ties with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders (The Straits Times, July 18, 2000).

Washington's plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and a Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system are set to take center-stage in Putin's summit with Mr Jiang (The Straits Times, July 18, 2000).

During his three-day visit here, Putin is also scheduled to meet Mr Li Peng, the head of the National People's Congress and Premier Zhu Rongji (The Straits Times, July 18, 2000).

Chinese President Jiang Zemin and his Russian President Vladimir Putin on 18 July 2000 issued a strong condemnation of US plans for missile defense shields

Chinese President Ziang Zemin and visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin extended their strategic partnership by signing joint statement opposing the proposed US national missile defense (NMD) system and supporting each other's policies on Taiwan and Chechnya (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000).

President Putin warned that Russia and China will “react appropriately” if the United States goes ahead without consultation and builds a missile defense (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000).

The statement warned the US that including Taiwan in the TMD system would “seriously undermine regional stability” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000).

Moreover, China and Russia “firmly opposed” NMD and urged adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty, which was vital to international agreements on arms control and reduction (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000).

Putin said, “I think neither Russia nor China will just stand aside, and we will try to maintain this balance”(Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 18, 2000).

Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan on 27 July 2000 blasted the U.S. proposal to develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system in Asia, setting the stage for a wave of opposition against the missile shield system at the start of a ministerial forum in Bangkok on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Foreign ministers from 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their counterparts from 12 other countries, including Japan, the United States, Russia and China, plus the European Union are taking part in the forum.

The Cold War mentality is still affecting the way some countries perceive world politics and international relations,” Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said in a speech at the opening session of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

“Some people are hawking the Theatre Missile Defense program against the tide of our times,” he said, referring to the US regional missile defense system. “Such developments are compromising the regional confidence-building effects and aggravating the instability of regional security” (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov said, “the US plan to develop the National Missile Defense (NMD) are a matter of deep concern,” he told delegates from 22 nations and the European Union, adding that the TMD was of equal concern (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

“As a result of NMD, further strategic offensive arms reduction would become impossible and the entire system of arms reduction and limitation agreements would be revised (and) would inevitably lead to a new arms race” (Japan Economic Newswire, July 27, 2000).

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said on July 30 2000 conference in Tokyo that the Clinton Administration had "not yet made any decision" on missile defense options. (Albright's July 30 press availability in Tokyo)

In response to the issue of NMD and TMD, She said, “President Clinton would be making a decision “within the near future based on four criteria, which are (1) the threat, (2) whether the technology works, (3) the cost of the technology, and (4) its effect generally on the international security environment and arms control issues.” Moreover, “as far as TMD is concerned, or BMD as people like to call it here, we will obviously continue to work on that together”(US Dept of State, July 30, 2000).

Jiang likely to slam TMD, NMD in upcoming United Nations Millennium Summit, said by Chinese foreign minister on 31 August 2000

Chinese President Jiang Zemin will likely express China's opposition to the U.S.-Japan theater missile defense (TMD) system and the proposed U.S. national missile defense (NMD) system during his brief speech at the U.N. Millennium Summit in New York on 7 September 2000, a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official said on 31 August 2000 (Japan Economic Newswire, August 31, 2000).

“In (Jiang's) address, he might bring up a new security concept, mainly stressing that in the post-Cold War world...there are still certain countries which seek so-called absolute security for themselves, and are speeding up the development and deployment of advanced antimissile systems” Li Baodong said. (Japan Economic Newswire, August 31, 2000).

. Li also said Jiang “could very likely” discuss TMD and NMD in his bilateral meetings with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, and Russian President

Vladimir Putin, who were among the more than 150 world leaders planning to attend the 6-8 September UN summit ([Japan Economic Newswire](#), August 31, 2000).

US President Bill Clinton announced that he would delay the development of missile defense on 1 September 2000

People's Daily said, "US President Bill Clinton announced in a speech at Georgetown University that he will leave to his successor the decision on beginning the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system because there is not yet enough confidence in technology and the effectiveness of the system" ([People's Daily](#), September 3, 2000).

Moreover, he said "We need this time to determine whether the system -- if deployed -- would enhance national security" ([CNN](#), September 1, 2000).

Furthermore, he said, "In time I hope the United States can narrow our differences with Russia on this issue and the decision I have made also gives the United States time to answer our allies' questions and consult further on the path ahead" ([CNN](#), September 1, 2000).

Appendix Two

The Important speeches and official material of the Missile Defense (MD) Issue between US and China during the George W. Bush presidency

US Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush reiterated that he might provide Taiwan with the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system on 21 November 1999.

President Candidate Bush on 21 November 1999 reiterated that the United States would honor its commitment to defend Taiwan in case of a mainland Chinese attack during his tenure if he were elected and hinted that he might provide Taiwan with the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system.

He said, "whether we own it or Taiwan owns it, whether we own it or Japan owns it, it is not a matter of ownership, it's a matter of ownership, it's matter of deployment, it's a matter of convincing people not to launch missiles against our friends"([Central News Agency](#), November 22, 1999).

In early January 2001, President-elect Bush's nominee for defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, hinted that the United States government would seek active development of missile defense

On 11 January 2001, he said in a confirmation hearing "Effective missile defense, not only homeland defense but also the ability to defend US allies abroad and our friends, must be achieved in the most-effective manner that modern technology offers" ([Japan Economic Newswire](#), 11 January 2001).

"The American people, our forces abroad and our friends and allies must be protected against the threats which modern technology and its proliferation confront us" he said. ([Japan Economic Newswire](#), 11 January 2001).

Moreover he said, "This isn't the old Star Wars idea of a shield that'll keep everything off of everyone in the world." "It is something that in the beginning stages is designed to persuade people they're not going to be able to blackmail and intimidate the United States and its friends and allies"

(Newsday, January 12, 2001).

Concerning about the TMD, he said, “In light of the widespread deployment of ballistic missiles today, I believe it is imperative that the Department (of Defense) develop, test, procure and deploy TMD systems ... in a timely and efficient manner” (US Dept of State , January 12, 2001).

China expressed serious concerns about US plans for the deployment of NMD

On 16 January 2001, China Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao response to the US President-elect Bush urging the development of NMD.

