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THE EFFECTS OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION ON CHINESE
YOUTHS' PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN

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MPHIL

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2012

THE EFFECTS OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION ON CHINESE
YOUTHS' PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN

by
WU Zeying, Zena

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences
(Political Science)

Lingnan University

2012

ABSTRACT

The Effects of Patriotic Education on Chinese Youths' Perceptions of Japan

by

WU Zeying, Zena

Master of Philosophy

This study tries to address a research question on what effects Chinese patriotic education has on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan. The question is raised from a recent discussion on the issue of whether the "patriotic education campaign" since 1989 has led to anti-Japanese sentiments in China.

Guided by the research question, this study particularly looks at the impacts of patriotic education in schools on Chinese students' perceptions of Japan. While aware of the theoretical arguments and the focus on Chinese historical narrative of Japan in previous research, this study instead serves as an empirical examination on the topic and emphasizes the importance of students' reactions in determining the effects of Chinese patriotic and history education in schools. This study thus is primarily based on the empirical data collected from fieldworks and surveys. Comparative and content analyses were also employed to examine relevant official documents and the history textbooks in secondary schools.

Based on these empirical and comparative examinations, this study on the one hand concludes that the historical narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic curriculum, though it has been more negative than positive, has been consistent since 1989, when the Chinese government attempted to reform and strengthen its patriotic education and emphasized on the history of the "Chinese humiliation century." In addition, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced to students with a reformed history curriculum since 2001. This study, on the other hand, also discovers that nowadays Chinese youths tend to perceive Japan in a multi-faceted and rational way, that their understandings of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the historical narrative of Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum, and that Chinese youths today tend to resist the message likely embedded with the political-ideological indoctrination in the school curriculum. Due to the stronger influences from the Internet and other mass media, the conflicting effects of textbooks and teachers as well as Chinese students' superficial receptions and "digestion" of the information from schools, this study reveals the weak effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan.

DECLARATION

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.

(WU Zeying, Zena)

Date:

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS

THE EFFECTS OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION ON CHINESE YOUTHS'
PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN

by

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Master of Philosophy

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Background and Literature Reviews

The last two decades have seen large-scale street demonstrations and online petitions against Japan across Mainland China, although economic exchanges, on the other hand, have boomed between China and Japan.¹ Nationwide anti-Japanese protests in 1996, 2003, 2005 and 2010, for example, were highly visible cases. There were also large-scale demonstrations against the United States and other western countries by Chinese living inside and outside mainland China in the last two decades, for instance, the nationwide demonstrations against the United States in response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the demonstrations against western countries in response to Tibet issues and western media bias during the Beijing Olympic torch relay in 2008. Nonetheless, street demonstrations and online petitions against Japan have been much more consistently visible.

The last two decades similarly have seen Chinese holding consistently negative attitudes toward Japan. As showed by public opinion polls concluded by both China and Japan since 1988, Chinese perceptions of Japan have been consistently negative since the mid-1990s (Kobayashi 2008). Triggered by different disputes and incidental events, as we saw, the frequent street demonstrations and online petitions against Japan in China usually involved Chinese youths in their 20s as major participants (Wang 2009: 800).

Why do Chinese still harbor consistently negative feelings toward Japan while older generations, who had direct experiences of the war and occupation, have been passing away and the younger generation has grown up with all kinds of Japanese products and Japanese cultural influences in their lives? Why have large-scale street

¹According to the figures drawn from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the value of the mutual trade between China and Japan had grown from \$12 billion in 1990 to \$83 billion in 2000 when it accounted for more than 22% of China's total trade in 2000. Also, according to the latest report released by Japan External Trade Organization, compared to 2010 Japan's total trade with China rose 14.3% to US\$344.9 billion in 2011, setting a new record. This number is expected to reach a record high exceeding US\$350 billion in 2012. See <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20120223142-news>, accessed in Feb. 2, 2012.

demonstrations and online petitions against Japan frequently occurred across Mainland China in the past two decades despite increased economic and social exchanges between China and Japan?

Explorations of these questions bring about extensive discussions and in-depth analyses on Chinese perceptions of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations from different perspectives. Among those discussions and analyses, two main arguments can be broadly concluded. While one suggests that Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments (if there are any) are deliberately disseminated by the Chinese government for or through promoting nationalism, the other argues that anti-Japanese sentiments in China (if there are any) are deeply embedded within historical trauma and current disputes rather than being a product of manipulation.²

Given China's rise as an economic, political, and military power, as has been argued by many scholars, the last two decades have coincided with a resurgence of Chinese nationalism through a nationwide "patriotic education campaign" across mainland China.³ The "patriotic education campaign" launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1990s, which emphasizes the traumatic experiences mainly resulting from the invasion by Japan during China's "humiliation century" and the CCP's contributions to riding China and its people of the humiliation, especially of Japan's invasion, is thus believed to be aimed at promoting Chinese (Chinese youths in particular) nationalist feelings toward Japan, so as to legitimize the CCP regime and sustain social stability.⁴

This argument, as Japanese scholar Shogo Suzuki (2007) concluded, is increasingly popular in the context of a legitimacy crisis of the CCP within China in the late 1980s. It also strongly relies on the assumption that Chinese nationalism is rooted in China's wartime past and that the Chinese leadership is capable of strategically utilizing historical memory to suit its interests. On the heels of these assumptions, both politicians and scholars believe that Chinese patriotic education serves as a pragmatic tool to nurture anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese,

² For the first point of view, see, for example, Callahan (2006, 2007); Gries (2005); He (2007, 2009); Mitter (2000); Zhao (1998, 2004). For the second point of view, see, for example, Liu (2007); Jiang (2005); Wang (2008); Suzuki (2007).

³ There have been a number of surveys on the rise of Chinese nationalism, see, for examples, Gries (2004); Hughes (2006); Whiting (1995); Zheng (1999) and etc.

⁴ For this view, see especially Zhao Suisheng's works (1998, 2004). Also see, for example, Barne (1995); Callahan (2006); Chen (2005); Cohen (2002); He (2007); Gries (2005).

especially Chinese youths.⁵

When large-scale anti-Japanese protests burst out across Mainland China in 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura at that time connected China's anti-Japanese sentiments with China's history-based education, claiming China should "modify" its education concerning history. He also cited, "a survey released by Japan's *Asahi Shimbun* in April 2005 indicated that more than 80% of Japanese respondents believed that China's nationalistic education system encouraged Chinese anti-Japanese protests" (*Los Angeles Times*, 8 May 2005). This argument actually had existed in Japan much earlier. From 27 February to 23 March 2001, for example, a Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* carried a series of twenty-one articles on the teaching of history in China, offering detailed support for what many had been writing: the Chinese leadership buttress growing nationalism by presenting Japanese history more negatively and stirring public opinion towards increased animosity (Rozman 2002: 119). Almost ten years later when the boat collision incident happen between China and Japan in September 2010, an editorial entitled "China shouldn't stir up anti-Japanese sentiments" was released by *Yomiuri Shimbun*, similarly criticizing that China has instilled this belief [Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands belong to China] among its people through "anti-Japanese patriotism" education since the 1990s (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 16 September 2010).

In Japanese academia, the same arguments over Chinese nationalism and patriotic history education are getting more popular as well. Quite a number of Japanese scholars, Akio Takahara in the University of Tokyo, for instance, believes that China's rising self-confidence in the nation, which reacts on the remaining sense of inferiority and promotes nationalism of an aggressive nature, is a structural cause of the tension between China and Japan (Takahara 2005:41). It is thus also argued by some Japanese scholars that the history-based patriotic education in China has been an important contributing factor for the Chinese peoples' consistently negative perceptions of Japan (Kobayashi 2008).

Although China and Japan fought a traumatic war from 1937 to 1945, they did

⁵ Numerous works have discussed the negative influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations. See, for example, Appenrodt (2008); Calder (2005); Callahan (2009); Chan and Bridges (2006); Gong and Teo (2010); He (1998, 2007, 2009); Hughes (2006, 2008); Jiang (2006); Moore (2010); Wang (2008); Zhao (2000).

not start to quarrel about history until the early 1980s, when the majority of the populations in both countries no longer had a direct experience of the war and the two countries had developed closer economic and social ties. By questioning why this happened between China and Japan, Chinese scholar He Yinan (2007: 44) believed that the fundamental cause of international political conflict over history lies in the intentional manipulation of history by ruling elites, or national mythmaking, for instrumental purposes; the national mythmaking in both China and Japan thus has led to the mistrust between Chinese and Japanese and the failure of Sino-Japanese reconciliation. On China's side, He (2009) suggested that the "patriotic education campaign", which was promoted by the CCP leaders to sustain its legitimacy since 1989, has contributed to the volatile Sino-Japanese relations at both official and popular levels.

However, is it true? Are the Chinese, especially Chinese youths, harboring such strong anti-Japanese sentiments? Is a state-led "anti-Japanese patriotic education campaign" really going on in China? Does Chinese patriotic education necessarily lead to anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese?

While more and more critics point to the Chinese "patriotic education campaign" since 1989, blaming it as a trigger for anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese, particularly among Chinese youths, Japanese scholar Suzuki (2007:27) refuted these critics, suggesting that although it is indeed true that the CCP has promoted some form of patriotism to legitimize itself, it does not necessarily follow that anti-Japanese sentiments per se are deliberately disseminated. He further pointed out several crucial flaws such critics should confront: 1) a growth in popular anti-Japanese sentiments may not secure the stability of CCP regime but instead could result in the destructions of foreign property; 2) historical perceptions do matter and thus it is unlikely for any Chinese leadership to be autonomous from history memories; 3) Japanese imperialism can be used for regime legitimating only when the rhetoric has "resonance" with the Chinese populace.

For many Chinese, as Chinese scholar Wang Zheng (2008:800-801) asserted, the foreign invasions, the military defeats, the unequal treaties and all the details of invaders' atrocities during the "100 years of national humiliation" are not merely a recounting of national history; Chinese people learn these sad stories not only from history textbooks or patriotic education activities, but also from their parents and

grandparents. Although Wang (2008) believed that the institutionalized historical discourses about the country's traumatic national experiences have profoundly influenced young people's perceptions of the outside world, Wang also agreed with Suzuki's argument and believed that without comprehension of the primordial background of Chinese nationalism, we would not be able to fully understand why Chinese elite-led top-down propaganda campaign could have realized its objectives of enhancing the regime's political legitimacy and improving social solidarity.

By reviewing the existing literature on Chinese nationalism, Allen Carlson (2009) has also criticized that in the absence of a broader set of comparisons and empirical observations, the existing literature on Chinese nationalism has simply assumed a surge of Chinese nationalism in the last two decades as a matter of fact and understood Chinese nationalism in terms of exclusionary dichotomies. It is, nonetheless, not necessary for Chinese nationalism to bear an exclusionary and egoistic nature in the sense that the contemporary construction of national identity in China is possible to proceed with transnational and global political space and bottom-up narratives of national belongings at the grassroots level (Carlson 2009: 29-30). Contemporary Chinese nationalism, as Carlson (2009: 29) further suggested, may differ from the Chinese nationalism in the old days as well as the nationalism in other nations.

Given the fact that nationalism as a term is seldom used by either the Chinese government or academia while patriotism is such a term overused by both Chinese government and populace, there have also been debates on whether Chinese nationalism is officially substituted for by patriotism.

In the PRC official discourse, the term "nationalism" is close to "chauvinism", which referred to parochial and reactionary attachments to nationalities, whereas "patriotism" is just a love of the Chinese motherland (Zhao 1998: 290). Therefore, for many Chinese, patriotism is a term totally different from nationalism. As CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin once emphasized in 1990 "the patriotism we advocate is by no means a parochial nationalism." (Jiang 1990). For many Chinese, patriotism, instead, is essentially identical with socialism because "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" has been officially justified as a common task for all Chinese and is the main theme of patriotism in today's China (Qiang and Fairbrother 2006:8). As the *People's Daily* editorial stated on the 1996 National Day, "Patriotism

is specific... Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and road chosen by all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party.” (Quoted from Zhao 1998: 291).

However, in the sense that China is such a nation-state with 56 ethnic groups and “nationalism” as a term with ethnic connotations which may arouse nationalistic fervor among multiple ethnic groups inside China, there has been another argument suggesting that Chinese governments have purposely substituted nationalism with patriotism in order to ensure Chinese national unity (Gries 2004; Kao 1996; Zheng 1999). To some extent, patriotism is indeed a more acceptable non-political notion to the PRC government as it helps the people to focus on problems and challenges they share in common. It acknowledges the ethnic differences among China’s population but insists that all are members of a large nation that binds them together by the Communist state. It thus helps the Communist Party, who speaks in a nation’s name, to successfully demand the citizens to identify themselves with the nation and subordinate other interests to those of the state. Characterized by its obvious state-centric nature, Chinese patriotism, as was concluded by Zhao (1998), is in fact state-led nationalism.

Due to its state-centric nature, however, some scholars contradictorily argue against reducing Chinese patriotism to the western term nationalism. As Michael Hunt (1994: 63) observed, “by professing *aiguo* (love the state), Chinese usually expressed loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be in its renovated form.” This observation, as aforementioned, is shared by many Chinese scholars, officials and populace who believe that Chinese patriotism is such a term not equal with the concept of nationalism as understood in the western context and bearing egoistic and exclusivist nature, but again, is just a love for the socialist state. (Liu 2007; Jiang 2004; Pang 2005).

Efforts have also been undertaken by Chinese scholars to detach anti-Japanese sentiments from Chinese patriotic education. By citing the recent popularity of Japanese (and Korean) products and modern culture among Chinese youths, most Chinese scholars of Chinese patriotism, instead, have criticized a growth of “national nihilism” among Chinese youths nowadays and argued that the Chinese government has never intended to instill anti-Japanese sentiments into its general public, but only asks its people not to forget historical lessons so as to avoid the recurrence of

historical tragedies. They cited Chinese government's official statements that people of both countries should look forward into the future and be friends forever (Jiang 2005; Shang 2004). Following Mao Zedong's logic to distinguish the Japanese people from a small batch of Japanese militarists, Chinese scholars also argued, if there is anything Chinese history education teaches their students to go against, that must be the Japanese imperialism and the war crimes committed by Japanese militarists, but by no means the Japanese people (Pang 2005; Liu 2007).⁶

Public opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in 2004, 2006, and 2008 revealed that Chinese respondents who chose incomplete reflections on wartime history by the Japanese as one of their main reasons for having negative feelings of Japan were much more in number than those who chose the history of Japan's invasion in modern China as a reason.⁷ Based on these survey results, recent attempts have also been made to distinguish the history of Japan's invasion in modern China from Japanese current attitudes toward history. In doing so, Chinese governments and scholars suggest that what Chinese mostly care about is current Japanese attitudes toward history but not the past history itself, and letting people know about the history itself is by all means necessary and beneficial for the bilateral relations.⁸

1.2 Research Question

Discussions of Chinese nationalism and why Chinese harbor consistently negative feelings of Japan are ongoing.⁹ One key aspect of these discussions would be Chinese patriotic education and its impacts on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan. By assuming the high effectiveness of Chinese patriotic education and looking at Chinese perceptions of Japan in a dichotomous way, a seemingly popular argument sets out that there exist strong anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese populace, especially among Chinese youths, and that Chinese patriotic education necessarily leads to Chinese youths' anti-Japanese sentiments. Actually, this has

⁶ Two textbook designers and two historians I interviewed during my fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing also indicated similar ideas. See Chapter III.

⁷ For specific figures, see the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS (2004, 2006, 2009).

⁸ These arguments can be found in Liu (2002); Jiang (2005); and Su (2000).

⁹ There have also been more empirical examinations on Chinese history and patriotic education in recent years. See, for example, Fairbrother (2006); Friedman (2008); Jin and Li (2011); Müller et al. (2011); Rose (2010); Shin and Sneider et al. (2011).

simplified Chinese patriotic education, Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan as well as the mechanism of how Chinese patriotic education impacts on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan in this way:

However, does this very assumption of the “creator-receiver connection” really work out in China? If whether Chinese patriotic education per se has impacts on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan is not a proper research question to ask since the role of school as a political socialization agent has been widely admitted and confirmed, the questions of to what extent Chinese patriotic education affects Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan and what these effects are should definitely be proper, and actually important, questions to ask. Thus, this study raises a main research question of “what effects of Chinese patriotic education has on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan?”

To address this main research question and to question the very assumptions of the “creator-receiver connections”, this study accordingly asks sub-questions about the “creator”, Chinese patriotic education, in chapter III: 1) What is Chinese patriotic education really about? 2) How does Chinese patriotic education actually work out in China? 3) What information about Japan does Chinese patriotic education intend to teach Chinese youths? In Chapter IV, this study further asks about the reactions of the “receivers” — Chinese youths: 4) How do Chinese youths actually perceive Japan? 5) How do Chinese youths receive and “digest” the information about Japan from the school patriotic curriculum?

Through answering all these sub-questions respectively addressing the “creator” and “receivers,” this study again comes back to its main research question and tries to come out with a more genuine picture of how Chinese patriotic education affects

Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan.

1.3 Study Scope

In response to the aforementioned discussions on “Chinese patriotic education campaign” after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and its impacts on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan, this study principally focuses on the post-1989 patriotic education in China. For comparative study, however, it also traces China's ideological-political education back to 1978 when China inaugurated its reform and opening-up policy and started an emphasis on patriotic education. Patriotic education, as parts of the party-state's political-ideological education program is indeed broader than other forms of schooling and may be hidden in every corner of the society. However, in the sense that patriotic education in schools is the most direct reflection of state's political-ideological education and the secondary schooling is taken as the core of patriotic education in schools according to the Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,¹⁰ this study thus narrows its research subjects down to patriotic education and Chinese youths in secondary schools, including both junior and senior levels. Within schools, the patriotic education curriculum is also infused in both classes and extra-curricular activities to different extents. Regarding the education containing information about Japan, as is found from my analysis on China's post-1989 patriotic education and my survey with secondary school students, history classes in schools are the classes where most information about Japan are supposed to be taught due to Japan's dominant role in wartime history,¹¹ and thus is particularly emphasized in the “patriotic education campaign” after 1989. Simply put, this study focuses on the patriotic history curriculum in secondary schools.

According to the Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education again, Chinese youths, most of whom are under schooling and particularly those in secondary schools, are the focus of Chinese patriotic education.¹² To examine the direct impacts of the patriotic education in secondary schools and address a group of Chinese youths who have seldom been addressed in previous studies, this study thus

¹⁰ See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” *the Selected Archives of Importance since the 14th People's Congress Meeting*, p. 925.

¹¹ See survey results of Q9 in Appendix II.

¹² See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” p. 925.

focuses on Chinese students in secondary schools and particularly examines their reactions to the patriotic history curriculum as well as their perceptions of Japan.¹³

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Schools, as one of the most controllable agents for political socialization, have also been widely taken as one of most effective socialization agents in influencing students' political attitudes by conveying knowledge and prescribing attitudes through the curriculum and textbooks, through the influence of teachers, and through children's participation in extracurricular and ritual activities (Dawson, et al. 1977). Empirically, however, scholars in political socialization theory had come to doubt the effectiveness of school education as an agent for regimes to justify their rule and motivate populations behind national goals.

Based on their empirical research, Kenneth Langton and Kent Jennings (1968) have shown the weak correlations between American high school civic education courses and a number of political attitudes. Reviews of other empirical studies have also cast doubt upon the effects of the curriculum, teachers, extracurricular activities, and the general secondary school experience on students' political orientations, views, values, attitudes, and behavior.¹⁴

Some explanations for the ineffectiveness of schooling in influencing students' political attitudes lay blame on the contradictory or stronger effects from other socialization agents, such as the mass media, family education, peer groups, personal experience, etc., while others focus on the structures and actors (teachers and students in particular) within schooling itself (Beck 1977; Langton and Jennings 1969).

The explanation of redundancy, for example, asserts that by the time students reach secondary school, the political messages of the school are duplicating those which students have already encountered in earlier stages of schooling or outside the schools (Langton and Jennings 1969). Political messages from secondary schools

¹³ Previous studies have focused more on Chinese college students for their perceptions of Japan. See (Chen (2003); Li and Shi (2005); Sha (2008) and the Public Opinion Polls jointly conducted by *China Daily* and Genron NPO in Japan since 2005. Caroline Rose has recently had an empirical examination on Chinese and Japanese civil education in primary schools. See Rose (2010).

¹⁴ For a summary of these studies, see Fairbrother (2002:22).

thus may be just a repetition of those in previous years or echoes of what students have heard or are hearing from other sources, which may result in a diminished impact between new and old information and consensus among messages students receive from schools and other agents of socialization. Students may thus miss or ignore what is intended to be taught to them (Dawson, et al. 1977).

