

2018

The cultural of the political : towards a cultural sociology of state formation

Xiaohong XU

Philip GORSKI

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master

Recommended Citation

Xu, X., & Gorski, P. (2012). The cultural of the political : towards a cultural sociology of state formation. In J. R. Hall, L. Grindstaff, M.-C. Lo. (Eds), *Handbook of Cultural Sociology* (pp 535-546). Routledge.

This Book chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Lingnan Staff Publication at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325866234>

The Cultural of the Political: Towards a Cultural Sociology of State Formation

Chapter · June 2012

CITATIONS

0

READS

10

2 authors:



Xiaohong Xu

Lingnan University

6 PUBLICATIONS 10 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE



Philip Gorski

Yale University

72 PUBLICATIONS 1,183 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Chinese Modernity [View project](#)



A Secular Age beyond the West [View project](#)

The cultural of the political

Towards a cultural sociology of state formation

Xiaohong Xu and Philip Gorski

In the human sciences, the study of culture and the study of the state are usually separate enterprises. In the disciplinary division of labor, the state is assigned to political science and (diplomatic) history, while culture is placed in the care of anthropology and (cultural) sociology. This division of labor has been underwritten and legitimated by aligning the state/culture opposition with various other binaries—state and nation, self-interest and solidarity, institutions and culture, power and language, and so on. These oppositions are quite old and stable.

This division of labor has come under challenge during the last two decades. The challenge arose from multiple conjunctures and can be observed across multiple fronts. The historical turn within anthropology (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997 [1991]) and the cultural turn within sociology both generated a number of “culturalist” studies of the state (Geertz 1980; Corrigan and Sayer 1985; Steinmetz 1999). The Foucauldian impact within the humanities led some literary scholars to roam far afield. Among early modern historians, the “confessionalization paradigm” generated much research interest in state-building. Even within political science, there is some evidence of a similar erosion of binary divides (e.g. Laitin 1986).

Certainly, there are plenty of counter-trends. These days, the buzz in history is about “political economy” and empire. In political science, formal models, quantitative methods, and experiments are the order of the day. In sociology, meanwhile, the once busy intersection of cultural and historical work is less traversed. Research informed by cultural and historical perspectives certainly generated impressive works of individual scholarship but—thus far—not a coherent research program. In retrospect, it looks more like a patchwork than a wave. As for cultural sociology, it has always been somewhat presentist and Americanist in orientation.

Is state formation just a bridge too far for cultural sociology? Not in principle. Many of the aforementioned binaries can be, and have been, challenged. Culturalist approaches have yielded considerable insight on other, seemingly unpromising topics, such as money and scientific institutions (e.g. Zelizer 1994; Vaughan 1996). Moreover, as state-building enters into discussion of foreign policy (e.g. Fukuyama 2004; Chandler 2005), it is important that historical and cultural sociologists counter naïve forms of

neo-conservatism, which imagine that liberal democracies simply sprout up out of the scorched earth left behind by the slash-and-burn politics of regime change.

In this chapter, we will first review the theoretical threads in sociological lineages that can inspire cultural approaches to state formation; second, examine the state of affairs and the problematics in current literature on state and culture; and, lastly, tease out four subject areas in which a cultural sociology of state formation may bear fruit.

Cultural approaches to the state in sociological lineages

Karl Marx

Although most cultural Marxists have been more interested in “hegemony” and “ideology” (e.g. Gramsci 1971; Althusser 1971), Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer’s by-now classic work *The Great Arch* (1985) shows what a Marxist cultural sociology of state formation might look like. By linking English state formation back into the process of the “long making of bourgeois civilization” and the embourgeoisement of English society, they have paid much attention to the changes in social relations and human subjectivity that shaped the English state. Into this line of inquiries of culture, class formation, and state formation also falls Jürgen Habermas’s early work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989 [1965]), which tracked the emergence—and decline—of a “bourgeois public sphere” in early capitalist societies.