“The United States is the country with the largest and most sophisticated nuclear and conventional arsenals and now it is engaging in TMD and NMD” (Agence France Presse, January 16, 2001).

Moreover, he said,” we hope that relevant country will listen to the just call of the international community, strictly abide by the ABM treaty and give up at the early date their plan that will undermine that global strategic balance” (Agence France Presse, January 16, 2001).

National Security Adviser-designate Condoleezza Rice said that President-elect Bush would review U.S. troop deployments in various parts of the world "in the context of our alliances" and in consultation with allies on missile defense issue on 17 January 2001

Rice said that “with allies and friends you will always be committed to talk and consult and try to understand each other and where possible move toward agreement” (US Dept of State, January 18, 2001).

On NMD, she said the President-elect “has set as one of the criteria for any national missile defense that it has to protect not just us but our allies. He does not want a decoupling. This will take diplomacy. I think it also probably takes understanding the entire complex of nuclear issues”, including proliferation concerns. “So we're in a different world than we were when the American nuclear arsenal faced off against the Soviet threat of thousands of nuclear warheads. The threats are different, and we'll take some time with our allies and friends and, indeed, with other interested parties, including the Russians, to talk about this new world and to figure out how to address it in an intelligent way” (US Dept of State, January 18, 2001).

Russian Army vowed Intensive steps if US quitted ABM Treaty on 6 February 2001

Russia is closely watching the US actions over the 1972 ABM treaty and will intensive steps if the United States quitted the treaty, said by Russian Air Force Commander Anatoly Kornukov (People's Daily, February 7, 2001).

He said, “Russia keeps meticulous and strict observance of the treaty, but we are already prepared for an adequate response to the US withdrawal from” (People's Daily, February 7, 2001).

“The US's quitting the treaty will not help international détente and will lead to confrontation. Such a step will not find understanding among allies and friends of Washington”(People's Daily, February 7, 2001).

He warned if the Pentagon “speeds up the implementation of the NMD program, the Russian side will surely take adequate and practical actions” (People’s Daily, February 7, 2001).

Concerning about the TMD program, he said if the US insisted on establishing TMD, Russia will “take appropriate steps and help its friend in the region” (People’s Daily, February 7, 2001).

US Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted US determination on missile shield on 9 February 2001

He vowed Washington would consult with its allies as well as Russia and China to listen to their concerns but said the administration’s position was firm.

He said, “I don’t consider it as being an arrogant position or one where we are trying to force anything on the rest of the world” (People’s Daily, February 10, 2001).

US Secretary of State Powell met Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to discuss issues on NMD system on 24 February 2001

Powell met Ivanov at the neutral venue of a Cairo Hotel on February 24, 2001 to discuss a wide range of issues including the NMD issue.

At the beginning of the meeting, Powell said, “this is the beginning of the engagement between the Bush administration and the Putin administration” (Agence France Presse, February 24, 2001). Ivanov also committed Russia to maintaining a dialogue with the United States on the controversial missile plan saying, “we are ready to build a constructive dialogue between our countries in the interest of our states and of the international community and will support this dialogue in the future” (Agence France Presse, February 24, 2001).

However, differences over the NMD system remained unsolved, the two leaders said. Powell, however, termed the first face-to-face talks with Ivanov since the new U.S. Administration took office on January 20, as “excellent” and looked “forward to many such meetings in the future” (Xinhua News Agency, February 24, 2001).

China’s Defense Budget vowed to rise by 17.6 Percent from last year on 6 March 2001

Chinese Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng said China would increase its defense expenditures for national defense by 25.2 billion yuan this year, an increase of 17.6 percent from last year (People’s Daily, March 6, 2001).

He said China will appropriately increase expenditures for national defense to utilize modern technology, especially high technology to raise the arm’s defense and combat capabilities, safeguard the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and adapt to changes in the international situation (People’s Daily, March 6, 2001).

China urged US to hold in-depth talks on missile defense system on 14 March 2001

Sha Zukang, director-general of arms control disarmament for the foreign ministry, said “we are ready to have discussions and dialogue with the Americans”. But when talking about the NMD issue,

he said “from a technical point of view NMD would certainly have the capability of compromising China’s nuclear deterrence” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 14, 2001).

Concerning about the TMD issue, he said, “China is not against TMD per se, as it does not violate international conventions and the protection of US forces is legitimate, but if TMD becomes a large deployment and extension of NMD, then the consequence will be just as serious as NMD” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 14, 2001).

Moreover, “though research and development of TMD itself may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM treaty.” Moreover, he added “the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of the TMD that the US is preparing to deploy in Asia” (People’s Daily, March 15, 2001).

Concerning about the NMD, he said, “we have a love-hate relationship but we do have a lot of common interests, we want to be friends. It seems to me that they have the same good intention” (Financial Times, March 15, 2001).

On 22 March 2001, China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen met President George Bush in the United States

Bush said, “I’m confident that we have common ground.... We can have good relations with China. I want to lay the foundation for 30 years from now, taking a long-term view” (US Dept of State, March 22, 2001).

According to the U.S. official, the two leaders discussed the World Trade Organization, human rights, and regional security issues, among other things. President Bush, the official said, assured Qian that “Nothing we do is a threat to you, and I want you to tell that to your leadership” (US Dept of State, March 22, 2001).

Concerning about the Taiwan issue, a senior administrative official said, “As the President said, as you heard in the meeting there, the President reaffirmed our commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and our obligations under it”. Moreover, about the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, he said. “no, we have no -- we didn't get into -- we do not discuss the details of arms sales, and we did not” (US Dept of State, March 22, 2001).

Furthermore, the senior administrative official said he did not want to go into details about the missile defense issue, but admitted that they have talked about this during the meeting (US Dept of State, March 22, 2001).

The collision of Chinese and US airplanes on 1 April 2001 (Chinese time)

According to the statement by the U.S. Pacific Command, at approximately 8:15 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Saturday, March 31, in international waters, a U.S. Navy EP-3 maritime patrol aircraft on a routine surveillance mission over the South China Sea was intercepted by two PRC fighter aircraft. There was contact between one of the Chinese aircraft and the EP-3, causing sufficient damage for the US plane to issue a “Mayday” signal and divert to an airfield on Hainan Island, PRC (US Dept of State, April 1, 2001).