Another school-level explanation focuses on the roles of teachers as mediators between intended and implemented curriculum. Due to the conflicting demands and pressures from administrators, other teachers, parents and students as well as problems of education system, such as, examination and curriculum reforms, teachers may have to cope with both these conflicting demands and over workload through the tactics of “routinizing procedures, modifying goals, rationing services and asserting priorities” or a cost-benefit type analysis (Weatherley and Lipsky 1977; Clark and Lampert 1986). Therefore, the implemented curriculum may substantially differ from the intended one after teachers have specified “how much time will be devoted to a subject, what topics will be taught, and how well topics are to be learned” (Schwille, et al. 1983, quoted from Fairbrother 2002: 24). With different personal experience and educational backgrounds, teachers may also have different understandings and interpretations of the intended curriculum. Students thus may find conflicts among the interpretations of different teachers on one particular issue and compromise their receptions of the messages taught by the teachers (Goodlad 1986). In this way, to what extent the intended curriculum is actually implemented and received by students largely depends on teachers who act as the mediators between the intended and implemented curriculum.

The final explanation focuses on students, who are the “receivers” of the schooling and have the final saying of the effectiveness of school education. According to Wendy Griswold (1994: 14), cultural objects such as textbooks need audiences or receivers who digest the former, and unless cultural objects have “people who receive them, people who hear, read, understand, think about, enact, participate in, remember them,” their intended messages and cultural meanings cannot be enacted. In other words, only when students receive and “digest” the information from school curricula, can school curricula have impacts on students. Thus, examination on students’ reactions to the schooling is no doubt necessary for studying the effects of the schooling.

There are various factors, however, affecting students' reception or "digestion" of the message from schools, making examination of students' reactions to the schooling hard and complicated. Students, especially those in their young age, for example, may have problems in understanding and grasping political messages due to their intrinsic failure to understand certain complex and abstract political concepts (Hess and Torney 1967). Also, students' interests in the content, their relationships with teachers, their exposure to the other information resources and their personalities as well as personal experiences may all contribute to their reception and "digestion" of the messages from schools (Dawson, et al., 1977).

As suggested by Fairbrother based on his comparative and empirical study on the patriotic education and students' national identity in Mainland China and Hong Kong, students' critical thinking (or in Henry Giroux's word, "resistance") of the political message from schools may tell better stories of Chinese students' reaction to their political schooling and explain why political socialization messages may not come to be fully accepted and taken in by students in China.

According to Giroux's "resistance" theory (1983a), schools as one of the controllable institutions for political socialization, represent the interests of the dominant group in society. This may cause students' perceptions of "hegemony" or the unequal relations between the dominants and the subordinates. In the situation when students find incongruity between the political messages they are being taught in schools and alternative messages from other groups or actors in society, the perception of "hegemony" may lead students to resist the political messages from schools (Fairbrother 2002: 30).

A reaction of "resistance", as Giroux (1983a: 291) noted, should involve "critical thinking and reflective action." Critical thinking, as defined by Catherine D. Ennis (1996), is "reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do" (p.10, quoted from Fairbrother (2002: 34)). It engages in "a certain skepticism, or suspension of assent, towards a given statement, established norm or mode of doing things... it considers alternative hypotheses and possibilities" (McPeck 1981: 6).

With critical thinking, as Fairbrother's empirical research found out, Mainland students in China exhibited their skepticism toward the hegemonic political socialization in schools although they did not completely deny the influence of the

schooling and took advantage of those aspects of the schooling experience which could be viewed as less like indoctrination, extracurricular activities and encouragement to form their own attitudes toward the nation, as well as the relatively free intellectual atmosphere of the university (Fairbrother 2002: 198). Students' individual perceptions and other socialization factors, as further shown by Fairbrother's survey data, partially detracted from Mainland students' patriotism and nationalism through fostering and interacting with their critical thinking (Fairbrother 2002: 258).

Regarding the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan, can Chinese patriotic curricula in schools succeed in cultivating Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan by telling the historical stories about Sino-Japanese wars and Japan's invasion in modern China when Chinese youths nowadays have grown up with numerous Japanese products and Japanese contemporary cultures rather than with direct experience of Sino-Japanese wars? With many more economic and social exchanges between China and Japan and in a relatively more liberal Chinese society with both globalization and new communication structures today, to what extent does the information about Japan from the school curricula contribute to students' understanding of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations? Also, with pressures from all kinds of examinations in the Chinese educational system and students' pragmatic approaches to deal with the coursework in schools, how well, then, do students "digest" the school curricula, and particularly the message about Japan from schools?

These questions are definitely necessary and important to be answered if one would like to judge the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan. Without further inquiry on these questions, one can hardly make assumptions on the effects of Chinese patriotic education or even blame it as a trigger for Chinese youths' anti-Japanese sentiments.

1.5 Research Methods

While being aware of numerous existing theoretical arguments on Chinese nationalism/patriotism (education) and its history narratives (and production), this study, instead, intends to have an empirical survey on the topic. Also, being aware that previous researches have seldom addressed the reactions of "receivers" –

Chinese students – to the history narratives of the “creator” – patriotic education in schools,¹⁵ this study attempts to examine the characteristics of the Chinese patriotic curriculum and empirically survey Chinese students’ reception and “digestions” of the patriotic curricula in schools. This empirical study, therefore, consists of two parts: analysis on Chinese patriotic history curriculum and survey on students’ reactions to the curriculum.

The whole process of the empirical examinations generally involves two stages: data collection and data analyses. While site visits, in-depth interviews and questionnaire surveys are carried out to collect data, both qualitative and quantitative analysis are adopted for data analyses.

1.5.1 Data collection

I. Field Research and In-depth Interviews

The process of data collection began with a fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing where famous patriotic education bases concerning Japan’s invasion in modern China,¹⁶ and the biggest state-owned press for publishing textbooks—the People’s Education Press—are located.

During the fieldtrip, site visits to several important patriotic education bases were conducted, with notes and photos taken of the museum exhibitions as well as visitors’ comments.¹⁷ Visits were also paid to the library of the People’s Education

¹⁵ There have been both theoretical and empirical researches on Chinese patriotic education and its impacts on students. However, few of them have empirically examined students’ reactions to the patriotic education. As Kazuya Fukuoka (2011) suggested, emphasizing creators of history narratives (and their production), the field tends to overlook the audience, or, receivers in the process. Fairbrother (2002)’s empirical work on secondary school and college student’s reactions to the civic education in Hong Kong and patriotic education in Mainland education is one of the few. By examining the textbooks of the civic classes at the primary level in both China and Japan, Caroline Rose (2010) also made a contribution to the existing empirical works in the field, but she also pointed out the importance to analyze students’ “digestion” of the curriculum in the end of her paper.

¹⁶ The “Outline for Implementing the Patriotic Education” (1994) required local governments of all levels to use different sorts of museums, memorial halls, buildings in memory of martyrs, sites of important battles in revolutionary wars, protected historic relics, and scenic sites for conducting patriotic education. In March 1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that 100 sites were selected as the national level “patriotic education bases.” For more details about the 100 patriotic education bases, see Wang (2008).

¹⁷ The patriotic education bases visited include the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Memorial Sculpture Garden of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing as well as the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders in Nanjing. Visitors’ comments are voluntarily and freely left by the visitors when they are having and finish their visits to the museums. These comments could be visitors’ feelings towards the themes of the museums and

Press in order to examine different editions of history textbooks in secondary schools and have in-depth interviews with two history textbooks designers. To inquire about the nature of Chinese nationalism/patriotism and the impacts of Chinese history education on Sino-Japanese relations, in-depth interviews were also administered with another 2 historians in Chinese modern and contemporary history and 6 specialists in both Chinese patriotic education and Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁸

For those in-depth interviews with textbook designers, historians and specialists, the construction of a semi-structured interview schedule was designed beforehand, guided by the existing literature on Chinese history education, Chinese nationalism/patriotism and their impacts on Sino-Japanese relations. Due to the expertise of different interviewees, different questions related to different aspects were asked. Those questions, however, all pointed to the research topic and can be initially grouped into the following aspects: 1) the nature of Chinese nationalism/patriotism; 2) the design of history and patriotic curriculum in secondary schools and its impacts on students' views of foreign countries; 3) Chinese (especially Chinese youths) perceptions of Japan and the impacts of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations.

Exploratory interviews were also conducted with history teachers and students from secondary schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.¹⁹ In these interviews with history teachers, I talked to them individually either online or in face-to-face manner.²⁰ With a semi-structured schedule in hand, my talk with the history teachers in general focused on the following two questions: 1) what and how do they actually teach students about Japan in and out of history classes with the patriotic education curriculum? 2) how do they evaluate the impacts of the patriotic history curriculum on students and students images of Japan?

their advice for the improvements of the museums.

¹⁸ Those historians and specialists interviewed currently teach and work in the top universities and research institute in Beijing and Nanjing. Interviews were taped with the consent of the interviewees, with anonymity assured.

¹⁹ Since Shenzhen is a new city without historical events concerning Japan's invasions in modern China while Nanjing did experience dominant ones, it is reasonable to assume it is more likely for these two cities to have different approaches to history and patriotic education, particularly regarding to Japan. Thus, 4 teachers and 10 students in total were conveniently selected from two secondary schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.

²⁰ Interviews with the teachers from Shenzhen were conducted in face-to-face manner while interviews with the teachers from Nanjing were conducted online.

To see students' reflections on the patriotic history curriculum in schools and as parts of the pretests for the questionnaire survey in the later stage, students were interviewed with a structured schedule (See Appendix I), in which open-ended questions were carefully designed and students were asked to answer the open-ended questions one by one without time constraint.²¹ The structured interview schedule mainly covered the following three aspects: 1) what do students know about Japan? 2) through what means do students receive information about Japan? and 3) how do students view Japan as well as the patriotic history education in their schools?

With both semi-structured and structured interviews, specific information and tentative insights into how Chinese patriotic history education is implemented in schools and how students "digest" the education were provided by the history teachers and students interviewed. However, given the small number of teachers and students who could feasibly be interviewed, it would be difficult to gauge differences and similarities in the ways teachers teach students about Japan in schools and students' reflections to the education. It is also acknowledged that the interviews (especially those with historians, specialists and textbook designers) would suffer from the following limitations. First, it would be difficult (and understandable) for all the interviewees, who are Chinese, to be truly value-free and interpret Chinese patriotism objectively, even though they are all well-educated and are experts in their fields. Second, due to the political sensitivity of the topic, there may still be a certain political "propaganda" element in the response (especially those of interviewees who actually participate in designing the patriotic education curriculum).

II. Questionnaire Survey

To address the limitations of in-depth interviews and to have a more faithful and genuine picture of Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan, a detailed questionnaire survey was administered to 643 secondary schools students in 8 mainland cities where large-scale anti-Japanese protests have taken place both in 1996 and 2005.²²

²¹ All the students from both Nanjing and Shenzhen were interviewed with the same structured schedule. While interviews with students from Shenzhen were conducted in oral and face-to-face manner, interviews with students from Nanjing were also conducted online through email..

²² The survey was carried out in 9 mainland cities – Shenyang, Xi'an, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing and Shenzhen – at the very beginning. As the sample of Xi'an was withdrawn from the total sample due to a possible invalid and unreliable dataset from a preliminary

With extensive reference to the published public opinion polls administered nationwide in mainland China by both Chinese and Japanese organizations, most of the questions and items in the questionnaire were firstly drawn from the previously published polls.²³ To make the questionnaire best fit within the context of our research objects, however, certain questions and scale items were revised based on the information gathered from the earlier exploratory interviews with textbook designers, scholars and teachers as well as students.

To further enhance the construct validity of the questionnaires, efforts were also tried to obtain the evaluations of the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of the questionnaire from 4 professors, each of whom is both interested in the research topic and has expertise in Chinese patriotic education, Sino-Japanese relations, political socialization or survey research. Moreover, advice from teachers and students in secondary schools was sought to further develop the questionnaire so that the questionnaire could have better measurements and be fully understood by the respondents -- secondary school students.

In terms of the content, the questionnaire generally addresses the following concerns: 1) what and through what means do students know about Japan? 2) what do students learn about Japan through the history and patriotic education curricula in schools? 3) how do students view Japan and “digest” the history and patriotic curricula in schools? 4) what impacts do the history and patriotic curricula in schools have on students’ perceptions of Japan?

The questionnaire was originally written in Chinese and later translated into English with the help and evaluation of an English native speaker, a Hong Kong Chinese, a mainland Chinese as well as a Singaporean who speaks very good Mandarin. For both English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire, see Appendix II and III.

Given pilot tests administered in small-scale samples from Shenzhen, Wuhan and Nanjing in earlier stages,²⁴ the final version of the questionnaire with 18

analysis, the survey data of the other 8 cities was analyzed.

²³ These public opinion polls include 4 polls conducted by the Japanese Studies Institute of CASS in every two years since 2002, and annual surveys jointly conducted by China Daily and Genron NPO in Japan since 2005.

²⁴ Before pilot tests, pre-tests were repeatedly administered with secondary schools students in Shenzhen for better construction and distribution of the questionnaire. To group representativeness,

closed-ended questions was refined and distributed to students of different grades and classes by their teachers in different cities during June 1st -10th , 2011.²⁵

Students were sampled from one or two public secondary schools conveniently accessed in each city,²⁶ ranging from the first year students in junior high schools to the third year students in senior high schools. Fifteen students were selected from each of the six grades, making a sub-sample of 90 for each city and a total sample of 720 for 8 cities. With a response rate of 89.3%,²⁷ 643 valid cases with complete responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are cases from Beijing, 73 from Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72 from Wuhan.

1.5.2 Data analyses

I. Qualitative Analysis

Through the previous fieldwork, textbooks material, teaching guidelines, official documents, transcripts of interviews as well as museums visitors' comments were collected. Qualitative approaches, such as content analysis and the methods of summary and induction then were used to analyze these archival data at hand.

For textbook materials, teaching guidelines, official documents and museum visitors' comments, content analyses were mainly conducted. At first, relevant textual data of these materials were selected, condensed and classified into different groups.

pilot tests were finally administered to 60 students from Shenzhen, Wuhan and Nanjing, each of which had 20 students conveniently sampled.

²⁵ Students ranging from the first year in junior high schools to the second year of senior high schools were asked to complete the questionnaires within 15 minutes in classes and directly returned the questionnaires to the teachers. However, since the third year students in senior high schools are taking or have taken the College Entrance Examinations when the survey was conducted, and could not be regularly accessed in the classes, the questionnaires had to be distributed to them individually through mailings and be returned with return envelopes.

²⁶ In Mainland China, there are different types of secondary schools. According to the figures from the Ministry of Education, however, nearly 90% of the secondary schools are public schools in 2010. Though all secondary schools in China are more or less required to follow a patriotic education curriculum, public secondary schools are generally believed to provide the strongest patriotic education. Thus, to examine the impacts of official patriotic education, we had our samples taken from public schools rather than from other types of schools. Among the 8 cities under observation, students in Beijing, Wuhan and Chongqing were from two different public secondary schools since schools selected were either junior high schools or senior high schools, while students from Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, Changsha and Shenzhen came from the same secondary schools with both junior and senior high classes. Following the principle of anonymity, the names of these schools are not revealed here.

²⁷ The response rate was obtained with the exclusion of the Xi'an's sample. Of 720 questionnaires distributed in the examined cities, 48 were not returned, and 29 were discounted for their partial completion.

Subject to our research questions, these textual data were then coded and in turn used together with statistical data in an attempt to understand salient themes and test relevant suggested assumptions.

For transcripts of the interviews, however, data were analyzed inductively. Detailed transcripts of interviews were firstly summarized. They were then categorized into the three aspects which the interviews were intended to address. In this way, instead of detailed transcript being cited, opinions from different interviews were summed up with corresponding themes and used to answer the questions addressed in Chapter III and IV.

II. Quantitative Analysis

Closed-ended questionnaire survey makes it possible to carry out quantitative statistical analyses with the data. It also makes it possible to compare research subjects by different variables and examine relationships between variables. For the research purpose of this study, descriptive analyses and the statistical procedures of comparing means, such as independent samples t-tests and ANOVA, through SPSS computer software, were mainly used. Moreover, to examine relationships between certain variables, correlation analysis (Pearson's correlation) was also employed.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

With this introductory chapter covering literature reviews, research questions, study scope, theoretical framework and research methods of the study, the next chapter provides a brief historical review of Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972 as background information for further discussions. Based on both qualitative and quantitative analysis on the empirical data collected from the fieldworks and surveys, the study then comes to address the research questions on Chinese patriotic education after 1989 in chapter III and further discusses Chinese youths' reactions to the patriotic curriculum in schools and their perceptions of Japan in chapter IV. In chapter V, this study comes back to answer the main research question and generally concludes the effects of patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan. To link the findings of this study with its social background, a further discussion on Chinese "confident nationalism" in current Chinese society is also provided in the conclusion, placing the study under the broader discussions on the evolving Chinese

nationalism and its impacts. In the end are elaborations of the contributions and limitations of the study as well as several practical suggestions for improving mutual perceptions and the bilateral relations between China and Japan.

Chapter 2

Chinese Perceptions of Japan since 1972

2.1 Introduction

Being close neighbors in Asia, China and Japan had enjoyed good relations for a long time in ancient times. The long friendships were unfortunately interrupted by the brutal warfare between two countries in modern times, leaving much historical legacy to the bilateral relations in the postwar and current days. After the World War II, due to the Cold War structural constraints and Japan's official recognition of Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government during the 1950s and 1960s, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations did not come until the 1970s when China split with the Soviet Union and the U.S. subsequently sought Sino-American rapprochement for Chinese assistance to end the Vietnam War and to facilitate the broader goal of balancing Soviet power. To inquire into the impacts of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan since 1989, however, this study mainly focuses on the Sino-Japanese relations after the normalization in 1972. For further discussions in the later chapters, this chapter attempts to have a general review of the bilateral relations since 1972 and particularly outline a picture of the evolving Chinese perceptions of Japan in the past 40 years.

2.2 The “honeymoon” period: mutual perceptions improved in 1970s

Faced with the common Soviet threat in the later stages of the Cold War, soon after the “Nixon Shock”,²⁸ Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka paid an official visit to Beijing to seal the Sino-Japanese normalization with his Chinese counterparts on 25 September 1972. While China aimed at strengthening its anti-Soviet front through the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, Japan attempted to gain a certain diplomatic autonomy by normalizing relations with Beijing before the Sino-U.S. rapprochements (Chalmers 1986: 403; He 2009: 186). Motivated by these pragmatic

²⁸ In February 1972, the U.S. President Richard Nixon surprisingly paid a visit to China and signed the Shanghai Communiqué with China. This unexpected gesture caused shock outside China and the U.S., including for the Japanese government and people (Feng, Gao and Wang 2007: 310-311).

objectives, China and Japan thus joined efforts to build up a mutually beneficial relationship between two nations in 1970s, directly and indirectly promoting friendly relations between two peoples as well.

In a 1969 survey in Japan, China was rated as the second largest security threat to Japan (15.6%) after the USSR (20.4%).²⁹ A survey in April 1972, however, showed that the percentage of Japanese people who saw China as the most threatening country dropped to 9%, which fell far behind those who felt the same way about the USSR (34.3%) and even the U.S. (16.6%).³⁰ On China's side, without public opinion polls about Sino-Japanese relations being conducted in 1970s, it was nonetheless known that China's previous travel restrictions with Japan were scrapped and personnel exchanges between two sides increased rapidly soon after the Sino-Japanese normalization. Regular exchanges of commercial flights between Tokyo and Beijing began in September 1974 and by November 1981, friendly exchange relations had been established between 33 pairs of "sister cities".³¹

With these good postures between two governments and the goodwill of senior officials in both sides to develop friendships between two countries, the mutual perceptions of Chinese and Japanese people were obviously improved after the normalization, even though most of the Chinese who had suffered from the wars still kept in mind the traumatic past while most of Japanese took China as a backward country in need of Japan's help. In China, for instance, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan, positive images of contemporary Japan, though co-existing with negative media treatment of past Sino-Japanese conflicts, portrayed Japan as a role model that should be emulated in selective ways (Whiting 1989: 80). Favorable depictions of all walks of the life in Japan, which covered education, technology, economic and even Japanese daily life, were found in both Chinese scholarly works and official newspaper, such as *Zhongguo Qingnian* (*Chinese Youth Daily*) and *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*). These descriptions of Japanese

²⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey on public perceptions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, June 1969, in Public Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat of Japanese Prime Minister, *Seron Chosa Nenkan*, 1970, 492, quoted from He (2009: 201)

³⁰ National survey on Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. and China and approval rates of cabinet and political parties by the Japan Association for Public Opinion, April 1972, in *Ibid*, 1973, 395, quoted from He (2009: 201)

³¹ The China-Japan Friendship Association, "Table on Friendly Cities between China and Japan (Chronologically)", see <http://www.zryx.org.cn/AssociateCityList.aspx?toSort=0>, accessed on April 25, 2012.

contemporary society and its postwar evolution, while facilitating the leaderships' efforts to promote good relations between two countries, countered the war memories in Chinese minds and gradually built up Chinese new images of Japan and Japanese contemporary society in this "honeymoon period" in 1970s.