Max Weber

Strangely enough, the best starting point for a Weberian theory of culture and the state is not his political sociology, but his sociology of religion. Consider two of his most famous metaphors: the “switchman” and “elective affinity.” The “switchman” metaphor arises out of Weber’s attempt to grasp the long-term impacts that subtle differences in religious doctrine have on economic conduct, but a similar mode of analysis can be, and has been, employed in thinking about the impact of culture and/or religion on political conduct, the *locus classicus* being Michael Walzer’s (1965) analysis of Puritanism, selfhood, and revolution in seventeenth-century England. There, Walzer argues that the Puritan movement forged a disciplined self capable of extraordinary feats of world-transformation.

Weber’s second metaphor, “elective affinity,” is an attempt to grapple with the same problem. In this case, however, the relationship is not between a realm of abstract ideas on the one hand and the sphere of individual interests on the other, but between two cultural constructs or “historical individuals”—the “spirit of capitalism” and the “Protestant ethic.” This mode of analysis can also be applied to the relationship between culture and the state, if we focus on potential affinities between religio-cultural and political ethics or spirits. For example, Gorski (2003) has argued that Calvinism and bureaucracy have such an affinity, and Van Kley (1996) has made a similar argument for Calvinism and French republicanism.

Weber’s sociology of religion contains two other concepts that are potentially useful for a cultural theory of the state—value spheres and carrier groups. In his version of differentiation theory, Weber makes “ultimate values” the gravitational force around

which the various spheres take shape. These ultimate values are transmitted and elaborated by "carrier groups" that have strong interests, material and ideal, in the preservation and influence of these values. The value spheres concept is useful insofar as it allows us to pose questions about cultural boundaries—between the political and the religious, say, or the political and the aesthetic. In addition, it instructs us to conceive of such boundaries as the result of ongoing struggles between carrier groups that are seeking to expand the reaches of their cultural authority. This line of analysis is further elaborated in Bourdieu's theory of "fields" and "classification struggles."

We conclude with Weber's well-known definition of the state as an organization that claims a "monopoly of legitimate violence" within a particular territory or community. Although this definition appears non-culturalist at first glance, Norbert Elias (1994) has spelled out its underlying cultural significance, in that the historical process of monopolization of legitimate use of physical violence involved a radical cultural change in terms of both the disposition of the governed and the relationship between the state and the individual life. Moreover, as Ikegami (1995) has shown, the civilizing process is not a purely Western phenomenon.

Emile Durkheim

Although Durkheim is often charged with ignoring power and politics, Durkheimian political sociology is not an oxymoron. For example, Durkheim's theory of ritual (1995) can help to solve the "collective action problems" that arise within rationalist accounts, which transform obedience into the "principal-agent problem," cooperation into the "collective action problem," and institutional reproduction into an "equilibrium problem." A Durkheimian approach suggests that these "problems" are more easily solved if we attend to collective rituals, collective emotions, and collective identity. The fruitfulness of this neo-Durkheimian political sociology is evident in works on court ritual, political festivals (Ozouf 1988), "political religion" (Gentile 1996; Falasca-Zamponi 1997), and "civil religion" (Bellah 1975).

The second possible starting point for this research program is the analysis of law in Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* (1984), particularly the discussion of criminal punishment as a mechanism for articulating and reproducing the social norms that make up the "collective conscience." Historical criminologists of a neo-Durkheimian bent—and that includes Foucault—have effectively shown how changing practices of punishment can be used to track changes in the character and efficacy of state power (Smith 2003; Garland 2006; Spierenburg 1984; Foucault 1995).

A third possible starting point for a neo-Durkheimian political sociology is a pair of lesser known works: *Moral Education* (1961) and *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (1958). Little read and often out of print, these writings anticipate themes that are now drawing increasing attention. One is the relationship between state formation and subjectivity. Whereas the standard trope suggests that the growth of state power is associated with a devaluation of the individual, Durkheim strongly rejects this view. Insofar as the growth of the state goes together with an increasing "division of labor," it is in fact accompanied by a higher degree of individuation as well as by a greater respect for "the abstract individual," that is, with respect for, and protection of, human rights. If Durkheim is right, a cultural sociological analysis of state formation will not be complete without serious inquiry into the ideologization of the individual (Koselleck 1988), as the formulation of autonomous political judgments

has become both an important right and duty of the modern, democratic citizen (Schneewind 1998).