President George Bush called on the Beijing government to arrange the prompt return of the US crew and aircraft after the incident. He said “ We have allowed the Chinese government time to do the right thing. But now it is time for our servicemen and women to return home. And it is time for the Chinese government to return our plane” (US Dept of State, April 3, 2001).

In remarks to the press during an April 10 photo opportunity with King Abdullah of Jordan, President Bush said, “I am making it clear to the Chinese that it is in their nation interests to end this situation as quickly as possible (US Dept of States, April 12, 2001).

Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed that surveillance is essential to protect US national security. On the other hand, he said, “Because when you apologize, you are suggesting you did something wrong. You’re accepting responsibility for something that you don’t believe you have responsibility for” (CBS News, April 8, 2001). Also, “the relationship is being damaged and so we’ve got to bring this matter to a close as soon as possible” (Reuters English News Service, April 9, 2001).

According to the responses from the Chinese foreign Ministry, Zhu Bangzao said, “A US military surveillance plane bumped into and damaged a Chinese military jet over the South China Sea.” Moreover, “The US side should bear all the responsibility arising therefrom” (People’s Daily, April 3, 2001).

On the next day, Zhu also said “Such acts of the US side constituted an infringement on China’s sovereignty and airspace” (People’s Daily, April 4, 2001). Suffice it to say China reacted strongly against the act of US and was not willing to release those aircraft crewmembers from the US as well as the EP-3 stationed on the Chinese airport on Hainan Island.

One month after the outbreak of the incident, President Bush, in a major speech at the National Defense University, said “US must move beyond the constraints of the 1972 the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia and committed the United States to building a defense against ballistic missile attack, also would not allow a Cold War-era arms treaty to stand in the way” (People’s Daily, May 2., 2001).

US refused to sell Arleigh Burke class destroyers with Aegis radar system to Taiwan on 24 April 2001

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters that the United States will make available to Taiwan “up to eight diesel submarines, four Kidd-class destroyers, 12 P-3s” (US Dept of State, April 24, 2001).

He said, “It was based on his (President) assessment and the assessment of his national security team about the threat that is posed to Taiwan by China. And that includes all the military operations of China, including the missiles that are located across the strait” (US Dept of State, April 24, 2001).

Asking why the United States deferred a decision on including in the package Nay ships equipped with the advanced Aegis radar system, he said, “the way the process works is Taiwan always has the right to come back and request and suggest” (US Dept of State, April 24, 2001).

Bush vowed that US must move beyond constraints of ABM on 1 May 2001

In a major speech at the National Defense University, Bush committed that the United States to building a defense against ballistic missile defense, and indicated that he would not allow a Cold War era arms treaty to stand in his way.

He said, “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defense to counter the different threats of today’s world, to do so we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty” (US Dept of State, May 1, 2001).

He said the treaty “does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies, is in our interests or in the interests of world peace” (US Dept of State, May 1, 2001).

The president said that he was committed to achieving a “credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies.” Moreover, he said that he would “move quickly” to reduce nuclear forces and the United States “will lead by example, to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world” (US Dept of State, May 1, 2001).

Bush said the he would “reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia,” and he hoped that Russia and the United States would work together to develop a new foundation for world peace in the 21st century.

China was willing to hold missile talks with US envoy on 10 May 2001

China was willing to negotiate with the United States on the issue of the Theatre Missile Defense System (TMD) and the National Missile Defense System (NMD), Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said in Beijing Thursday at a regular news briefing.

He said, “if the United States decides to send a special envoy here, we are willing to have consultations on the issue” (People’s Daily, May 11, 2001).

“If such a treaty is undermined, no matter whether it is NMD or TMD, global strategic equilibrium and stability will be undermined and international disarmament process will be hindered, nonproliferation efforts will be obstructed and a new round of military arms race will be caused” (Agence France Presse, May 10, 2001).

China vowed that its stance on NMD would not change on 15 May 2001

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said, “China’s opposition to the US NMD (national missile defense) program is consistent and will not change, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sun Yuxi said” (People’s Daily, May 16, 2001).

He also that in a sense China objects more to the TMD, because such a program aims to enhance military alliance, exceeds the needs of a justifiable defense, poses a threat to surrounding countries, and undermines the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific Region in particular. The intention of including Taiwan in TMD constitutes direct interference in China's internal affairs (People’s Daily,

May 16, 2001).

Wolfowitz says US will move beyond ABM treaty on 12 July 2001

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Services Committee July 12, 2001 that the Bush administration intended to develop layered missile defenses “capable of intercepting missiles of any range at every stage of flight” (US Dept of State, July 12, 2001).

He said there would be no distinction between National Missile Defense and Theatre Missile Defense.

Bush Says Won't Change Positions on Missile Defense on 16 July 2001

“US President George W. Bush made clear that he would stick to his controversial positions on missile defense and global warming during his second European trip this week” (People's Daily, July 17, 2001).

Moreover, “Bush said on both issues, I have made my position clear. People shouldn't doubt where the United States stands” (People's Daily, July 17, 2001).

On missile defense, Bush said, “In principle, it's important for us to develop a new strategic framework to make the world more peaceful” (People's Daily, July 17, 2001).

“We will continue to consult with Great Britain on the issue. And I think British Prime Minister Tony Blair and others are beginning to realize that the Cold War is over” (People's Daily, July 17, 2001).

Bolton said US seek new strategic framework with Russia on 24 July 2001

Under Secretary of State John Bolton said the Bush administration is seeking to move away from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War toward a cooperative relationship with Russia and new strategic framework not based on mutually assured destruction (US Dept of State, July 24, 2001).

President Bush and Russian President Putin, in their bilateral meeting following the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Genoa, “has reached an understanding that the world has changed, and they would immediately begin intensive consultations on missile defenses and offensive systems” (US Dept of State, July 24, 2001).

“We need to accept that the treaty is fundamentally in conflict with the administration's approach to the development of missile defenses and ABM is no longer appropriate to future relationship we want with Russia” (US Dept of State, July 24, 2001). However, Russia still opposed to the NMD issue after the meeting with President Bush.