2.3 Tensions come back: wartime memories stirred up in 1980s.

The amicable atmosphere between China and Japan during 1970s did not continue into the 1980s even though China and Japan still shared a common strategic interest to balance the Soviet threat in this period. Washington's continued military commitment to Taiwan in late 1970s, which was displayed through arms sales to Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act (enacted in April 1979), also distanced Beijing from Washington. Beijing formally endorsed its so-called independent foreign policy at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and shortly afterward resumed normalization talks with Moscow (He 2009:207). Japan, by the beginning of the 1980s, had become an economic giant. It then sought to promote international political influence to commensurate with its economic power. As both the international and domestic environments changed, tensions between China and Japan came back and demolished the friendly relationships which were built up in the 1970s.

Under the three principles (Peaceful and Friendly, Equal and Mutually Beneficial, Long-term and Stable) for the bilateral relations proposed by Premier Zhao Ziyang in June 1982 when he visited Japan,³² and with Japan's extension of generous yen loans to China, Sino-Japanese diplomacy still remained an upbeat tone at the beginning of the 1980s (He 2009: 232). However, starting with the disputes over Japanese history textbooks in 1982, Sino-Japanese relationship turned to a downturn due to frequent inter-governmental disputes and the simmering mutual antipathy at the popular level from the mid-1980s.

The textbook disputes in 1982 had caused such a lengthy and bitter coverage of the campaign in the mass media from both sides, stirring up China's memories of the wartime past and aroused contemporary Chinese youths over possible Japanese

³² This was developed into "four principles" by adding "mutually trust" in November 1983 when Hu Yaobang visited Japan. See: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guojia/8212/30794/30796/2230761.html>, accessed in April 25, 2012.

militarist behavior in the future (Whiting 1989: 28). The commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of Japan's surrender in 1985 also brought vividly communicated accounts of wartime suffering to the younger generation in China. Dramatic evidence of the impacts of these issues came in September in 1985 when thousands of university students in Beijing and elsewhere publicly demonstrated against Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honored the memory of Japanese war dead including 14 class-A war criminals, on the anniversary day of the 1931 Manchurian Incident (Whiting 1989: 28).

The theme of wartime recall reemerged in 1986 during the second textbook dispute. Although this dispute ended without the rancor of the first dispute and without too much attention from media, public objections still remained on the Chinese side (Whiting 1989: 20-21). Despite little media attention, many Chinese individuals showed a keen knowledge of the details and expressed considerable emotion in criticizing the Japanese handling of the matter. Although the 1986 controversy was diplomatically settled down with the compromise from both sides, this repeated dispute further educated Chinese, especially the Chinese younger generations who have not personal experiences of the wars, about the past wartime history and worsened their images of Japan.

Almost at the same time of the history textbook disputes, in both 1986 and 1987, the Osaka High Court twice recognized Taiwan's ownership of a student dormitory in Kyoto called the Guanghai Hostel (Kokaryo in Japanese), which was purchased by the KMT regime in Taiwan in 1952. This dormitory dispute unavoidably increased attention over Taiwan from both the Chinese government and its people. It not only reminded Chinese people of the history that Taiwan was taken by Japan in 1895, but also further triggered Chinese worry over Japanese reviving militarism. It thus again resulted in another clash of Chinese and Japanese nationalism as well as another bitter war of words between Beijing and Tokyo regarding the legitimacy of the Taiwan regime (Howe, ed 1996: 74-76).

Coming to the late 1980s, as an accumulative result of the previous disputes, Chinese government turned to criticize the strengthening of Japan's military capabilities, questioning Japanese government's decision to break the 1 percent GNP ceiling for annual defense spending in 1987 and directly remarking its worry over the revival of Japanese militarism. Due to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Japan joined

the other Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations in isolating China in both political and economic ways. China and Japan thus suspended the bilateral summits by the end of the 1980s and the friendly relations soon cooled off (Whiting and Xin 1990: 108).

The bilateral disputes and frictions in the 1980s may have soon died down, but they eventually led to public frustration between two sides in this period. The anti-Japanese student protests across China began with the historical disputes in this period. As a reaction, Japanese people started feeling “annoyed” and resentful with the Chinese “playing the history card.” Under an “action-reaction syndrome”, as argued by Allen Whiting (1989: 196), popular nationalism and estrangement turned stronger between the two countries during this period and continued rising since then.

2.4 “Economically hot, politically cold”: popular relations frozen in mid-1990s and early 2000s.

Although downgraded from the previous rapprochement to frictions within the stage of shallow reconciliation in 1980s, the general atmosphere of Sino-Japanese relations did not turn decisively negative (He 2009: 232). The China-Japan joint polls held in 1988 showed that 50.6% of Chinese respondents and 64.4% percent of Japanese respondents still thought the current bilateral relationship was “very good” or “good” (Jiang 1989: 23). As a matter of fact, as suggested by Whiting (1989:80-92), Chinese perceptions of Japan were dual images of an “economic role model” and a “ruthless aggressor” in the 1980s. The Sino-Japanese relationships therefore did not see actually downward spiral until the mid-1990s.

Coming to the 1990s, the common basis of the strategic interests for China and Japan in defending themselves from the “Soviet Threat” disappeared with the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The U.S. then began to adjust its China policy from “alliance” to one of seeing a major ideological enemy and a potential geo-political rival in the West Pacific zone (Jin 2001: 104). Faced with these international changes in post-Cold-War era, China and Japan had to re-define their bilateral relationship (Manicom and O'Neil 2009: 217). Sino-Japanese relations thus met uncertainty and volatilities during this post-Cold-War era.

Although Japan joined the G-7 in isolating China after the Tiananmen Incident

in 1989, Japan soon restarted its ODA to China in July 1990, being the first country of the G-7 to stop isolating China. With the frequent inter-governmental visits between two countries in the next two years, including Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's official visit to China in 1991, the General Secretary of CCP Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1992 and the well-received visit to China by the Japanese Emperor and Empress in 1992, Sino-Japanese relations enjoyed temporary serenity in the early 1990s.

However, Sino-Japanese relations started the downturn of both governmental and popular relations from the mid-1990s (He 2009: 234). The downturn of the bilateral relations was precipitated by the controversy over whether a Taiwan official, Hsu Li-teh, should be allowed to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games in Hiroshima in 1994 and the exchanges over Chinese nuclear testing in 1995. Following disagreements were over Japanese right-wingers' repeated attempts to land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1996 and Japanese PM Ryutaro Hashimoto's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in the same year. Bilateral frictions even continued during Chinese president Jiang Zemin's formal visit to Tokyo in November 1998, in which he harshly criticized Japan's wartime history and demanded Japanese contrition. All these frictions in the mid-1990s consequently led Sino-Japanese relations to the worst point since 1972 (Jin 2001: 106).

In February 1997 when *Zhongguo qingnianbao* reported on its 1996 survey of 100 000 Chinese young people, it asserted that just 15% of them had good feelings toward Japan and 14% thought Sino-Japanese relations were good. A 1997 follow-up, however, found that only 10% like Japan and 34% dislike it (quoted from Rozman (2002), Amako 1998: 24).

Alarmed by the downturn in public opinion, leaders in both sides had tried some efforts to stabilize the bilateral relations. Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998, for example, resulted in a joint declaration as the third document between China and Japan, in which the two governments reached an agreement for building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Developments (Jin 2001: 108). However, due to Jiang's insistence on mentioning the historical issues during his visit, Jiang's visit to Japan unfortunately did not improve the bilateral relations. Instead, it aroused the disputes over wartime history and quarrel over the issue of "apology" between two countries, further worsening Chinese negative opinions

towards Japan, and even resulting in Japanese people's reactive protests against Jiang personally and China as a whole (Rozman 2002: 111). Since then, the dispute over "apology" has remained a problem in the background of Sino-Japanese relations and from time to time was brought to the forefront.

Being aware of the importance of Sino-Japanese relations, to reassure Japanese people and calm their own public, Chinese government later announced its "smile diplomacy" to Japan in the fall of 1999 (Rozman 2002: 113). The visibility of Chinese government's efforts was Jiang Zemin's meeting with Japanese travelers on 20 May 1999 and Zhu Rongji's "friendship tour" to Japan from 12 to 17 October 1999. However, Chinese government's "smile diplomacy" did not work out among its public. Chinese Internet posts defied the official goals, criticizing Zhu for his message that present-day Japanese should not bear responsibility for the militarism and war against China, and furthermore that China highly appreciated Japan's ODA (Quoted from Rozman (2002: 113), Watanabe 2001: 126). Zhu was even called a traitor by millions of educated young Chinese on the Internet for his assertion to Japanese reporters that China does not want to hurt Japanese feelings over historical matters.³³

Coming to the 21st century, disputes over history, territory and sovereignty continually popped up one after another. Starting with the textbook disputes in late 2000 and early 2001, Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi's insistence on annual worship at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 consistently broke the bilateral relations. In addition, provoked by the bawdy show of four Japanese who taught and studied at the Northwest University in China, massive numbers of Chinese university students demonstrated in the streets in Xi'an in 2003.³⁴ Following in 2004 were ongoing disputes over economic rights in the East China Sea, riots in Beijing after Japan beat China in the Asia Cup football finals, and the intrusion into Japanese territorial waters of a Chinese nuclear attack submarine, as well as the Japanese identification of China as "a concern" alongside North Korea in the national defense program guidelines. In 2005, moreover, upon Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United

³³ *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 2, 2000.

³⁴ In October 2003, a Japanese teacher and three Japanese students presented a bawdy show, which was taken to insult China, in a formal and serious ceremony, triggering massive protests of numerous Chinese students from different universities in Xi'an.

Nations Security Council, a collection of 44 million signatures for a Chinese petition was alleged in early 2005. In February, Japan and the US released a joint statement, which was a continuation of the “New Directives for US-Japan Joint Defense” in 1996 and 1997 and included the security of Taiwan into the alliance’s “common strategic objectives.” The joint-statement not only raised “grave concern” and strong objections from Beijing, but also annoyed the Chinese populace and further aroused Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments. Being the last straw, the Japanese Education Ministry’s approval of a controversial history textbook in April 2005 finally provoked mass demonstrations against Japan across the Mainland. The nationwide demonstrations kept growing and lasted long during the last week of March and the first few weeks of April in 2005 (Hagström 2008-2009: 225).

Strangely, while political and popular relations between China and Japan deteriorated since the mid-1990s, the economic ties between two countries somehow grew rapidly and were becoming “hot”. During 1994-2003, Japan had been China’s largest trading partner while China had been Japan’s second partner since 1993 and surpassed the U.S. to become Japan’s largest trading partner in 2005 (Wan 2006: 223). According to Chinese figures, the value of the mutual trade between China and Japan had grown from \$12 billion in 1990 to \$83 billion in 2000 when it accounted for more than 22% of China’s total trade. Paralleling this had been a corresponding growth in Japanese FDI in China. Following their caution in the 1980s Japanese companies had rapidly increased their investment in China in the 1990s. Japanese FDI in 1991 came to \$579 million and in 1998 it reached \$3.2 billion. By the late 1990s, there had been 18,140 Japanese direct investment projects in China and China had ranked second only to the US as a target for Japanese investment.³⁵

Despite the “hot” economic interactions between two countries in general level, with poor governmental and popular relations, frequent frictions in different business sectors to some extent also worsened the bilateral relations. In 1985, for example, while the student demonstrations in fall seemed provoked by Nakasone’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine in August, they actually attacked Japan’s “economic invasion” as well (Whiting 1989: 95). In 2001, the dispute over what the Chinese called

³⁵ The figures were drawn from the web site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/478.html). See Yahuda (2006).

“discrimination by Japanese firms”³⁶ also caused Chinese negative images of Japan and added to cause the outburst of the massive anti-Japanese protests across China in 2005.

2.5 Thawing the ice but tensions remain: popular relations warming up with uncertainty since 2006

When Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, this marked a new phase of Sino-Japanese relations since it ended the “frozen” bilateral relations that existed under the leadership of Koizumi (Jiang 2007: 15). To improve the “frozen” state of the bilateral relation, the new Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, decided to make his first foreign trip to China (instead of the U.S.) in October 2006, attempting to break the ice on the bilateral summit that had been suspended for the past five years and warm up the “cold” political ties between China and Japan. In response, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao paid an “ice-melting” visit to Japan in April 2007, followed by the next Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda’s “spring-welcoming” trip to China in December 2007. To push the bilateral relations into a further stage, Chinese president Hu Jintao also paid his “warm spring” visit to Japan in May 2008, leading Sino-Japanese relations back to the peak of amicability in 1970s (He 2009: 288; Jiang 2007: 18).

With these friendly official gestures and the positive rhetoric of “ice breaking,” “ice melting,” “spring-welcoming,” and “warm spring,” the popular relations between two peoples were warming up as well. According to the annual surveys jointly launched by both sides since 2006, a favorable opinion of Japan among Chinese had uninterrupted risen from 11.6% in 2006 to 38.3% in 2010.³⁷

Despite of the bilateral relations being warming up at both governmental and popular levels, none of the bilateral disputes has been actually settled, but only been shelved. Given the fact, tensions thus remain in current Sino-Japanese relations. Bilateral tensions always come back when any of these shelved disputes popped up. In March 2007, for instance, the “comfort women” issue, which was re-politicized

³⁶ Mainly referring to Chinese outcries over two issues in 2001: 1) Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airlines forced Chinese passengers to spend the night in Japanese airports while treating other passengers differently; 2) Mitsubishi Motors recalled cars in the United States but refused to recall similar models in China. See Rozman (2002: 121).

³⁷ *China Daily*, August 19-25, 2011.

after then-Prime Minister Abe's denial of the Japanese military's involvement in forcing women into sexual slavery during the World War II, has raised up certain levels of tensions between two sides. Similarly, the disputes over wartime history came up this year again. The Nagoya Mayor publicly denied the Nanjing Massacre when he met his Chinese counterparts from Nanjing in February 2012, resulting in tremendous online protests by Chinese internet users and the official objections from Chinese government.

Coming to the latest days, Sino-Japanese relations have been more often troubled by the territorial disputes, which tend to be more serious and more troublesome since territory is both politically and economically important and both sides tend to hold assertive stands on the issues. The competition over the Chunxiao gas field (Shirakaba in Japanese) since 2008 has been an important issue between China and Japan and from time to time attracts great attentions from both the public and mass media in two sides. Contingent incidents over disputed waters, like the fishing boat collisions in late 2010, had also caused mass protests in both sides and eventually affected the bilateral economic exchanges. The ongoing controversies over "buying" the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in most recent days, for instance, have doubtlessly caused certain tension between two governments, inevitably worsening the mutual perceptions between two peoples.

According to the latest survey results published in June 20, 2012 by both *China Daily* and Genron NPO, it was indicated that 58.4 % of Chinese respondents believed territorial issues are a primary cause of the problems hampering the development of Sino-Japanese relations, followed by 30% of Chinese respondents taking a lack of mutual trust as a primary cause for poor relations.³⁸ The results of the same survey in 2011 similarly suggested the recent territorial disputes have been an bigger factor affecting the bilateral relations. Actually, Chinese favorable attitudes towards Japan have dropped from 38.3% in 2010 to 28.6% in 2011, reversing the uninterrupted rising number in the previous four years since 2006.³⁹

³⁸ *China Daily*, June 21, 2012.

³⁹ *China Daily*, August 19-25, 2011.

2.6 Conclusion

The year of 2012 marks the 40th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. With almost two generations' efforts in the past 40 years, Sino-Japanese relations in general have been improved at least in political and economical sectors even though tensions still remain.⁴⁰ Given both regional and worldwide challenges under the globalization and with deeper economic interdependence, both Chinese and Japanese governments have shown their goodwill to sustain and improve the bilateral relations. Sino-Japanese relations thus currently keep manageable with normal political interactions and frequent economical exchanges between two sides.

The bilateral relations between Chinese and Japanese peoples, however, seem more complicated. As Whiting (1989:126) concluded, mutual perceptions between peoples do not always accord with actual circumstances, especially when they are embedded in a relationship plagued by historical and emotional tensions. Therefore, despite the friendly official gestures of two governments and the interdependent economic ties between two countries, it is to some extent true that the popular relations between two peoples so far remain at the stage of shallow reconciliation without genuine mutual trust and institutionalized interactions. As Wan (2006: 2) described, Sino-Japanese relations up to now still remain dispute-prone, cyclical and distant psychologically at popular level.

⁴⁰ As the latest survey suggested, despite the drop of Chinese favorable attitudes towards Japan in 2011, this figure have increased (to 35.4%) again this year. See Genron NPO, June 20, 2012, <http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/cat119/2012-a.html>, firstly accessed on June 21, 2012.

Chapter 3

Chinese Patriotic Education Since 1989

3.1 Introduction

With a brief historical review of the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations and Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972 provided in the previous chapter, this chapter comes to address the two research questions on Chinese patriotic education: 1) what is Chinese patriotic education since 1989 about? 2) what information about Japan does the post-1989 patriotic education intend to teach Chinese youths? By using comparative and content analysis on the official documents on patriotic education and the history of Japan in the history curriculum in secondary schools before and after 1989, this chapter at first tries to examine whether or not the patriotic education itself at the official level has been purposely infused with modern China's "humiliated history" in general and an anti-Japanese context in particular. Secondly, by using an analysis of the new history curriculum since 2001 along with interviews that I conducted with history textbook designers from the People's Education Press in PRC and history teachers from secondary schools in Nanjing and Shenzhen, this chapter further analyzes how patriotic education is actually implemented in schools and what information about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are actually taught under the current reformed history curriculum.

3.2 The "Patriotic Education Campaign" since 1989

During the post-Mao reform in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up policy, China for the first time tried to set up a market – oriented economy system and "fully" opened its "national door" [*guomen*] to the outside world. This left Chinese people with much more freedom to be exposed to liberal and democratic ideas. Also, during the post-Mao reform period, Deng's efforts to "reassess" Maoism so as to eradicate all ideological and psychological obstacles to economic reform unexpectedly resulted in the demise of the official ideology (Zhao 1998: 288). With more influences from the outside world on the one hand and the demise of the official communist ideology on the other, it

has been then argued by many scholars that the large-scale anti-government demonstrations in the spring of 1989 were a result of the bankruptcy of the communist official ideology. In accordance with these arguments, the CCP regime had tried almost all ways to step up its state-led political education and had thereby launched a “patriotic education campaign” in all sectors of Chinese society, especially in schools, in the face of perceived challenges to its authority (Gries 2004; Whiting 1995; Zhao 1998, 2004; Zheng 1999).

To some extent, it is true that the biggest lesson the Chinese leadership learned from the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was the ineffectiveness of its political and ideological education in the 1980s. As Deng concluded after the Incident,

*“During the past ten years (the post-Mao reform period), the biggest mistakes had been made in the sector of education. By ‘education’, I referred to the ideological and political education (sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu).”*⁴¹

The pro-democracy movements, which were mainly organized and joined by students in 1989, somehow did teach the CCP leadership an important lesson in that they had to some extent failed in their ideological-political education, particularly in fostering students’ belief in communist ideology and the legitimacy of CCP authority. Ironically, as Zhao (1998:289) put it, the pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, while confronting the government, claimed that patriotism drove them to take to the streets. It thus seems that the previous efforts of the CCP in its ideological-political education did not totally fail but at least succeeded in teaching Chinese people to be patriotic. Inspired by this, as Zhao (1998: 289) further suggested, patriotism was re-discovered and pragmatically used by the CCP leaders to sustain the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority as well as the stability of Chinese society.

Following these ideas, it is argued that a “patriotic education campaign” was launched by Deng and his successor (Jiang Zemin) after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 with a number of official documents and regulations pertaining to patriotic education being released by both the CCP Central Committee (hereafter CCPCC) and the State Education Commission (which was replaced as the Ministry of

⁴¹ Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, *Dengxiaoping Wenxuan (Disanjuan)* [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol.3)], (Beijing, 1993-1994), p. 56.

Education in 1998, and hereafter the MOE) since the early 1990s (Zhao 1998, 2004). In April 1990, as a starting point of the patriotic education in new era, the MOE issued “A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School Moral Education Work” [*Guanyu Jinyubu Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian*], calling on schools to emphasize moral education, particularly patriotic education, and offering detailed instructions on the content and implementation of the patriotic education (Zheng 2011: 77). Following up was a “Notice on Fully Using Culture Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions” [*Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguo zhuyi he Geming Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi*], issued by CCPCC in August 1991. The “Campaign” was more evident after Deng’s southern China tour in early 1992. Soon after Deng’s Southern China Tour, in January 1993, the MOE enacted the “Program for China’s Education Reform and Development” [*Zhongguo Jiaoyu Gaige yu Fazhan Jihua*], laying out patriotism as a guiding principle for China’s educational reform (Zhao 1998: 292). One year later, in August 1994, the CCP Central Committee released a key official document – “Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [*Aiguo Jiaoyu Shixing Gangyao*], leading to a climax of the nationwide “patriotic education campaign” (He 2007: 57).