Michel Foucault

Few contemporary social theorists have had a greater impact on state theory than Michel Foucault. Contrary to the commonplace understanding of state power as top-down, centralized, coercive, legal, and ideological, Foucault asserts that power is diffuse and productive. Real state power, he argues, operates at the micro-level (as capillary power). It works on the body, not the mind, and it does so through the organization of space rather than the promulgation of laws (disciplinary power). It is more concerned with bringing the lost sheep back into the fold (pastoral power) than with building fences. Given the secularist impulse that underlies Foucault's work, unsurprisingly he refuses connection between ideas (beliefs, ideologies, etc.) and practices, and altogether ignores the history of Christendom, focusing instead on pre-Christian antiquity and the post-Reformation. Still, as Gorski (2003) has shown, Foucault's theories of "disciplinary power" and "governmentality" can be adapted and applied to religious movements and to the pre-Enlightenment era. Timothy Mitchell's (1999) well-known work on "the state effect" suggests another possible direction for Foucauldian analysis. He maintains that it is precisely through its self-conscious separation and disentanglement from the "society" by its management of space, uniforms, routines, and specialized organization that the state manages to (mis)represent itself as a unifying structure and achieve the "state effect."

Pierre Bourdieu

Insofar as Bourdieu's work represents a synthesis of the classical traditions, it is a fitting way to conclude such a survey. Like Weber, Bourdieu is preoccupied with the relationship of the ideal and the material or, as he usually frames it, the "subjective" and the "objective," and his programmatic aim is to do justice to both. This is particularly evident in his approach to class. Like Marx, he formulates a political sociology that highlights class conflict and capital accumulation. Like Durkheim (and Mauss), however, he gives considerable attention to systems of classification as well. The result is his theory of "classification struggles," in which the stakes are not simply power relations between already existing classes, but the very reality of competing bases of group formation, what Bourdieu (2000) calls "principles of vision and di-vision." The outcome of such struggles, he argues, is determined not solely by material conditions, but also by symbolic struggles. If this outcome influences the state, the reverse is also true. In one famous formulation, Bourdieu refers to the state as the "central bank of symbolic credit" (Bourdieu 1996: 376). What does he mean by this somewhat cryptic phrase? Simply put, the state is often the final arbiter of classificatory systems, through its authority over language and the law. Like Weber, Bourdieu traces the emergence of the state field mainly to intra-elite conflicts, first within royal households, and then between religious and secular intellectuals and administrators. He also links the formation of the state to the differentiation of various species of capital (Bourdieu 2004). The separation of the political rule, first from economic production, and then from ideological production (i.e. religion), is accompanied by the primitive accumulation of three species of capital—symbolic, economic, and cultural (Loveman, 2005).

Research agendas

As should be clear from the foregoing discussion, a "cultural sociology of state formation" could be many different things. Just what it is depends on just how one defines "culture" and "the state," as well as on the direction of the causal arrow between them. In this context, we can only outline a few of the main questions and approaches. The first question concerns the ontology of culture—what culture *is*. Here, we can distinguish three basic approaches. The first conceives of culture as a kind of grammar, as the "code" that underlies and structures language and ritual. In this conception, the key task of the cultural sociologist is to discover the rules and crack the codes that structure cultural expression. The second approach conceives of culture as "values." From this perspective, the main task of the cultural sociologist is to identify the central values of a culture and specify their relationship to world-pictures. There is also an intermediate view, which understands culture as a "map" or a "script," which people use to orient themselves. Here, the key task of the cultural sociologist is to identify the various types of cultural performances.

The second major question concerns the relationship between culture and action. In the first tradition, the relationship between culture and action is analogous to the relationship between grammar and speech. Action simply manifests and reproduces culture. Culture is enacted. In the second tradition, the relationship between culture and action is one of ends to means. Culture provides one set of ends, material interests another, and action arises out of the clash between them. Culture exerts a force on action. In the third tradition, the relationship between culture and action is one of means to ends. Culture provides scripts for performing a role or maps for traveling to a destination.