US National Security met China to discuss the NMD issue on 3 September 2001

“The US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice would come to China soon to negotiate with China on issues like NMD and to brief China its latest idea on NMD” (People's Daily, September 3, 2001).

The United States said it would like to hold intensive discussions with China on Missile Defense.

Moreover, “our consultations with China will make clear that the U.S. missile defense program does not threaten China but seeks to counter limited missile threats from rogue states and the danger of accidental or unauthorized launches,” according to the statement issued by the White House Office of the Press Secretary (US Dept of State, September 4, 2001).

Unfortunately, the United States was attacked by terrorists on 11 September; that stopped all of the military contacts between the United States and China including discussions on the test on the national missile defense.

Appendix Three

Important speeches and official documents of the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis during President Clinton presidency

President Bush's authorization of the sale of 150 US-made F-16 fighters to Taiwan on 2 September 1992

In a speech on September 2, 1992 at the General Dynamics factory in Fort Worth that produces the aircraft, Bush noted that “after decades of confrontation, great strides have been made in reducing tensions between Taipei and Beijing” (US Dept of State, September 3, 1992).

Bush said, “the United States has provided Taiwan with sufficient defensive capabilities to sustain the confidence it needs to reduce these tensions. And that same sense of security has underpinned Taiwan's dramatic evolution toward democracy” (US Dept of State, September 8, 1992).

“And my decision today does not change the commitment of this administration and its predecessors to the three communiqués with the People's Republic of China. We keep our word. Our One-China policy, our recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. I've always stressed that the importance of the 1982 communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan lies in its promotion of common political goals -- peace and stability in the area through mutual restraint.” Bush said (US Dept of State, September 3, 1992).

China strongly opposed to the arms sales from US to Taiwan on 3 September 1992

In an angry protest against the Bush Administration's decision to sell up to 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, China threatened to withdraw from international arms control talks and cut cooperation with Washington at the United Nations.

Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu said, “this will lead to a major retrogression in Sino-US relations and will inevitably cause a negative impact on Sino-US cooperation in the United Nations and other international organizations” (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1992).

“The Chinese government solemnly demands that the United States revoke its erroneous decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Pending a reversal of this decision by the U.S. side, China would find it difficult to stay in the meeting of the five (permanent members of the UN Security Council) on arms control issues.” he said. (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1992).

“If the US side should insist on having its own way, the Chinese government and people will have no choice but to make a strong reaction and the US government will be held responsible for all

the serious consequences arising therefrom” (Los Angeles Times, September 4, 1992).

Moreover, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told reporters that “The Chinese government has already launched the strongest protest to the US government and will also stress the US government should be held accountable for any serious consequences arising therefrom” (Los Angeles Times, September 3, 1992).

United States planned to sell twelve anti-submarine helicopters to Taiwan on 21 September 1992

The US Defense Department said it intended to sell 12 SH-2F “Lamps” helicopters and spare parts to Taiwan for around 161 million dollars.

The Pentagon tried to justify the new sale by saying it “will not affect the basic military balance in the region” (Japan Economic Newswire, September 22, 1992).

China denounced a United States plan to sell 12 anti-submarine helicopters to Taiwan on 25 September 1992

A statement released immediately after a meeting between Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on the sidelines of the 47th United Nations General Assembly in New York that focused almost exclusively on the F-16 jet fighter deal.

Chinese Foreign ministry Qian Qichen said, “the US Government has repeatedly violated the Sino-US Communiqué of August 17, 1982, by continuously selling large quantities of arms to Taiwan and its acts are absolutely unacceptable as they constitute an infringement of China's sovereignty and interference in China's internal affairs” (South China Morning Post, September 26, 1992).

“The Chinese Government strongly demands the US Government revoke these wrong decisions. Otherwise the US side would be held responsible for all serious consequences arising therefrom” (South China Morning Post, September 26, 1992).

China in December 1992 purchased more arms from Russia in response to US arms sales to Taiwan

In response to the arms sales to Taiwan from the United States, China signed an agreement with Russia to buy Su-27s in 1992 (Sheng, 2001, p.111).

A scholar said during Boris Yeltsin’s trip to Beijing in December 1992, “Yeltsin stated that China had brought US\$1.8 billion of arms from Russia, including twenty-six Su-27 fighter aircraft and then IL-76 heavy transport planes. China also purchased four batteries of S-300 high altitude surface-to-air missiles. Since then, it was reported that China had secured two to four Kilo-class conventional submarines and another batch of twenty-four Su-27s” (Cheng, 1995, p.27).

The Clinton administration’s decision on 7 September 1994 to expand official ties with Taiwan raised another confrontation between the United States and China.

On 7 September 1994, Washington announced a modest change in Taiwan policy. During a background briefing at the State Department, a senior US official emphasized that the US “is trying to

promote and strengthen our unofficial economic and commercial ties by lifting the level of exchanges and visits and changing the nature of settings for those kinds of issues” (US Dept of State, September 7, 1994).

He said, “the United States is committed to maintaining unofficial commercial, culture and other contacts with people with Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act facilitates that contact in a legally binding way” (US Dept of State, September 7, 1994).

Specifically, the United States was willing to establish “a subcabinet economic dialogue” with Taiwan through the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan. Moreover, “we will permit high-level US government officials from economic and technical agencies to visit Taiwan and we will make adjustments as to what level of visitor is necessary for our interests” (US Dept of State, September 7, 1994).

Chinese condemned the US policy adjustments on the Taiwan issue on 9 September 1994

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang said the United States “has seriously violated the three joint communiqués between China and the United States” (The New York Times, September 9, 1994).

Moreover he said, “This act of the United States brazenly interferes with the internal affairs of China and is something we are firmly opposed to and this will seriously, adversely affect the further development of bilateral relations” (The New York Times, September 9, 1994).

Vice Premier Qian Qichen attacked the United States for adjusting its policy on the Taiwan issue on 13 September 1994 and the US leadership replied on the oppositions.

Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen attacked Washington’s violation on three Sino-US joint communiqués consequent upon the upgrading unofficial ties with Taiwan, and said “We show our grave concern over the US government adjusting its policy on the Taiwan issue” (South China Morning Post, September 14, 1994).