By carrying out these official documents to all sectors of Chinese society, the CCP leaders have indeed tried to reform and strengthen the patriotic education in China since the early 1990s in order to sustain Chinese people’s love and support for the Chinese motherland and the CCP authority. However, it does not mean that Chinese government’s emphasis on patriotic education or political ideological education started after 1989 as well.

As a matter of fact, soon after the post-Mao period of reform and openness began with the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party in 1978, China’s leaders had been aware of the perceived need for patriotic education in China. Therefore, both the CCPCC and the MOE had in fact issued certain official documents to strengthen the ideological and political education to deal with a number of perceived problems with Chinese society and citizens, such as “worship of foreign things,” “national nihilism,” and a lack of confidence in socialism in China, which were mainly caused by the past experience of the Cultural Revolution and the current openness to the outside world (Guo, eds. 1995: 602). The earliest document

on political education after the Cultural Revolution – “Ministry of Education Opinion on Improving and Strengthening Secondary School Political Education Courses”—for example, was released by the MOE in September 1980 (Guo, eds. 1995: 628). Three years later, in both July and August 1983, the CCPCC and the MOE successively released relevant documents on patriotic education in particular.⁴² A notice on improving and strengthening the teaching of history and geography courses in secondary school, for example, was also issued by the MOE in the same year so as to stimulate students’ national pride and patriotism.⁴³

Unfortunately, due to the problems existing with teachers, the content, and the teaching methods of moral education as well as the inadequate coordination between schools, society and families, the patriotic and moral education in schools before 1989 was somehow not effective, and thus partially contributing to students’ large-scale anti-government movements in 1989 (Fairbrother 2002: 91; Zheng 2011:77).

Given the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which led to the perceived needs for patriotic education in the Chinese society, China’s leaders therefore called for a reform and strengthening of patriotic education in the whole Chinese society and launched such a so called “patriotic education campaign” after 1989 (Zhao 1998), or in Zheng’s (2011: 75) words, “Chinese patriotic education in the new era.”

Chinese patriotic education since 1989, as prescribed in the 1994 Outline, was all-encompassing, with all actors throughout Chinese society called upon to contribute to the implementation of patriotic education. Schools, from the daycare level to the university level, were specifically called on to create a lively atmosphere of patriotism in which all courses were to be infused with patriotic education (Editorial Committee of CCPCC 1999: 925). As the major objects of school education, Chinese youths were taken as the focus of patriotic education, and were

⁴² They are respectively “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education” [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian*] issued on July 2, 1983 and “Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the ‘Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education’” [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian*] issued on August 24, 1983.

⁴³ See “Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary School History and Geography Course” [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi*] issued on August 1, 1983.

targeted by television, movies, music, dramas, arts, and stories which used rich and vivid imagery to provide patriotic education to young people (Editorial Committee of CCPCC 1999: 925-926). According to the 1994 Outline and relevant documents, museums, memorial halls, martyrs' memorials, revolutionary war campaign and battle memorials, protected cultural and historical sites, important scenic spots, important development projects that demonstrate the nation's achievements in developing material and spiritual civilization and so on should also be developed as patriotic education bases and allow school-organized teacher and student groups to visit free of charge.⁴⁴

The content of Chinese patriotic education stipulated in the 1994 outline was, as Zhao (1998: 296) put it, wide-ranging with two dominant themes: 1). Chinese tradition and history; 2) national unity and territorial integrity. Chinese students were expected to learn China's traditional civilization, culture, customs, traditions, and philosophies as well as current national conditions and policies, including economic and political systems and policies, policy on reunification, nationalities policies, military affairs, foreign affairs, society, culture, population, and national resources (Fairbrother 2002: 95).

The functions, or the goals of patriotic education, which were demonstrated in the 1994 Outline and also analyzed by Fairbrother (2002:93-94), mainly cover the following four aspects: 1) patriotic education contributes to the maintenance of territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride, responding to problems indicating a lack of respect for the nation among some Chinese citizens; 2) patriotic education is a vehicle for transmitting knowledge and appropriate attitudes about international relations; 3) patriotic education fulfills a function of maintaining the socialist system and state legitimacy, in response to the perceived appearance or influx of a variety of negative societal influences; 4) patriotic education performs a progressive function, encouraging contributions to China's program of development and modernization.

⁴⁴ See "Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State Education Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil Administration, Communist Youth League Central Committee, and National Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics in the Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary Traditions" [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang, Guojia Wenwu Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi*] issued on August 28, 1991.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, patriotism, in Chinese, *aiguo zhuyi*, literally means “loving the state”. In China, “love for the state” is certainly equated with love for the People’s Republic of China, and as such is indistinguishable from love for socialism and love for the Communist Party (Fairbrother 2002: 96). In the PRC official discourse, patriotism in China is differentiated from nationalism and simply used under the context of a love for the socialist state and the Communist Party. In the period of reform and openness, it is particularly pointed out that in the post-1989 patriotic education curriculum, patriotism cannot be equated with “narrow nationalism.” Instead, as Fairbrother (2002) further illustrated based on his understanding of the 19 official documents pertaining to Chinese patriotic education which he has examined,

“While fostering China’s superior achievements and supporting her own interests, [Chinese]modern patriotism allows for the study and absorption of advanced culture from the world’s nations, including capitalist nations. This is patriotic because it allows for China’s further progress and development. Regarding knowledge and appropriate attitudes to hold about foreign nations and the world system, the basic message to be conveyed to students is that China upholds world peace. Students are to learn of China’s support for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, policy of peaceful diplomatic relations, and support for friendly, cooperative relations with the people of other nations”(p.96).

3.3 An official emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China in the post -1989 patriotic education

Following the aforementioned analysis on the CCP leaders’ pragmatic promotion of patriotic education since 1987, it is suggested that as an important source of the CCP regime’s legitimacy, the history of modern China has been emphasized in the post-1989 “patriotic education campaign” (Callahan 2007: 186; Zhao 2004: 219).

By comparing the most important documents pertaining to patriotic education released by the CCPCC before and after 1989, it is evident that while the targets of the patriotic education remain the same – Chinese youths, as Figure 3.1 shows, the

content of patriotic education in different periods does vary from each other.⁴⁵

Figure 3.1. Comparisons between two official documents on patriotic education issued by the CCPCC before and after 1989

Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department and the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguo zhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian]		Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao]
Date	July 2, 1983	August 8, 1994
Content	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A new look for (Chinese) motherland and the Developments and Achievements after 1978 2. Modeling deeds of heroic figures and advanced community 3. Successful experience of development 4. Magnificent Chinese mountains and rivers as well as places of historic interest and scenic beauty 5. Significant historical events and famous historical figures 6. Outstanding (Chinese) artists and their works since ancient time 7. Outstanding (Chinese) scientists and their contribution since ancient time 8. (Chinese) cultural relics since ancient time 9. The historical contribution of all ethnic groups to Chinese motherland 10. (Chinese) patriots living in foreign countries and foreign patriots in the world 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The long history of the Chinese nationality, especially modern and contemporary history 2. (Chinese) tradition and culture 3. The basic outlines of CCP policies and the great achievements of modernization in China 4. Chinese national conditions, especially in the context of the global environment 5. Democracy and legal system in socialist China 6. National defense and security in China 7. Unity among different ethnicity groups 8. The policy of “Peaceful Unification and One Country, Two Systems”.

In the 1994 Outline, Chinese history (especially the history of modern and contemporary China), the CCP’s ideology and the national conditions are highlighted, while these salient themes were not particularly or clearly illustrated in the 1983 Guideline.

Also by comparing two more significant official documents issued by the MOE

⁴⁵ Both the CCPCC and the MOE also had their most important document in different periods. For the CCPCC, for instance, the “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department and the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education” [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguo zhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued in 1983 could be taken as the most important document for patriotic education since it provided most comprehensive instructions for the implementations of patriotic education in all sectors of Chinese society, while the “Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao] issued in 1994, is believed to have marked the peak of the patriotic education campaign after 1989. See, He (2007:57) and Zhao (1998: 292).

respectively in 1983 and 1991, which were supposed to follow the ideas of the CCPCC but mainly focused on the implementation of patriotic education in educational sectors, I discovered similar differences. In the MOE's 1983 document, there was only one sentence used to describe the history course (especially the history of modern and contemporary China) as an important and useful source for patriotic education.⁴⁶ However, in the MOE's 1991 document, there were five paragraphs used to stress the importance of Chinese history (especially the history of modern and contemporary China) for the implementation of patriotic education, taking up more than half of the content of the document, which in total had 9 paragraphs.⁴⁷

Regarding to the impacts of the Tiananmen Incident on the patriotic history curriculum and the CCP leaders' efforts to use both Chinese history and the current national conditions to foster Chinese people's patriotism and its own legitimacy, obvious contrasts were also found between two official documents respectively issued by the MOE in August 1983 and November 1989 for strengthening the teaching of history and geography class in primary and secondary schools. In the MOE's 1989 document, the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which were concluded as preventing and resisting "the intervention of capitalist liberalization" and "democratic countries' peaceful revolutions," were added as the main reasons to explain why schools should strengthen the teaching of history (especially the history of modern and contemporary China) and geography in schools, while these were not mentioned in the 1983 document at all.⁴⁸

Finally, the importance attached to the history of modern and contemporary China was much more evident in the MOE's document which was named as "State

⁴⁶ See "Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the 'Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education'" [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche 'Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian de Tongzhi*] issued on August 24, 1983.

⁴⁷ See "State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developinfg Patriotic Education Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools" [*Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian*] issued on April 25, 1991.

⁴⁸ See "State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of Ideological and Political Education and Education on National Conditions in Primary and Secondary Language, History, Geography, and Other Courses" [*Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, Lishi, Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian*] issued on November 8, 1989. Also see "Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary School History and Geography Courses" [*Jiaoyubu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi*] issued on August 1, 1983.

Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the ‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions’” in 1991. The document directly put it as a great strategy to strengthen the education on the history of modern and contemporary China and national conditions among the primary and secondary school students and called up the entire Chinese society to carry out this strategy thoroughly and efficiently.⁴⁹

The history of modern and contemporary China began with the first Opium War between China’s Qing Dynasty and the British Government in 1840 and continues to date. China began its contemporary history with the set-up of the new PRC in October 1949. But before that, the 109-year long history of modern China was known as “the century of humiliation.” During this “humiliated century”, both China and the Chinese people had been through numerous traumatic wars and had suffered a great deal from the invasions of western imperialism and Japanese militarism. The Communist Party, which was formally established in 1921, had played an important role in safeguarding the Chinese people and the motherland through its determined resistance against foreign invaders, especially the Japanese militarists, during the wartime, and had finally won victory in the resistance against Japanese militarists. Thus, the nationalist credentials of the CCP are inextricably intertwined with the Chinese resistance to Japan’s invasion. As many scholars believed, this explains why CCP leaders emphasized the history of modern and contemporary China in their patriotic education campaign since 1989 (Gong and Teo 2010; Hamada 2003; Hughes 2008; Moore 2010; Gries 1999; Reilly 2004; Wang 2008).

Compared to the emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China in both 1980s and 1990s, the history of ancient China and the world, where Japan was mentioned as one of the neighboring countries of ancient China and one of the countries in the world, were relatively less stressed. However, when compared to the history textbooks before 1978, the history of ancient China and the world had been more fairly treated in both the 1980s’ and 1990s’ history curricula.

After the new PRC was established, Chinese history curricula were largely

⁴⁹ See “State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the ‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions’” [*Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa ‘Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandai shi ji Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao’ (Chugao) de Tongzhi*] issued on August 27, 1991.

influenced by the Soviet Union curricula models and separated the curricula into “Chinese history” and “world history (Muller 2011: 39). Before 1978, Chinese history curricula were written with classical Marxist history concepts and class-struggle principles. The world history thus was focused on the “daily growing peace camp” under the Soviet Union’s leadership and anti-colonial liberation movements and their necessary success (LSJ 2001b: 107). In this way, the West (including Japan) were either not mentioned or just appeared only in the context of imperialist aggression against China. After 1978, a new framework of history curricula started to emerge. In 1980s’ history textbooks, the successes of the capitalist countries were now conceded, and their innovative power was acknowledged. Structurally, new chapters on Western science, literature and art were also added though they were marked as “not relevant” for the examination (LSJ 2001b:487). In 1990s’ history textbooks, Chinese history was to be taught in an ancient-modern ratio of 1:1, whereas world history was to remain mainly modern (LSJ 2001b: 512).

As a result, both Japan’s friendly and bad relationships with China in ancient time were taught in 1980s’ and 1990s’ history classes. The story of Jianzhen and his trip to Japan in Tang Dynasty were well known to students and while Japanese pirates’ existence in East China Sea in Ming Dynasty was also acknowledged. As one of the capitalist countries in modern time and one of the militarist countries which launched the World War II, Japan’s success in capitalist reforms was praised while its inhuman Fascism in the World War II was condemned in the history curricula. In both the history curricula in 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s Meiji Restoration, for example, was detailed and took up a chapter with 3 three lessons in the textbooks on world history. Accordingly, the situations of Japanese society in the 1850s and during the Meiji Restoration were also introduced in details as well.⁵⁰

Therefore, although it is evident that the history of modern and contemporary China was emphasized in the patriotic history curricula after 1989, the history of ancient China and the world, where more positive information about Japan was

⁵⁰ See *Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in Full-time Middle Schools)* (1986), p. 88; and *9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in Full-time Middle Schools of Nine-year Compulsory Education)*(1992), p. 39.

mentioned, was also taught in the history classes before and after 1989, suggesting that the Chinese history curricula after 1978 overall was relatively moderate and neutral when describing Japan.

3.4 The War of Resistance against Japan had been highlighted and the discourse of Japan's atrocities had kept consistent before and after 1989.

With an evident emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China at the official level, the War of Resistance against Japan during 1931-1945, which was claimed as China's first complete victory against foreign invaders by Jiang Zemin and thus is central to the CCP's legitimacy,⁵¹ is suggested to have been highlighted in the patriotic history curriculum after 1989. With "self-glorifying and other-maligning myths," it is also believed that the "post-1989 patriotic education campaign" has reversed the previous cover-up of Japanese atrocities in Chinese history textbooks, which was mostly due to the need of a good Sino-Japanese relationship in face with the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and went to another extreme of arousing a sense of Chinese victimhood and demonizing Japan in 1990s (He 2007: 58-59; Reilly 2004: 280).

By examining the textbooks on China's modern history for secondary schools, which were published by the People's Education Press (hereafter PEP) – the biggest official press for designing and publishing guidelines for school curriculum (before 2001) and all kinds of textbooks for schools – in 1985 and 1995,⁵² it is unsurprisingly found that the War of Resistances Against Japan was actually the dominant theme of both textbooks, taking up almost half of the content of both textbooks (See Figure 3.2 and 3.3).⁵³

⁵¹ See "Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Veterans' Symposium, August 25, 1995," in Tian Huan, eds. *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji [Archives on Post-WWII Sino-Japanese Relations (Vol. 2)]*, (Beijing, 1997), p.939.

⁵² Before 2001, under one history curriculum guideline, there may be different versions of history textbooks successively published by PEP in different years. The content of these different versions of textbooks are close and sometimes almost the same. For comparing textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s, here, I adopted the 1985 *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]* for junior secondary schools under the 1978 Guideline and the 1995 *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]* for junior secondary schools under the 1993 Guideline for examinations.

⁵³ In PEP's *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]* (1985), there were a total of four sections, among which the section III was entirely devoted to the War of Resistance against Japan with the part on Japan's atrocities included and this topic covered nearly half of the section II. In *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]* (1995), however, there were a total of 17 lessons, among which seven lessons were about the War of Resistance against Japan and one lesson was about Japan's

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Figure 3.3

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The catalog of 1985 history textbook

The catalog of 1995 history textbook

As suggested by Li Wei (2011:140), one of the leading editors of history textbooks in PEP, “from a Chinese perspective, the War of Resistance against Japan marked the first time in the modern era that the nation was completely victorious in its many wars of resistance against foreign aggression. It, therefore, occupies a central place in modern Chinese history.” Moreover, “China’s War of Resistance against Japan was an important part of the Second World War and made major contributions to the victory in the global war against fascism. Thus, in both Chinese and world history, this war is of great significance and is given extensive treatment in PRC textbooks.”

Regarding the details about Japan’s atrocities, however, in the 1985 textbook, Japanese militarists’ atrocities were mainly concluded under two subtitles—“Japanese Militarists ‘Mop up’ [*Da Saodang*] the Anti-Japanese Bases [*Kangri Genjudi*]” and “Japanese Militarists Economically Plunder the Occupied Areas.” About 6 pages of this textbook were given for detailed elaborations but with no pictures.⁵⁴ In the 1995 textbook, however, a particular lesson with also 6 pages was used to detail the Japanese militarists’ cruel rules, inhuman atrocities and barbarianism in the occupied areas with vivid pictures and specific examples, such as

invasion in China in particular.

⁵⁴ PEP (1985), *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]*, pp. 112-117.

the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese Unit 731 and so forth.⁵⁵

Even though many more specific examples and vivid pictures about Japan's atrocities during their invasions of China were provided in the 1995 textbook, these details took up a relatively low proportion of the textbooks when compared to the elaborate details focusing on the War of Resistances against Japan.⁵⁶ These details about Japan's atrocities, as suggested both by Reilly (2004:285) and by one of the textbook designers I interviewed in PEP, were brought about with a surge of academic researches on wartime history and Japan's atrocities since the early 1980s in China in reaction to Japan's revisionism of the later 1970s and 1980s. Take the research on the Nanjing Massacre as an example, as suggested by Zhang Xianwen, one Chinese historian who headed the earliest research on the Nanjing Massacre in Nanjing University,

*"In response to the textbook disputes with Japan in 1982, the earliest effort at academic scholarship (mainly conducted by four scholars in world history in Nanjing University at the very beginning) on the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese atrocities in China came in the mid-1980s, which was much later than Japan's side. It was thus much later when the Nanjing Massacre was written into the history textbooks. So, Chinese populace did not know about the Nanjing Massacre until the early 1990s."*⁵⁷

What is more, the descriptions of Japan's atrocities and invasions in China in the 1990s' textbooks did not vary so much from the 1980s' ones. The descriptions of the September 18th Incident (also known as the Manchurian Incident) in 1985 and 1995 textbooks, for example, were quite similar in terms of the discourse on Japan's roles in causing the Incident.

In 1985 history textbook, it was written:

In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Imperialist World (*diguo zhuyi shijie*). In order to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese Imperialists decided to invade the Northeast (also known as Manchuria) of our country (China) and occupy the entire China step by step, when Chiang

⁵⁵ PEP (1995), *Zhongguo Lishi (Disice)* [*Chinese History (Vol. 4)*], pp. 64-69.

⁵⁶ 1:7 in ratio

⁵⁷ Author's interviews with Zhang Xianwen, who headed the earliest researches in Nanjing Massacre in China and now serves as the Director of the Research Institute of History in Nanjing University, Jan. 9, 2011.

Kai Shek was focused on his domestic wars (with the Chinese Communist Party). With the intention to turn China into its colony, the Japanese Kwantung army designed a conspiracy and bombed the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu, on the outskirts of Shenyang (also known as Mukden), during the night of September 18, 1931. The Kwantung army then called the bombing the work of Chinese forces and, in the name of self-defense, quickly seized control of Shenyang. The September 18th Incident so happened.

(*Zhongguo lishi (disice)*1985: 67)

In 1995 history textbook, it was written:

In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Capitalist World. In order to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese imperialists strengthened their invasions in China. During the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung army bombed the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu and called the bombing the work of Chinese forces. Taking this as an excuse, the Japanese Kwantung army soon embarked on military action to the base camp of Chinese northeast military and occupied Shenyang. This is so called the “September 18th Incident.”

(*Zhongguo Lishi (Disice)*1995:32)

Comparing the above descriptions on the September 18th Incident in 1985’s and 1995’s history textbooks, it is easier to find the differences between the discourses on Chiang Kai Shek (or Kuomintang) than the differences between the discourses on Japan. To the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which fought a bloody battle to gain its ruling position, Kuomintang was taken as a rival after the new PRC was founded, and thus, in the depiction of the War of Resistance against the Japanese in Chinese history textbooks, many paragraphs were used to condemn the KMT for collaborating with, or not resisting, the Japanese Army (Su 2011:148). This intention to take KMT as a rival or the “other” was still evident in the 1980s’ history textbooks. With the changes of the relationships between mainland and Taiwan and for the purpose of national unification, however, the historical discourses on the roles of Kuomintang in resistances against foreign invaders had been changed in the 1990s’ history textbooks. In 1990s, the history textbooks emphasized the cooperation more than the conflicts between the KMT and CCP and the KMT was instead mentioned

for its positive role in resisting foreign invaders in the textbooks.