A third and final area of difference concerns the relationship between culture and social structure. On one view, broadly Durkheimian, the relationship is homologous and unitary. Social boundaries are cultural boundaries. On a second view, broadly Marxist, the relationship is homologous but stratified. Class boundaries are also cultural boundaries, but the dominant class dominates the culture. On a third view, more Weberian in inspiration, the relationship is fractured and stratified. Societies are divided into autonomous and antagonistic value spheres, and the value spheres are dominated by a class of "virtuosos."

We can distinguish three broad categories in theories of the state as well: neo-Marxian, neo-Weberian, and neo-Smithian. For the most part, neo-Marxian approaches conceptualize the state as an instrument of class domination, putting the focus on state-society relations and state policies. There is little attention to institutional structures or inter-state relations. These are precisely the principal concerns of many neo-Weberians, for whom state formation is synonymous with state organization and geo-political conflict the key catalyst. Finally, in the neo-Smithian approach, the state is conceptualized as a hierarchy of self-interested principals (i.e. rulers) and agents (officials) engaged in various forms of predation and deception. Not much culture here. The dominant approach to the state within contemporary sociology is undoubtedly the neo-Weberian one. Insofar as culture figures at all in comparative-historical work on the state, it is mainly as a "dependent variable." Thus states build nations, construct ethnicities, legitimate professions; etc.

What would be the most promising and fruitful direction for a new cultural sociology of the state? Some of the possible paths between cultural theory and state theory are

already well trodden. Surveying the terrain, we see two paths that are both passable and under-traversed. The first leads from Weber's theory of value spheres to the study of "the state effect" and "the political" more generally, and involves looking at how conflict within carrier groups and between ultimate values affects state/society boundaries (one could also map this path in Bourdieuan terms by focusing on the state's role in constituting and regulating an encompassing "field of power"). The second leads from Durkheim's sociology of religion to the study of political rituals and classifications. Each path can also be trodden in reverse as well. This yields the following four subject areas: (1) state ideas, (2) state boundaries, (3) state rituals, and (4) state classifications.

State ideas

The concept of the impersonal state as the object of universal service and respect, from both rulers and ruled, is a modern invention (Shennan, 1974). The historical formation of this concept and the drawing and redrawing of boundaries between the state and other spheres—many of which are also modern constructions—were not epiphenomenal to the formation of the "class state" or "fiscal-military state." Instead, these processes independently took part in shaping the symbolic power and organizational de-limitation of the emerging state. A cultural sociology of state formation thus needs to address the cultural constructions of the state idea and its relationship with other spheres.

For cultural sociologists, the formation of state ideas itself must be part and parcel of "real" state formation. Here, a fruitful starting point may be found in Bourdieu's analysis of the *noblesse de robe* and their republican inheritors, who have their private interests in public interest, and who have played a role in constructing the centrality of the state idea in France's political life. A similar analysis might be made of, say, the revival of Roman law from the late medieval period to the Renaissance (Anderson 1974: 26–29; Berman 1983) and the emergence of "reason of state" around the same period (Shennan 1974; Viroli 1992; Skinner 1989; Oestreich 1982). Both developments helped augment the symbolic power of the central authority and transform the "king's house" into an impersonal state. Meanwhile, the symbolic power of the state also encountered its organizational de-limitation with the emergence and autonomization of other spheres, helping to forge the functionally differentiated world we know today.

State boundaries

There are two dimensions of boundary-makings in this process—external and internal. Both are involved in long-term processes of state-making. Territorial states must bind themselves off both from sub-state social formations such as kinship networks, as well as from larger-scale social formations such as religious networks. The idea of "sovereignty" was integral to this process, and jurists played a particularly important part in its articulation (Spruyt 1994). With the "rise of the West," the territorial nation-state became the legitimate model of political organization (Meyer 1999). The state-empire relation should not be conceived in stadial terms, however: The consolidation of Western nation-states was succeeded by a long period of empire-building, too. The same might be said of the relationship between state-building and nation-building. The old adage that the one follows the other—"We have made Italy, now we must make Italians"—is

only one of the forms it can take. Nationalism can also be a tool for empire-building—or empire-smashing. Once a territorial state has been consolidated, a new problem of internal boundary formation emerges—the boundary between state and society. The problem was first posed by Cassirer (1946) and posed anew in recent years by Philip Abrams (1988) and Timothy Mitchell (1999). But it has not received sustained and systematic attention from them or anyone else.