However, China also at the same time took another step to signal that it wanted to improve its relation with Washington and repeated an invitation to President Clinton to visit China (South China Morning Post, September 14, 1994).

US Under-Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff said, “the highest authority of the country would like to reiterate that the US government will stick to the one China policy and the principles enshrined in the three joint communiqués” (South China Morning Post, September 14, 1994).

House of Representatives and the Senate submitted a joint resolution demanding the administration allow President Lee to travel to Cornell University to receive an honorary degree on 6 March 1995

Some 39 members of the House of Representatives and the Senate submitted a joint resolution demanding the administration allow President Lee to travel to Cornell University to receive an honorary degree. The non-binding resolution urged the government to allow President Lee to stop

over in Alaska in September to address US and Taiwanese businessmen (Financial Time, March 8, 1995).

The US State Department allowed the Taiwanese President Li Teng-Hui entered the US to attend an alumni reunion at Cornell University on 22 May 1995

State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns said, “President Li will visit the US in a strictly private capacity and will not undertake any official activities. It is important to reiterate that this is not an official visit. The granting of a visa in this case is consistent with U.S. policy of maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan” (US Dept of State, May 22, 1995)

“It does not convey any change in our relations with or policies toward the People's Republic of China with which we maintain official relations and recognize as the sole legal government of China. We will continue to abide by the three communiqués that form the basis of our relations with China. The United States also acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China” (US Dept of State, May 22, 1995).

“Any future requests will be considered on a case-by-case basis and we will be open to requests that pertain completely to the unofficial nature of our relations with Taiwan. We will, however, not approve visits which we feel are inconsistent with the unofficial nature of our relations with Taiwan. And in discussing this, I'm not just talking about President Li but about possible visits by other members of the Taiwanese leadership” (US Dept of State, May 22, 1995).

China blasted the US moves to allow the Taiwanese President visited the US on 23 May 1995

The Chinese Government summoned the American Ambassador Stapleton Roy and demanded that the United States reversed its decision to allow Taiwan's President to visit the United States next month.

China foreign minister Qian Qichen, said, “We solemnly urge the US administration to seriously consider the consequences of allowing Lee's visit and immediately reverse its erroneous decision” (The Independent (London), May 24, 1995). Moreover, he added, “if the United States mistakenly appraises the situation and clings obstinately to this course, it will certainly bring serious damage to China-US relations and the United States will bear full responsibility for the consequences” (The Independent (London), May 24, 1995).

Chinese military ended US tour as a signal to retaliate US's adjustment policy on Taiwan on 23 May 1995

A Chinese military team cut short an American tour as a result of Washington's decision to let Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui visit the US next month (Financial Times (London), May 24, 1995).

Lieutenant-General Yu Zhenwu, the air force chief of staff, and six other military officials were ordered to return to Beijing. The delegation, summoned home four days before the end of their trip, were supposed to tour several U.S. Air Force bases and meet with U.S. Air Force General Ronald Fogelman from May 17 to 27 (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 24, 1995).

China cancelled trip to US in protest over visit by Lee on May 30 to 31 1995

China on 25 May, 1995 announced to cancel a senior official's US visit late this month in protest at Washington's decision to grant an entry permit to President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. Li Guixian, senior adviser to the State Council and a former central bank governor, will not go ahead with his May 30-31 visit (Financial Times (London), May 26, 1995).

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said, "If the US side still refrains from returning to the correct course of the three Sino-US joint communiqués, China will make further response" (Agence France Presse, May 25, 1995).

"However, I feel quite sure in saying that if the United States clings to its erroneous decision, serious harm will be inflicted on Sino-US relations" (Agence France Presse, May 25, 1995).

China's defense minister postpones U.S. trip on 26 May 1995

China postponed a scheduled US visit next month by Defense Minister and State Councilor Chi Haotian.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said, "The U.S. has infringed upon China's sovereignty, violated the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués and brought serious damage to Sino-U.S. relations. The Chinese government therefore decided to postpone Chi's visit to the US" (Japan Economic Newswire, May 26, 1995).

China suspended talks with the United States on the control of missile technology and cooperation on nuclear energy on 28 May 1995

Foreign minister spokesman Shen Guofang, said talks between Sino-US experts on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and nuclear energy cooperation had been postponed. Moreover, he said visits to China by the director of the US arms control and disarmament agency John Holum, in June and Thomas McNamara, deputy assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs, in July have also been put off (Agence France Presse, May 28, 1995).

He said the United States "infringed upon China's sovereignty, violated the principles of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués and brought serious damage to Sino-U.S. relations" (The Washington Post, May 29, 1995).

Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui arrived the United States on 8 June 1995

Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui left Taipei with his wife after an official farewell for an unofficial trip to the United States (Financial Times (London), June 8, 1995).

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said "punitive steps being contemplated against the US for fostering the visit would have a detrimental effect on China's economic and trading relations with the US" (South China Morning Post, June 9, 1995).

"The negative effects will far outweigh the steps taken by the Chinese side so far. In the long run there will be visible effects." he said (South China Morning Post, June 9, 1995).

"A skin disease is visible but less serious than a cancer you cannot see. This problem will

influence all areas.” Shen said (South China Morning Post, June 9, 1995).

The Taiwan Affairs Office and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) jointly declared that the second Koo-Wang meeting would be indefinitely postponed on 16 June 1995

China postponed a high-level meeting with Taiwan, tentatively scheduled for around July 20, to protest Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's recent visit to the United States, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said (Xinhua News Agency, June 16, 1995).

The Council of State's Taiwan Office saying that Taiwan bore sole responsibility for the cancellation. The meeting, between Koo Chen-Fu, the chairman of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and Wang Daohan, the chairman of China's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), had been scheduled to take place in mid-July (Xinhua News Agency, June 16, 1995).

The spokesman said, “recently, Lee Teng-hui and the anti-china forces in the United States collaborated with each other. They spent a great deal of the Taiwan people's money to make contacts and make lee's so-called “private visit” to the us possible so as to engage openly in for the activity of creating “two Chinas”, or “one China, one Taiwan”” (Xinhua News Agency, June 16, 1995).

The first meeting between Koo and Wong had taken place in Singapore in 1993 and there had been hope of a second round of dialogue.