Therefore, although the War of Resistance against Japan was highlighted and the descriptions of Japan's atrocities in history textbooks have been consistently negative and detailed, the Chinese government did not have the intention to stress or exaggerate Japanese invasions in China in history textbooks. As Li Weike (2011:144) further suggested, the descriptions of the wars and Japan's atrocities in China actually intend to stress Chinese determined resistance against foreign invaders and that Japan's instigation of war and massacre of Chinese people were inhumane violations of international law, but never placing an emphasis or exaggeration on the atrocities themselves.

3.5 A comprehensive view of Japan in the new history curriculum since 2001

Coming to the beginning of the 21st century, with the goal of an "emotional and value-based" education and for the purpose to turn China's basic education from being exam-oriented to quality-oriented, China has undertaken a curriculum reform based on *The Compendium of Curriculum Standards for Compulsory Education (tentative) [Jichu Jiaoyu Kecheng Gaige Gangyao (Shixing)]* enacted by the MOE in 2001 (2001a, quoted from Li 2011: 138).

By "emotional and value-based" education, in accordance with the new history curriculum standards, two aspects of emotion and values are highlighted in the new history curriculum: 1) the understanding of Chinese national conditions, an identification with national history and culture, a cultivation of a national spirit and patriotic sentiments; 2) an understanding of the diversities of human history and society, comprehension of and respect for cultural traditions of different regions, countries and nationalities, absorption of the outstanding achievements of human civilization and the formation of an open world-view. (2001b, quoted from Li 2011: 143)

The History Curriculum Standards for full-time compulsory education [Quanrizhi Jiaoyu Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun] (hereafter HCS) were issued by the MOE in 2001, setting guidelines for teaching arrangements and textbook compilation. With the HCS, secondary school history textbook compilation in China has greatly changed from the original "one syllabus, one version" to "one syllabus, many editions" (Li 2011: 137). Since 2001, not only PEP, but also other publishing houses

and presses could now enjoy autonomy for editing textbooks. Although textbooks compilation and writing must strictly correspond to the HCS and pass through the examinations of the National (or Provincial) Committee for Elementary, Junior and Senior Secondary School Textbook Approval [*Quanguo (huo Shengji) Zhongxiaoxue Jiaocai Shending Weiyuanhui*], the diversification of textbooks is encouraged by the history curriculum reform (2001a).

As a result of the history curriculum reform, the history textbook editions available for junior secondary school have so far expanded into 10 versions.⁵⁸ Concerning senior high schools, four kinds of senior secondary school history textbooks have been published.⁵⁹ These different versions of textbooks are now competing with each other as the local governments are permitted to choose among the published textbooks autonomously (Su 2011: 150).

With a paradigm shift from political history to economic, cultural and social history in history academic research, the history curriculum reform has also enhanced content related to social, scientific, educational and cultural history, while still keeping its emphasis on political history (Su 2011: 149). Therefore, under this new curriculum, the history courses have been integrated with other courses, such as “science”, “society”, or “geography”, resulting in a series of new experimental history textbooks in schools. Furthermore, in many of these new history textbooks, topical arrangements crossing national borders and integrating Chinese and world history are adopted, in contrast to the chronological and regionally divided approach found in history textbooks written during the 1980s and 1990s (Li 2011: 137).

Given such “radical” history curriculum reform, what are the “radical” changes in the imagery regarding Japan? How is Japan taught in classes using the new history curriculum?

As previously discussed, in both 1980s’ and 1990s’ history textbooks, the history of modern and contemporary China was emphasized and the War of Resistance against Japan was highlighted with Japan’s atrocities in China detailed, while the history of Japan as one of the neighboring countries of China since ancient

⁵⁸ For details about each version, see Su Zhiling, “The ‘Others’ in Chinese History Textbooks: A Focus on the Relationship between China and Japan,” in Goteling Muller, ed. *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations*, (NY, 2011), pp.149-150.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

times and the history of Japan as one of the countries in the world were either almost ignored or less mentioned. Coming to the 21st century, with the curriculum reform, content about Japan in Chinese textbooks, however, started to change (Su 2011: 147). Due to the curriculum reform, there have been various editions of history textbooks being used in different cities and different schools in China. Different editions of textbooks, though all adhere to HCS guidelines, have different arrangements and space distributions for different historical topics and events.

Regarding to the content relevant to the history of the War of Resistance against Japan and Japan's atrocities in China during the wartime, it is noted that compared to the previous editions, the length of these sections has been reduced either due to the topical arrangement of the content or the integration with other courses in the new history textbooks. The textbooks published by most of the press in Shanghai and by Beijing Normal University Press, for example, have reduced the space allotted to the content about the War of Resistance against Japan and Japanese atrocities due to the integrations between history and other sciences courses (Su 2011: 152). The textbooks published by PEP also reduced the space covering these two topics due to the topical arrangement of the new textbooks.⁶⁰

Looking at the most recent history curriculum standards, which were recently published by the MOE in 2011 and must be fully followed during the textbook compilation process, the War of Resistance against Japan and Japan's atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, are still listed as a dominant topic of modern Chinese history the same as before. What is different in the new history curriculum, however, is that it includes specific suggestions for history teachers engaged in hands-on learning activities outside the classroom, such as discussions in classes, watching movies and documentaries, and visiting historical relics and living war victims, etc.⁶¹ Besides, Japan's ancient, modern and contemporary history are all partially included in the respective sections of world history, depicting both Japan's contributions and its harms to the world and showing a much more comprehensive view of Japan.⁶² Therefore, as Su (2011: 152) concluded, regarding to the content and discourse on

⁶⁰ See, for example, PEP (2008), *Lishi [History]*, pp. 74-78.

⁶¹ The Ministry of Education of PRC, 2011. *Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun (The History Curriculum Standards)*, Beijing:Beijing, Normal University Press,, p. 20.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 26-34.

Japan, most of the history curricula currently circulating in China are characterized with:

“While keeping their condemnation of the Japanese invasion, Chinese history textbooks also began to praise Japan’s modern reforms, such as the Meiji Restoration, the democratic reforms after World War II, the successful economic recovery and the combination of traditional and modern culture. Japan’s developmental aid to other countries, including to China, is also appreciated in today’s textbooks.”

In current PEP’s history, by contrasting two pictures of a Japanese soldier – one showing the soldier happily spending time with his family before joining the army and the other showing the same soldier bayoneting Chinese people with ferocious looks during the wars, the textbook is attempting to lead students to think about the great harm and calamities caused by wars.⁶³ In so doing, the descriptions of wars and Japan’s atrocities in Chinese history textbooks aim to teach Chinese students that war is cruel, that the civilians massacred in war are blameless, that life should be cherished, and peace for humankind treasured, but never hatred or anti-sentiments towards Japan and any other country (Li 2011: 144).

Coming to the classes in schools, under the new history curriculum with a goal of having “emotional and value-based” and “quality-oriented” education, history teachers have tried to introduce different aspects of Japan to students with comprehensive information. According to the teachers I interviewed in Nanjing, although they sometimes feel tensions between cultivating students’ patriotic sentiments and their respect for traditions and culture of Japan when coming to discuss some relevant issues, such as the origin of Japanese militarism and Yasukuni Shrine, they always try to teach students to examine different aspects of the issues and understand the issues from different perspectives and with respect and appreciations.⁶⁴

Following the instructions of HCS, history teachers have also tried different ways to teach students about the historical events. In Nanjing, for example, as suggested by one secondary school teacher I interviewed in the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, most of the history teachers

⁶³ PEP (2008), *Lishi [History]*, P. 76.

⁶⁴ Author’s interview with secondary school teachers in Nanjing on Jan.10, 2011.

in schools organize different extra-curricular activities, such as visiting the museum and memorial hall and the living victims, watching documentaries or movies and so forth, to allow the material to resonate with students and give them a better opportunity to understand the Nanjing Massacre and Japan's invasions in China as well as other wartime history. While in Shenzhen where there are not historical relics or relevant museums, history teachers, however, have to rely more on the Internet, documentaries, movies and TV programs, and other forms of media, to teach students about the wartime history. Added by one history teacher from a junior secondary school in Shenzhen,

*"Since many students are very interested in Japanese cartoons, one of my colleagues who is very good at drawing, has tried to use cartoons to teach his students the historical events. It works very well in helping students learn about Japan as well as the wartime history."*⁶⁵

In all, when the goal of cultivating both students' patriotism and open-world view is pursued, the new history curriculum intends to teach student a more comprehensive view of Japan. With more liberal resources for updated information about different aspects of Japan and the popularity of Japanese products and cultures across China nowadays, teachers in history classes in schools, who are the mediators between the intended and implemented curriculum, have to give students more comprehensive information about Japan based on their own experience and understanding of Japan and the curriculum through their own innovative approaches.

3.6 Conclusion

With the perceived challenges for both the CCP and Chinese society after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, China's leaders have put many efforts into strengthening and reforming their ideological-political education through promoting a patriotic history curriculum in schools. In this patriotic history curriculum, the history of modern and contemporary China has been emphasized as an important source for patriotic education while the War of Resistance against Japan has been highlighted and Japanese atrocities have been detailed. Nonetheless, from both the official documents and different editions of history textbooks in 1980s and 1990s, it

⁶⁵ Author's interview with secondary school teachers in Shenzhen on April 11, 2011.

is noted that Chinese patriotic history curriculum has focused more on Chinese heroic and adamant resistance against the invasion from Japan rather than purposely maligning Japan. It is also noticeable that the descriptions of Japanese atrocities in different editions of the history textbooks had been consistent even though they were negative. Coming to the new century, under a nationwide history curriculum reform in China, which aims at cultivating students a more balanced patriotic sentiments and an open world-view, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been taught through various ways in the history classes in secondary schools.

Based on these empirical findings through comparative and content analysis, I thus come to conclude that the patriotic history education since 1978 in China has not been infused with an intended stress on Japan-related or anti-Japanese context as often assumed. By its content in both official and implemented levels, the patriotic history education in China has been aimed at and committed to teaching Chinese youths to be patriotic through its conventional hero folktale with such functional units as endurance, struggles and ultimate victory (Hamada 2003:109), but not through exaggerating Japan's atrocities in modern China or purposely maligning Japan.

Chapter 4

Students' Reactions to the Patriotic Education and Their Perceptions of Japan

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter empirically studies the “creator”— Chinese patriotic education before and after 1989 in both official and school levels. It particularly examines the history narrative of Japan in patriotic history curriculum in Chinese secondary school and shows how and what teachers teach students about Japan in the history classes. This chapter, on the other way around, focuses on the “receiver” – Chinese youths, and their reactions to the patriotic history curriculum in schools.

Relying on survey results as well as content analysis on relevant textual materials, this chapter starts by discussing how Chinese youths perceive Japan and what their understandings of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are. It then comes to address the focus of this Chapter: how do Chinese youths react to the patriotic education curriculum in schools? Based on these discussions, this chapter finally goes back to answer the main research question of this study: What effects does patriotic education have on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan?

4.2 Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan

As mentioned before, public opinion polls conducted by both Chinese and Japanese organizations since the late-1980s have shown that Chinese in general harbor consistently negative attitudes towards Japan, especially since the mid-1990s (Kobayashi 2008: 89). Yet, having grown up in a more open Chinese society with all kinds of Japanese products as well as influences from Japanese modern cultures, what attitudes do Chinese youths nowadays have towards Japan? Although Chinese youths have been indeed largely involved in the frequent anti-Japanese demonstrations across mainland China in the last two decades, we have simultaneously witnessed an overwhelming popularity of Japanese products and modern Japanese culture among Chinese youths while the economic and cultural exchanges between two sides have been greatly boosted.

Based on the empirical data from my survey with 643 secondary school students

in 8 mainland cities and recent surveys conducted with college students and Chinese populace in general by both independent scholars and research institutes, I thus firstly try to obtain a more genuine picture of Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan nowadays.

4.2.1 Multi-faceted rather than Simplistic

Most previous studies have commonly analyzed Chinese attitudes toward Japan in a dichotomous manner and particularly focused on the increase/decrease of either the negative or positive attitudes Chinese have towards Japan. From my survey with secondary school students, however, I find out a majority of “moderate” attitudes towards Japan among students (see Figure 4.1), which suggests that the majority of the students hold neither negative nor positive views of Japan.

Figure 4.1. Students' general perceptions of Japan⁶⁶ (N^{*}=640)

Degree	Value	Percent (%)
Very Unfavorable		9.9
	1	6.1
	2	3.8
Unfavorable		12.3
	3	6.1
	4	6.2
Moderate		52.2
	5	25.0
	6	27.2
Favorable		20.4
	7	10.6
	8	9.8
Very Favorable		4.7
	9	2.2
	10	2.5
Not sure		0.5

Notes: *N is the valid cases in total.

⁶⁶ A 10-point scale (ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable) was offered for students to indicate their level of favorable/unfavorable attitudes towards Japan by a number between 10~1 (10 and 1 included). Since values in this 10-point scale are continuous and higher values are for more favorable attitudes, for the purpose of data analysis, we equally divided ten points into five categories – very favorable (10~9), favorable (8~7), moderate (6~5), unfavorable (4~3) and very unfavorable (2~1). (See Figure 4.1)

Surprising as this result seems to be, it is nonetheless not new. A majority of moderate attitudes were also found in a regional survey conducted amongst Chinese youths by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS in 2008.⁶⁷ Many of the previous public opinion polls on the general Chinese populace since 1988 in fact had a majority or quite a large number of respondents demonstrating moderate attitudes towards Japan as well (See Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. Moderate Attitudes in the Previous Public Opinion Polls since 1988⁶⁸

NO.	Time	Organizer	Moderate Attitudes (%)
1	Oct-10	<i>Insight China</i>	43.0
2	Oct-08	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	31.2
3	Apr-07	<i>Oriental Outlook</i>	40.4
4	Sep-06	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	37.5
5	Aug-06	<i>China Daily</i> and Genron NPO (Japan)	51.5
7	Aug-05	<i>China Daily</i> and Genron NPO (Japan)	46.8
8	Aug-05	<i>Globe</i> · Sina.com	43.6
10	Dec-04	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	53.6
11	Dec-02	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)	43.3
12	Sep-02	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	35.0
14	Sep-97	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	51.0
15	Jun-97	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	35.0
16	Feb-97	<i>China Youth Daily</i>	43.9
17	Jan-96	Fudan University	48.9
18	Dec-92	China National Situation Research Association (CNSRA)	31.0
19	Dec-88	Jilin University	35.0

Methodologically speaking, reasons for respondents to hold moderate attitudes vary and as Bailey (1987:133-134) suggested, sensitivity of the research topic may cause respondents to be reluctant to expose their positions. It is indeed possible that respondents in my survey avoid expressing their favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards Japan due to the potential political sensitivity of the research topic under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, a majority of moderate attitudes towards Japan among secondary school students in my survey may imply that instead of seeing

⁶⁷ The survey was conducted with 591 secondary school students and college students from Beijing, Shanghai and Hohhot (the capital city of Inner Mongolia). 55.0% of the 591 students held moderate attitudes to Japan. See Zhang (2009).

⁶⁸ For the public opinion poll conducted in 2010 by Insight China, see <http://news.cntv.cn/china/20101108/104125.shtml>; for the one conducted by CASS in 2008, see the Japanese Studies Institute of CASS (2009); for the others, see Kobayashi (2008).

Japan in a dichotomous way, Chinese secondary school students may perceive Japan from with both positive and negative orientations and have multi-faceted perceptions of Japan.

Chinese youths' multi-faceted perceptions of Japan have also been pointed out and discussed in more recent surveys particularly done with Chinese college students. In Sha's survey with 410 college students from Xiamen University in 2008, for example, Sha (2010: 3) found out that college students' attitudes toward Japan varied from Japanese culture, people and government. When Sha asked students to describe their perceptions of Japan with two words (including nouns, adjectives, names of people, etc.), Sha finally obtained as many as 8.18% neutral adjectives, of the 550 words provided by students (Sha 2010: 4).

Sha's survey results somehow coincide with my survey result. As shown by Figure 4.3, when students were asked about their views on different characteristics of Japanese people, it turned out that most of the students surveyed agreed with both positive and negative statements about Japanese. They on the one hand thought that the Japanese are polite, responsible and discipline, but on the other hand, took the Japanese impenitent, arrogant and aggressive.

Figure 4.3. Views on Different Characteristics of Japanese⁶⁹

	Strongly Agree / Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Strongly Disagree / Disagree (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
Japanese are polite	66.9	22.7	8.5	1.9	100 (N*=643)
Japanese are responsible	70.8	21.0	5.9	2.3	100 (N=643)
Japanese are disciplined	69.1	20.0	8.2	2.7	100 (N=641)
Japanese are impenitent	45.6	32.0	18.0	4.4	100 (N=641)
Japanese are arrogant	48.5	30.7	17.1	3.7	100 (N=641)
Japanese are aggressive	68.6	20.6	8.3	2.5	100 (N=641)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

⁶⁹ Students were provided a five-point statement (5-1) ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree to measure their agreements with the six items describing both positive and negative characteristics of Japanese people in the questionnaire. For the purpose of analysis, however, "strongly agree" and "agree" are combined as a group while "strongly disagree" and "agree" are combined as another group. For original data, see Survey Result in Appendix II

Students' multi-faceted understanding of Japan was further confirmed in my in-depth interviews with 10 secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing. When students were individually interviewed and asked about their general perceptions of Japan, almost all of the 10 students, however, answered that Japanese are both "good" (*hao*) and "bad" (*huai*). Although different students gave different reasons for Japanese being "good" and "bad", in general, students hold negative perceptions of Japanese because they thought that Japanese militarists who once invaded China were cruel and aggressive, while the current Japanese [people] who do not truly reflect on and even attempt to whitewash the war crimes that their ancestors committed during the wartime are arrogant and impenitent. On the other hand, however, they were impressed by Japanese politeness and self-discipline. All the 10 students appreciated the good quality of Japanese products very much. Some of them expressed their great fancy for Japanese cartoons and movies. Typically, four senior high school students attributed the good quality of Japanese products and the post-war economy miracle in Japan to the diligent Japanese people but blamed Japanese militarists for their brutal invasion in China and other Asian countries.

Chen Shengluo's in-depth interviews with college students in Beijing, Fujian and Henan in 2001 revealed similar results. College students, as he concluded, clearly indicated their appreciations of certain Japanese national spirits, high technology and modern culture, even though their general perceptions of Japan tended to be negative (Chen 2003: 24).

Based on all these survey data, it is obvious that Chinese students' perceptions of Japan are not as simplistic as they are usually assumed and widely believed. Chinese students, who are overall more liberal and better informed nowadays, actually perceive Japan from multiple perspectives and have multi-faceted rather than dichotomous perceptions of Japan.

4.2.2 More rational than nationalistic

Chinese youths' multi-faceted views of Japan can be further proved by their rational views on Japan and the controversial issues between China and Japan. By "rational", here I try to suggest, as is also supported by the survey data below, that Chinese youths tend to adopt an approach with more liberal and pragmatic rationality

but less subjective and emotional nationalism to understand Japan and Sino-Japanese relations. In other words, although it is inevitable for Chinese students to possess and demonstrate certain levels of nationalist sentiments when looking at Japan, which is one of several foreign countries invading China, Chinese students nowadays manage to perceive Japan in a more liberal, reasonable and pragmatic way.

My surveys firstly found a more liberal understanding of the controversial issues between China and Japan among the students surveyed. As Figure 4.4 indicates, when asked about their views on wartime history and the current disputes between China and Japan,⁷⁰ less than half of the students strongly disliked the issue concerning Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, while a majority of the students hold the same views on the issues regarding wartime history, textbook disputes, and territorial disputes. Accordingly, there are relatively more students not against Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine than students not against the other disputes. (As highlighted in Figure 4.4)

Similar results are also found in students' responses to the question of whether they would demonstrate against Japan due to the disputes between China and Japan.⁷¹ (See Figure 4.5)

⁷⁰ To measure this dimension, students were asked: To what extent, if any, do you dislike the following issues: 1) Japanese aggression in China during wartime; 2) Japanese right-wingers' revisions of history textbooks; 3) Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 4) Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea? 5) strongly dislike, 4) dislike, 3) somewhat dislike, 2) not dislike, 1) not dislike at all, and 0) not sure. The listed disputes obviously do not cover all bilateral disputes between China and Japan. The dispute over Japan's "apology", for example, is not included in the scale. However, these disputes chosen the disputes most frequently mentioned by students when they answered my open-ended questions about their knowledge about the bilateral disputes between China and Japan in the pre-tests.

⁷¹ Since wartime history has been past, it is inappropriate to ask students whether they will demonstrate due to Japanese aggression in China during wartime. Therefore, students were asked: Given permissions to demonstrate in China, please tell us if you will: 1) attend, or 2) not attend the legal demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and Japan: 1) Japanese right-wingers' revision of history textbooks; 2) Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 3) Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea.