A culturalist account may need to first ask if it even makes sense to speak of “state–society relations” in historical contexts where these are not operative political categories. In early modern Europe, such relationships were above all marked by the emergence of the pre- or non-political public space that early Enlightenment thinkers understood as “civil society” or simply “society” (Koselleck 1988) and that today’s scholars refer to as “civil society” or the “public sphere” (Habermas 1989 [1965]). This “society” was characteristic of the equality between contracting agents or conversational partners and its rejection of the logic of hierarchy that was usual in families, corporations, political patronage, or any other social relations. Its emergence made a huge impact on the dynamics of politics and the form of state power that could be legitimately exerted (Knights 2005; Ikegami 2005).

The boundary between state and economy has been quite contested and variable as well. As Foucault (1991) reminds us, “economy” was originally private or household economy and only gradually came to be redefined in impersonal terms that legitimated state involvement (“governmentality”). However, we should not imagine that the boundaries of state power are always expanding. The upshot of the eighteenth-century debate between mercantilist and *laissez-faire* theories of political economy was to contract the boundaries of the state and free the economy from political control.

Similarly, the boundaries between state and religion can also be problematized in cultural sociological terms. How shall we explain the historical relationship between the emergence of the modern state and the separation of church and state in the context of confessional strife in early modern Europe? Which kinds of cultural refashioning in political theories as well as in political theologies had made possible the autonomization of these two fields from each other? To what extent can we compare the Western experience with those of other parts of the world? These are questions that have received too little attention from sociologists. The church/state relationship has also not been as simple as modernist narratives would lead us to believe. True, the dominant trend in most Western countries has been towards the transfer of various “social functions” from the church to the state (“secularization”). But there have been local counter-trends as well—the expansion of religious schools and colleges, for example, or the growth of “faith-based initiatives”—which have shifted boundaries in the other direction.

State rituals

In comparison to the study of state boundaries, this is a relatively developed field of inquiry. One seminal work is Ernst Kantorowicz’s study (1957) of the funereal rituals designed to contain the contradiction between the immortality of kingship and the mortality of kings with the (to us) peculiar doctrine of “the king’s two bodies.” Others include Mona Ozouf’s monograph on “French Revolutionary Festivals” (1988); which staged the revolutionary break and connected the new regime to transcendent purposes by means of elaboration processions and deistic liturgies; Emilio Gentile’s (1996)

fine-grained analyses of Mussolini's use of ritual to legitimate his new regime, and Falasca-Zamponi's (1997) and Berezin's (1997) re-theorizations of it; and finally Robert Bellah's (1975) analyses of "American civil religion." Nor are these the only studies that might be mentioned (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Geertz 1980; Shils and Young 1953). One limitation of this work, however, has been its focus on social stability and reproduction. That ritual analysis can also be used to understand processes of historical rupture and transformation has recently been shown by William Sewell, Jr.'s study (1996) of the cultural improvisation and invention that occurred during the storming of the Bastille and the subsequent influence of these events and their construction on the French Revolution as a whole.

Contemporary cultural sociology has offered two major strains of thought, both deriving from the Durkheimian heritage, which may bear fruit in studying state rituals. Jeffrey Alexander's social performance theory (2004) can be employed to analyze how state actors (symbolic persons such as figureheads, diplomats, etc.) succeed or fail in "re-fusing" the elements of successful social performance in front of their audiences. Even in stable democracies, the maintenance of state power cannot dispense with the façade of these "stately" performances. Randall Collins's interaction ritual theory (2004) focuses on collective, rather than individual, performances, and could be fruitfully applied to political life. Although Alexander and Collins both emphasize the "higher rituals" of the state, its "lower rituals" (e.g. bureaucratic rituals) can also be studied in light of Goffman's work.