China called back its US Ambassador to Beijing on 17 June 1995

China today recalled its Ambassador Li Daoyu for consultations in Beijing, asserting that Washington changed its policy toward China when it allowed President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan to make a private visit to the United States last week (The New York Times, June 17, 1995).

In announcing the decision in Beijing, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, “The Chinese Government has decided to recall Ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu to report on his work in view of the current state of Sino-U.S. relations” (The New York Times, June 17, 1995).

China announced that it would conduct missile tests near Taiwan on 19 July 1995

Basically the missile tests could be phased into three stages. The first phase started from 21 and ended in 26 of July 1995, it is a kind of surface-to-surface missile test, code-named “95-Ziqiang”. This test was only 50 kilometers from Taiwan-controlled Pengchia Yu Island and 150 kilometers north of Taipei. Six surface-to-surface missiles were tested (Sheng, 2001 p.28).

Further to the July missile tests, China continued to have missile test in August. The Straits Times, 17 August 1995, reported that “China is carrying out its second series of missile tests, which is expected to last until August 25, to protest Taiwan President Lee's Teng-hui's visit to the United States.” The second missile test and artillery test, code-named “95-Zizhu”, was conducted from 15 to 25 August by the PLA Navy's East China Sea Fleet, the Navy's air force, and the Second Artillery Corps. The test site was about one-sixth the size of Taiwan, in a sea area 136 kilometers north of

Taiwan.

The third missile test was in mid-October 1995, the PLA conducted combined air and sea exercises, with rocket and missile launches from navy vessels, flyovers by fighter planes and helicopters, as well as manoeuvres by a nuclear submarine in the East China Sea.

US queried China's missile tests near Taiwan on 19 June 1995

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said the upcoming tests were of "great interest" to the United States but declined to comment on them, saying US officials knew little about China's plans. He said they would be in contact with the Chinese "shortly" through the US embassy in Beijing but suggested that Washington had no immediate plan to lodge a formal protest (Agence France Presse, June 19, 1995).

"We intend to discuss with the Chinese government the purpose of these tests, and the length and duration of these tests, and are seeking more information from the Chinese government on them" (Agence France Presse, June 19, 1995).

"Given the nature of how we want to deal with the Chinese, we want to deal in a very professional, stable manner," Burns said (Agence France Presse, June 19, 1995).

Moreover, "We want to give them a chance to let us know what they're doing ... and to assure ourselves that we have sufficient information to form an opinion on them" (Agence France Presse, June 19, 1995).

US rejected ideas on banning visas to Taiwanese officials before the summit meeting at late October 1995.

US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said the United States would reject any Chinese proposal for a formal fourth communiqué committing the United States to banning visas to Taiwanese officials (The Daily Yomiuri, September 20, 1995). Moreover, he added, "We cannot give an ironclad promise, nor should we give an ironclad promise, that we will not issue a visa at some point in the future to Taiwanese who wish to enter the United States for official, private or personal reasons" (The Daily Yomiuri, September 20, 1995).

"Who gets American visas will be determined by the United States and by American diplomats, not by anybody else," Burns said. But he reaffirmed, that Washington would continue "to assure the People's Republic of China of our fundamental position" of a one China policy (The Daily Yomiuri, September 20, 1995).

On 24 October 1995, Clinton and Jiang met when they attended the 50th anniversary commemorations of the United Nations in New York.

Before the meeting, President Clinton vowed to the reporters that "these are two great countries that have a real interest in maintaining a constructive dialogue with each other and wherever possible, a partnership" (US Dept of State, October 25, 1995).

"The important thing is that we're going to have this meeting," he said. "These are two great

countries that have a real interest in maintaining a constructive dialogue with each other and wherever possible a partnership, and we need to go to work on it” (The New York Times, October 25, 1995).

Concerning about the Taiwan issue, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord said, “we've made clear all along that we believe it's important to have stability in the straits and that both sides should seek a peaceful resolution on that issue, although it's up to Taiwan and China to work out that issue, but it should be done peacefully, and we would want to see stability in the straits in the meantime” (US Dept of State, October, 25, 1995).

When asking for a promise for no Taiwan official visited Taiwan in the future, Lord said the United States would not make any such pledges. Clinton told Jiang that future visits of Taiwanese officials “would be considered on a case-by-case basis. They'd be unofficial, private and rare” (The Washington Post, October 25, 1995).

Also, At the Sino-US summit meeting, The United States reaffirmed that it supported a “one-China” policy, clearly declaring that Washington did not support “one-China, one Taiwan” and “two Chinas”, Taiwan’s reentry into the United Nations or Taiwan independence (Chen, 1999, p.131).

US on 3 January 1996 hinted that it might give visa to Taiwan vice President

The United States hinted strongly that it would issue a transit visa to Taiwan’s vice president Li Yuan-zu, who applied for a transit visa allowing him to stop over in Los Angeles while on his way to attend Guatemala's presidential inauguration J nuary 11, 1996.

“The United States has received a request by Taiwan's vice president for a transit visa. We are considering this request,” State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters (Agence France Presse, January 3, 1996).

He said “I would just note that we have issued such transit visas in the past and it certainly would not be inconsistent with our unofficial relationship with Taiwan were we to issue one in this case” (The Washington Post, January 6, 1996).

“It should not be a big deal for U.S.-China relations, and it should be seen for what it is, if this visa is issued,” Mr. Burns said, “and that is the mere transit of an authority from Taiwan to the inauguration of a President in this hemisphere” (The New York Times, January 6, 1996).

Finally, the United States granted a visa to him.

China opposed any move by the United States to issue a visa to the vice-president on 4 January 1996

Chinese ministry spokesman Chen Jian said, “we are resolutely opposed to the Taiwan authorities using so-called transit diplomacy and other means to engage in activities in countries which have diplomatic relations with China” (South China Morning Post, January 5, 1996).

Chen said “the question of Taiwan is a very sensitive issue in Sino-US relations and bears upon china's sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Xinhua News Agency, January 9, 1996).