Figure 4.4. Views on Controversial Issues between China and Japan

	Strongly Dislike (%)	Dislike (%)	Somewhat Dislike (%)	Slightly Dislike (%)	Don't Dislike at All (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese aggression in China during wartime	75.1	18.0	5.8	0.6	0.3	0.2	100 (N=643)
2. Japanese right-wingers' revisions of history textbooks	69.6	17.0	8.7	2.6	0	2.0	100 (N=642)
3. Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine	45.3	24.8	13.0	9.8	1.1	5.9	100 (N=640)
4. Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea	65.3	22.9	9.0	1.2	0.5	1.1	100 (N=643)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Figure 4.5. Attending demonstrations against Japan due to the disputes between China and Japan

	Yes (%)	Not (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese right-wingers' revisions of history textbooks	55.6	40.2	4.2	100 (N [*] =639)
2. Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine	38.4	58.7	2.8	100 (N=635)
3. Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea	60.5	35.8	3.8	100 (N=640)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Why are there relatively fewer students against and willing to demonstrate against Japan for Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine? Based on my content analysis on students' answers to the open questions which asked students to

explain reasons for their options in the questionnaire, the biggest reason cited by the students, who chose not to against Japan due to Japanese prime ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, is that "Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine are personal behaviors and domestic issues within Japan, and thus should not be intervened in by foreigners."⁷²

Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine have been commonly taken as one of the major disputes bothering Sino-Japanese relations and the main reason for the "cold" political relations between Chinese and Japanese governments between 2001 and 2005 (Liu 2007; Wan 2006). While the Chinese government usually criticizes Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine as a serious offense which harms the feelings of Chinese and other Asian countries, Chinese students seem less critical on this issue and would take it as Japan's domestic affair. This clearly reveals certain levels of disparity between the Chinese official narrative and students' understanding of the issue.

The fact that recent Japanese prime ministers have avoided actually visiting Yasukuni Shrine may also contribute to the easing of Chinese students' criticisms on this dispute. Nonetheless, students' liberal understanding of Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine is possible in today's situation when Chinese students are better informed and have a more liberal and comprehensive understanding of Japan. Without direct experiences of the war and occupation but living in a relatively more open Chinese society, as Figure 4.6 shows, students nowadays generally know about the different aspects of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, though the extent to which they know about different aspects varies. It is thus not groundless to argue that Chinese students nowadays tend to have more comprehensive knowledge about Japan and understand Sino-Japanese relations in a more liberal way. This also makes it possible for Chinese students to perceive Japan with less subjectivity and emotional nationalism, but with more reasonable considerations and pragmatic rationality.

⁷² For further analysis, I asked respondents to give reasons for their decisions. Two biggest reasons suggested by respondents who decided not to demonstrate against in terms of Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine are "It is the freedom of Japanese prime ministers" and "It is the domestic issues of Japan".

Figure 4.6. How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations?⁷³

	Know Very Well /Know/ Somewhat Know (%)	Know Very Little / Don't Know at All (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products	92.4	7.6	100 (N [*] =643)
2. Japanese traditional culture	79.6	20.4	100 (N=642)
3. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes	93.3	6.7	100 (N=638)
4. Japanese emperors	70.3	29.7	100 (N=641)
5. Meiji Restoration	74.0	26.0	100 (N=642)
6. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time	87.7	12.3	100 (N=640)
7. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China	48.4	51.6	100 (N=643)
8. Japan's aggression in modern China	94.0	6.0	100 (N=631)
9. Historical disputes between China and Japan	72.1	27.9	100 (N=642)
10. Territorial disputes between China and Japan	92.4	7.6	100 (N=642)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

As figure 4.6 shows, Chinese students nowadays are very much impressed by Japanese products and modern culture (92.4%). This result seems contradictory to the fact that Chinese students from time to time raise high a slogan of “boycotting Japanese products” to go against Japanese governments for their misdeeds to China. One thus may question whether Chinese students really boycott Japanese products in their daily life, or, it is just a nationalistic slogan.

A recent survey particularly undertaken with the Chinese youths in Beijing, Shanghai and Hohhot has shed light on this question. It showed that as a matter of

⁷³ A five-point statement was offered to measure the extent students know about the listed aspects about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, ranging from “know very well” (5) to “not know at all”(1). For the purpose of analysis, “know very well”, “know” and “somewhat know” were added up together as one group, while “know little” and “not know at all” were added up as the other. For original data, see Survey Results in Appendix II

fact, the majority of the Chinese youths would rather make a rational choice between Japanese products and other products based on the price and quality than emotionally boycotting Japanese products for political reasons.⁷⁴ With an overwhelming popularity of Japanese products, fashion and popular cultures among Chinese youths and the increasing economic and cultural exchanges between two countries, it is more evident that Chinese youths in fact tend to have a rational calculation instead of being emotionally nationalistic when coming to decide what product to buy.

Chinese youths' rational views of Japan could also be implied in their pragmatic efforts to divide Japanese society into different sectors and treat the different sectors according to the extent of the damages which these different sectors have given or might give to China. As Sha found out in her survey, college students' positive attitudes toward Japanese culture, Japanese people and Japanese governments successively decreased as the possibility that these three sectors might bring harms to China successively increase (Sha 2010:3).

From my own survey with secondary school students, it is also noticeable that students held different attitudes towards the Japanese military and Japanese people. In a scale for measuring students' views towards different issues after their visits to the patriotic education bases concerning Japanese invasion in modern China, 89.0% of the students in total strongly agree and agree that Japanese militarists were cruel, while only 47.6% of the students strongly agree and agree that Chinese should hate Japanese (As highlighted in Figure 4.7). There are also as many as 62.9% of the students strongly agree and agree that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of the wars (See Figure 4.7).

⁷⁴ 66.3% of the respondents held this point of view toward Japanese products while only 6.8% of the respondents said they will never buy a Japanese product. See Zhang (2009:143).

Figure 4.7. Attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and wartime history after participating in the extra-curricular activities⁷⁵

	Strongly Agree/ Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Strongly Disagree/ Disagree (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese militaries were cruel.	89.0	9.0	1.6	0.4	100 (N*=511)
2. Chinese soldiers were great.	77.3	14.9	5.9	2.0	100 (N=511)
3. Chinese should hate Japanese.	47.6	34.8	15.7	2.0	100 (N=509)
4. Chinese fellows who victimized in the wars should be mourned forever.	84.8	11.4	3.6	0.2	100 (N=507)
5. Both the Chinese and Japanese peoples were victims of the wars.	62.9	21.0	14.3	1.8	100 (N=509)
6. Take history as guidance and look into the future.	75.9	17.5	5.7	1.0	100 (N=509)
7. Love Chinese motherland and revive Chinese nation.	85.9	12.5	1.6	0	100 (N=511)
8. Love peace and fight against the wars.	92.2	6.1	1.2	0.6	100 (N=511)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents

Moreover, as the Chinese older generations do, Chinese youths nowadays also try to distinguish the majority of Japanese people from the small batch of Japanese right-wingers. One student who I had in-depth interviews with, for example, seriously blamed the Japanese right-wingers for their efforts to revise the Japanese history textbooks and “whitewash” the historical facts, but believed that the revised textbooks were not widely accepted by most of the Japanese people.⁷⁶

In the scale for measuring students’ views towards different issues after their visits to the patriotic education bases, again, there are totally 75.9% of the students who strongly agree and agree with Chinese official approach to take history as guidance and look into the future. There are also as many as 92.2% of the students

⁷⁵ Students were posed a question of “Do you agree with the following statements after watching movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to Japanese aggression in China during wartime?” and a five-point statement to measure the extent to which they agree with the listed statements. The five-point statement ranges from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1). For the purpose of data analysis, “strongly agree” and “agree” were added up together as one group while “strongly disagree” and “disagree” were added up as the other. For original data, see Survey Results in Appendix II.

⁷⁶ Author’s interview with a senior high student from Shenzhen in April 2, 2011.

who strongly agree and agree to cherish world peace and go against the wars (See Figure 4.7).

From the aforementioned survey results on students' attitudes towards the different disputes between China and Japan and the wartime history, although students seem more radical regarding the historical disputes and territorial disputes, it does not necessarily mean that students hold exclusively nationalistic attitudes towards Japan. Students' strong support for a peaceful and far-sighted approach to deal with the historical disputes and a truly love for world peace further proved that Chinese youths are by no means adopting exclusive nationalism towards Japan. Rather, they tend to look at Japan and deal with disputes between China and Japan in a more rational manner. As both Chinese and Japanese scholars believe, Chinese youths, though embedded with a collective memory of historical traumas in the "humiliated century", somehow manage to deal with the bilateral disputes rationally (Chen 2003, Sha 2008, Suzuki 2007).

4.3 Students' reactions to patriotic history curriculum

Having examined the history narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic education ("creator") in the previous chapter and the perceptions of Japan among Chinese youths ("receivers") above, it is still hard to conclude the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan based on the assumption of "creator-receiver connections." It is obvious that Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan do not perfectly fit with the official narrative of Japan in the patriotic history curriculum though a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced in recent history classes and Chinese youths nowadays indeed tend to have multi-faceted perceptions of Japan.

While schools have been widely taken as one of most controllable and thus effective socialization agents, as aforementioned, the theory of political socialization also stresses the important role of students, who are the "receivers" of the schooling, in deciding the effectiveness of school education, and admits the possibility of students' resistance to the political messages embedded within the curriculum. Therefore, the causal linkages, if there are any, between the patriotic education curriculum in schools and students' perceptions of Japan, are actually not that straightforward. It, however, has to go through students' reception and "digestion" of

the messages from the patriotic education curriculum in schools. Whether and how students actually take in the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic education curriculum should largely depend on students' reactions to the curriculum.

How do Chinese students, then, react to the patriotic history curriculum in schools? Do they receive or resist the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic curriculum? To what extent do they “digest” those messages received? To address these questions, I thus posed two questions to the students surveyed to inquire about their views towards what has been taught about Japan in schools and the consistency between the narratives of Japan in schools and the ones from sources out of schools.

Students were firstly asked, “Which have you been taught about the most in your classes: the positive aspects of Japan or negative ones?” According to students' responses to the question, the majority of the students (67.5%) chose “both”, which suggests that students have learned equally positive and negative messages about Japan (See Figure 4.8). This result somehow matches with the aforementioned fact in the previous chapter that the reformed history curriculum since 2001 has introduced a more comprehensive and balanced view of Japan, even though other 22.2% of the students thought that what has been taught about Japan in schools is more negative than positive, which is more than the students thinking in the opposite way (8%) (See Figure 4.8). This result therefore reveals that Chinese students to some extent receive the information about Japan provided by the schools, and that the information received, if there is any, covers both positive and negative aspects of Japan while the negative are more than the positive.

In the questionnaire, I successively asked students, “Do you think what you have learned about Japan in schools is consistent with what you have learned about Japan out of schools?” Based on students’ responses, again, I find out a majority of students holding moderate attitudes (61.0%), which suggests that most students thought that some of the contents about Japan in school curricula are consistent with the information about Japan outside of schools while some are not (See Figure 4.9). Except for this majority of “moderate attitudes”, however, there were 32.2% students thinking that the narrative of Japan in schools is consistent with the ones out of schools while only 3.3% of students thought in the opposite way (See Figure 4.9).

Additionally, based on students’ responses to the question pertaining to the effects of textbooks and teachers on their perceptions of Japan, it is shown that more students did not think that their perceptions of Japan were changed by the both textbooks and teachers (respectively 43.1% and 47.4%, as highlighted in Figure 4.10). According to the aforementioned explanation of redundancy in chapter I, these results in all imply the possibility that students may compromise their receptions of the information from schools since what has been taught about Japan in schools may be just a repetition of the information from other resources out of schools.

Figure 4.10 How did your perceptions of Japan change due textbooks / teachers?

	Worsened (%)	Remained the same (%)	Improved (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
Textbooks	35.0	43.1	17.4	4.5	100 (N*=638)
Teachers	24.0	47.4	24.2	4.4	100 (N=633)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Furthermore, as shown by Figure 4.11, most of the students nowadays took the Internet and other mass media as their most important source of information about Japan (69.1%) while far fewer students thought school education are most important for them to learn about Japan (21.9%). This also proved that schools are not the most important information sources for the most students to learn about Japan. It is thus evident that students' reception of schools' narrative of Japan is limited, even though students do receive information about Japan from schools to certain extent and the information within schools has more consistency than inconsistency with the ones out of schools.

From Figure 4.9, it is also found that the effects of textbooks and teachers on students' perceptions of Japan, if there are any, are contradictory. This finding is more important in the sense that it reveals teachers' resistance to the intended history curriculum as well. According to Grioux (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349), neither students nor teachers resemble the "social puppets" and both teachers and students demonstrate forms of resistance to the "hegemonic" contexts in the intended curriculum. Teachers' resistance to the intended curriculum will counteract the effects of textbooks. It thus may again hinder students' receptions and "digestion" of the intended curriculum and strengthen students' resistance to the intended curriculum.

According to my interviews with history teachers in both Nanjing and Shenzhen, parts of which have been revealed in chapter III, teachers do have their own interpretation of the history and they could actually teach students their own understanding of the history in classes although they have to strictly follow the official curriculum and teaching guideline by principle and constrained by all kinds of competitive examinations for students in China. With the reformed history curriculum, history teachers have tried their own ways to teach students a more comprehensive view of Japan, especially when they find tensions between cultivating students' patriotic sentiments and teaching students broader knowledge about Japan.

Being better informed and with more liberal mind-sets, Chinese students nowadays, though they have to pragmatically deal with the coursework in schools due to the pressure from examinations and may not well receive and "digest" the history curriculum due to the reasons of redundancy, teachers, etc., also tend to be more political-ideological independent and thus more skeptical towards the political messages embedded in the hidden curriculum in schools. Students' unofficial thinking of Japanese PMs' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as aforementioned, not only shows students' rational perceptions of Japan, but also shows students' resistance to the official narrative of Japan in school history curriculum, especially the negative narrative of Japan, which tends to contradict students' own images of Japan based on their own experience and information from other more liberal sources. This explains the disparity between the intended official narrative and students' actual understandings of Japan.

In sum, by examining Chinese students' reactions to the patriotic history

curriculum in secondary schools using the survey data, it is found that although students receive the information about Japan from schools to certain extent, students do not well “digest” the information received and tend to resist the negative narrative of Japan, which is suspected to be embedded with political-ideological propaganda or national myth making messages.

4.4 The effects of patriotic education on students’ perceptions of Japan

As shown above, the empirical findings of this study so far do not support the assumption of “creator-receiver connections,” but reveal that students’ reactions to the patriotic history curriculum do matter in deciding the effects of Chinese patriotic education and the Chinese patriotic education tends to have relatively weak effects on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.

4.4.1 A less important role compared to mass media

Previous surveys have consistently asked Chinese respondents their sources of information about Japan. With the developments of technology and more alternatives for communication, the sources for Chinese to learn about Japan change over time. For the purpose of this study, I asked students about their views on different possible sources as well. As discussed earlier and shown by Figure 4. 11, the majority of the students (69.1%) chose Internet, TV programs and other mass media as the most important sources for them to learn about Japan, while only 21.9% of the students selected school education, followed by experience of families, relatives, friends (2.6%) and personal experiences (1.9%).

This result is not surprising in today’s context. It is consistent with the results from the nationwide public opinion polls jointly conducted by China Daily and the Japanese Genron NPO since 2005 as well as the ones conducted by the Institute of Japan Studies of CASS since 2002.⁷⁷ In general, most of the Chinese populace nowadays indeed learns major information about Japan from different kinds of mass media rather than other sources and this is just more obvious among Chinese students

⁷⁷ For results of the 6 surveys of China Daily and Japanese Genron NPO from 2005 to 2010, see http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=17&Itemid=159; For results of the most recent survey in 2011, see <http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum2011.pdf>. For results of surveys conducted by Institute of Japan Studies of CASS, see Institute of Japan Studies (2002, 2004, 2006) and Wang (2009).

today.⁷⁸

It is not the intention of this study to make comparisons among the effects of different sources in influencing students' perceptions of Japan. However, comparisons among the roles of different sources are helpful to "locate" the role of school education as a source of information about Japan in a broad sense. By comparisons, it seems obvious that the Internet and other mass media are playing much bigger roles than schools in providing students' information about Japan. It is also implied, as aforementioned, that students may tend to compromise their receptions of messages from schools rather than the ones from the Internet and other mass media if these two messages meet conflicts or redundancies. This well explains why more consistency between information inside and outside of schools could not necessarily lead to students' stronger receptions of the information from schools, and further confirms the relatively less important role of patriotic education in schools at least as a source for information about Japan when compared to the Internet and other mass media.

4.4.2 Not as effective as it is assumed

According to the Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education, which was issued by the Chinese Communist Party in 1994, patriotic education in schools is implemented mainly through the following three approaches: textbooks, teachers and extra-curricular activities (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 1994). To fully examine of the effects of patriotic education, I thus inquire the effects of all three dimension respectively.

Students then were asked to evaluate the direct impacts of these approaches on their perceptions of Japan in my survey. As is highlighted in Figure 4.10 above, nearly half of the students suggest that their perceptions of Japan remain the same. In other words, their perceptions of Japan were not changed by both the textbooks and teachers in classes.

In reality, "remain the same" could be understood in two ways. First, as

⁷⁸ Due to the bigger popularity of Internet among younger people, it is reasonable to assume that among all the mass media, it may be the Internet that plays a relatively bigger role in influencing Chinese youth's perceptions of Japan. But this is not the focus of this study. I thus put the Internet together with the other mass media so as to compare with the role of school education.

discussed earlier, students may resist the information from textbooks and teachers, and thus their perceptions of Japan are not affected by both the textbooks and teachers at all. Second, students may well receive information about Japan from their classes, but the information they received from school classes is the same as the information they received from sources outside of the schools, therefore their perceptions of Japan remain the same.

Both of these two situations exist among students I had in-depth interviews with. Some students said that they did not learn that much information about Japan from classes, but received information mainly through the Internet and newspapers, and thus their perceptions of Japan were not affected by either the textbooks or teachers in classes; some students, however, suggested that they had indeed learnt different aspects about Japan from classes, but what they had learnt from classes was almost the same as what they had known about Japan from their families, newspapers and the Internet, where they learned major information about Japan, and thus textbooks and teachers in classes do not really change their perceptions of Japan.⁷⁹

In either way, it is clear that the effects of textbooks and teachers do not work out independently, but have to interact with the effects of other sources and are largely constrained by the effects of other sources. Moreover, as discussed before, from Figure 4.10 we also see that the effects of textbooks and teachers on students' perceptions of Japan themselves tend to contradict with each other. This suggests that the effects from textbooks and teachers will counteract with each other and both two factors consequently could not be as effective as is usually assumed.

4.4.3 Effective as patriotic education but not as “anti-Japanese” education

What about, then, the effects of the curriculum through extra-curricular activities? Could the patriotic education through extra-curricular activities make a difference in influencing students' perceptions of Japan?

As mentioned in chapter III, the CCP outline and other educational regulations for implementation on patriotic education have called upon all social sectors,

⁷⁹ Students holding the first point of views are 2 senior high students from Shenzhen. They are both majoring in physics and thus may pay less attention to the history classes. Students holding the second point of views are 4 students from Nanjing. Students in Nanjing, as Li and Shi's survey with 1000 college students in Nanjing revealed, know more about Nanjing massacre and other historical events concerning Japan's invasion in modern China than students from other cities. See Li and Shi (2005).

especially primary and secondary schools, to create a lively atmosphere of patriotism. Thus, a plethora of extracurricular activities have been carried out in primary and secondary schools in China. Among those activities, watching documentaries and movies related to wartime history and visiting patriotic education bases (which are usually museums and memorial halls) concerning Japan's invasion in modern China are two major and important ones which are supposed to provoke students' anti-Japanese sentiments towards Japan. To examine the effects of schooling through those extra-curricular activities, I thus asked students about their participations in these extra-curriculum activities. As Figure 4.12 shows, most of students have watched movies or documentaries relevant to Japan's invasion in modern China (72.4%), while nearly half of the students said that they have pay site visits to those patriotic education bases pertaining to Japan's aggression in China (40.4%). This suggests that students to some degree do participate in these school-organized activities, though students' participations in site visits are generally lower than their participations in watching movies and documentaries.⁸⁰

Figure 4. 12. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized by schools?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
1. Watching movies, TV programs or documentaries relevant to Japanese aggressions in modern China	72.4	27.6	100 (N [*] =642)
2. Visiting patriotic education bases pertaining to Japanese aggressions in modern China	40.4	59.6	100 (N=634)

Notes: * N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Having participating in those extra-curricular activities, what patriotic lessons have students learnt? As was discussed earlier, a scale was further posed to measure students' attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and the wartime history. According to Figure 4.7, Chinese students, though agreed that Japanese militaries are cruel (89%), they did not really think that Chinese should hate Japanese (46.7%, as highlighted in

⁸⁰ Students' participations in site visits depend on the historical background of the cities. Much more of the students from Nanjing and Shenyang have participated in site visits since Nanjing and Shenyang are two cities with more patriotic education bases related to Japan. See Survey Results in Appendix II.