State classifications

In the seminal work of Durkheim and Mauss, the theory of ritual was closely associated with a theory of classification. Strangely, the latter subject has received relatively little attention. One important exception to this rule is Chandra Mukerji's study of *Territorial Ambitions and the Garden of Versailles* (1997). In seventeenth-century France and other early modern states, she shows, the building of states went hand in hand with a reshaping—or rather, a reconstitution—of the "natural" environment. Whereas conventional, realist accounts might be more apt to portray the Garden of Versailles as a symbol of fiscal irresponsibility, Mukerji suggests that such projects were symbols of something else—the centralization and territorialization of political power. Nor were such projects "merely" symbolic: for instance, there was considerable synergy between gardens and garrisons. If Durkheim and Mauss argued that group boundaries underwrote and naturalized epistemological categories, Mukerji shows that groups' boundaries were themselves "planted" in the material environment. The "construction" of the French state and the French nation was not just linguistic, then, but aesthetic as well.

The limits of such construction projects are ably demonstrated in another work, James Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998). By the nineteenth century, for economic and fiscal reasons, rulers were looking to reshape landscapes and cityscapes so as to increase their efficiency and output. To that end, state managers and planners sought to rationalize the natural and built environments. State-owned forests were reconfigured to maximize timber harvests. State-managed housing developments were constructed to maximize labor productivity. As Scott reminds us, however, such schemes rarely worked for long. The reason, he argues, is that the hyper-rationalist models of "high modernist" aesthetics failed to capture many aspects of natural and social ecologies—aspects that

turned out to be crucial to their long-term vitality. That such utopian schemes were ever implemented had to do with their "elective affinity" with the ethos and interests of managerial elites, on the one hand, and the weakness of civil society, on the other.

Of course, one of the most important forms of state classifications is individual identification and the issuance of corresponding documents. John Torpey (2000) uses the history of the passport to track the state's gradual monopolization of control over movement across borders and its use of civil registration as a means of public mobilization (e.g. in mass conscription). This project is also subject to failure, as shown by Mara Loveman's study (2007) of popular opposition to civil registration in Brazil's "war of the wasps." The "primitive accumulation of symbolic power," she argues, is in a sense prior to, and constitutive of, other forms of state power and requires a certain degree of cooperation and collusion on the part of local elites, which it did not receive in the Brazilian case, partly because state managers refused to ally themselves with the traditional holders of classificatory authority in Brazil—the Catholic clergy. And with far-reaching consequences: Absent such basic information, the Brazilian state was unable to establish a "modern" army and forced to rely on semi-feudal systems of military recruitment. Here again, symbolic power proved all too "real."

Conclusion

The "third wave" of comparative-historical sociology arose out of a powerful confluence of trans-disciplinary currents during the late 1980s, when the "second wave" of neo-Marxian and left-Weberian work intersected with cultural sociology, cultural history, Geertzian anthropology, and historicist forms of literary scholarship. The result was a dramatic upsurge in culturally inflected historical analysis. But many of these currents have now weakened or receded. This is not to say that the sands have not shifted in their wake. Historians now routinely do comparative work. Comparative methods are *de rigueur* in such diverse areas as urban ethnography and international relations. Historical anthropology is a stable sub-field. Still, the center did not hold. It never does.

A new wave of cultural work on state formation, and cultural analysis of politics more generally, would probably have to draw its energy from other sources. Which ones? Surveying the horizon, we see three possibilities. One, of course, is cultural sociology itself, a field which has been remarkably Americo-centric and presentist in its orientations, but where trans-national scholarly networks have become denser and cross-national comparison is becoming somewhat more common (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). Another is political theory, where old-school exegesis of classical texts has been increasingly supplanted by empirically informed (if methodologically unsystematic) philosophical reflection on citizenship, cosmopolitanism, toleration, minority rights, public and private, and other subjects closely related to the research program sketched above (Benhabib 2002; Walzer 1997; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). The last is historical work by literary scholars, which increasingly engages topics such as publicity, secularism, civil religion, state subjectivity, and so on (Warner 2002; Visconti 2008).

In a sense, promoting a cultural sociology of state formation means not only reclaiming the analytical territories that sociologists have surrendered to other disciplines by engaging substantive questions about the state and its historical formation, but also reinventing sociology itself in this process.