“The Taiwan authorities are attempting to create “two Chinas” or “one china, one Taiwan” in the name of making a stopover in the United States and this is bound to meet with the resolute opposition

of all the Chinese people” (Xinhua News Agency, January 9, 1996)

“We demand the United States government to strictly abide by the principles enshrined in the three joint communiqués between China and the US and take concrete and effective measures to prevent the Taiwan authorities from engaging in activities aimed at splitting the motherland under the pretext of making a stopover in the country so as to avoid further damage to its relations with China,” Chen said (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 10, 1996).

US granted a visa to Taiwan Vice-President again on 31 January 1996

The United States granted Taiwan's vice president a visa to travel to three US cities on his way to Haiti and El Salvador, the State Department said (Agence France Presse, January 31, 1996).

State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said “We believe this is routine,” he said. “I think it's reasonable. Taipei is a long way” (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

“He cannot hold public meetings, he cannot stand up in the middle of a park to give a speech, and we certainly don't want to see any interviews on television. ” Burns said (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

China strongly opposed to the US granted visa twice to Taiwan Vice-President on 1 February 1996

Foreign ministry spokesman Chen Jian said, “we are firmly against the activities conducted by the Taiwan authorities to create two Chinas, or one China one Taiwan, under the pretext of making a stopover” (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

“We demand the US government honor its serious commitments made in the three Sino-US joint communiqués covering the Taiwan question and strictly confine its relations with Taiwan to an unofficial status.” Chen said (Agence France Presse, February 1, 1996).

US Defense Secretary William Perry expressed concerned about Chinese military deployments opposite Taiwan on 7 February 1996

“I'm concerned about the military maneuvering that the Chinese are doing to, in not so subtle ways, threaten Taiwan, try to influence their election.” Perry said in a speech to the Aspen Institute (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 7, 1996).

“At this point, with the present level of concern but no imminent danger, I don't think we will make a statement more definitive than that.”

“I don't see this as a threat yet, but I am concerned,” he said (South China Morning Post, February 8, 1996).

Clinton expected no Chinese attack on Taiwan on 7 February 1996

“As you know this whole matter from time to time arises as tensions between China and Taiwan. But most political leaders in both places acknowledge that China should be one country,” he said. “I would just urge them to do what they have done, stake out clearly their various political positions but

keep trying to work them out peacefully,” Clinton told reporters in the Oval Office (Agence France Presse, February 8, 1996).

“Eventually time will take care of this,” “I believe they will find a way to work this out.” Clinton said (Agence France Presse, February 8, 1996).

U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry condemned China's action against Taiwan on 13 February 1996

“Our policy accepts China at its word when it says that it wants to become a responsible world power, but China sends quite the opposite message when it conducts missile tests and large military maneuvers off Taiwan, when it exports nuclear weapons technology or abuses human rights,” Perry told a seminar at the National Defense University” (Japan Economic Newswire, February 14, 1996).

“Ultimately, it is the responsibility of both Beijing and Taipei to build healthy relations, but it is in the abiding interest of Beijing, Taipei and Washington that relations maintain a healthy, peaceful course without provocation or overreaction by any capital, and to continue to follow China’s maxim of patience and caution in its dealings with Taiwan,” Perry said (Japan Economic Newswire, February 14, 1996).

Concerning about China’s plan for conducting missile tests during the first March Taiwan presidential election, he said “It is time for China to start sending the right message” (Japan Economic Newswire, February 14, 1996).

Chinese Premier Li Peng condemned US’ acts on Taiwan on 4 March 1996

Premier Li Peng addressing the fourth session of the eighth National People's Congress (NPC) on March 4, 1996.

He said “only when the principles enunciated in the three Sino-US joint communiqués are strictly observed and only when the two sides respect each other and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs will Sino-US relations achieve sound development.” he said (Xinhua News Agency, March 5, 1996).

He said, “Sino-US relations have undergone serious difficulties, which were entirely due to the unwise China policy of the United States” (Agence France Presse, March 4, 1996).

China announced missile tests would be conducted from March 8 to 15, 1996 on 5 March 1996

Ren (1997, p.131) argued that the crisis developed in several stages. Before Taiwan's March 1996 presidential election, the PLA would conduct a missile launch exercise in two areas in the East China and South China Seas from 8 to 15 March. The nuclear-capable missiles were fired in tests conducted within twenty miles of the Taiwanese City of Kaohsiung, one of the largest container ports in the world. Tensions were clearly felt on Taiwan.

Sheng (2001, p.30) argued that the largest military exercises were held from 8 to 25 March 1996. The exercises were under the command of General Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the CMC and Head of the Headquarters for Operations against Taiwan, which had been set up in 1995 during the

Taiwan Strait crisis. Lee (1999, p.49) stated that “there firings would take place more than 80km closer to Taiwan than the 1995 exercises; both Clinton and the US Congress publicly condemned the proximity to the island of the two impact areas.”

US responded on the announcement of the coming missile tests on 6 March 1996

“We believe that the plans for these missile tests are irresponsible, and we have informed the Chinese government that there will be consequences should these tests go wrong,” US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said (Japan Economic Newswire, March 7, 1996).

He said China “should refrain from further provocative actions...Any military attack on Taiwan...would have very grave consequences” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 7, 1996).

Chinese made verbal defense on it upcoming missile tests on 7 March 1996

Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang told a news conference that “the missile tests set to begin Friday will demonstrate to the world that Taiwan is still a part of China, and that we have the determination and capability to safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity” (United Press International, March 7, 1996).

He emphasized that “these exercises are not being carried out against the ordinary people of Taiwan,” but are intended to “suppress the acts of pro-independence forces” (United Press International, March 7, 1996).

He said the United States has been repeatedly asked to “cease intervention in China’s internal affairs, refrain from official contacts with Taiwanese authorities in disguised form, abstain from transferring weaponry and supporting pro-independence forces” (United Press International, March 7, 1996).

US reiterated its position on the tight Taiwan Straits on 7 March 1996

“We have expressed our deep concern about these missile tests,” said State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns. “We have informed the Chinese government . . . there will be consequences should these tests go wrong” (The Washington Times, March 8, 1996).

“We believe that these tests are designed for political reasons; to intimidate the people of Taiwan prior to the elections in Taiwan,” said Mr. Burns (The Washington Times, March 8, 1996).

“We believe that the People’s Republic of China should refrain from further provocative actions,” Burns said (South China Morning Post, March 8, 1996).

US White House condemned China’s missile tests on 7 March 1996

“We have repeatedly urged (China) to refrain from provocative exercises...So these missile exercises -- and indeed we have some reason to believe they have occurred -- we consider both provocative and reckless,” White House spokesman Mike McCurry said (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1996).

He stressed that “We would be deeply disturbed by any tests of that nature and We

believe...tensions in the Taiwan Straits...need to be addressed through direct, cross-strait dialogue” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1996).

US sent guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill to Taiwan Strait on March 7, 1996 and aircraft carrier USS Independence on March 8, 1996

The Clinton administration stepped up its criticism of China’s missile firings near Taiwan today, and the Pentagon disclosed that Navy ships and U.S. aircraft were monitoring the tests from near the island.

Defense Secretary William Perry said, “the action they took with these missile firings was reckless and. it could only be viewed as an act of coercion” (The Associated Press, March 8, 1996).

“It had the danger that if the firings had any malfunctions at all, then some parts of the missiles could have landed on populated areas,” Perry said (The Associated Press, March 8, 1996).

He said, “we have, of course, a substantial naval presence in the Western Pacific,” Perry told reporters when asked how the U.S. military is monitoring the missile tests (Japan Economic Newswire, March 9, 1996).

Perry said, “we have, within a few hundred miles of Taiwan, a carrier, the Independence. We have a guided missile cruiser and a guided missile destroyer, also, nearby” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 9, 1996).

He said the aircraft carrier USS Independence was near Taiwan, and that the guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill was close enough to observe the missile flight. The Bunker Hill was equipped with sophisticated radar that can track missile flight paths (The Associated Press, March 8, 1996).

The United States deployed the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill around the Taiwan Strait to monitor and observe the Chinese’s ballistic missiles tests on March 7,. On the following day, the United States also sent “Independence” battle group (Sheng, 2001, p.32).

China on 9 March 1996 announced a new round of live ammunition army and navy drills close to Taiwan

The new exercises, to run from March 12 to 20 and coinciding with a previously announced series of missile tests off Taiwan, are aimed at discouraging the election of President Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan's first direct presidential elections March 23 (Agence France Presse, March 9, 1996).

Three days after the first announcement, the Chinese government proclaimed that a live ammunition exercise by the PLA navy and air force would take place off the coast of Fujian Province between 12 and 20 March (Sheng, 2001, p.32).

US responded by repositioning a Seventh Fleet aircraft carrier closer to Taiwan on 10 March 1996

Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, “We’re concerned to make sure that those forces, that carrier battle group, are in a position to be helpful if they need to be.” Moreover, the U.S.S.

Independence aircraft and its support ships “will be moved somewhat closer to Taiwan in future days” (United Press International, March 10, 1996).

He said, “The actions they’ve taken, I believe, smack of intimidation and coercion, so that is a situation of grave concern to us” (United Press International, March 10, 1996).

He also blackmailed that “We have been following a one China policy with China – that is that we say that there is a single China – but part of that has been a commitment on the part of the Chinese to deal peacefully with the issue of Taiwan, not to solve this issue by force” (United Press International, March 10, 1996).

China warned the US increasing intervention over the Taiwan Straits on 11 March 1996

He was speaking at a press conference at the National People's Congress and mentioning the tensions over the Taiwan Straits on March 11, 1996.

He said, “should the foreign forces support and connive in the attempt by the Taiwan authorities to create independence or split the motherland, it will lead to a chaotic situation in Taiwan” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1996).

“Should foreign forces refrain from conniving at or supporting the attempt at creating independence or the separation of Taiwan, then there is no need to worry about the tensions in the situation.” “If a chaotic situation prevails, I am afraid this will not serve the U.S. interests as well” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1996).

“It is preposterous for some people in the U.S. to call openly for interference on the Taiwan issue by the 7th Fleet or even in protecting Taiwan. Taiwan is not a protectorate of the U.S.,” Qian said (Japan Economic Newswire, March 11, 1996).

“It is ridiculous for some people in the US to call openly for interference on the Taiwan issue by the 7th Fleet or even for it to defend Taiwan” (Agence France Presse, March 11, 1996).

US sent a second carrier battle group to the Taiwan straits on 11 March 1996

President Clinton, responding to rising tensions between China and Taiwan, has ordered a second aircraft carrier battle group deployed to international waters near Taiwan.

Clinton ordered on Sunday the carrier USS Nimitz to join the carrier USS Independence, already patrolling about 100 miles from Taiwan, to illustrate to China that the live-fire military exercises scheduled to begin Tuesday off the coast of Taiwan should not get out of hand. A White House spokesman said Monday the increased show of U.S. was “to make clear our interests” in the area (United Press International, March 11, 1996).

“This language is meant to signal our very great concern over the reckless behavior of China, and the disposition of these battle groups is meant to convey that concern,” State Department spokesman Nick Burns said. (Agence France Presse, March 11, 1996).

On March 11, the “Nimitz” battle group was sent to monitor the Taiwan Strait situation (Sheng, 2001, p.32).

China reiterated Taiwan was a domestic issue and condemned the acts of the United States on 17 March 1996

Li told journalists following the close of the annual session of the NPC, he said, “if somebody attempts a show of force in the Taiwan Strait, their efforts will not only be futile, but will merely complicate matters” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 17, 1996).

“The fundamental reasons for the present tense and chaotic situation in Taiwan are the serious results of activities carried out by some leaders among the Taiwan authorities who overtly and frequently go in for Taiwan independence on the island and in the international arena” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 17, 1996).

A third round of military test was carried out in the Taiwan Strait, that time during Taiwan's presidential election from 18 and 25 March 1996

China announced a new round of military exercises in north of the Taiwan Strait while at the same time declaring the end of its week-long missile tests (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 15, 1996).

“The latest exercises, to begin on 18 and run until March 25, will come the closest to Taiwan-held territory of any of three set of drills timed to coincide with the island’s presidential campaign” (The Washington Post, March 16, 1996).

Ren (1997, p.131) stated that “as the United States was openly cautioning China and sending two aircraft carriers and supporting naval forces toward the seas of the Taiwan Strait, and as Taiwan was continually defying Beijing's warnings, the third Taiwan Strait crisis occurred.”

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