Figure 4.7). Most of them, however, would rather like to take Chinese and Japanese people as both victims of the wars (62.9%). Chinese students were definitely patriotic in the sense that most of them felt deeply empathetic to their Chinese fellows who suffered from and died in the wars (84.8%) and responsible for reviving Chinese nation (85.9%). Chinese students, however, would like to settle down the historical disputes with Japan in a peaceful way and agreed to take history as guidance and look into the future (75.9%). Moreover, Chinese students who voted for a love for peace and a fight against wars ranked the highest (92.2%), which clearly suggests that Chinese students nowadays do not bear narrow or radical nationalism as it is usually assumed.

These survey results are further supported by my own visits to two of the largest patriotic education bases -- the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression located near Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) in Beijing and the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders built on the historical battlefields in Nanjing. In these two historical sites where strong anti-Japanese sentiments are supposed to be provoked, I am surprised to find out that there are actually more striking banners glorifying Chinese people's great resistance against the foreign invaders and calling for love for Chinese motherland and world peace than anti-Japanese rhetoric. Both museums, as could be perceived from their names, were certainly built for memorializing the traumatic wartime history. Thus, important historical events are presented in details with words, vivid pictures and different kinds of touching approaches in the museums. However, with the historical details, the museums do not actually aim at provoking peoples' hatred and nationalistic feelings towards Japan. Rather, an emphasis on China's triumph in Sino-Japanese wars, a call for Chinese love for motherland and world peace, and the official discourse, "taking the past as a guide for the future" (*yishi weijian*), are more dominant, especially when it comes to in the conclusion part of the museums (See Figure 4.13).

Figure 4. 13. “Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future” (*qianshi buwang, houshi zhishi*). Photo taken in the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing, January 5, 2011.

Note: “Museum” means the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression; “Hall” means the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders.

As a result, when examining the visitors' comments in both museums,⁸¹ I also surprisingly found out that there are more non anti-Japanese comments than anti-Japanese comments in both museums (See Figure 4. 14). From the visitors' comments collected, positive comments like "Keeping the national humiliation in mind and reviving the Chinese nation" (*wuwang guochi, zhenxin zhonghua*) and "Cherish the peace and fight against wars" (*zhenai heping, fandui zhanzheng*) are more numerous than negative comments such as "All Japanese evils go to the hell" (*riben guizi sige jingguang*) or "Little Japanese deserve one more nuclear bombing" (*gaigei xiaoriben laiduo yige yuanzidan*). From the comments, it is clear that more Chinese visitors tend to be sympathetic for their Chinese fellows who died in wars, be patriotic to the Chinese motherland, and be appreciative of the present-day peace. Not many of them really bear hatred towards Japan, especially towards Japanese people. They would criticize, if they do, Japanese militarism, fascism, or the evil of war as a whole.

4.5 Conclusion

Focusing on the "receivers" of Chinese patriotic education, this chapter mainly examines Chinese students' perceptions of Japan and their reactions to the patriotic education through history textbooks and teachers as well as extra-curriculum activities in secondary schools. Based on data from my surveys with secondary schools students and other surveys with college students as well as general Chinese populace, it is firstly found out that different from, if not contrary to, the widely-accepted idea that Chinese youths are anti-Japanese, Chinese youths nowadays in fact tend to perceive Japan in a multi-faceted and rational way. Having grown up in a more open Chinese society with different sources of information about Japan, Chinese youths are better informed and more politically and ideologically independent. They thus have a more liberal understanding of Japan as well as the patriotic education in schools. It is then found out that the reactions of the "receivers"

⁸¹ Both museums allow visitors to leave comments on the museums as well as their personal feelings after their visits. By collected the latest parts of the comments which were left by the most recent visitors and were available for reference, I totally collected 61 pieces of comments from the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, and 126 pieces of comments from the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Based on the general ideas and the wordings of the comments, I further divide the comments into two categories – "anti-Japanese" and "non anti-Japanese." For the results of the content analysis, see Figure 4.14.

do matter in deciding the effects of schooling, and due to the bigger influences from the Internet and other mass media as well as the problems within the schooling structure and actors (in this case, the “resistance” of the teachers and students to the intended curriculum), Chinese patriotic education in schools seems to play a less important and effective role in forming students’ perceptions of Japan, especially their negative perceptions of Japan.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

5.1. A more genuine picture

The politics over the content of history textbooks has triggered the “memory wars” between China and Japan since the early 1980s. Critics and public attentions have for so long focused on history textbooks and the negative impacts of history textbooks on both Chinese and Japanese people’s understanding of the wartime history and the bilateral relations. This study, however, based on its empirical examinations on Chinese textbook materials and secondary school students, has come to suggest the weak effects of Chinese patriotic history education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.

In today’s China, which is characterized by new academic journals, gradually more liberalized news media, rapid growth of Internet, and a more globalized, developed and informed citizenry, it has been much more difficult for the state to impose a single version of the nationalist truth (Zhao 2006). It is therefore no longer possible for the party-state to cultivate Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan (or any other countries) simply through its political-ideological education in schools as well.

While schools have been taken as one of the most controllable and important socialization agent, the theory of totality suggested by Giroux (1983: 344) has pointed out that schools do not exist in a political and social vacuum. Instead, “schools would be analyzed, both historically and sociologically, in regard to their interconnections with other economic and political institutions” (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 344). The theory of totality also stresses the complex relationship between schools and the dominant society as well as the active nature of resistance in human beings. It believes that neither students nor teachers resemble the “social puppets” and both teachers and students demonstrate forms of resistance to the “hegemonic” contexts in the intended curriculum (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349). In this way, to what extent the intended curriculum is implemented and received actually depends on the interactions among different socialization agents, the interconnections among different components within each agent, and most importantly, students’ reactions to the schooling.

This study, thus, by surveying the secondary school students from 8 Chinese mainland cities about their reactions to the patriotic history schooling, has revealed that in the case of contemporary China, Chinese youths nowadays, who are better informed and with a more liberal mind-set, are no longer good followers and listeners of the political-ideological curriculum in schools. Their understandings of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the history narrative of Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum. They, instead, tend to resist the message which is likely to be embedded with political-ideological indoctrination. With stronger influences from the Internet and other mass media and the conflicting effects of textbooks and teachers, Chinese youths in fact do not well “digest” the information from schools.

Therefore, this study makes a strong case to scrutinize the acuities of “receivers” in the analysis of school history education’s impact on peoples’ understanding of history, rejecting the simplified assumptions of “creator-receiver connections” and providing a more genuine picture of the formation process of Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan and the mechanism on how Chinese patriotic education affects the formation process (See below).

5.2. “Confident nationalism”

Born in 1980s and 1990s when both economic and cultural exchanges have been boosted between China and Japan, Chinese youths have grown up with access to all kinds of Japanese products, fashions and popular cultures, although on the other hand they have learned about Japanese invasions in modern China from schools and witnessed the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations with their own eyes in the past decades. With such living experience, Chinese youths nowadays, as my survey results have shown, tend to have multi-faceted rather than dichotomous perceptions of Japan. As aforementioned, with more liberal mind-set and being better informed, Chinese youths seem also more politically and ideologically independent and thus manage to perceive the outside world, including Japan who was once the most brutal invader in China during wartime, with more reasonable and pragmatic rationality but less emotional and exclusionary nationalism.

In today’s China, which has been undergoing the Reform and Opening-up policy with globalization for over 30 years, Chinese youths have also witnessed the rapid growth and the great reform of Chinese society in the past few decades. Although they have been taught the history about the “humiliation century” in schools, they have been living far away from wartime and instead being taught to cherish the peace and be prepared for the globalization. Chinese youths, therefore, as some scholars recently observe, tend to have more “confident nationalism.”⁸² It is also suggested that the pre-existing Chinese “traumatic nationalism” which was rooted in its “national humiliation” and supposed to be vengeful and exclusionary seems to be fading away, or at least, is no longer that obvious among Chinese youths (Friedman 2010; Lewis 2010).

According to Daniel Bell (2008: 2), who has been teaching political theory at Tsinghua University in Beijing and has a chance to closely observe Chinese youths, “As China rises to great power status, it seems more obvious that Chinese patriotism and nationalism, especially those among Chinese youths, tend to base their national pride and confidence on China’s recent developments and Chinese traditional culture

⁸²Michel Oksenberg (1986) used “confident nationalism” to describe Chinese nationalism after Deng’s Open and Reform policy in 1980s and characterized by openness to international ideas in the economic sphere, confidence in the resiliency of Chinese culture and ongoing rhetorical opposition to the West as the primary means of national identification. Also see Bell (2008).

rather than the national traumas and the psychology of ‘being victimized’... Some Chinese students nowadays become “nationalistic” in the sense of being committed to learning more about Chinese culture and philosophy... In fact, Chinese students today commonly believe that any stable and legitimate political arrangement needs to be founded, at least partly, on political ideas from their own tradition.”

Despite the growing social and economic inequality and more widely known official corruption in current Chinese society, many Chinese, not only Chinese youths, seem quite confident in China’s further developments and the way in which China is developing. Based on the Pew Research Center’s most recent global survey on peoples’ outlook on the economy growth of their own countries, China is one of the emerging economies where the people have more positive economic outlook of their country and more trust in their economic model.⁸³ Being aware of the complexity of the domestic and international problems China is facing, Chinese youths today, however, no longer think that there is “one catch-all solution” and even become “apologists” for the government especially when “the ill-informed foreigners start to bash their countries” (Bell 2008: 2).

With its economic success, social stability and gradual political reform in the past three decades, the CCP government has indeed won widespread support from its peoples (Lewis 2010, 10). Despite there have been critical voices rising up across the nation through different approaches, and for long there have been both international and domestic critics of the CCP government’s oppressions over the critical voices within China, the CCP government so far has successfully avoided another massive anti-government movements and won over the satisfaction and confidence from most of Chinese public. In order to build up Chinese populace’s confidence and trust in its ruling, the CCP government has in fact shifted its post-1989 “patriotic education campaign” emphasizing the “humiliation century” to the new state propaganda focusing on “great achievements under the Reform and Opening-up Policy of the CCP.” (Lewis 2010)

Such a shift in official propaganda has been clearly seen from many aspects of

⁸³ See” Pervasive Gloom About the World Economy”, Pew Research Center, July 12, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/12/pervasive-gloom-about-the-world-economy/?utm_source=Pervasive+Gloom+About+the+World+Economy&utm_campaign=Economic+Conditions&utm_medium=email, firstly accessed on July 13, 2012.

the recent changing Chinese society. First and foremost, the changes of the ideological-political discourse in school curriculum, as revealed earlier in this study, are obviously seen through the more balanced introductions and more equal treatments to Chinese ancient, modern and contemporary history and world history in the reformed history curriculum for secondary schools since 2001. These changes in historical narratives – if they are not a coincidence – could be viewed as a sign of the CCP government’s new efforts to build up people’s confidence in the party-state through promoting their national pride based on the great achievements in the past three decades, their national identity originated from Chinese traditional culture and their balanced and peaceful view of the outside world.

Besides, it is clear that the evolving nature of Chinese state propaganda was best seen in 2008, the year when the worst snowstorm in 50 years hit China in January, followed by Tibetan unrest in March, 8.0-magnitude Sichuan Earthquake in May, the Torch Relay through April to July, the Beijing Olympics in August and finally the worldwide financial crisis starting in late-2008 (Barme 2009; Brady 2009). All these “natural calamities and man-made misfortunes” (*tianzai renhuo*) as well as the great success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 have called upon Chinese national unity and identity, raising high Chinese “confident nationalism” and building up a new source for the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority.

The successfully holding major international events, such as the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, thus have been important to promote Chinese “confident nationalism.” Those international events are important not only in the sense that those events provides important opportunities to present China as a modern, confident and responsible power, but also in the sense that in order to succeed in holding these international event, Chinese are required to be more open-minded, tolerant and respectful to other cultures and nations while being confident in Chinese culture and nationality. A number of innocuous slogans such as “One World, One Dream” [*yige shijie, yige mengxiang*] and “Be Civilized and Follow the New Trends” [*jiang wenming, shu xinfeng*], thus have encouraged citizens to integrate notions of China’s national greatness with its objectives of re-vamping China’s image abroad (Barme 2009).

In this “post-Olympics” era, if China’s rising indeed leads Chinese to have “confident nationalism” instead of “assertive nationalism” as is often assumed,

China's rising will certainly serve as a positive factor contributing to both world peace and regional stability. It will also point to a better relationship between China and Japan since with "confident nationalism," it is possible for Chinese, especially Chinese youths, to be patriotic while being confident and tolerant, but without being antagonistic towards other countries, including Japan.

5.3 Further Discussions

5.3.1 Limitations

Although this study intends to address the effects of Chinese patriotic education and Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan in a broader sense, it principally focuses on the patriotic history curriculum and students in secondary schools of major cities in Mainland China. The narrowing down of the research subjects, though it could be justified in theory and compensated by additional second-hand data, suffers from an insufficient coverage of the whole population. The patriotic education curriculum embedded in other classes, such as politics and geography classes, for instance, are not addressed in this study.⁸⁴ Furthermore, college education which is also involved with a noticeable patriotic education curriculum is not covered in this study either, while students in rural China, who may have significant variances from students in big cities, are also not intentionally sampled in both my questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews (though some of my respondents once lived in rural areas). Therefore, it may be problematic to generalize the empirical findings of this study into the whole population of Chinese youths and the effects of Chinese patriotic education in different levels.

Also, the foregoing analysis was largely based on the cross-sectional survey data collected at certain points in time – January 2011 for most in-depth interviews and early June 2011 for questionnaire survey, which closely followed the ship collision disputes between China and Japan in the late 2010 and the magnitude-9.0 earthquake, deadly tsunami and Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan on March 2011. We thus must acknowledge that the survey data from both in-depth interviews and questionnaire survey are more or less affected by those events. Although the effects of these two

⁸⁴ From my survey with secondary school students, it is found that students also learn knowledge about Japan from other courses, such as geography, politics and foreign language classes. For survey results, see Q 9 in Appendix II.

events on Chinese perceptions of Japan might seem to cancel one another out since the Chinese reaction to the boat collision was generally one of hostility or anger while their reaction to the March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown tended to be one of sympathy and compassion, these contingent events may somehow lead to certain levels of instant fluctuations of respondents' attitudes towards Japan.

What is more, recent media discussions over the bilateral disputes and official interactions between two governments may also affect students' opinions on relevant issues and the bilateral relations. Even though most the bilateral disputes have remained problems in the background of Sino-Japanese relations, it is undeniable that the most recent disputes (such as the textbook and territorial disputes) which are brought to the forefront are more fresh and vivid in students' minds and thus may tend to arouse students' emotional sentiments towards the issues, while disputes which are fading away and recently less discussed (for example, disputes over Japanese PM's visits to Yasukuni Shrine) may be beyond students' knowledge and attention and thus lead students to care less or have cooler thinking of the issues.⁸⁵

Hidden effects may also be brought by the possible political sensitivity of this research topic in China's context and particularly in the school circumstances where the surveys were mainly conducted. With the supervision of the teachers, who were questionnaire distributors, in classrooms, students tend to be more aware of the censorship and official propaganda as well as the political sensitivity of the topic. Although the principle of anonymity has been always emphasized before the interviews and questionnaire survey, students may still be reluctant to tell their true feelings especially when they were asked to evaluate their perceptions of Japan and the impacts of school education and their teachers. So were those students and teachers in my in-depth interviews. Therefore, we must keep it in mind that the Chinese political culture and the relationships between students and teachers – respondents and questionnaire distributors in our survey – may to some degree diminish the validity of the respondents' response to both the questionnaire and interviews.

⁸⁵ However, in the sense that most the disputes between China and Japan are supposed to be taught and discussed in school classes, family, and other occasions. Students' knowledge about the disputes may not necessarily be affected by the recent media discussions and official interactions.

5.3.2. Practical propose based on further survey findings

While revealing the relatively weak effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths' perceptions of Japan, this study finds out students' knowledge about Japan and the friendly exchanges between China and Japan positively correlates with students' perceptions of Japan (See Figure 5.1.).

Figure 5.1. Correlations between Knowledge about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations and Students' Perceptions of Japan. (Pearson's Correlation)

Level of knowledge of Japan	Perceptions of Japan
1. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products	0.305** (N=640)
2. Japanese traditional culture	0.257** (N=638)
3. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes	0.147** (N=635)
4. Japanese emperors	0.172** (N=638)
5. Meiji Restoration	0.109** (N=639)
6. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time	0.219** (N=637)
7. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China	0.238** (N=640)
8. Japan's aggression in modern China	0.034 (N=628)
9. Historical disputes between China and Japan	0.038(N=639)
10. Territorial disputes between China and Japan	0.010 (N=639)

Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Moreover, by dividing the 8 cities where the survey was undertaken into two groups—Shenyang, Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen as cities which have more contacts with Japan due to economic and historical reasons (for short, “exchange developed cities”), and Wuhan, Changsha and Chongqing as cities which have fewer contacts with Japan for geographic and economic reasons (for short, “exchange undeveloped cities”), it is found that students from these two groups of cities have significantly different perceptions of Japan.⁸⁶ It is further found that students from those “exchange developed cities” overall have better perceptions of Japan than students from those “exchange undeveloped cities”.⁸⁷ It is thus clear that exchanges with Japan also positively correlates with students' perceptions of Japan. Bilateral exchanges at all levels, especially among youths, are no doubt the key to improve students' perceptions of Japan and the bilateral relations.

⁸⁶ An Independent sample test was conducted to compare the perceptions of students from these two groups of cities. $t(4.88) = 638, p = 0.000$.

⁸⁷ By comparing the means of students' perceptions of Japan from these two groups, the mean of students' perceptions of Japan from “exchange developed cities” ($M = 5.69, SD = 1.954$) is higher than the mean of students' perceptions of Japan from “exchange undeveloped cities” ($M = 4.94, SD = 2.082$).

Unfortunately, as my survey and previous public opinion polls have also revealed, personal experiences are playing the least important role as an information source about Japan for Chinese students (1.9%, see Figure 4.11).⁸⁸ This result may be largely caused by the lack of chances for students to have personal exchanges to Japan and personal contacts with Japanese people. What is worse, most of the Chinese students instead get much of their information about Japan through the Internet and other mass media where there may be more bias and political propaganda hidden. As a result, it is more likely for Chinese students to develop incomplete – though not necessarily negative – views of Japan.

On Japan's side, the previous public polls similarly indicated that most of the Japanese people also learn information about China through the Internet and Japanese mass media.⁸⁹ Due to the recent fact that Japanese perceptions of China have also been deteriorating, it is highlighted that the more influential role of mass media and the lack of first-hand information in both sides may be one of the main reasons contributing to the consistently negative perceptions between Chinese and Japanese peoples. Based on these findings, this study thus suggests the necessity and very importance to encourage mutual exchanges between Chinese and Japanese peoples, especially among youths. Without doubts, only with more first-hand knowledge based on personal experience, can two peoples have more comprehensive and deeper understanding of each other.

Finally, although this study emphasizes that the underlying power of the patriotic history education in Chinese schools is less vigorous than assumed, it is noted that this does not mean that the study overlooks “the power of silence” in history education. As Muller (2011: 52) suggested, “in any case, without building up more trust, which cannot be torpedoed by history education stressing insurmountable differences, a regional integration is hardly possible.” Thus, the efforts to address the bilateral disputes over history education between Chinese and Japanese governments and academia are of great importance though so far they have not yet achieved much consensus and still have to be developed. Sino-Japanese relations are the key to the regional stability in Asia and the world peace. It therefore deserves the joint and long-term efforts from governments, academia and peoples.

⁸⁸ Also see survey results on Q7Appendix II.

⁸⁹ *China Daily* and Japanese Genron NPO (2005 -2011), Ibid.

Appendix 1

(Structured schedule of interviews with students)

Interviewees: secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing

Methods and language: face-to-face and online interviews in Chinese (mandarin).

Duration: no time limit.

[The start of the interview]

Q1. *At the mere mention of Japan, what is the first thing you think of?*

Q2. *How do you perceive Japan?*

Q3. *What do you know about Japan?*

Q4. *Where do you learn the above information from about Japan?*

Q5. *Do you know the history about Japan's invasion in China in the past? Could you raise some examples?*

Q6. *Where do you learn the history about Japan's invasion of China in the past?*

Q7. *How did your perception of Japan change after you learned the history about Japan's invasion of China in the past?*

Q8. *Do you know about Japan's attempts to revise its history textbooks after the WWII? Where did you learn this?*

Q9. *How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japan's attempts to revise its history textbooks?*

Q10. *Do you know about Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine? Should the Japanese Prime Minister visit Yasukuni Shrine?*

Q11. *Where did you learn about Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine?*

Q12. *How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine?*

Q13. *What have you been taught about Japan in school classes?*

Q14. *During which schooling period did you (learn) knowledge about Japan?*

Q15. *Have you watched any movies or documentaries on Japan's invasion of China during wartime in classes? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these movies and documentaries?*

Q16. *Have you participated in any school-organized extra-curricular activities, such as visiting museums or memorial halls pertaining to Japan's invasion in China during wartime? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these extra-curricular activities?*

Q17. *What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of Japan or the positive ones?*

Q18. *Are school classes the most important source for you to learn about Japan? If no, what is your most important source for information about Japan?*

[The end of the interview]

Appendix 2

(Questionnaire (English) and Aggregated Survey Results)

Note: 1. The survey was carried out in early June 2011 with secondary schools students from 9 cities of Mainland China – Shenyang, Xi'an, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing, Shenzhen – where anti-Japanese protests had taken place in 1996 and 2005. However, as the sample of Xi'an was removed from the total sample, the survey data of the other 8 cities was analyzed. With a response rate of 89.3%, 643 valid cases with complete responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are cases from Beijing, 73 from Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72 from Wuhan.

2. N is for the number of valid cases.

Q1. Which grade are you currently in? (N=642, %)

A. Year 1 in junior high school	18.1
B. Year 2 in junior high school	18.1
C. Year 3 in junior high school	13.2
D. Year 1 in senior high school	19.9
E. Year 2 in senior high school	17.2
F. Year 3 in senior high school	13.1

Q2. Have you been studying in the city where you are currently living in? (N= 641, %)

A. Yes	91.0
B. No	9.0
C. Others	0

Q3. Given a chance to visit Japan, would you like to go? (N=642, %)

A. Yes (continue to answer Q4)	72.3
B. No	22.7
C. Others	5.0

Q4. For what purpose would you like to visit Japan? (N=503, %)

A. Travel and shopping	39.2
B. Further education	11.1
C. Understand Japanese culture and society	43.3
D. Make Japanese friends	2.2
E. Others	4.2

Q5. How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations?

	Know Very Well (%)	Know (%)	Somewhat Know (%)	Know Very Little (%)	Don't Know at All (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products	16.0	28.0	48.4	6.4	1.2	100 (N=643)
2. Japanese traditional culture	8.6	24.5	46.5	17.0	3.4	100 (N=642)
3. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes	27.7	39.5	26.0	4.2	2.5	100 (N=638)
4. Japanese emperors	9.2	25.4	35.7	23.6	6.1	100 (N=641)
5. Meiji Restoration	15.9	26.8	31.3	18.8	7.2	100 (N=642)
6. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time	29.1	32.3	26.2	9.2	3.1	100 (N=640)
7. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China	3.0	9.3	26.1	44.0	17.6	100 (N=643)
8. Japan's aggression in modern China	54.4	25.8	13.8	4.1	1.9	100 (N=631)
9. Historical disputes between China and Japan	24.1	22.9	25.1	19.6	8.3	100 (N=642)
10. Territorial disputes between China and Japan	38.3	33.0	21.0	5.9	1.7	100 (N=642)

Q6. Which of the following aspects about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations is most impressive to you? (N = 641, %)

A. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products	41.5
B. Japanese traditional culture	7.8
C. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes	7.5
D. Japanese emperors	1.1
E. Meiji Restoration	1.1
F. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time	1.4
G. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China	0
H. Japan's aggression in modern China	30.6
I. Historical disputes between China and Japan	0.5
J. Territorial disputes between China and Japan	2.7
K. Others	5.9

Q7. What is the most important approach for you to learn about Japan? (N=640, %)

A. School education (i.e. classes, textbooks, extracurricular activities in schools, etc.)	22.0
B. Internet, TV programs, newspapers, and other mass media.	69.4
C. Experiences of families, relatives and friends.	2.7
D. Personal experiences	1.9
E. Others	4.1

Q8. In which period have you learnt most knowledge about Japan?

Schooling Period	Junior High School Students (N=317, %)	Senior High School Students (N=325, %)
A. Pre-schooling	0.6	0.9
B. Primary School	12.6	3.7
C. Junior High School	83.0	45.2
D. Senior High School	--	46.2
E. Others	3.8	0.4

Q9. Through which of the following school classes have you learnt knowledge about Japan? (Multiple Answers, N=643, %)

A. History class	91.6
B. Geography class	58.0
C. Politics class	18.8
D. Chinese class	18.2
E. Foreign languages class	4.7
F. Moral cultivation class	4.7
G. Society and sciences class	3.9
H. Military theory class	2.2
I. Others	0.9

Q10. What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of Japan or the positive ones? (N=640, %)

A. The positive aspects	8.1
B. Equal	67.5
C. The negative aspects	22.2
D. Not sure	2.2

Q11. Do you think that what you have learnt about Japan from schools is consistent with what you learnt about Japan out of schools? (N=634, %)

A. Yes	32.2
B. Some yes, some no	61.0
C. No	3.3
D. Not sure	3.5

Q 12. How did your perceptions of Japan change due to textbooks\ teachers?

	Worsened (%)	Remained the same (%)	Improved (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
Textbooks	35.0	43.1	17.4	4.5	100 (N=638)
Teachers	24.0	47.4	24.2	4.4	100 (N=633)

Q13. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized by schools? (By city)

		Watch movie or documentary about Japan's aggression in modern China (%)	Visit museum or memorial hall about Japan's aggression in modern China (%)
Beijing	Not	16.9	55.4
	Yes	83.1	44.6
	Total	100 (N=65)	100 (N=65)
Chongqing	Not	28.8	76.4
	Yes	71.2	23.6
	Total	100 (N=73)	100 (N=72)
Changsha	Not	21.5	62.8
	Yes	78.5	37.2
	Total	100 (N=79)	100 (N=78)
Nanjing	Not	24.1	21.8
	Yes	75.9	78.2
	Total	100 (N=87)	100 (N=87)
Shanghai	Not	35.6	65.5
	Yes	64.4	34.5
	Total	100 (N=87)	100 (N=87)

Shenyang	Not	30	39.5
	Yes	70	60.5
	Total	100 (N=90)	100 (N=86)
Shenzhen	Not	26.1	73
	Yes	73.9	27
	Total	100 (N=88)	100 (N=86)
Wuhan	Not	36.1	90
	Yes	63.9	10
	Total	100 (N=72)	100 (N=70)

Q14. Do you agree the following statements after watching movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to Japanese aggression in China during wartime?

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese militaries were cruel.	61.4	27.4	9.0	1.4	0.2	0.4	100 (N=511)
2. Chinese soldiers were great.	53.2	24.1	14.9	4.3	1.6	2.0	100 (N=511)
3. The Chinese should hate the Japanese.	24.2	23.4	34.8	14.1	1.6	2.0	100 (N=509)
4. Chinese fellows who victimized in the wars should be mourned forever.	61.5	23.3	11.4	3.2	0.4	0.2	100 (N=507)
5. Both the Chinese and Japanese peoples were victims in the wars.	38.1	24.8	21.0	10.2	4.1	1.8	100 (N=509)
6. Take history as guidance and look into the future.	51.3	24.6	17.5	5.3	0.4	1.0	100 (N=509)
7. Love Chinese motherland and revive Chinese nation.	68.5	17.4	12.5	1.4	0.2	0	100 (N=511)
8. Love peace and fight against the wars.	81.4	10.8	6.1	0.8	0.4	0.6	100 (N=511)

Q15. To what extent, if any, do you dislike Japan in terms of the following controversial issues between China and Japan?

	Strongly Dislike (%)	Dislike (%)	Somewhat Dislike (%)	Slightly Dislike (%)	Don't Dislike at All (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese aggression in China during wartime	75.1	18.0	5.8	0.6	0.3	0.2	100 (N=643)
2. Japanese right-wingers' revisions of history textbooks	69.6	17.0	8.7	2.6	0	2.0	100 (N=642)
3. Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine	45.3	24.8	13.0	9.8	1.1	5.9	100 (N=640)
4. Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea	65.3	22.9	9.0	1.2	0.5	1.1	100 (N=643)

Q16. Given permissions to demonstrate in China, will you attend the legal demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and Japan?

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
1. Japanese right-wingers' revisions of history textbooks	55.6	40.2	4.2	100 (N=639)
2. Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine	38.4	58.7	2.8	100 (N=635)
3. Japan's competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea	60.5	35.8	3.8	100 (N=640)

Q17. Do you agree with the following statements about Japanese?

	Strongly Agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neutral (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly Disagree (%)	Not Sure (%)	Total (%)
Japanese are polite	27.7	39.2	22.7	3.6	5.0	1.9	100 (N=643)
Japanese are responsible	29.9	40.9	21.0	2.5	3.4	2.3	100 (N=643)
Japanese are disciplined	34.5	34.6	20.0	3.9	4.4	2.7	100 (N=641)
Japanese are impatient	27.0	18.6	32.0	14.4	3.7	4.4	100 (N=641)
Japanese are arrogant	27.8	20.7	30.7	13.3	3.7	3.7	100 (N=641)
Japanese are aggressive	44.9	23.7	20.6	5.5	2.8	2.5	100 (N=641)

Q18. What perceptions do you have of Japan? (N=640)

Degree	Value	Percent (%)
Very Unfavorable		9.9
	1	6.1
	2	3.8
Unfavorable		12.3
	3	6.1
	4	6.2
Moderate		52.2
	5	25.0
	6	27.2
Favorable		20.4
	7	10.6
	8	9.8
Very Favorable		4.7
	9	2.2
	10	2.5
Not sure		0.5

Appendix 3

(Original Questionnaire in Chinese)

问卷编号：

问卷调查说明

此问卷调查出于本人硕士论文研究的需要，主要目的在于收集有关中学生对日本的整体认知，以及其认知是否来源于学校教育的数据。

问卷调查采取随机抽样获得样本，答卷人以自愿原则参与。问卷内容主要涉及答卷人的个人观点和学习经历，不涉及任何与学校和答卷人有关的私人信息。本人将严格按照问卷调查的有关要求，妥善处理、保管问卷和有关数据，尊重并维护有关学校和问卷参与者的相关权利。

此问卷包括封面和结语共五页，其中问卷主体题目 18 道，结语附有信息题目 4 道。正常答卷时间约为 10-15 分钟。

问卷制作人： 吴泽映
学习单位：香港岭南大学政治学系

说明：请仔细阅读以下问题和相关指示，用**圆圈**标出适合的选项的编号并填写相关答案。

1. 你目前就读哪个年级？
 A. 初中一年级 B. 初中二年级 C. 初中三年级
 D. 高中一年级 E. 高中二年级 F. 高中三年级
2. 你一直都在目前所在的城市上学吗？
 A. 是 （到目前为止有几年： _____ 年）
 B. 不是 （请说明最近两处曾经上过学的地方： _____ 省 _____ 市 _____ 县/村； _____ 省 _____ 市 _____ 县/村）
3. 如果有机会让你去日本，你愿意去吗？
 A. 愿意
 B. 不愿意 （无需回答问题 4）
 C. 其他 （请说明： _____ ）
4. 你去日本最主要出于什么目的？（单选）
 A. 游玩和购物
 B. 留学深造
 C. 认识和体验日本文化
 D. 与日本人交流
 E. 其他 （请说明： _____ ）
5. 你对以下有关日本的知识了解有多少？（请**圆圈**标出适合的数字来表示你对相应知识的了解程度。）

	非常了解	了解	一般了解	不了解	非常不了解
A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。	5	4	3	2	1
B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、歌舞伎、相扑等。	5	4	3	2	1
C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、资源贫乏、地震多发等。	5	4	3	2	1
D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、社会等级观念较强等。	5	4	3	2	1
E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新等。	5	4	3	2	1
F. 日本近代侵华的历史。	5	4	3	2	1
G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。	5	4	3	2	1
H. 日本战后通过政府发展援助计划（ODA）援助中国经济发展。	5	4	3	2	1
I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。	5	4	3	2	1
J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛问题。	5	4	3	2	1

6. 你对日本的印象**最**主要是根据你对日本哪方面知识的了解？（**单选**）
- A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。
 B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、歌舞伎、相扑等。
 C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、资源贫乏、地震多发等。
 D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、社会等级观念较强等。
 E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新等。
 F. 日本近代侵华的历史。
 G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。
 H. 日本战后通过政府发展援助计划（ODA）援助中国经济发展。
 I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。
 J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛问题。
 K. 其他（请说明：_____）
7. 你**最**主要是通过哪一途径了解到**这一方面**的信息的？（**单选**）
- A. 课本教材、课堂和学校组织的课外活动。
 B. 网络、电视、报纸和各种课外书籍杂志。
 C. 家人、亲戚或朋友的经历和见闻。
 D. 自己的亲身经历和见闻。
 E. 其他（请说明：_____）
8. 你在以下哪个阶段接收到了**最多**有关日本的知识？（**单选**）
- A. 学前教育 B. 小学 C. 初中 D. 高中
 F. 其他（请说明：_____）
9. 你在学校的哪些课堂上接收到了有关日本的知识？（**可多选**）
- A. 历史课 B. 地理课 C. 政治课 D. 语文课 E. 外语课 F. 思想品德课 G. 社会与科学 H. 军事理论课 I. 其他（请说明：_____）
10. 你觉得你在学校课堂上接收到的更多是有关日本正面的知识，还是负面的知识？
- A. 正面的知识 B. 负面的知识 C. 两者相当 D. 不清楚
11. 你觉得你在学校里接收的有关日本的知识跟你在学校外了解到的一致吗？
- A. 一致 B. 有些一致，有些不一致 C. 不一致 D. 不清楚

12. 你对日本的印象有没有因为以下两个因素而改变？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字。）

	有， 变好	有， 变差	没有 变化	不清 楚
A. 学校教科书里有关日本的内容。	3	2	1	0
B. 老师在课堂上对有关日本的知识的讲解。	3	2	1	0

13. 你有没有参加过学校或老师组织的以下的课堂活动和课外活动？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字，并填写有关答案；若都选择“0”，则无需回答问题 14。）

	有	没有	若有，请列举一例。
A. 观看有关日本侵华历史的影片或纪录片。	1	0	
B. 参观与日本侵华历史有关的纪念馆。	1	0	

14. 你看完这些影片或纪录片（或参观完有关的纪念馆）后，有以下哪种感觉？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字来表示你相应感觉的强烈程度。）

	非常强烈	强烈	一般强烈	不强	非常不强烈	没感觉
A. 日本士兵很残忍。	5	4	3	2	1	0
B. 中国军人很伟大。	5	4	3	2	1	0
C. 憎恨日本人。	5	4	3	2	1	0
D. 缅怀战争中遇难的同胞。	5	4	3	2	1	0
E. 中国人民和日本人民都是战争的受害者。	5	4	3	2	1	0
F. 以史为鉴，面向未来。	5	4	3	2	1	0
G. 热爱祖国，振兴中国民族。	5	4	3	2	1	0
H. 反对战争，热爱和平。	5	4	3	2	1	0

15. 你对以下日本方面的行为是否反感？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字来表示你的反感程度。）

	非常反感	反感	一般反感	不反感	非常不反感	不清楚
A. 日本近代侵华。	5	4	3	2	1	0
B. 日本右翼单方面修改历史教科书。	5	4	3	2	1	0
C. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。	5	4	3	2	1	0
D. 日本在钓鱼岛和东海油田等领土主权问题上与中国存在争议。	5	4	3	2	1	0

16. 如果允许，你会因为以下的事件参加针对日本的抗议、示威、游行等活动吗？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字，并填写有关答案。）

	会	不会	其他（请说明）
A. 日本右翼单方面修改历史教科书。	1	0	
B. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。	1	0	
C. 日本与中国在钓鱼岛和东海油田等领土主权问题上爆发冲突。	1	0	

17. 你同意以下的说法吗？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字来表示你的认同程度。）

	非常同意	同意	一般同意	不同意	非常不同意	不清楚
日本人待人礼貌。	5	4	3	2	1	0
日本人做事认真。	5	4	3	2	1	0
日本人严守纪律。	5	4	3	2	1	0
日本人不知悔改。	5	4	3	2	1	0
日本人狂妄自大。	5	4	3	2	1	0
日本人有侵略其他民族的野心。	5	4	3	2	1	0

18. 你对日本这个国家的整体印象如何？（请用**圆圈**标出适合的数字。）

非常好		好		一般		不好		非常不好		不清楚
10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

结 语

谢谢支持与合作！

因本人分析数据的需要，请答卷人在完成答卷后，继续回答以下四个有关个人和所在学校信息的问题：

1). 你所在学校属公立、私立、还是其他（请说明）？

答：

2). 你所在学校属非重点中学还是重点中学（请具体说明是国家重点、省重点、还是市重点）？

答：

3). 你所在班级属文科班、理科班还是其他（请说明）？

答：

4). 你所在学校采用的历史教科书是由哪个出版社出版？

答： 高中：

初中：

Appendix 4

I. Official Documents on Chinese Ideological-Political Education since 1980s, (From *the Encyclopedia of Education Law of the People's Republic of China* [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Fa Quanshu])

1. Ministry of Education Opinion on Improving and Strengthening Secondary School Political Education Courses (September 12, 1980) [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin he Jiaqiang Zhongxue Zhengzhi Ke de Yijian*]
2. Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education (July 2, 1983) [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguoizhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian*]
3. Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary School History and Geography Courses (August 1, 1983) [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi*]
4. Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the 'Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education' (August 24, 1983) [*Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche 'Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguoizhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian*]
5. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming the Teaching of Ideological Character and Political Theory Curricula in Schools (August 1, 1985) [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige Xuexiao Sixiang Pinde he Zhengzhi Lilun Kecheng Jiaoxue de Tongzhi*]
6. State Education Commission Notice on Further Expanding the Experiment in Reforming Secondary School Ideological and Political Education Courses (Extract) (April 22, 1987) [*Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Zhongxue Sixiang Zhengzhi Ke Gaige Shiyan de Tongzhi (Jielu)*]
7. Outline on Secondary School Moral Education (Draft) (August 20, 1988) [*Zhongxue Deyu Dagang (Shixing Gao)*]
8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Primary and Middle School Moral Education Work (December 25, 1988) [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi*]
8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Primary and Middle School Moral Education Work (December 25, 1988) [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi*]
9. State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of Ideological and Political Education and Education on National Conditions in Primary and Secondary Language, History, Geography, and Other Courses (November 8, 1989) [*Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, Lishi, Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian*]
10. A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School Moral Education Work (April 13, 1990) [*Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian*]
11. State Education Commission Notice on Implementing the Policy of Strictly Instituting a System for Flag Raising in Primary and Secondary Schools

- According to the 'People's Republic of China National Flag Law' (August 24, 1990) [*Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Shixing 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoqi Fa' Yange Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Guoqi Zhidu de Tongzhi*]
12. State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developing Patriotic Education Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools (April 25, 1991) [*Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan Aiguo zhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian*]
 13. Office of the State Education Commission Notice on Primary and Secondary School Extracurricular Reading Materials for Education on National Conditions (June 1, 1991) [*Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zhongxiaoxue Guoqing Jiaoyu Kewai Yuedu Duwu de Tongzhi*]
 14. State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the 'General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions' (August 27, 1991) [*Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa 'Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandai shi ji Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao' (Chugao) de Tongzhi*]
 15. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State Education Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil Administration, Communist Youth League Central Committee, and National Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics in the Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary Traditions (August 28, 1991) [*Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang, Guojia Wenwu Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguo zhuyi he Geming Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi*]
 16. The Need to Seriously and Earnestly Implement Primary and Secondary Education on Flag-Raising Activities (October 17, 1991) [*Yao Yansu er Renzhende Jinxing Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Qi Huodong de Jiaoyu*]
 17. State Education Commission Outline on National Defense Education in Primary and Middle Schools (Draft) (February 19, 1992) [*Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Xiaoxue, Chuzhong Guofang Jiaoyu Gangyao (Shixing)*]
 18. Opinion on Strengthening "Loving the Hometown" and Patriotic Education in Kindergartens (May 5, 1992) [*Guanyu Zai Youeryuan Jiaqiang Ai Jiaxiang, Ai Zuguo Jiaoyu de Yijian*]
 19. Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, August 8, 1994) [*Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao*]

II. Chinese Secondary School History Textbooks and Curricular Standards Examined

1. *Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi*, People's Education Press, 1985.
2. *9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 3 Nian Zhi Chuji Zhongxue Jiaokeshu: Zhongguo Lishi*, People's Education Press, 1995.
3. *Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shiyan Jiaokeshu: Lishi*, People's Education Press, 2008.
4. *9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang*, People's Education Press, 1992.
5. *9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang*, People's Education Press, 2000.

6. *Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang*, People's Education Press, 1986.
7. *Lishi Kecheng Biaoqun*, The Press of Beijing Normal University, 2011.

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