References

- Abrams, Philip. 1988. "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1: 58-89.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2004. "Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy." *Sociological Theory* 22(4): 527-73.
- Althusser, Louis. 1971. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses." Pp. 127-86 in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
- Anderson, Perry. 1974. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: NLB.
- Bellah, Robert N. 1975. *The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of Trial*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Berezin, Mabel. 1997. *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy*. Ithaca, NY: London: Cornell University Press.
- Berman, Harold J. 1983. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," trans. Loic J.D. Wacquant and Samar Farage. *Sociological Theory* 12(1): 1-18.
- . 1996. *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power*, trans. Laretta C. Clough. Oxford: Polity Press.
- . 2000. *Pascalian Meditations*, trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge: Polity.
- . 2004. "From the King's House to the Reason of State: A Model of the Genesis of the Bureaucratic Field." *Constellations* 11(1): 16-36.
- Cassirer, Ernest. 1946. *The Myth of the State*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Chandler, David. 2005. "How 'State-Building' Weakens States." Available at <http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CADDDB.htm> (last accessed June 25, 2008).
- Collins, Randall. 2004. *Interaction Ritual Chains*. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John L. 1997 (1991). *Of Revelation and Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Corrigan, Philip and Sayer, Derek. 1985. *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution*. Oxford and New York: Blackwell.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1958. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, trans. Cornelia Brookfield. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- . 1961. *Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education*, trans. and ed. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer. New York: Free Press.
- . 1984. *The Division of Labor in Society*, with an introduction by Lewis Coser, trans. W.D. Halls. New York: The Free Press.
- . 1995. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen E. Fields. New York: The Free Press.
- Elias, Norbert. 1994. *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta. 1997. *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1988. "Politics and Reason." Pp. 57-85 in *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*, trans. Alan Sheridan and others. New York: Routledge.
- . 1991. "Governmentality," trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon. Pp. 87-104 in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- . 1995. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

- Garland, David. 2006. "Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of Punishment." *Theoretical Criminology* 10(4): 419–47.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gentile, Emilio. 1996. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, trans. Keith Botsford. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gorski, Philip. 2003. *Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1989 (1965). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence, eds. 1992. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ikegami, Eiko. 1995. *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2005. *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst H. 1957. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Knights, Mark. 2005. *Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship and Political Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1988. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Kymlicka, Will and Norman, Wayne, eds. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Laitin, David. 1986. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lamont, Michèle and Thèvenot, Laurent, eds. 2000. *Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Loveman, Mara. 2005. "The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power." *American Journal of Sociology* 110(6): 1651–83.
- . 2007. "Blinded Like a State: The Revolt against Civil Registration in Nineteenth-Century Brazil." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49(1): 5–39.
- Meyer, John W. 1999. "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State: A World Society Perspective." Pp. 123–43 in George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 1999. "Society, Economy, and the State Effect." Pp. 76–97 in George Steinmetz, ed., *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mukerji, Chandra. 1997. *Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oestreich, Gerhard. 1982. *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, trans. David McLintock. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ozouf, Mona. 1988. *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. Alan Sheridan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schneewind, Jerome. 1998. *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.

- Sewell, William Jr. 1996. "Political Events as Structural Transformations: Inventing the Revolution at the Bastille." *Theory and Society* 25: 841–81.
- Shennan, J.H. 1974. *The Origins of the Modern European State, 1450–1725*. London: Hutchinson.
- Shils, Edward and Young, Michael. 1953. "The Meaning of Coronation." *Sociological Review* 1: 63–81.
- Skinner, Quentin. 1989. "The State." Pp. 90–131 in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Philip. 2003. "Narrating the Guillotine: Punishment Technology as Myth and Symbol." *Theory, Culture and Society* 20(5): 27–51.
- Spienburg, Pieter. 1984. *The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression: From a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Steinmetz, George, ed. 1999. *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Torpey, John. 2000. *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Kley, Dale. 1996. *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560–1791*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Vaughan, Diane. 1996. *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Viroli, Maurizio. 1992. *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1965. *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1997. *On Toleration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Warner, Michael. 2002. *Publics and Counterpublics*. New York: Zone Books.
- Visconti, Elliott. 2008. *Lines of Equity: Literature and the Origins of Law in Later Stuart England*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Zelizer, Viviana. 1994. *The Social Meaning of Money*. New York: Basic Books.

Handbook of Cultural Sociology

Edited by
John R. Hall,
Laura Grindstaff,
and Ming-Cheng Lo

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK