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**TERRORISM -- A NEW THREAT FOR INDONESIA?  
AN ANALYSIS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDONESIA  
IN THE POST-SUHARTO PERIOD**

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**by  
LAU Wun Yin Wilson**

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submitted in partial fulfillment  
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Terrorism -- A New Threat for Indonesia? AN ANALYSIS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDONESIA IN THE POST-SUHARTO PERIOD**

**By**

**LAU Wun Yin Wilson**

**Master of Philosophy**

Indonesia is the fourth most heavily populated nation in the world with over 210 million inhabitants. Almost half of all Southeast Asians live in Indonesia, and it is also the world's most populated Muslim nation. These features make it a crucial country in the Southeast Asian Region, as well as in the world. Therefore, the national security of this country is very important to the region and the world.

Security or national security covers dealing with the threat(s) to the state, so, in order to study this issue, we need to identify what kind of threat is behind the scenario.

Indonesia's post-independence political history has been dominated by two long serving presidents. During Sukarno's period (1949-1965), external or conventional military threats ranked the highest priority in the agenda of national security; but after the fall of Sukarno in 1965, under Suharto's New Order (1966-1998), the focus was changed to internal threats, such as secessionist movements, religious conflicts, radicalism and so on. The security goals of the New Order government were to maintain sovereignty, unity, integrity and stability through economic development and military suppression. However, in May 1998, anti-government demonstrations (Reformasi Movement) made Suharto step down. Within 2 years, the presidency of

Indonesia changed 3 times, from Suharto to Habibie; from Habibie to Wahid; and from Wahid to Megawati. In addition, after the September 11<sup>th</sup> incident, the whole international environment has changed as well. Therefore, is there any change to the national security parameters of Indonesia in such a new era?

The purpose to this research project is to find out what has happened to Indonesian national security priorities in the post-Suharto period. To a certain extent, the security goals of those post-Suharto governments are almost the same as during the Suharto period---maintaining national unity and integrity plus restoring Indonesia's international creditability, in order to achieve a stable country. However, after the September 11<sup>th</sup> incident, the world has been pushed on to a "war on terror" led by United States, and the explosion on the island of Bali in October 2002 have suddenly put Southeast Asia on the frontline of the "war on terror" and heightened concerns about the threat of terrorism to Indonesia's national security and its national credibility. Therefore, will terrorism become a new threat to Indonesia? How deep is the impact that terrorist activities can make on Indonesia?

In order to answer the above questions, this thesis will be focusing on three aspects; firstly, how terrorism intensifies the pre-existing internal security threats of Indonesia. Secondly, the emergence of 'new terrorism' in the contemporary Indonesian political economy. Thirdly, the limitations on or difficulties for the Indonesian government in tackling terrorism.

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been duly acknowledged.

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LAU Wun-yin, Wilson  
November 2004

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## **List of Abbreviations**

DOM	Area of Military Operation
FKM	Maluku Sovereignty Front
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
HDC	Humanitarian Dialogue Center
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JI	Jemaah Islamiah
LJ	Laskar Jihad
MMI	Mujahidin Council of Indonesia
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia
OPM	Papua Youth Movement
PDI-P	Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle
PKI	Indonesia Communist Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SIRA	Aceh Referendum Information Centre
OKPH	Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law
TNI	Indonesia National Army

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I dedicate this thesis to my mother and sister who give me everlasting love and care.

## Chapter One

### Introduction

What is a New Era? The beginning of a new millennium, the successful mapping of the human genome or the development of the Internet across the world? Many people might have thought that those events represent the beginning of a new era, at least until the day of September 11th 2001. It will be remembered as a defining moment in world history. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington on that day, shocked not just the United States but the entire world. The attacks are a watershed, with far-reaching implications for future security. They demonstrated that even the world's sole superpower, historically protected by two vast oceans, is no longer immune from the new weapons of terror. Terrorism thus became a global phenomenon and problem, not only affecting the diplomatic policy of United States but also the global order, because the world has been pushed on to a "war on terror" led by the United States.

As we are all living in such a new era, I think more should be known on terrorism. This reason provides me with a great interest in conducting research about terrorism. In doing a literature review, I found that most of the research on terrorism was based on the Western or the Middle East countries; only a little touched on South-east Asia, one of the most diverse and complicated regions in the world. Moreover, the explosion on the island of Bali at October 2002 has suddenly put South-east Asia on the frontline of the "war on terror" and heightened concerns about the threat of terrorism to Indonesia's national security and its national credibility. Therefore, I would like to conduct research on terrorism based in Indonesia.

## **Background on Indonesia**

Indonesia is the fourth most heavily populated nation in the world with over 210 million inhabitants. Almost half of all Southeast Asians live in Indonesia, and it is also the world's most populated Muslim nation. These features make it a crucial country in the Southeast Asian Region, as well as in the world. Therefore, the national security of this country is very important to the region and the world.

Indonesia's post-independence political history has been dominated by two long serving presidents. During Sukarno's period (1949-1965), external or conventional military threats ranked the highest priority in the agenda of national security; but after the fall of Sukarno in 1965, under Suharto's New Order (1966-1998), the focus was changed to internal threats, such as secessionist movements, religious conflicts, radicalism and so on. The security goals of the New Order government were to maintain sovereignty, unity, integrity and stability through economic development and military suppression. However, on 20<sup>th</sup> May 1998, ten days of student-led anti-government demonstrations (Reformasi Movement) made Suharto step down. Within 2 years, the presidency of Indonesia changed 3 times, from Suharto to Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie; from Habibie to K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid; and from Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri. Indonesia is now undergoing first direct presidential election which may result in yet another new president. In addition, after the September 11<sup>th</sup> incident, the whole international environment has changed as well. Therefore, is there any change to the national security parameters of Indonesia in such a new era?

## **Objective**

There are altogether three objectives of this thesis: First, try to examine the national security of Indonesia. Second, try to examine the influence/impact of terrorism on the national security. Third, try to examine whether the nature of terrorism in Indonesia is changing.

## **Research Questions**

With the above objectives, four research questions will be set out in this thesis, and they are:

- 1) What is the nature of the security threats in Indonesia?
- 2) Did the nature of the security threats change due to the changes in the political environment?
- 3) To what extent did terrorism already exist in Indonesia and what is the nature of the current terrorism?
- 4) What are the limitations on or difficulties for the Indonesian government in tackling the security threats and terrorism?

## **Literature Review**

Since Indonesia is a crucial country in the Southeast Asian region as well as in the world, the national security of this country is an important and interesting topic for the scholars to study.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar (1998) produced a comprehensive structure in examining the issue of national security of Indonesia by suggesting that there are different perspectives on the security threats by different presidents. According to Anwar, Sukarno believed that Indonesia's independence and national unity were directly threatened by foreign powers in particular by the former colonial and imperialistic states. Such a world-view made him focus on the external threats that will affect the stability of the country. However, Suharto saw the most immediate threat was come from the country itself. Anwar interpreted Suharto's view on the issue of national security as "fundamental insecurity stems from the fact that it is a newly independent county with a highly heterogeneous population, most of whom are still poor and barely educated, living in an equally fragmented territory" (Anwar, 1998, p.478). With such a perspective, Suharto took an inward-looking security strategy in dealing with the national security issue of Indonesia. Anwar had identified three threats that Indonesia was facing during the New Order's administration: they were the ideological threats from Communism and Islam, the secessionist threat and democratic threat. In dealing with these threats. She suggested that Suharto had been practiced management of ideological conformity, tight sociopolitical control of society and economic development. Finally, Anwar made a comment on the New Order's approaches to national security in that way, "Although this strategy may give the government a sense of security in the short term, it will undoubtedly lead to instability in the long term, because the people will not tolerate forever all the rules and limitations that govern their lives in the name of stability and development" (Anwar, 1998, p.512). This suggestion, in fact, acts as a good starting point in exploring the national security issues of Indonesia, because Anwar's works only covered the period from Sukarno to Suharto.

Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk's book (2001) made further contributions to the issue of national security in Indonesia by extending the study in the post-Suharto period. In addition, they have done a more detail and in depth study on the secessionist threats in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor. They have suggested the roots of the secessionist threats, for example, the transmigration policy practiced by the central government, the strong ethnic identity of these areas and the economic exploitation by Jakarta. Besides, they have pointed out that the factor of TNI was in fact the most crucial factor in the secessionist threat. Rabasa and Chalk did make an interesting statement on it by stated that, "economic exploitation would probably not have been strong enough to generate overt separatist sentiments. For much of the 1980s, GAM experienced relatively little popular support, with most Acehnese merely calling for more autonomy and control over natural resources. It was only during the last decade that these sentiments began to change, largely as a result of anger generated by military excesses...such excesses engendered increased support for GAM and its violent separatist agenda." (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.33) Moreover, Rabasa and Chalk also provided much information and facts on the secessionist movements, they have mentioned that the operational tactic for GAM was mostly concentrated on hit-and-run attacks at first, however the overall scale of violence have been increased since 1999. The operational focus of GAM has been extend to Javanese migrants, suspected Indonesian sympathizers and perceived symbols of Javanese domination.

There are also works done in this aspect by other academics and organizations, such as Rabasa and John Haseman (2002) and the reports made by Human Rights Watch. These works also provide details on the secessionist movements in Indonesia, together with some analysis and recommendation behind the scenario. For example,



Rabasa and Haseman suggested that the inconsistent approach of conciliation and repression in dealing with the secessionist movements by the post-Suharto governments was a failure.

Tim Huxley (2002) and Vivienne Wee (2002) produced more comprehensive works on the study of national security in Indonesia by clearly stating out the two threats that were most serious to the national security of this country: the secessionist movements and the ideological challenge from Islam. They both emphasize in pointing out that the threats will lead to the fragmentation of the country. However, Wee stated that the idea on the fragmentation of the country arises from primordial ethnic sentiments (secessionist movements) was a wrong interpretation. "While there are dozens of major ethnic groups and hundreds of minor ones in Indonesia, there are not correspondingly dozens or hundreds of separatist movements...this indicates that ethnicity, in and of itself, does not necessarily generate ethno-nationalism" (Wee, 2002, p.3). In fact, the ideological conflicts between secularism and Islamic act as the driving force in generate ethno-nationalism. Huxley also have the similar view as Wee, but he presented the ideological challenge from Islam as communal conflicts, and stated that "communal conflict has been much more widespread than armed separatism, and together with growing religious extremism may undermine national cohesion more seriously in the long term" (Huxley, 2002, p.57). Once recognizing the security threats in Indonesia under the post-Suharto period, they go into depth in examining the threats. Wee has pointed out that the factors behind the threats were due to the uncertainty on the nature of state. Just as what she mentioned in her article, "Is Indonesia the 'heir' of the Dutch East Indies?" or a "brand-new nation-state, which has liberated itself completely from the Dutch?" (Wee, 2002, p.7) Besides, she also pointed out that "the transmigration

programme has generated much resentment among indigenous host populations.” (Wee, 2002, p.11) which act as fundamental factor to the security threats that Indonesia is facing with nowadays. Wee (2002) even produced a historical comparative study on the ethnic and ideological conflicts in Indonesia, starting from 1945 to present, which may served as a background for the further on study. While Huxley focus on the military factor which will act as the major reason behind the security threats, because the military see the unstavle and violence situation as a ‘project’ for them to gain more in the political arena. A variety of the academic works on the study of national security of Indonesia in the post-Suharto period are not so systematic, with just emphases on certain specific aspects or areas, for example, the secessionist threats (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002, Lee 1999), the ideological challenge by Islam (Abuza 2003, Azra 2003, Porter 2002, Jamhari 1999, Rais, 1999), the military factor in the security threats (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, Rasaba and Chalk 2001, Vatiklots 1993), the change in the political environment after the fall of Suharto (Ricklefs 2001, Schwarz and Paris 1999, Vatiklots 1998). However, even though the works of Huxley and Wee have included almost all of the above, aspects or areas as mentioned, they still left out one aspect, that is the influence of terrorism. Although, Huxley’s work (2002) covered the influence of the international on the national security of Indonesia, it just focused on the situation after the September 11 incident and not in a comprehensive way.

It seems that there is an academic poverty in this area, which induced me to do some literature review on the aspect of terrorism.

To date, works on terrorism are numerous (such as Comb 2002, Laqueur, 2001, Whittaker 2001, Hoffman 1998). Basically, these works try to conceptualize the

meaning of terrorism, the features of terrorism or the motivations behind it. (this will be discussed in more details in the conceptualization). Bruce Hoffman (1998) has made a distinction between “traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism, which served as a breakthrough in the study of terrorism. It is because he was the first one who have systematically modified the meaning of terrorism with the change in the world context and clearly stated out some difference between the “traditional” one and the “New” one (refer to conceptualization for more details). However, most of these academic works seldom use Asia or Southeast Asia region as an example. Much of them were focused on the cases in Middle East or the Western countries. For example, in David Whittaker’s book (2001), twelve case studies on terrorism were listed out in the book, but not one of them is a country in Asia. For other literatures on this aspect (Henderson 2001, Laquer 2001, Hoffman, 1998), they also seldom use the countries in Asia or Southeast Asian region as examples for illustrating the concept of terrorism. That means, there is a lack of application of the study on terrorism to the Asia and Southeast Asia region.

Only until recently, seldom academic works have began to apply the study of terrorism together with the national security issues of the countries in Southeast Asia.

Daljit Singh (2002) stated that the main reason behind the growth of terrorism in Indonesia was due to the change in the political environment after the fall of Suharto, in which, Muslim political forces have been able to organize and propagate important factor in the domestic politics of Indonesia. This will act as a pressure or constraints to the Jakarta in tackling the suspected terrorist group with Islamic background, such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI). He stated that “Islam will remain on important force, making it difficult for political leaders to act firmly” (Singh,2002, p.7).

Rabasa and Haseman (2002) go along with this view by stating that in response to the challenge of Islamic terrorists and radicals, Megawati's government showed caution and hesitancy. They further explain this view by saying that "Megawati and her advisors see great political risks and few advantages in moving against the radicals, even if this frustrates the U.S. and some of Indonesia's neighbors" (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.89). Beside the Islamic factor, they have also suggested that the infiltration and operating of the international terrorist groups (networks) in Indonesia will act as a factor to induce the growth of terrorist sentiment. It will be relatively easy for the international terrorist groups to infiltrate and influence the domestic radical organization since many of these groups share the same ideological orientation and biases.

Rohan K. Gunaratna (2003) does make a contribution in illustrating how Al-Qaeda began infiltrating into Indonesia from the late 1980s, making Indonesia become a terrorists training base. In fact, Gunaratna's work provides information to support the views from Rabasa and Haseman. In addition, he had also mentioned some features of the terrorism nowadays, for example, terrorists have shifted their attention from hard targets (military targets) to soft targets (economic and commercial targets); and most of their training is political and ideological training, the military training just completed within a short period of time at the last stage. However, they are not presented in a systematic way and not in detail.

Andrew Tan (2003) perhaps has done the most comprehensive, systematic and organized work on this aspect. He bring along the concept on "traditional" terrorism and New Terrorism from Hoffman (1998) together with the national security issue in the Southeast Asia region, especially on Indonesia. However, the lack of a close fit

between nation and state, in which, a legacy came from the colonial period was the main cause for the growth of terrorism in Southeast Asian as well as Indonesia. He thinks that the lack of political legitimacy has been a major cause for the armed rebellions that have taken place in some countries in Southeast Asia.

Actually, the above works have thrown light on exploring the inter-relationship between terrorism and the national security of Indonesia. However, they are all more descriptive than theoretical, so, a study on this aspect with theoretical support and guiding is urgently needed. My thesis attempts to make use of the conflict cycle model as a theoretical framework in examine the inter-relationships between terrorism and national security in Indonesia, hopefully, to throw new light on the inspirations of this aspect.

### **Conceptualization**

There are two crucial terms that need to conceptualize in this thesis first prior to the further discussion. They are “Terrorism” and National Security.

#### ***Terrorism***

Terrorism is a term that most people must have a vague idea or impression of what it is, especially after the September 11<sup>th</sup> incident. There are many definitions of the term “terrorism”, such as,

‘The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’ (FBI).

‘The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological’ (US Department of Defense).

‘The use of threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property’ (UK government).

‘A strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large’ (Walter Reich).

‘The use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change’ (Brian Jenkins).

An influential definition on terrorism was given by Walter Laqueur as ‘the use of covert violence by a group for political ends, usually directed against a government, less frequently against another group, class or party. The ends may vary from the redress of “grievances”, to the overthrow of a government and the taking over of power, or to the liberation of a country from foreign rule. Terrorists seek to cause political, social and economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently engage in planned or indiscriminate murder.’

Although there are many definitions on the term terrorism, we still lack a more precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition of this word. There are basically three reasons why terrorism is so difficult to define.

First of all, the meaning of the term has changed so frequently since the end of the Second World War. At that time, the term was used primarily in reference to the violent revolts then being prosecuted by the various indigenous nationalists/anti-colonialist groups that emerged in Asia, Africa and the Middle East during the late 1940s and 1950s, to oppose continued European rule (Hoffman, 1998, pp.15-28).

Later on, during the late 1960s and 1970s, terrorism continued to be viewed in a revolutionary context, but was expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside a colonial or neo-colonial framework as well as radical, entirely ideologically -motivated organizations. (Whittaker, 2001, pp4-6)

During recent years, terrorism has been used to denote broader, less distinct phenomena, for example, in the 1980s, the term came to be regarded as a calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy. By the middle of the decade, terrorism became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution (Hoffman, 1998, pp.15-28).

The frequent shifts in the meaning of terrorism has induced a second difficulty, namely the question of subjectivity. As Brian Jenkins stated,“(Terrorism) thus seems to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has directly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.” (Whittaker, 2001, p8) Another example comes from the address of Yassir Arafat, the chairman of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the UN General Assembly in November 1974,

which stated that, “The difference between revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorists.” (Whittaker, 2001, p8) Hence it seems that the decision to call someone or label some organization “terrorist” becomes almost unavoidably subjective.

The third problem is that the term “Terrorism” has been overused by the mass media, which labels of a range of violent acts as “terrorism”, thus making confusing guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminal events as well as lunatic assassin. Hoffman has distinguished the difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare; and the difference between terrorism and ordinary criminal events as well as lunatic assassin.

First of all, although guerrillas often employ the same tactics for the same purpose as terrorist did; guerrilla warfare is taken refer to a numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory; while terrorists do not function in open as armed units, make no attempt to seize or hold territory, and rarely exercise any direct control or sovereignty over either territory or population (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-44).

In addition, terrorism is different from civil war, too. According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, war means “armed conflict between two or more parties, usually fought for political ends.” Although it is quite similar to terrorism, the difference is on the scale. For war, it involved with the use of force between large scale political units, such as state or empires; while the scale of terrorist group(s) is not as large as the state. Moreover, for war, it usually concerns the control of territory



and ultimately the government structure while terrorists acts seldom have such an aim in mind.

Secondly, although both the ordinary criminals and the terrorists use violence as a means to attaining a specific end; while the violent act itself may be similar, the purpose or the motivation clearly is not. For ordinary criminals, the goals are purely egocentric, they use violence as a means to obtain money or to acquire material goods. They are acting primarily for selfish, personal motivations. However, terrorism, is intended to create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself, and the fundamental aim of the terrorist's violence is "altruistic". Terrorists want to change "the system". They believe that they are serving a "good" cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency, whether real or imagined. As Konrad Kellen observes, "Terrorist without a cause(at least in his own mind), is not a terrorist" (Whittaker, 2001, pp.8-9). In addition, the ordinary criminal's violent act do not convey with "message" to anyone other than the victim itself. That means the violent act is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself which is different from terrorism.

Thirdly, for the difference between lunatic assassin and terrorism is on the purpose. The goal for the lunatic assassin is more often intrinsically idiosyncratic, completely egocentric and deeply personal; whereas goal for terrorist is much more "political" (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-43).

It is clear that defining the term "terrorism" will not be easy due to the above reasons. However, in order to complete this thesis, a definition of "terrorism" must be worked out or conceptualized. In fact, some elements can be derived from the

analysis of the differences among terrorism and guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminal events and lunatic assassin, which will help to contribute to a more objective definition of “terrorism”. The elements are as follows.

Terrorism:

- has ineluctably political aims and motives;
- is a violent or, equally important, threatens violence;
- is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;
- is conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia);
- is perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.
- Attacks both military and civilians, often seeing the latter as “soft targets”.

(Source: Hoffman, 1998 p43)

So, based on these elements, Hoffman has defined “terrorism” as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence.” He further elaborates the term by saying that “Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or a political party, or public opinion in general Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate

power where there is very little.” (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-44) through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

However, in order to simplify the definition for the purpose of this thesis, I would like to combine two points from Hoffman’s definition together with the description from Cindy C. Combs. She defined “terrorism” as,

‘An act comprised of at least four crucial elements: 1) it is an act of violence; 2) it has a political motive or goal; 3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons; and 4) it is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result.’ (Combs, 1997)

To these four points I would add Hoffman ‘s final two points, namely that the act should be conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or cell structure and that it should be carried out by a subnational or non-state entity.

Moreover, for those states that are using terrorist acts against the innocent people outside their country, for example, Libya, would be just defined as state-sponsored terrorism but not state terrorism.

Therefore, the term “terrorism” in this thesis will be defined as—An act comprised of at least six crucial elements: 1) it is an act of violence; 2) it has a political motive or goal; 3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons; and 4) it is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the

desired result.’ 5) it should be conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or cell structure; and 6) it should be carried out by a subnational or non-state entity.

In addition, as derived by Hoffman, the mechanism of terrorism is “Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale” (Hoffman, 1998, p.44)

This thesis will not be concerned with so called “State Terrorism” because it a rather mis-leading concept.

State terrorism was defined as “acts of terrorism which a state commits against defenseless victims, rather than from terror-violence by a lone assassin or small, fanatic, non-state group” (Comb 2002, p.24). However, according to Max Weber, the state is a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1988); in other words, the state is considered as the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. It seems that there is a contradiction between the definition of state and the concept of state terrorism.

Moreover, for those states that are using terrorist acts against the innocent citizen outside their country, for example, Libya can be just defined as state-sponsored terrorism but not state terrorism.

Therefore, I would say that State terrorism is a mis-leading concept subject to

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the definition of the state by Weber. So, this thesis will be focused on a more narrow definition of terrorism with non-state actor(s) as mentioned in the previous paragraphs.

After conceptualizing the term “terrorism”, two types of terrorism, which are “traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism will be included in this thesis.

### ***“Traditional” Terrorism and “New” Terrorism***

In order to utilise the term New Terrorism, the term “traditional” terrorism should be explained first. According to Bruce Hoffman, traditional terrorism was formed during the Cold War; it had a clear set of political objectives. The groups who conducted the “traditional” terrorism were those radical left-wing groups, such as the Japanese Red Army Faction, as well as other nationalist-type groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the PLO. These groups were mostly characterized by their tight organization and hierarchical structure, consisting of individuals engaged in conspiracy as a full-time occupation. These groups often issued communiqués taking credit for and explaining their actions (Hoffman, 1997, p.2).

In contrast to the “traditional” terrorism, those groups who adopted new terrorism have less comprehensible nationalistic or ideological motivations, embracing much more amorphous religious and millenarian aims; moreover, they are also less cohesive in their organization, with a more diffuse structure and membership. More important is that those groups who have adopted new terrorism as the strategy usually see violence as an end in itself, not just a means to an end (Hoffman, 1997, pp.8-9). They attempt mass casualty terrorist acts, which try to kill a large number of

people, by using both conventional explosives or weapons of mass destruction (Tan, 2003, p.87) and try to create a spectacle before the audience in which they hope for a reaction of fear and terror as the desired goal. So it is obvious that the lethality of the New Terrorism has been increasing. Hoffman has suggested three reasons in explaining such a phenomenon.

First, it was due to the growth in the number of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Religion can fulfill the function of a legitimizing force, which can justify the action that they are undertaking. (more will be discussed in chapter six)

Second, is due to the proliferation of “amateurs” involved in terrorist acts. Due to the improvements in science and technology, the means and methods of terrorism have become “accessible to anyone with a grievance” (Hoffman, 1998, p.4). In contrast to the terrorists in “traditional” terrorism, the terrorists now can obtain the necessary capability more easily. Thus, more people can be involved in terrorism since they have both the motivation and the capability in doing that.

Third, is due to the increasing sophistication and operational competence of “professional” terrorists. The new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors, becoming smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture or eliminate. Rather like the Darwinian principle of natural selection (Hoffman, 1998, p.7).

Beside the increase in lethality, another feature of New Terrorism is that there is less frequently any claiming credit for the attacks by the terrorist group. They tend not to take responsibility and much less issue communiqués explaining why they

carried out an attack in the way that “traditional” terrorist groups of the past did (Hoffman, 1998).

The above features for New Terrorism derive from another feature, that is “violence for some terrorist group is becoming less a means to an end than an end itself that does not require any wider explanation or justification beyond the group’s members themselves and perhaps their specific followers” (Hoffman, 1998, p.8). It may be due to the function of religion or it may be that the terrorists even cannot find out a reason for the violent acts.

Hoffman concludes that New Terrorism has “become more complex, amorphous and transnational. The distinction between domestic and international terrorism is also evaporating” (Hoffman, 1998, p.10).

### *National Security*

National security is a diverse and complicated topic. Scholars have various definitions on it. For example Penelope Hartland-Thunberg defines national security as the ability of a nation to pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them, any place in the world; Michael H.H. Louw sees national security as the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives; and the National Defense College (Canada) defines the term as the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the...people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others (Buzan, 1991 pp.16-17).

However, if we want to have a more comprehensive and accurate picture, one way is to analyse both words “National” (State) and “Security” individually.

According to Barry Buzan, “State” is comprised of three components; they are “Idea of State”, “The Physical Base of the State” and “The Institution of the State” (Buzan, 1991 p.65). The Idea of State means what binds the people into a socio-political and territorial entity, the two main sources are to be found in the nation and in organizing ideologies. The Physical Base of the State comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural resources and man-made wealth contained within its borders. The Institutions of the state comprise the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate

The term “Security”, according to John E. Mroz, means the relative freedom from harmful threats (Mroz, 1980 p.105).

Therefore, the term “National Security” in this research will be defined as preventing or lessening harmful threats to the three components of the state.

## **Theoretical Framework**

The Conflict Cycle model will be used as the theoretical framework for this thesis. According to Louis Kriesberg, a conflict or a social conflict exists when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives (Kriesberg, 1998 p.2). Two words should be clarified at this stage, the first is “manifest”, which means that significant members of at least one of the contending



groups exhibits the belief that some of its goals are incompatible with those of another party; this is indicated by attacking the other party, by proclaiming that an adversary must change, or by arousing and mobilizing other members of the group for the struggle. The second word is “incompatible objectives” which means that the realization of some of their goals are thwarted by another party and therefore requires that party to change the ways it resists. Those pre-existing threats to Indonesia are exactly a kind of social conflict or conflict in these terms. The separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and the Indonesian government, act as adversaries. Each side has incompatible objectives which compels the other side to change. The above framework also applies to the ideological conflict in Indonesia, in which the secularist and the radical Muslim act as the adversaries.

The Conflict Cycle is used to illustrate different stages of a conflict, how it emerges, escalates, de-escalates and is settled. There are altogether six stages for a conflict cycle, which are: **1) Bases; 2) Manifestation; 3) Escalation; 4) De-escalation; 5) Termination; 6) Consequences** (see figure 11). The pre-existing threats which have been mentioned before can be illustrated by this cycle, since they are a kind of conflict. Below is a brief explanations to each stage,

- 1) **Base:** The underlying conditions that can become the sources for an overt struggle.
- 2) **Manifestation:** Four components must be present for this to occur. First, at least one protagonist has a sense of its identity, distinguishing itself from other parties. Second, members of one or more of the adversary parties believe that they have a grievance, some aspect of their situation being unsatisfactory and unjustified. Third, members of one or more sides, believing that their grievance would be

reduced by a change wrought by another person or group, formulate a goal to bring about the changes in the other side so that the grievance will be reduced. Fourth, those asserting the goal must believe that they can act to help attain it. The conflict has become manifest as one or both sides express these beliefs by mobilizing supporters or by directly trying to affect the opposing side so as to achieve their goal.

- 3) **Escalation:** Opposition becomes manifest and each side attempts to attain its goal, increasing its efforts by intensifying the means used and rallying support for its cause. Terrorism is a strategy for the adversaries at this stage and terrorist activities such as bombing, mass killing and kidnapping are the tactics in achieving the strategy.
- 4) **De-escalation:** It arises from changes in the relationship between adversaries, from changes within one of the major adversaries, and from changes in the external context.
- 5) **Termination:** The end of a conflict.
- 6) **Consequences:** The outcome of a conflict.




Fig 1.1 Conflict Cycle  
 (Source: Kriesberg, 1998)

So, for this thesis, we will be focusing on how and why terrorism is chosen as anti-government strategy. Actually, each contending party adopts a strategy or a set of strategies to attain its goals. There are a lot of alternatives in conflict strategies which can be explained in terms of the inducements. According to Louis Kriesberg, three basic inducements are generally recognized: coercion, reward and persuasion. Terrorism is recognized as a highly coercive inducement strategy. It is generally regarded as the violation of fundamental rules of conflict behaviour, so it has a low degree of regulation and institutionalization; therefore it can help in explaining that why terrorism to some group is just but to another is immoral. It is because such a low degree of regulation and institutionalization will make the adversaries of the two sides in the conflict disagree with the modes or strategies that is being used. Since there are no external rules or regulations that govern the contending parties in the conflict.

Different types of inducement and differences in degree of regulation and institutionalization generate different conflict strategies or modes; and terrorism is one of these strategies. Why do adversaries adopt terrorism as the strategy in conflict?

Four sets of conditions jointly affect the strategies adopted in conducting a struggle, they are 1) the partisan's goals, 2) the characteristics of each adversary, 3) the relations between the adversaries, and 4) their environment.

It is important in analysis for the partisan's goals is due to the ends help determine the means chosen and the means tend to change as goals are modified in the course of a struggle. In studying the characteristics of the partisan, it can be

divided into four aspects, they are the conflict groups internal predispositions, ideology, social structure and resources. For the relations between adversaries, we can studying them in three ways: the kind of integration between the antagonists, how they perceive and feel about each other, and the degree of symmetry in the resources each controls. For the environment, it means the social context of the adversaries. It included four categories: the institutions of the opponents social system, the norms and prevailing ways of thinking in their environment, the role of other parties and other systemic features of their environment (the distribution of resources and the degree of integration among the members).

This thesis will develop the above four aspects in discussing why the adversaries will adopt terrorism as a strategy. The spread out of terrorism all over the world after the 11<sup>th</sup> September incident may have a influence on the social context which change the norms and prevailing of thinking of the adversaries party.

The use of terrorism as a conflict strategy will also generate conflict escalation which will increase in the severity of coercive inducements and the increase in the scope of participation within a conflict.

In addition, the process of de-escalation will be used in the thesis for assessing the future of the security threats in Indonesian and why the Jakarta government is difficult in dealing with the separatist threats and the ideological threats.

## **Chapter Outline**

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction and Literature Review**

In this chapter, the conceptual framework; the theoretical background and some key concepts/terms will be presented; the literature review will also be appear in this chapter

## **Chapter2 Historical Background on Indonesia National Security (From Sukarno to Suharto)**

In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis will be given on the national security issues, such as the security goals and the different perspectives on security threats during the periods of both Sukarno and Suharto.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Indonesia National Security in the Post-Suharto period**

For this chapter, I will try to describe the overall situation of Indonesia in the post-Suharto period; and then analysis will be given on the similarities and differences on the national security issues between the Suharto and post-Suharto periods. The main objective of this chapter is try to picture the present situation that the Indonesian government is facing.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Terrorism and New terrorism in Indonesia**

This Chapter will act as the leading chapter for the following two chapters, I will try to give a brief description on the history of terrorism in Indonesia first; and then analysis will be given on how the New Terrorism has affected the country. In addition, description on what kind of pressures from the international community

that the Indonesian government is facing on the issues of terrorism in Indonesia will also be provided.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Secessionist Threats in Indonesia**

In Chapter 2, I will try to point out that secessionist threat was one of the most serious threats that Indonesia has been facing, so in this chapter, I will try to explain how terrorism can infiltrate the pre-existing security threat of Indonesia; with the theoretical framework as the background. I will also try to explain why it will be difficult for the government to tackle it.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Ideological Challenge from Islam**

The basic aim for this chapter is quite similar to the previous chapter, however the subject will be changed to Ideological/Religious threats; the other serious threats to the national security of Indonesia. How terrorism can infiltrate into this pre-existing threat and why it will be difficult for the government to tackle it.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusion**

I will try to state out the general argument in this chapter, saying that “traditional” terrorism will transform to New Terrorism in Indonesia.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Historical Background on Indonesian National Security**

#### **(From Sukarno to Suharto)**

Since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949, the country has been facing many challenges to its national security. This may have been due to the long, bloody and harsh struggle over its independence from the Dutch<sup>1</sup>; or may be related to being a fragmented archipelago and having a weak national identity. In this chapter, we will have a comprehensive examination of the national security of Indonesia during the periods of Sukarno (1949-67) and Suharto (1968-1998).

#### **Security Goals of Indonesia**

To a certain extent, the security goals for these two periods were almost the same. It is reflected in the defense and security doctrine of Indonesia; it stated that the ideal of the national struggle is to realize a unitary Republic of Indonesia that is independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous, based on Pancasila<sup>2</sup> and the 1945 Constitution. We can see that the aim of the struggle was to transform the national condition of Indonesia from a colonized and backward situation into an independent and successful nation, which was freed from exploitation, poverty, ignorance, backwardness, and other forms of sufferings (Departemen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 1991). Based on these general ideas, 3 distinctive but closely related security goals can be distinguished, they are sovereignty, unity and integrity; and stability (Anwar, 1998, p.484).



At the top of the security agenda of Indonesia is to maintain itself as an independent and sovereign state. As a country that suffered from colonialism and foreign exploitation for centuries and which obtained its independence only after a long and bloody revolutionary war, Indonesia came regard to its independence and sovereignty highly. The post-independence leaders thought that without independence and sovereignty the Indonesian nation could not achieve any of the other national goals. As a result, Indonesia is generally opposed to any activities that may impinge on its sovereignty. Retaining the independent status in the international arena and maintaining its sovereignty over the territories thus becomes the nonnegotiable line for the government. Other security goals serve this primary objective.

Maintaining national unity and integrity is equally important to the previous security goal in the view of the post-independence leaders. Due to the basic weakness of a newly-formed multi-ethnic country, they thought that unity among the peoples and the unity of the territories was crucial to the national security of Indonesia. Pancasila is such an ideology that would be used to unite people of different religious backgrounds. Nationwide acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state and other sociopolitical organizations was regarded as a primary security goal by the government, especially the military (Anwar, 1998, p.486).

Actually speaking, the practice of Pancasila and the military did make a significant role in the nationalist struggle during the period between 1945 to 1949 as well as the primary stage of the country. As mentioned before, maintaining national unity and solidarity was crucial to a newly formed country. The practice of Pancasila

act as an important strategy to ensure ideological conformity. It is a state ideology which require the total acceptance of all Indonesians, and the only ideological basis of political parties and the social organizations. The five principles (refer to endnotes) were intended to provide the spiritual and philosophical basis for a secular Indonesian state. The most important aspect of the Pancasila is the lack of direct reference to Islam, an omission intended to enable persons of all religious to follow the precepts. This help to create a harmony environment for those who are non-Muslims, which may enhance the solidarity of the country (Anwar, 1998, pp .499-504).

Besides the practice of Pancasila, military also took a crucial role in the nationalist struggles and in the primary stage of the country. It might be due to the historical background of the military. The Indonesian national military, TNI was officially established on October 1945, with strong background in struggling with the colonists. The origin of the Indonesian army was in the pro-independence militia formations organized by Indonesian nationalists after the Japanese surrender in 1945. the aim of the TNI was to defend the Republic's independence.

Because of such a background, the military came to view itself as the guardian of national unity and cohesion and act as a co-equal to the civilian political leadership. Indonesian army thought that they should take an active part in politics to ensure stability and central control, thus, they have developed an ideological and legal framework to support a formal role in political affairs, which was named ' dual function' (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.7-12)

The implementation of the ' dual function' in Indonesia did make a great impact

on the political side of the country, for example, even until nowadays, the military still have a strong voice in politics. More will be discuss in later chapters.

A unitary form of government based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution was a way to make sure the territories is in a unified form. At the very beginning of the independence period, the Dutch wanted to introduce a federal system for Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, asking for a setting up of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. However, suspicions came from the nationalist leaders who viewed such a federal system as acting as an attempt to preserve Dutch influence in Indonesia and weaken Jakarta's control over the archipelago (Anwar, 1998, p.486). Therefore, they wanted a unitary system in Indonesia, under which the provinces depended politically and economically on the central administration.

Under the security agenda of Indonesia, stability acted as the prerequisite for the first two security goals. To the leaders, there was a general fear that political instability in one area would be regarded as a sign of weakening government control and thus would lead to turbulence in other parts of the country, which would weaken national integration. If things were happening in this way, those anti-government forces within the country could use such a chance to damage the solidarity of the country through infiltration and subversion. So, any kind of political disturbances, even the overt criticisms of government policy were usually not tolerated, since they might undermine the government's authority. In the government's view, political stability entailed a strong executive control over the country, for both the Sukarno's and Suharto's government had an interest in maintaining loyalty to the 1945 Constitution since it gives enormous power to the executive; it enabled the

government to accumulate and centralize power.

If the security goals for these two periods are almost the same, does it mean that Sukarno and Suharto had the same views over security issues in Indonesia? The answer is definitely not, for the main difference between them was their different perspectives towards the threats that the country was facing.

### **National Security under Sukarno period**

Sukarno saw the most immediate threats to Indonesian security coming from the external side, which is totally different to Suharto, who saw the greatest threats to the national security of the country coming from within the country itself. These different perceptions were reflected in their policies towards national security.

Sukarno's view led him to launch a confrontation against the West, as well as against the new Malaysian federation, which he saw as an encirclement of Indonesia. The conflicts with the Netherlands over the sovereignty of West Irian<sup>3</sup> even more consolidated the hostility of Sukarno towards the West. In his view, the world was not divided in terms of the global ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, but rather in terms of the "nationalist struggle the world over against colonialism and imperialism" (Anwar, 1998, p.481). Unlike the independence history of Malaysia or the Philippines, Indonesia had to fight for its independence from the Dutch through a revolutionary war between 1945 and 1949. That revolutionary experience promoted an ambivalent worldview for Sukarno; it led him to believe that Indonesia's independence and national unity were directly threatened by foreign powers, in particular by the former colonial and imperialistic states, which continued

to maintain their military presence in the neighboring countries.

It does not mean that there were no internal threats during the period of Sukarno, for, in fact, ideological conflicts over religions, political orientations or on which political system and structure that the new republic should take were quite serious at that time. One example was the argument between the “administrators” and the “solidarity” makers<sup>4</sup>. However, Sukarno’s anti-colonialism determined the whole strategies and policies on national security of Indonesia during this period. The covert help given by the British and the Americans to the regional rebellions that took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958<sup>5</sup> even strengthened the suspicion that the presence of the British bases in Malaya and Singapore, as well as the base in the Philippines, were actually aimed at containing Indonesia.

Many scholars have analysed the reasons behind Sukarno’s anti-colonialism. Some said that it was a continuing attempt by an “emerging nation to forge its national integration.” (Reinhardt, 1971), while others said that since he was a “fervent nationalist” (Bunnell, 1966), the strong sense of nationalism is the reason behind that. However, Anwar has a more comprehensive analysis, suggesting that while there is no doubt that Sukarno’s anti-colonialism was genuine, he used the struggle against an external enemy as a rallying point to unite the polarized national elites and to keep himself in power (Anwar, 1998, p.482). The reason is that at the very beginning, the development programmes which were proposed by the “administrators” would weaken the political position of the “solidarity makers”, thus the “solidarity makers” were opposed to them. By practicing the liberation campaign on West Irian and the confrontation against Malaysia, Sukarno left little room for the “administrators” who wanted to focus on internal stability and economic

rehabilitation.

We cannot dismiss the idea that the anti-colonial struggles were meant to prevent any threats to the security of Indonesia; however, to certain extent, it was also a practise by Sukarno to consolidate his power over the country.

### **National Security under Suharto**

After the abortive coup in 1965<sup>6</sup>, Suharto's New Order government came into power. Unlike Sukarno, he emphasized the domestic aspect, believing that the greatest threats to Indonesian national security came from within the country itself. It was because Indonesia was a newly independent country with a highly heterogeneous population. Most people were still poor and barely educated, living in fragmented territory, thus, the commitment to a national identity as an Indonesian had not spread equally throughout the archipelago. This could act as a potential threat to the unity and integrity of the country as well as to the stability of the society. In order to overcome this basic weakness, Suuharto shifted the priorities in the security agenda from anti-colonial struggles to internal political stability and economic development.

Generally speaking, during the Suharto period, the government was faced with two types of major internal threats: one was the ideological threats from communism and Islam, the other was the secessionist threats.

Just like many other governments at that time, at the height of the Cold War, the New Order government regarded communism as the most dangerous ideology.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, both the military and communists gained influence and emerged as the two main contending forces. In addition, the previous history on the armed rebellion which had been practiced by the PKI (Indonesia Communism Party) in September 1948 in an attempt to seize control of the national leadership made Suharto become more cautious of the communists. The involvement of PKI in the coup at 1965 had consolidated the government's suspicions about the possibility of a leftist subversion. Because at that moment, the PKI has become the third largest communist party in the world, which was the largest communist party outside the communist bloc. Although PKI was banned within days of the abortive coup, Suharto still believed that undetected communist members were still active, waiting for opportunities to undermine the government's authority through radical activities, like demonstrations or labor strikes. So, PKI was suppressed under the New Order administration (Neher, 2000, pp.104-08).

Besides communism, the government feared political Islam since some radical Islamic groups, such as Darul Islam, had tried to reject Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the Indonesian Republic and wished to set up an Islamic State. To certain extent, such an Islamic threat can always infiltrate into a secessionist movement, such as in Aceh. (More will be discussed in the later chapters)

In addition, the government also viewed the secessionist movements<sup>7</sup> as a threat to the idea of Indonesia as a nation-state as well as to its territorial integrity. The secessionist movements were active in three areas during the Suharto period: Aceh, West Irian Jaya and East Timor.

Aceh, once a powerful Islamic sultanate, was one of the last parts of the

archipelago to fall under Dutch control in 1913. The Acehese leaders supported the Indonesian revolution of 1945 to 1949, expecting that the new state would recognize their regional distinct history and status (Huxley, 2002, p.35). However, such a thing did not happen under Sukarno's administration since he wanted to centralize his power. Trouble began when the central government incorporated Aceh into the province of North Sumatra, trying to reducing its status from a province to a district in early 1953. Jakarta interpreted the protest from the Acehese as a revolt and tried to fix it by means of the military. Government military action pushed the province into an open revolt led by Daud Beureuh<sup>8</sup>, but the rebellion was finally quashed by Sukarno's government in 1959, when the central government finally assigned it a "special region" status with autonomy in religious and customary laws. However, the tension between the central and Aceh did not improve even under Suharto's administration. It was because Suharto's centralization of political and economic power during the 1970s and 1980s provided resentment. The most crucial complaint was about the exploitation of the province's huge natural gas resources, for the Acehese feel that they should have benefited more from this natural wealth. Instead, the 1945 Constitution stated clearly that all the country's natural resources belong to the state.

Although Daud Beureuh and most of his followers returned to the fold of the Indonesia Republic, a few, such as Hasan di Tiro<sup>9</sup> continued the struggle to set up an independent Acehese state (Aceh Merdeka) through the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Suharto responded by crushing it militarily. Yet by the late 1980s, GAM had reestablished itself as an underground political and military force, and in 1989 it began attacking Indonesia security forces. Order was restored only after the government launched a major military offensive spearheaded by the



elite Special Force Command (Kopassus). Between 1989 and 1991, the security forces killed approximately 2000 Acehnese, the great majority of them were unarmed civilians. The province was designated a Area of Military Operations (DOM). Although the Indonesia's forces had largely suppressed the rebellion, the DOM period has provoked hostility in most Acehnese, including many who did not support GAM.

The case in West Irian Jaya (also known as Papua) is much more intractable than Aceh since the majority populations are Melanesian people, who were ethnically distinct from Indonesia's population and included many Christians. In 1962, West Irian Jaya was finally made part of Indonesia. The Dutch had supported West Papuan nationalism in an attempt to abort Indonesia's takeover of West Irian Jaya. In the same year, anti-Indonesian dissidents founded the Papua Youth Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM); by 1964, this had evolved into the Papua Freedom Movement which was led by Permenas Ferry Awom and began to start an armed rebellion for the independence of Western Irian Jaya. There were at least 17 major offensives between 1971 and 1984; the central government again tried through the means of military suppression to solve this problem. Human rights group claim that more than 100000 people in the province have been killed by the Indonesian forces since 1963.

In fact, the fundamental problems relating to West Irian Jaya arise from the huge gap in the level of development between the local economy and the rest of Indonesia<sup>10</sup>; in addition, Jakarta's policies on migration and resource underscored the political unrest that periodically erupted in West Irian Jaya, so stimulating support for the separatist movement.

East Timor was once a tiny Portuguese colony, and Indonesia's founding fathers had never seriously envisaged this area to become part of their country until 1975. In August, the Portuguese began to withdraw from East Timor and civil war broke out after the Portuguese left. Three major parties emerged in East Timor. The UDT (advocated continuing the association with Portugal) launched a coup against the Fretilin (demanded independence for East Timor), which had seized control after the Portuguese left; and Apodeti (support the idea on integration with Indonesia) later joined with the UDT. Two days later, the UDT, Apodeti together with two small parties, Kota and Trabalhista, proclaimed East Timor to be part of Indonesia. On November 28<sup>th</sup> 1975, the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Fretilin) declared the independence of East Timor, but this unilateral declaration was rejected by both Indonesia and Portugal. Two days later, in December 1975, Indonesia annexed East Timor and Suharto signed a bill on the integration of East Timor into the country on 17<sup>th</sup> July 1976, officially making East Timor become the 27<sup>th</sup> province of Indonesia. However, Indonesia sovereignty over East Timor was not recognized by the United Nations, as well as most members of the international community. Portugal and several other Western countries even have accused Jakarta of forcibly annexing the former Portuguese colony. The primary reason for Indonesia's occupation was due to a fear that the territory might become a vector of communist influence in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of anti-communist forces in Indochina. The East Timorese (basically led by Fretilin) immediately began an armed independence movement to resist the Indonesians. In 1991, the Indonesian troops killed several hundred unarmed East Timorese who were organizing a demonstration. After this event, the so-called "Dili Massacre", Western criticisms of Indonesia over the East Timor issue intensified. East Timor thus became a diplomatic burden to the New Order government.

Generally speaking, in countering the internal threats, Suharto's government had used certain strategies including the management of ideological conformity, the practise on Hankamrata (Total People's Defense System), tight sociopolitical control of society and economic development.

From the view of Suharto, to ensure ideological conformity through the enforcement on the total acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology was one of the most important strategies for internal control<sup>11</sup>. In addition, he sought to limit popular political participation by keeping a tight control on nongovernmental organizations and the labor unions and restricting the operations of the mass media. These were the approaches to ensure a stable society by the New Order government. Moreover, economic development was viewed as a prerequisite for political stability, because uneven economic development could breed ethnic and class conflicts and undermine political stability and national unity, so the government in principle pursued the "development trilogy"<sup>12</sup>. Until the eve of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia's economic growth under Suharto was among the most remarkable the world has seen. With averaged 7 to 8 percent increased in the GDP's growth rate of the country during 1966 to 1997. Moreover, the poverty levels have been brought down from 60 percent to around 14 percent during the New Order period. For the per capita income of the Indonesian, it also began to rise above the \$US260 it was in 1970 to over \$US500 by 1980 (Vatikiotis, 1998, pp.33-37).

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, no matter whether the strategies were either the anti-colonial struggle by Sukarno or the desire on internal control by Suharto, there was only one

aim behind them--to try to achieve all the security goals in the security agenda and combat all the security threats to Indonesia. However, the most crucial question concerns the continuity of these strategies. Is it possible to practise them after the end of the three decade's long authoritarian rule? In the next chapter, we will have a look on the national security issues after the fall of Suharto.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1945, but the Dutch only transferred sovereignty to the new republic in the last days of December 1949 as agreed at the Round Table Conference in the Hague

<sup>2</sup> Pancasila, or the Five Principles, were introduced as the ideological basis of the Indonesian republic shortly before the proclamation of independence. The five principle are Belief in One God; Humanitarianism; Indonesia Unity; Democracy, and Social Justice.

<sup>3</sup> This part was not included in the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch colonial power to the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949.

<sup>4</sup> The "administrators", led by Vice President Mohammad Hatta, were primarily concerned with governance and with developing the national economy. This group of leaders supported a negotiated settlement of the West Irian Issue. For the "solidarity makers", led by Sukarno, the revolution was not yet over because West Irian had not been returned to the republic. This group stressed independence and advocated a confrontation against all forms of colonialism and imperialism.

<sup>5</sup> There were regional rebellions took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi which called PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic Indonesia) and PERMESTA (Universal People's Struggle). The two rebellious movements, led by local military commanders, the former based in West Sumatra and the latter in North Sulawesi.

<sup>6</sup> The coup still remains as a mysterious and arguable topic even until today. Basically, there are three interpretations on the coup. The first one suggest that an internal army affair devised by junior officers which is independent of outside influence. A second view suggested that Suharto had a hand in the coup plotting. The third interpretation suggested that the army rebels were colluding with Sukarno and the PKI to set up a socialist state to be led at least initially by Sukarno.

<sup>7</sup> Publicly the government refers to these regional secessionist movements as GPK, which stands for Security Disturbance Bandit Groups, a pejorative term that denies their legitimacy as political groups

<sup>8</sup> He tried to launched an armed struggle to establish an Acehness Islamic state.

<sup>9</sup> As a former Darul Islam envoy and businessman descended from pre-colonial sultans, established the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front in 1976.

<sup>10</sup> Most of the Irianese depend for their livelihood on hunting and gathering.

<sup>11</sup> This ideological conformity is enforced through "Penataran P-4"(training on understanding and the implementation of Pancasila) training to enhance national understanding and devotion to Pancasila at all levels of society.

<sup>12</sup> This means political stability, economic growth, and equitable distribution of development benefits.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Indonesian National Security in the Post-Suharto period**

No regime lasts forever, not even Suharto's New Order. On 20<sup>th</sup> May 1998, after ten days of student-led Reformasi movement protests, Suharto was forced to step down<sup>1</sup> and the New Order's administration thus came to the end. Indonesia entered into a new era. However, the question is whether Indonesia has entered into a more stable era or a chaotic era? In this chapter, we are going to focus on the national security issues of Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. Basically, Indonesia has been faced with two security threats in the post-Suharto period, they were the secessionist threats and the ideological challenge from Islam.

Generally speaking, there has been a perceptible change in Indonesia's political culture in the post-Suharto period. The authoritarian bureaucratic-military vision of the state and society that dominated the Suharto era has been replaced by a greater emphasis on civil society and political parties as the primary focus of order and stability. The stepping down of Suharto opened the way for a considerably more open and liberal political system. How did the change in the political dimension affect the national security of Indonesia?

#### **National Security in the Post-Suharto Period**

As stated in the previous chapter, the major threats to the national security of Indonesia in the Suharto period were the secessionism and the ideological threats from communism and Islam. Under the post-Suharto period, these two factors are

still the most crucial threats towards the national security of the country; however, due to the change in the international political environment (the end of Cold War in the early 90s contribute to the decline of world communism), the ideological threat from communism has become less important. So, in what ways has the fall of authoritarian rule affected the security threats in Indonesia?

Suharto's favored instruments in dealing with the security threats were the management of ideological conformity, tight sociopolitical control of society and military repression. However, after the fall of Suharto, his successor, Habibie (June 1998-October 1999) initiated many significant reforms<sup>2</sup>, trying to create a more open political atmosphere since he wanted to escape from the legacy of being Suharto's protégé<sup>3</sup>. Under such a situation, the favored tools of the past were no longer appropriate. Those kinds of unstable factors that were previously suppressed could now be expressed. Crouch stated, "The fall of Suharto's regime allowed regional resentment against Jakarta to rise to the surface." (Wee, 2002, p.1)

Separatist movements have escalated so sharply after the independence of East Timor in 1999; international reportage and analysis have highlighted the growth of strong centrifugal forces within Indonesia, often claiming that the country might fragment along the lines of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (The Economist, 9/12/2000, p.86). The future integrity of the state has come into question. At the same time, the Islamic organizations were quick to capitalize on the liberal political conditions and newfound freedoms of the press and organization. A very good indicator is that in the first democratic election of the House of Representative at June 1999, beside Megawati's PDI-P (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle) and Golkar, which had dominated 55% of the seats, most of the remaining seats went to

six Muslim-oriented parties.<sup>4</sup> Some of the radical Islamic politicians, like Hamzah Haz, vice president in Megawati's government, have argued that sharia law should be enforced on all Muslims, which would be achieved by inserting a "Jakarta Charter", obliging all "adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law" into the constitution (Wee, 2002, p.4). It will intensify the ideological threat in Indonesia. However, more serious is that some radical Islamic groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Assembly), are even supporting the movement in the establishment of Islamic state. Such a practice will endanger the integrity of Indonesia, and thus act as a threat to the national security. Therefore, separatism and ideological threats still exist and have become more serious in Indonesia. In the following paragraphs, we will first look on the separatist movement in the post-Suharto period, and then the ideological threats will be discussed later on.

### **Secessionist Movements in Post-Suharto Period**

All the administration including Habibie, Wahid (October 1999-July 2001) and Megawati (July 2001-present) in the post-Suharto era have shown an inability to control the growing of separatism. Some scholars suggest that it may be due to the offer of independence to the East Timorese which accelerated demands for the independence in Aceh and Irian Jaya (such as Bourchier and Hadiz). However, some scholars, like Tim Huxley, did not go along with this view because the reason for the Indonesia's founding leaders to incorporate with East Timor was due to the prevention of communist infiltration. They had never seriously envisaged this Portuguese colony becoming part of their country due to the different colonial history in which the Timorese may not identify with Indonesian (Huxley, 2002, p.33). From my point of view, no matter who is right or wrong, to certain extent, at least,

the East Timor issue made Habibie's government and the Indonesia National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) become humiliated. At the same time, the violence in East Timor also damaged the central authority of Jakarta it is because the violence both before and during the referendum was believed to be supported by the Indonesia military has clearly demonstrated that the High Command may be unable to control the behavior of the troops in the field or due to the historical factor of the military<sup>5</sup>(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.23-25). The East Timor issue not only damaged the creditability of the Habibie's government but also anger the other separatists in the country, make the government more difficult in negotiate with them. Moreover, this issue opened the first major crack in Indonesia territorial integrity, which may act as a precedent for other periphery areas.

Therefore, although East Timor may not have the same strategic value as Aceh and Irian Jaya have, the East Timor issue still act as a precedent issues. It was doubt that the violence was carried out with the support of some elements of the Indonesia army, particularly the elements of the Army Special Forces Command (They were formed to defend their communities against attacks by pro-independence Faliatil guerrillas, which dated back to the 1970s).

For a long time, Jakarta's government has been using military measure, to suppress separatist sentiment, therefore, the relationship between the government and the military is also a crucial factor in studying this issue (Huxley, 2002, p.45). Although the three presidents in the post-Suharto era had all realized the importance of reform of the military<sup>6</sup>, none of them could succeed.

For example, despite the Habibie government's promise to prosecute military



personnel for abuses in Aceh, atrocities continued, notably the murder of an Islamic teacher and 57 of his students in July 1999 (Huxley, 2002, p.36). In addition, the widespread violence both before and during the referendum in East Timor in August to September 1999 were both indicators to show that Habibie's government had no effective control over TNI operation around Indonesia's periphery. Similar cases also happened under the rule of Wahid, since Wahid wished for a political settlement on the Aceh issue, while the military favoured a hardline approach. Although Wahid had successfully removed General Wiranto from the cabinet after the national and UN investigations on human right abuses, he calculated that in order to retain the TNI's cooperation<sup>7</sup>, the speed and extent of military reform had to be moderated. For example, the TNI was subsequently allowed considerable leeway in organizing its own affairs. The lack of intention and ability in controlling or constraining the power and influence of the armed forces may intensify or deepen the secessionist threat. It may be because the TNI will get benefits from the secessionist activities. As Tim Huxley suggests, "The TNI's clear determination to impose hard-line solutions in Aceh and Papua has reinforced concerns that the military sees these and other peripheral conflicts as "projects", where money is made, reputations are built and promotions gained" (Huxley, 2002, p.45). Megawati also showed a common interest with the TNI officers in containing a perceived growing threat from separatist sentiment since she has placed maintaining national unity as the highest objective for her government. It was widely expected that the Megawati's administration would be less willing to implement significant reforms affecting the TNI, and more likely to allow the military to crush secessionist movements in order to maintain national unity.

The local business activities, such as the financial benefit from Pertamina and

ExxonMobil, provided as much as 75% of TNI's funding. Moreover, the secessionist conflict can help to maintain the TNI's residual political influence in the central government since the TNI could define itself as the only force capable of preventing the disintegration of Indonesia. Therefore, the armed forces have had both political and economic reasons for prolonging the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Given this context, it is impossible that measures such as special autonomy bills<sup>8</sup> and dialogue can settle down the secessionist movement in the absence of considerable further progress in strengthening civilian control over the TNI.

The use of special autonomy bills on Aceh and Irian Jaya can only just maintain stability temporarily. It is because while local political elites were likely to benefit politically and materially from the provinces, it seems unlikely that resistance to Indonesian control will end until permission for independence is received.

As a whole, both the measures that had been practiced by the post-Suharto government, the military repression and special autonomy bills can only suppress or delay the problems but not completely solve the problem. The situation has become more complicated under the post-Suharto era since the more open political atmosphere throughout Indonesia and the greater freedoms for political, cultural and religious expression allowed by special autonomy can further boost separatist sentiment and spread to other provinces, such as Riau and Sumatra.

### **Ideological Challenge by Islam**

Actually the ideological threat from Islam can be viewed as a conflict between secularism and Islamism; within this conflict, there are two sides, modernist and

radicalist. For the modernist side, groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, despite their Islamic precepts, generally speaking, they agree with the Pancasila as the ideology of the state and support the idea of a secular state; they just want to focus on their mandate of religious, cultural and social activities. For the radical side, they try to adopt the Islamic shariah law to become the law of the land; this group of people was led by vice president Hamzah Haz as a coalition of Islamic parties<sup>9</sup>. This has alarmed Indonesia's non-Muslims, who fear the erosion of the secular constitution. Moreover, there are militant groups with more violent means of asserting their aim of making Indonesia as an Islamic state; such as Jemaah Islamiah and Laskar Jihad. More will be presented in the later chapters.

To certain extent, the challenge of Islam radicalism can be treated as a legacy from the Suharto period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to maintain an integrated and stable country<sup>10</sup>, Suharto's New Order attempted to depoliticize Indonesian Islam. Although Suharto was successful in politically defanging Islam, as a social force it grew tremendously. By the mid-1980s, the New Order government began to reach out to Islamic movements to help legitimize the regime due to the weakening support for his presidency from the armed forces and the slowing of economic growth. Therefore, one of the reasons to proliferate or expand was due to the relaxation of the political constraints in the post-Suharto period. However the practice of Suharto towards the Islamic groups also acted as a favourable factor for the growth of Islamic movements.

In the longer term, Islamic radicalism could damage Indonesia's stability and national cohesion. In addition, the Islamic resurgence was also brought on by economic factors, for the economic hardships since the mid-1990s could further reinforce the widespread popular disillusionment with the mainstream political elite,

making them seem corrupt and self-seeking. Moreover, due to the US-led war in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian crisis since around 2002, anti-western sentiment has grown. This may further undermine mainstream political leaders legitimacy unless they keep a distance from the West. All of the above factors will affect Megawati in adopting the national security agenda, thus affecting the national security of Indonesia.

As discussed before, some of the most important factors, such as rapid economic growth and the role of the armed forces in suppressing political, ethnic and religious dissent, which had effectively cemented Indonesia's diverse ethnic and religious communities together under Suharto, have weakened since 1998. Such a change in Indonesia has opened a way for the new threat to the national security, and that is the communal violence conflict, such as the one in Maluku and Poso in Central Sulawesi. These kinds of communal conflict were mainly due to the two different ethnic groups with different religious background which are living in the same area, for example, the Muslims and the Christians in Maluku and Poso; and the Dayaks and Madures in Kalimantan. The main reason behind such a scenario was the transmigration programme by the Jakarta central government. Generally speaking, the transmigration programme was started in the late 60s. The programme aimed at population redistribution. Until now, almost 10 million people from overcrowded regions, mainly Java, Bali and Madura, has been settled in less populated provinces particularly in East Indonesia. However, this programme fail to assess the social, cultural and environment background of the target region and people living there, which set a base for the communal conflict. For example, in Maluku, at first the majority population is Christian, however, after the transmigration, Muslim constitute 57% of the population there. It has affect the demographic balance

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between different ethnic groups, causing economic and political competition over scarce resources, thus stimulate the inter-ethnic conflict

In the past, due to the strong rule by Suharto, and the economic achievement, all dissent in those areas could be suppressed. However, after the fall of Suharto, democratization and decentralization has heightened political competition in local politics and the control of local natural resources. Together with the downturn in the economy, these factors intensified and contributed to the outbreak of violence (Huxley, 2002, pp.55-57). The conflict in Maluku since 1999 has left as many as 10,000 people dead and created 500,000 refugees in a population of 2.4 million (Jakarta Post, 6/9/2001). Although the communal conflicts was not so serious as the secessionist threat and the ideological threat which could lead to the disintegration of Indonesia, the communal conflict will really act as a destabilizing force in the society which will damage the legitimacy of the central government, thus acting as a threat to the security of Indonesia.

### **Conclusion**

To conclude, the end of the Suharto's era has created a more open political environment in Indonesia. However, under such a new situation, the security threats in the past not only still exist, but have also been intensified. In addition, new threats have also been created under the post Suharto era. It seems that the Habibie and Wahid administrations did not have the ability to deal with those threats; and the present situation shows that the threats have an escalating trend. Therefore, will Megawati's government have the faith and ability in dealing with these threats, especially under a new era after the September 11<sup>th</sup> incident?

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Scholars have different views on the step down on Suharto, but basically, most scholars believed it was due to two factors, they were economy and politics. The economic crisis that began in the middle of 1997 was the trigger only. What ultimately brought him down was the weakness of the political system he created and the threats behind the economic success. The New Order began to lose its coherence because its political architecture could no longer accommodate the tremendous social changes that had taken place over the past two decades.

<sup>2</sup> Habibie had initiated many reforms after he became the president, such as restoring press freedom, releasing political prisoners and holding the first democratic election since 1955.

<sup>3</sup> He faced an immediate crisis of legitimacy when he came to office as a non-elected President by virtue of being Suharto's vice-president.

<sup>4</sup> These parties are National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), National Mandate Party (PAN), Crescent and Star Party (PBB) and Justice Party (PK).

<sup>5</sup> The military may try to use the violence in East Timor as an object lesson to other provinces that may have hard secessionist mind or simply as redistribution.

<sup>6</sup> The leaders in the post-Suharto period realize that the TNI's interference in non-military spheres might seriously obstruct the new government's programme.

<sup>7</sup> As parliamentary opposition to Wahid's presidency grew, he highlighted the TNI's continuing political significance by attempting to use it as an instrument to protect his own position. Therefore, his weakening political position meant that he and his government had little effective sanction over the TNI's behaviour.

<sup>8</sup> In May 1999, Habibie approved laws decentralize regional administration and finance. Law 22/1999 allowed for the election by regional parliaments of provincial governors and district heads. Law 25/1999 tried to equalize grants between central and local.

<sup>9</sup> The coalition included three parties, they are PPP, PBB and PK.

<sup>10</sup> Suharto's regime tried to steer a middle course between the far left (PKI) and the far right (the Islamicist).

## **Chapter Four**

### **Terrorism and New Terrorism in Indonesia**

A year after the September 11 incident<sup>1</sup>, the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 killed 202 people and seriously injured another 350. It was the deadliest terrorist attack since the September 11 incident. This tragedy leaves a stigma both on Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region, even the world. It is because only after the tragedy of Bali did the Jakarta government start to believe in “the presence of a clandestine terrorist network” in Indonesia (Gunaratna, 2003, p.4); moreover, it drew attention from the world that Indonesia or the Southeast Asian region would act as a heaven for terrorist attacks. Under such a scenario, President Megawati’s government has been faced with a huge pressure from two sides; internally, such kinds of terrorist attack will greatly damage the social stability and economy within the country; externally, international pressure such as the voices from US and Australia asking for a crack down on local militants which are suspected of Al-Qaeda ties has been increasing. Indonesia has been faced with a new threat in a new era. This chapter will try to analyze how the New Terrorism affects the national security of Indonesia first, then we will focus on how Megawati’s government has been dealing with such a threat.

#### **Context behind New Terrorism**

In chapter one, we have come across the difference between “traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism; now, we will go in depth to see what kind of factors contributed in transforming the “traditional” one to a “New” one.

The context behind the emergence of new terrorism at the global level is the change in the political environment and globalization. The change in political environment means the end of Cold War and the coming of the post cold war era; and globalization stands for the increase in integration and linkage all over the world through the dramatic developments in telecommunications and information. All these factors help to transform the nature of the “traditional” terrorism into new terrorism.

The ethnic conflicts and disintegration of states in various places, such as Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union in the post Cold War period have encouraged the use of asymmetrical warfare. It is because there is only one superpower in the world after the fall of Soviet Union, so from the perspectives of the terrorists, asymmetrical warfare, such as using weapons of mass destruction (which are targeted at civilian infrastructure), may be the only means to counter states with much more superior conventional military capabilities(Tan, 2003, p.88). Therefore, the change in the political context at the post-Cold War era can help to explain why the terrorist groups nowadays are far more lethal than the traditional one. The reason is, they think that they can only use unconventional methods to challenge the conventional power under a unipolar world. In order to increase the power of such unconventional ways, they tend to practice mass casualty terrorist acts, which hope for create widespread panic in society.



So, New Terrorism always sees violence as an end in itself, but not just a means to an end.

The other reason or context which helps in shaping out the New Terrorism is due to the increasing globalization<sup>2</sup>. The development in telecommunications and information transmission has encouraged transnational terrorist cooperation. The improved technology made them become much more mobile, flexible, and they do not need fixed base areas to operate from (Hoffman, 1997). Globalization has provided new channels for transnational terrorism, enable terrorist groups operate in various countries, but joining together and sharing resources sometimes, fully taking advantage of porous borders in a rapidly globalizing world economy. Such a transnational terrorist cooperation makes it difficult for countries tracking them.

When facing such a more violent, disintegrated terrorism, all the countries find it hard to tackle. Indonesia was one of those countries. Terrorism has become a new threat to the world, just as what Andrew Tan stated, “The focus in the post cold war era has thus been on the emerging threat of post-modern terrorism.” (Tan, 2003, p.88)

With more knowledge on New Terrorism, we can now move on to the second question, how does the New Terrorism make an impact on the national security of Indonesia?

## **The Situation in Indonesia**

Basically, Indonesia has been suffered from “traditional” terrorism through the secessionist movements and the ideological challenge from Islam (more discussion will be in chapter five and six). “Traditional” terrorism was act as a conflict strategy for the secessionists and the radical religious group(s) in achieving their goal(s).

The influence of “traditional” terrorism was not so explicit during the Sukarno and Suharto period. It may be due to the tight control under the authoritarian rule of Sukarno and Suharto (refer to Chapters two and three), together with the military suppression. Terrorist acts at that period were being settled or suppressed within a short period of time.

However, there has been a tendency for “traditional” terrorism in Indonesia to turn into New Terrorism in the post-Suharto period. A good indicator of this trend is on the transnational cooperation among the terrorist groups, thus, the distinction between domestic and international terrorism become evaporated (as the terrorist group outside Indonesia can infiltrate within the domestic group, more discussion will be provide in the later paragraphs). It was due to the change in the world context after the end of the Cold War as mentioned before; and more importantly, was due to the change in the internal political, social and economic environment after the fall of Suharto. This means the political instability of the Jakarta government, the increasing influence of the Muslims on politics and the side effects from the East Timor issue to the other

secessionist movements. Situation became more worse with the economic downturn at this period, in which will help to trigger out the above factors.

The change in the international environment together with the change in the internal factors contributes an appropriate scenario for the emergence of New Terrorism in Indonesia.

Therefore, I would argue that Indonesia has not suffered from New Terrorism during the Sukarno and Suharto periods. Only since the Bali bombing has the Jakarta government realized that the whole country was facing a threat from New Terrorism.

### **The Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel Bombing**

At the night of 12 October 2002, the bomb at the Sari Club on Bali Island, with a smaller preceding explosive at the nearby Paddy's Bar, killed 202 people and seriously injured another 350, which was the deadliest terrorist attack since the September 11 incident. Most of those killed were Western tourists, included 88 Australians, 23 Britain, 9 Swedes and 7 Americans. Within a month of the bombing, joint Indonesian and foreign police arrested the head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abubakar Baasyir<sup>3</sup> for his alleged involvement in a series of church bombings in 2000 and in a plot to assassinate Megawati; and four members of JI, which were the accused bombers, they are Amrozi, Ali Imron, Muhlas, and Imam Samudra. The first three are bothers. Amrozi purchased the explosives and mini-van into which the Sari Club bomb was placed. Ali Imron and

Mukhlis were JI's operational head, who had oversight for the attack. Imam Samudra was the JI field commander, who leading the bombing this time (Fealy, 2003, p.3). Finally, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Muhlas were sentenced to death during August to October in 2003; Ali Imron was sentenced to life in jail. For the head of JI, a court in Jakarta acquitted Abubakar Baasyir of any role in the 2000 bombing and the plot to assassinate Megawati but still sentenced him to four years in prison for treason and immigration violations (Elegant and Perrin, 2003, pp.18-21).

Not more than one year from the Bali bombing, on 5 August 2003, a car bombing occurred in Jakarta. JI militants were suspected in blow up a station wagon in the driveway of Jakarta's J.W. Marriott hotel,<sup>4</sup> killing 12 and wounding more than 150 people.

There is one similarity between these two terrorist attacks, and that is, no group claimed immediate responsibility for the attacks. The spiritual leader of JI, Baasyir, even denies the group has ties to Al Qaeda. However, evidence shown that the two terrorist attacks had been done by the JI, and there are some linkages between JI and Al-Qaeda.

For example, Singapore had arrested 21 Muslim citizens in August 2002, in which 19 of them belonged to JI, because they were trying to plan some terrorist attacks. A list of sites, such as water pipelines, Changi airport and a radar station, which the group had been targeting was found. Moreover, Singapore also said that the 19 suspects belonged to the same group that had earlier plotted to bomb US military and diplomatic sites. That

plot was disclosed in January 2002 after Singapore arrested 15 JI members (Mapes, 2002).

In addition, Indonesian national police chief Da' i Bachtiar told reporters on 6 August 2003 (the day after the car bombing at Marriott) that initial evidence suggested that JI carried out the car-bomb attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel. Da' i said both the Marriott and the Bali bombs were placed in vehicles whose engine numbers had been partially erased, just as in Bali. Moreover, both bombs were detonated using cell phones and used the same types of explosive (Mapes, 2003). The style of the attacks were quite similar, so it was not hard to believe that the two acts were done by the same group of people.

Therefore, it is suspected that JI has been taken part in the two most serious terrorist acts in Indonesian history. Although no evidence fully supports the direct relationship between the terrorist acts and JI; at least one thing can be confirmed, there are linkages between JI and Al-Qaeda.

### **Infiltration of Terrorism in Indonesia**

According to Gunaratna, one of the strategies for the development of Al-Qaeda by Osama bin Laden was forming alliances and coalitions with a number of local and regional groups, so Southeast Asia of course is one of the target for building his worldwide network. Gunaratna suggested that there are altogether five phases of penetration of Al-Qaeda into Southeast Asia, with the initial phase which began in 1988

of the form as creating a network that would provide the logistical and the financial support to a number of Islamist groups in Philippines as well as in the neighborhood. The second phase was providing technical and military assistance, such as when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed<sup>5</sup> came to Philippines to train both the newly formed Abu Sayyaf group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the use of explosives and assassination techniques in 1991 (Gunaratna, 2003).

The next two phases were the most crucial factors in building up the origin of the terrorism influence in Indonesia, which were secondment of very important leaders of Al-Qaeda to Southeast Asia, (for example, Dr. Ayman Zahahiri, the deputy leader of Al-Qaeda ) and the intensifying of trans-border cooperation.

The secondment of the important leaders of Al-Qaeda has intensified the linkage and cooperation between Al-Qaeda and the groups in the Southeast Asia region. For example, there was cooperation between Hambali<sup>6</sup>, who was served in the Shura Council of Al-Qaeda, Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI, and Abubakar Baasyir, the co-founder of JI at that time. Thus, JI has developed into a pan-Islamic network, which has absorbed two Egyptian groups<sup>7</sup> and also built a very close relationship with a number of groups in the Southeast Asia region steadfastly from 1995 onwards (Gunaratna, 2003, pp.1-3). With the development of JI, the trans-border cooperation has emerged. At first most of the JI members were trained in Philippines and Afghanistan; when the Camp Abubakar complex was overrun in Philippines, the JI-Al-Qaeda network shifted its training and operation infrastructure into Poso, Sulawesi, and later on moved to Balikpapan in

Kalimantan, which are also within the boundaries of Indonesia. Besides the location of the terrorist training camps or bases, there were other indicators which can show the trans-border cooperation of JI in Indonesia with Al-Qaeda, such as the flow of financial support. According to Hambali<sup>8</sup>, the one who is believed to be JI's Southeast Asia operation chief, Al-Qaeda money helped fund the Bali bombings as well as the attack on J.W. Marriot Hotel. In some cases, charities have been used directly by Al Qaeda to funnel money into JI's hands. For example, a Saudi-funded charity in Cambodia was closed after a joint US-Cambodian investigation detected a large sum of money deposited into the charity's bank account, believed to be the financial support for JI. It was because Abdul Azi,<sup>9</sup> who was arrested at the charity, has admitted to police that he knew Hambali and had helped him hide out in Cambodia in early 2003; this means they have a close relationship. Thus, the large sum of money was suspected to be the funding for JI (Elegant and Perrin, 2003, p.20).

To conclude,

This region has had continuous infiltration by members of Al Qaeda through the gradual infiltration of local groups via financial and technical assistance as well as through coordinators and experts seconded from the main Al Qaeda group (Gunaratna, 2003, p.3)

It is clear that Indonesia is facing the threat from new terrorism. The training camps within the country's boundaries, the financial flows from the terrorist groups into the country, the existence of radical militant Islamic groups and the linkages with other terrorist groups outside are all indicators that show Indonesian national security is

affected by the infiltration of new terrorism. The situation becomes even worse after the September 11 incident and the US annexation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, Megawati's government has faced with the pressure on the national security both from within and outside the country.

To see how Megawati's government is facing the pressure, it will be useful to start from the government response to September 11 incident.

### **Response to September 11 incident**

Actually, formulating an official government position became the first serious challenge to the government of Megawati; it was because Megawati has caught between international necessity on one hand and domestic political reality on the other. In formulating the official stance, the Indonesian government was torn between two conflicting positions (Sukma, 2003, p.57). On one hand were the government officials who were loyal to Megawati, seeing that Indonesia had little choice but to support the US stand on terrorism; but, at the same time, they should be bearing in mind the reaction of the Indonesian public. On the other hand, several Islamic groups began to stage protests on the streets of Jakarta and to express their anger at the US accusation that Osama bin Laden had masterminded the September 11 attacks. They saw the allegation as an attempt to make a scapegoat of Islam. Not only did some Islamic groups show opposing attitudes towards the pro-US position, but also the vice president, Hamzah Haz, expressed his displeasure as what he perceived to be an attempt by the US to discredit



the Islamic world by saying that the September 11 attacks “will hopefully cleanse America of its sins” (Sukma, 2003, p.58). It truly demonstrates that even within the central authority, there were conflicts of views.

Finally, Megawati followed her schedule for the meeting with President George W. Bush on September 19. During the meeting, she stressed that “Indonesia is ready to cooperate with the US and other civilized countries on counter-terrorism” (Jarkarta Post, 21/9/01). Such an official position angered some radical Islamic groups, for example, Jafar Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, maintained that Megawati’s visit to US was “clearly ignored the feeling of the um’ mah” (Sukma, 2003, p.58). Several hardline Islamic groups even began to warn US nationals that they should immediately leave Indonesia (Jarkarta Post, 22/9/01). On September 25, 2001 the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), a semi-official body of Indonesia clerics, issues a declaration calling “Muslims in the world for jihad fii sabilillah (a fight in the footsteps of Allah) should the aggression of the US and its allies commit acts of aggression against Afghanistan and the Islamic world”(Jarkarta Post, 26/9/01). The pressure was intensified after Washington decided to attack Afghanistan. Anti-US protests began to challenge the presidency of Megawati, and forced the government to issue a six point statement on October 8, 2001<sup>10</sup>, in the hope of releasing the pressure. However, the government’s position angered many radical groups in Indonesia, since the government statement not only had stopped short of criticizing the US military campaign in Afghanistan, but was seen as proclaiming support for Washington. The protests in Jakarta and several other major cities thus intensified, radical groups began to burn US flags and effigies of Bush

and threats to expel US citizens from the country were made. These events put the government on the defensive, and it finally bowed to the pressure when, on October 14, 2001 at the Istiqlal Grand Mosque in Jakarta, Megawati issued a sharp criticism of the US military campaign in Afghanistan. She declared that “it is unacceptable that someone, a group or even a government – arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of the terror attack people or another country for whatever reason. There are rules that need to be observed, without observing those rules, the action initially meant to combat violence at the end would itself become a new act of terror and violence” (Sukma, 2003, p.60). The speech was widely seen in Indonesia and abroad as a significant departure from Indonesia’s previous stance on the issue.

To conclude, as Robert and Symonds have suggested, “Megawati’s veiled criticism of the US [was] part of a strategy to contain the protests and opposition” (Robert and Symonds, 2001). The change in Jakarta’s position towards the US-led anti-terror war and the above answer both lie in Indonesia’s domestic political context, and this was the pressures that Megawati had faced with in dealing with terrorism. Jakarta’s response to the September 11 incident and the US led anti-terror war was like a model of its response to the threat from terrorism. In dealing with the threat from terrorism, Megawati must be very careful in making a balance between the internal Islamic challenge and the fragile nature of her coalition government together with the external criticism from other countries.

For example, in dealing with JI, at first Indonesia has dismissed claims that the organization was a threat, or even that it existed; but later on, after the Bali bombing, several foreign governments, such as US and Australia said that they had strong reason to believe that JI was involved in the blast in Bali. Under these pressures, Jakarta finally declared the fundamentalist Islamic group, JI, a terrorist organization on October 17, 2002, five days after the Bali bombing. At the news conference of the same day, the minister for state security of Indonesia, Mr. Yudhoyono said that Jakarta had to “respect and believe” the assertion that JI was part of “an international terrorist network” (Bonner and Perlez, 2002).

The reason that Megawati’s government at first did not want to take any action on JI was due to the influence of Islam in politics; since the head of JI had been strongly supported by the vice president Hamzah Haz, whose support is important for Megawati. That Megawati could become president was partly due to the significant support from Islamic parties;<sup>11</sup> and she formed the coalition government with the PPP, which chairman is Hamzah Haz, so it would be difficult for her to rule without support from these Islamic political forces. However, on the other hand, while Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines have arrested dozens of suspected militants and have cooperated closely with the US, the Indonesian authorities have done comparatively little, so such a scenario acted to ratchet up the pressure on Indonesia to act more decisively against Islamic extremists (Mapes, 2002). Unfortunately, the possibility of a political backlash from the country’s powerful conservative Muslims had made it difficult for Megawati to act decisively (McBeth and Wain, 2002).

## Conclusion

As a whole, Indonesia cannot avoid the threat from new terrorism, which is featuring violent and transnational cooperation, for the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings were an alarm to the Jakarta that a government should act more decisively on the terror issue since terrorism is now affecting the national security of Indonesia directly. However, it will be a dilemma case for the Megawati's government in dealing with the threat from terrorism. On one hand, of course she knows that she needs to take some action on anti-terrorism in order to release the pressure from foreign countries or investors. Just as John Castle<sup>12</sup> said, "A decisive response could help clear the air; but a weak response would reinforce doubts that have existed for some time about the government's strategy in coping with the situation." (McBeth and Wain, 2002). But, on the other hand, unless she deals with the terror issue carefully, she takes the risk of being labeled "anti-Islamic" by her opponents, which could affect the elections in 2004.

It seems that the most serious impact from terrorism to Indonesian national security is the damage to physical properties and human lives, thus affecting the prestige of Indonesia on the international stage. From any point of view, the most serious impact come from the terrorism is that –it has breached an unseen threshold, the Pandora's Box has been opened. This means it will be more dangerous to Indonesia if New Terrorism has infiltrated into the pre-existing security threat of the country. In the following two chapters, analysis will be given on whether and how New Terrorism can infiltrate into

the pre-existing threats of Indonesia. In order to have a more systematic analysis, the conflict cycle model will be used in the next two chapters as a guiding on the findings.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Approximately 5000 people were to die during this incident.

<sup>2</sup> Globalization also affect the political stability of Indonesia. As mentioned before, the economic crisis in 1997 act as the trigger for the step down of Suharto. To certain extent, globalization plays an crucial role in that crisis since foreign capital flow were much more linked and dependent on each other than before. Therefore, if country in the region suffer, other may have a larger chance to follow.

<sup>3</sup> There is a linkage between JI, Al-Qaeda and Baasyir, for more information, please refer to chapter six.

<sup>4</sup> A defendant in the Bali bombing trials was to appear in a Bali court on Aug 7 2003 to hear the verdict in his case. There was some speculation that the Marriott bombing was timed as a warning to the government not to impose the death penalty, which Mr. Amrozi could face if convicted.

<sup>5</sup> The head of the Al-Qaeda military committee in 1991

<sup>6</sup> He is, for instance, operation commander of JI. He also serves in the Shura council of Kumpulan Majelis Mujahidin (KMM), and he is currently become the key man for Al-Qaeda.

<sup>7</sup> The two groups are Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic group of Egypt.

<sup>8</sup> He was captured by US and Thai agents on August 11 2003.

<sup>9</sup> A senior official at Cambodia's Interior Ministry told that Azi was in charge of accounts for Hambali (in Cambodia)

<sup>10</sup> The Six statement are, first, the government is deeply concerned that a military attack has been carried out; second, Indonesia notes the US statement that the operation has only been launched against terrorist training camps and military installations, and is not an act of hostility against Islam; third, Indonesia hopes the operation will be strictly limited, in terms of targets and duration, in order to minimize civilian casualties; fourth, Indonesia calls on the UN to undertake a collective response to restore peace; fifth, Indonesia warns that society should not react or express sympathy in ways that contravene the law; and finally, Indonesia will provide humanitarian assistance to ease the suffering of the people of Afghanistan, especially in the form of medical supplies and food.

<sup>11</sup> Megawati came to the power as a result of the fall of her predecessor Wahid, who was impeached by the concerted action of the Islamic parties in July 2001.

<sup>12</sup> He is a business consultant and chairman of the International Business Chamber of Indonesia.

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## Chapter Five

### Secessionist threats in Indonesia

Indonesia is a country which is full of drawbacks since the date of its establishment; it exhibits the classic feature of many decolonized countries, which is the lack of a close fit between nation and state. It will usually happens when the dominant ethnic group holds the reins of power over significant ethnic minorities that are located at the periphery in multi-national or multi-ethnic states. However, the situation for Indonesia is more complicated, since there was not such a country existing before; what such an area had in common was just the same colonial historical background, being governed by the Dutch. Such a scenario, together with the founding (mainly Javanese) leaders' strong views and strategy in integrating the whole area into one united country, helped in creating a fundamental weakness to the country's national security; that is the lack of political legitimacy. This has left a line for the secessionist movements in Indonesia nowadays, just as Andrew Tan has stated, that, "ethnic minorities, do not accept the legitimacy of the control government and seek either an irredentist agenda or outright secession to form their own separate states"(Tan ,2003, P.91).

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, some general background on the secessionist movements has been discussed; so, in this chapter, the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua) will be analysed in more detail using the guiding framework of the conflict cycle. These secessionists movements can be viewed as a social conflict between the secessionists and the central government, in which the two groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives. Such a

conflict will be go through with some stages starting from **Base** to **Manifestation** and then **Escalation; De-escalation**; finally reach to **Termination** and then **Consequences**. Within this cycle, what is more crucial or interesting is, does terrorism infiltrate into the secessionist movements? If yes, then why and how it can be practise in them? If no, will terrorism infiltrate into secessionist movements one day? What is (are) the influences(s) on the national security of the country?

Therefore, in this chapter, we will have a brief description on the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya first; and then we will try to apply the conflict cycle to them, as a guiding of the findings. After that, we will examine whether terrorism is present in the conflicts already. And finally, a discussion will be provided on how difficult it is for the Jakarta government in tackling it.

### **Secessionist movement in Aceh**

In chapter two and chapter three, we have already come across some background on the case in Aceh. Generally speaking, there are five reasons for this secessionist movement to occur. First, there is the strong ethnic identity of the Acehese, since they have their own culture which is different from the Javanese. Second, the Acehese generally hold a perception that the economic benefit from the national wealth had been taken over by the central with no economic reward to them. The living condition is still poor for them although they have got a huge national resources; Third, there is resentment at the Indonesia government's policy of transmigration during the Suharto period, which saw as an attempt to impose Javanese social, cultural and economic domination; Fourth, there is a rejection of the secular orientation of the Indonesia state, which is perceived to be at odds with

Aceh's strict Sunni form of Islamic observance. Fifth, the legacy of bitterness left by the military from the heavy-handed suppression has increased the resentment of the Acehnese, especially during the period of military operation, DOM (1990-1998) (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002; Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).

Due to the above five reasons, the secessionist movement in Aceh has been a prolonged conflict which started from 1950s and until now, existing almost since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia. In chapter two, we have already summarized the situation in Aceh during the Sukarno and Suharto period; and basically, Acehnese disillusion with centralized rule was first expressed in support for the wider Darul Islam<sup>1</sup> rebellion in early 1950s; but this was quashed by Sukarno's government quickly in 1959. However, resentment among the Acehnese had not been erased even after a "special region" status was assigned by the central government in 1959. In 1976, GAM was formed with a "non-negotiable" goal in the creation of an Independent Islamic state of Aceh. Initially, due to limited resources and lack of active popular support, the rebels initiated a low level insurgency throughout the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. Only from the late-1980s, did GAM benefit from the provision of Libyan arms and training<sup>2</sup>. This external support allowed the group to progressively escalate its activities, culminating in a surge of unrest between 1989 and 1990 (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.27-29). In 1989, the members of GAM began to make attacks on military and police posts (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.8). The response from Jakarta was stern: the Suharto government declared Aceh an Area of Military Operations (daerah operasi militer) or DOM; Aceh's special region status was terminated and the army was given a virtual free hand to crush the rebels all means possible. Over one thousand Acehnese civilians were killed in the first three years of the operation; according to the information provided by the provincial



government in late 1998, 871 people killed outright by the army, and 387 were missing who later turned up dead. More than 500 others were listed as “disappeared” and never found (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.8).

The Operation of DOM successfully stymied the immediate secessionist activity; however, it severely strained civil-military relation and have since fueled growing radicalization and anger. By the mid to late 1990s, those resentments had changed into widespread demonstrations of support for GAM and its violent anti-Indonesian separatist agenda<sup>3</sup> (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p30).

The fall of Suharto gave the insurgency a new lease on life since many political controls during the New Order's period has been removed. The GAM exploited the disarray in Jakarta and the growth of popular support for independence in Aceh to expand its presence in the province, step up its attack, and began to set up an alternative administration (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.102) For example, GAM was widely believed responsible for an attack on soldiers returning from holiday leave in late December, 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.9). Besides targeting security personnel, GAM guerrillas also attacked strategic economic targets, particularly the ExxonMobil natural gas facilities near Lhokseumawe in northern Aceh, gunmen have hijacked the company's trucks and vans traveling among company sites in northern Aceh 50 times since 1999. In September 2000, the members of GAM began to target company buses which carrying employees from the town to the gas fields. There was a tendency for increasing violence, since at the first, the buses were stopped and burned, but, when Indonesian soldiers began to escort the buses, the secessionists attacked them and detonated roadside pipe bombs (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.102).

Generally speaking, according to the book “Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia.”, it summarized the operation of GAM as below,

Operationally. GAM has concentrated mostly on hit-and-run attacks and ambushes directed against the Indonesian security forces, including locally based territorial troops and paramilitary police reinforcements units dispatched from Jakarta. For the most part, these attacks have been low key and sporadic, although since mid-1999 the overall scale of violence appears to have increased (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.31).

GAM has been prepared to extend its operational focus beyond military targets, trying to make attacks on economic targets which aim at creating economic loss to the central government as well as destabilizing the society. The attacks on ExxonMobil’s facilities made a total lost of \$100 million a month to the central government; production had been stopped for 4 months (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.102). More importantly, in reflecting the increase in the scale of violence, the abuses done by the GAM were good indicators. The abuses included killings of suspected military informants, as well as of family members of police and military personnel, such as the case in Samalanga on May 2001; unlawful detentions, forced expulsions, and other terrorizing of non-Acehenese, especially ethnic Javanese; destruction of property, including homes, of personnel working for Indonesian government institution or belonging to Indonesian political parties and systematic extortion (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p. 22). For example, on May 19, 2001, GAM burned six houses of Javanese in Lhoksari village of Pante Cermin, West Aceh. They had ordered all Javanese who were working in the PT Telaga Sari Indah plantation to leave within three days or they would be killed, one by one (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.23). In addition, dozens of government buildings, including schools and subdistrict administrative offices, have also been attacked or burned, forcing

hundreds of civilians and government employees to flee to other parts of Indonesia (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.31).

Beside the change in the political environment which favored the activities of GAM, the more mature structure and external support for GAM are also important factors in explaining the rapid growth and escalation of the secessionist movement.

GAM's current armed strength is at above 1000 to 2000<sup>4</sup>(Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.101), the members are trained to use pistols, automatic assault rifles, explosives and even some basic armaments, like axes and machetes. Structurally, the group is organized along functional lines, which divided into five units as , an infantry fighting battalion (overseen by a Special Command); a police force; an intelligence unit; a woman's wing; and an elite karades reconnaissance squad. In addition to the above units, a student front was responsible for collecting community contributions , running Aceh refugee camps, and organizing political propaganda (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001). GAM did benefit from the support from Libya in the late 1980s; but such assistance was largely transient and was not maintained into the 1990s. However, external backing was not totally absent in the 1990s, for GAM has received financial contributions from Acehnese businessmen in Malaysia and southern Thailand and the donations have been used in purchasing weapons from Cambodia<sup>5</sup> (McBeth at el, 1999). For Indonesia's generals, they saw Aceh's secessionists as much more dangerous than the poorly-armed secessionists of East Timor and Irian Jaya ((McBeth at el, 1999). With an arms supply, financial backing and growing popular support, the secessionist movement in Aceh will be much more difficult to deal with than East Timor.

The Human Rights Watch Report has summarized the violence in Aceh after the fall of Suharto as “From February 1999 onward, four key elements came together to facilitate the rapid growth of the independence movements; an armed guerrilla organization, a nascent pro-independence political movement; and a highly mobilized population looking for channels to express their frustration with Jakarta over failure to address past abuses. The fourth one was the series of missteps in Jakarta.” (Human Rights Watch, 2001b, p.9)

In Jakarta, the Habibie, Wahid and Megawati governments attempted to conciliate the Acehnese through dialogue and political concessions short of granting the province independence, since many Indonesians fear that if Aceh opted for independence, Irian Jaya, East Kalimantan and South Sulawesi would follow. Therefore, the current Indonesian government’s strategy in Aceh can be summarized as “address the political and economic demands of the Acehnese, short of granting independence, while conducting police operation with military support.”(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.34).

Based on this rationale in dealing with the conflicts in Aceh, Habibie’s government apologized for the past abuses against Acehnese<sup>6</sup> and appointed a 27 member independent Commission to investigate violence in Aceh at June 1999. The DOM status was formally lifted after the apology from General Wiranto on August 7, 1998; “non-organic” troops --- that is these not directly assigned to district, subdistrict and other territorial commands were to be withdrawn at the end of August 1998 (Huxley, 2002 p.36). In addition, Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy, passed under Habibie was implemented during the Wahid administration. This law restored Aceh’s Special Autonomous Region status, which stood for a broad grant of

autonomy that included the application of Islamic law (Sharia) to the Muslim inhabitants and compensation for past abuses by the security forces (Wee, 2002 p.1).

Rapprochement between Jakarta and Aceh seemed possible following the collapse of the Suharto regime; however, the above measures did not assuage Acehenese resentment. In early 1999, taking inspiration from the case of East Timor<sup>7</sup>, an all-Aceh student congress had called for a referendum to be held in Aceh. This congress gave rise to a province-wide, student-led organization called SIRA (Sentral Indormasi Referendum Aceh or the Aceh Referendum Information Centre), which argued that a referendum would be a peaceful way of resolving the conflict. Under the new administration of Wahid, the first try was to broach the possibility of a referendum on the state of Aceh but he finally retreated after heavy criticism by the nationalists and military. Wahid claimed that any referendum would not concern independence, but rather the implementation of Sharia law in the province (Huxley, 2002 pp.36-37). At the same time, from mid-1999 to mid-2000, the central government entered into negotiations with the GAM under the Auspices of a Geneva-based conflict resolution organization, the Humanitarian Dialogue Center (HDC) and signed a temporary cease-fire (officially called a humanitarian pause) in Geneva on May 15, 2000. It was extended several times, most recently in February 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.10).

However, the humanitarian pause did not have a lasting effect in reducing the level of violence<sup>8</sup>, amid the measures on political dimension<sup>9</sup>, the GAM began to move beyond sporadic attacks on police and soldiers and began setting up an alternative administration which gradually took control over most governmental functions from the district level through the way of replaced the village heads as well

as reinstated the idea of a council of village elders. They practiced it sometimes thorough persuasion, sometimes through abduction. By July 2001, GAM has exercised control over much of Aceh, with a particularly strong presence in six of the most popular, and wealthiest districts, such as Pidie district (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

At the same time, the security forces killed 41 people during October to November 2000, while trying to prevent Acehnese from attending a second SIRA-organized rally. By the end of 2000, Indonesian security forces in Aceh were around 30,000 personnel, including 16,000 TNI troops (Huxley, 2002, p.38).

With no discernable progress in the peace talks with the GAM and in the face of strong public and military support for a firm government stance toward the Aceh rebels (together with ExxonMobil temporarily halting production at Arun our concern at the deteriorating security situation (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002)), Wahid issued the Presidential Instruction Number 4 of April 11, 2001 under pressure. In theory, the Instruction outlined a “comprehensive approach” to the security problem in Aceh<sup>10</sup>, but, in practice, the main result of the Instruction was the restructuring of the security apparatus responsible for Aceh, the structure of the security forces in Aceh was reorganized, with the national police and the army commanded in Aceh given equal responsibility for operations, which were conducted by the police, but with full army support<sup>11</sup>. By April 2001, the government had deployed some 25,000 troops to the region, with Kostrad units engaged in field operations and Kopassus units providing intelligence support (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001). A New “Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law” (OKPH) was formed, under the overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander,

Yusuf Manggabarani.

The increased military presence apparently sharpened the conflict, so intensified operations have led to an escalation of violence since mid-2001; confidence-building measures languished as the military campaign escalated. The discussion in July 2001 on establishing a bilateral ceasefire-supervision committee failed to make progress and the police then arrested six negotiators (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

This escalated violence included stepped-up attacks and massacres of Javanese migrants by the GAM and executions of suspected GAM sympathizers and collective punishments by the TNI and pro-Indonesian militias in retaliation for the GAM attacks, just as what the Human Right Watch Report stated as below,

In June (2001), Central Aceh was the site of a particularly violent eruption with the army claiming that GAM had massacred more than forty Javanese migrants on June 5-6 in the areas of Bandar and Timang Gajah, and GAM claiming that the TNI, together with a Javanese militia called Puja Kusuma, had massacred even more ethnic Acehnese and Gayo people in retaliation in the weeks that followed (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

The intensity of the conflict could be measured by the number of casualties. According to the information from the Indonesian Red Cross, some 150 people had been confirmed dead between the first week of June and mid July; 800 homes had been burned to the ground (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.11).

When Megawati came to power in July 2001 after the fall of Wahid, she and her government appeared to assign greater priority to solving Aceh's problems; and was prepared to take a pragmatic stance. In mid-August 2001, she apologized to the

people of Aceh for the past policies, particularly human-right abuses. In the same month, she signed a law<sup>12</sup> granting wide-ranging autonomy to the province<sup>13</sup>. Although the legislation grants Aceh a much higher portion of the proceeds from the province's resources, the new law failed to impress most Achenese<sup>14</sup>; the GAM continued to insist that it would accept nothing short of independence (Huxley, 2002, pp.39-40). Just as when Wahid's earlier efforts to conciliate the Acehnese had met with little success, so Megawati's government turned to a "security approach" to the insurgency problem at the beginning of 2002. Jakarta announced that a separate military area command (kodam) would be re-established in Aceh to control larger numbers of permanently-based troops (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002).

By the beginning of 2002, the TNI had succeeded in breaking up the GAM units into isolated bands and in gradually pushing them off the north coast highway, through central Aceh, and into the hills of Pidie district, and GAM appeared to be on the defensive. On January 23, 2002, the military commander of GAM, Abdullah Syafiie was killed in a gun battle with the security forces; the GAM suffered a major blow (Huxley, 2002, pp.40-41). In February 2002, GAM accepted special autonomy as a starting point for negotiations, and agreed to a new ceasefire and confidence-building measures in advance of the 2004 provincial elections. The GAM now is operating in smaller bands which are not under unified central control, active in south and west coasts of Aceh.

### **Secessionist movement in Irian Jaya (Papua)**

To certain extent, the case in Irian Jaya have some similarities between the case in Aceh, although, relatively it has been far less violent than Aceh. However, the



secessionist movement in Irian Jaya still act as a prolonged conflict between the central government and the secessionists which can be dated back to the late 1940s - early 1950s. When Indonesia's independence was recognized in 1949, it was agreed that the territorial status of what was then known as West New Guinea would be determined in negotiations between Netherlands and Indonesia. However, in December, 1961, an Indonesian politico-military campaign against continued Dutch control provoked US diplomatic intervention (Huxley, 2002, pp.41-42). Ultimately, sovereignty over the province was transferred to Indonesia under United Nations auspices in 1963 with the proviso that so-called Act of Free Choice to be held in 1968 to determine if the inhabitants wished to be part of Indonesia (Human Rights Watch, 2001a pp.7-9). In July to August 1969, Indonesian authorities arranged for the Act of Free Choice in the form of consultations with 1026 electors<sup>15</sup> (selected tribal leaders by the Indonesia government). Those electors confirmed the integration with Indonesia without a formal vote (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.107). In November 1969, the UN General Assembly endorsed Indonesia's incorporation of the territory.

Such a historical background on the incorporation of Irian Jaya provided a fertile ground for the secessionist movement since the people in Irian Jaya were prepared to having Independence due to their unique cultural, religious and historical background which is different from Javanese. A very good indicator is the use of "Morning Star" flag, a potent symbol of Papuan cultural and political aspirations. Generally speaking, the base for the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya can be summarized as below:

First, Irian Jaya was not part of the original Republic of Indonesia, and shares few social or cultural characteristics with the rest of Indonesia. Most of the

province's two million inhabitants are Melanesians, who were ethnically distinct from Indonesia's population and include many Christians (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.37-40; Human Rights Watch, 2001a pp.2-4, 7-9).

Second, there was dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule, including Jakarta's policies of encouraging migration from densely-populated regions, such as Java to Irian Jaya and disregarding the local cultures and exploiting the province's natural resources<sup>16</sup> under terms that did not benefit the local population (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.37-40; Human Rights Watch, 2001a, pp.2-4, 7-9). These exacerbated the indigenous population's secessionism.

The above factors created the conditions for a low-intensity insurgency led by the tribal-based OPM, which continued to launch small-scale attacks on Indonesia troops. The insurgents have mostly staged relatively small-scale hit and run attacks on Indonesian military posts, and, on a few occasions have taken hostages to draw attention to their cause, but for most of the time, the OPM were practiced in the forms of guerrilla activity. The OPM, reportedly has a hard core of some 200 fighters (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p38), but unlike GAM, OPM received limited support from across the border.

As in the case of Aceh, a "security approach" had been pursued in dealing with the insurgency in Irian Jaya during the Suharto period. Guerrilla activities by the OPM in the 1970s led to major Indonesian military operations in the Jayawijaya highlands in 1977-1978; and in the Bela, Alama, Jila, and Mapenduma districts from 1996 to 1998. Violence was practiced by both sides (Human Rights Watch, 2001a, pp.8-9). For example, for the case in Mapuduma district in 1996, after the OPM took

hostage a group of young Indonesian and foreign scientists; hostage rescue operation was practiced by the military and police, civilians were killed and arrested; subsistence gardens and livestock were destroyed for the purpose of ensuing military and police sweeps. The campaign went on for two years after the army mounted its hostage rescue operation. Such kind of violence between the both sides plants the seeds of distrust and future conflict. By the mid-1990s, however, OPM had been reduced to the tribally-based bands operating close to the Papua New Guinea border.

The post-Suharto governments of Habibie, Wahid and Megawati followed an approach of conciliation and repression in dealing with the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya. Habibie initially made efforts to recognize and apologize for the human rights violations committee under his predecessors. In February 1999, the Habibie government endorsed a “national dialogue” on Irian Jaya with 100 provincial representatives (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.39); but the dialogue was suspended when the province’s leaders demanded independence at a meeting with the president in Jakarta. Security authorities launched a crackdown in the territory immediately. Just like the case in Aceh, Jakarta’s response was to ban all discussion or dissemination of information on independence or autonomy (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.39).

Wahid’s government also followed a similar approach to Habibie; it first tried a conciliatory way, but ruled out any prospect of independence. Within this context, Wahid’s government agreed to change the province name from Irian Jaya to Papua<sup>17</sup>, agreed to let the “Morning Star” flag be flown as long as it was flown below the Indonesian flag. In addition, the new administration openly acknowledged the errors of the past, allowing greater freedom and permitting the open, peaceful expression of

pro-independence views; it released more than 60 Papuans from prison as part of a nationwide amnesty for political prisoners (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.108). Wahid also provided state funds for a Papuan congress---a provincial assembly called the Great Consolation (Mubes) in 23-26 February 2000, at which for the first time, Papuan popular representatives could gather together to air their concerns. However, this congress created great pressure on Wahid and became embarrassing to him.

The reason is that as a result of the Mubes meeting, the Papuan Council Presidium was established to lead the independence movement and the leading personality in the movement and head of the Papuan Congress was Theys Eluay<sup>18</sup>. The delegates adopted a resolution stating that the province's incorporation into Indonesia was illegal, and therefore null and void, and so West Papua (the delegates name for the province) had been an independent state since 1961 (Human Rights Watch, 2001a). The congress also called on Jakarta to recognize the sovereignty and independence of West Papua. It made Wahid immediately state that although his government helped finance the event, it did not recognize the congress, and considered it illegitimate since it had failed to represent all sectors of society in Irian Jaya.

The Mubes meeting acted as a catalyst to the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya, and it created great pressure on Wahid's more tolerant policies on that issue, so that with the strengthening of pro-independence sentiment in the province, Jakarta shifted to a harder line approach toward the secessionists. Immediately follow the congress, the government interrogated key Presidium leaders and congress organizers. After June 2000, thousands of new troops were sent to the province, bringing total security-force numbers in the province to more the 10, 000 (Huxley, 2002, p.44).

Tensions are high in the province and there is a tendency for the escalation in violence. The case in Abepuard (December 2000), Wamena (October 2000), Betaf (February 2001) and Wasior (June 2001) were good indicators of the increasing violence by both sides, especially for the case in Wamena. In October 2000, joint security forces clashed with independent supporters when the authorities attempted to lower the “Morning Star” flag at a number of Satgas Papua<sup>19</sup> (Pro-independence militia) posts in the Wamena area<sup>20</sup>. 32 people were killed in the clashes. In response, the Papuan mob began burning and looting shops; confronted by gunfire from security forces, the mob went as a rampage, venting their anger in a residential area that is home primarily to migrants from other parts of Indonesia. Satgas Pupua members killed at least 28 non-Papuans in Wamena after police removed Morning Star flags and killed several militiamen Jakarta subsequently arrested more than 50 activists, including several leading members of the Papua Presidium, and the raising of the Morning Star flag was banned after the Wamena incident (Human Rights Watch, 2001a).

The military crackdown elicited an increasingly violent response from armed Papuan groups during 2001; OPM forces stepped up operations, taking hostages and attacking Indonesian troops. At the same time, Wahid’s government had drawn up special-autonomy legislation, intended to undermine secessionist aspirations by devolving substantial administrative and fiscal authority. The special autonomy law that parliament approved in October 2001, took effect on 1 January 2002<sup>21</sup>; however, many secessionists still rejected autonomy and demanded a referendum on independence (Huxley, 2002, pp.43-44).

As a whole, with the situation in early 2002, the prognosis for resolving the

conflict in Irian Jaya was poor because the autonomy law seemed unlikely to assuage pro-independence sentiment due to the incompatible goal between the two groups on one hand; and on the other hand, there was no sign that OPM could achieve more than “pin-prick” success in the face of Jakarta’s increasingly hard-line military posture.

After looking to the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, we can now move on to the second part of this chapter. In this part, the theoretical framework of this thesis, the conflict cycle, will be put along with the findings to act as a guide to the things that have happened in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The case in Aceh will come across first.

### **The application of the Conflict Cycle Model**

Conflict cycle is a way, a concept or an idea in studying the “life” of a conflict; how it emerges, escalates, de-escalates and then settled. It is assumed that conflicts move thorough a series of stages just like a cycle; and clearly have a beginning, a middle and an end. It is clear that the secessionist movement in Aceh is a kind of conflict, it is a conflict between the Indonesian government force (both the police and the military) and the forces of GAM with an incompatible objectives. For the Indonesian government force, their goal is to maintain the integration of the country; and for the GAM, they want to establish an Independent Islamic State of Aceh. Therefore, it will be appropriate in using the conflict cycle to illustrate the case in Aceh.

In fact, the metaphor of a conflict going through a cycle is not quite appropriate

or a little bit misleading in the case of Aceh. A conflict cycle is good in illustrating a micro-conflict, for example just a unique fighting or violent event between two groups, such as the events on attacking ExxonMobil facilities. If we want to analyse the prolonged conflict in Aceh as a whole or in a more comprehensive and macro-way, a conflict spiral will be more suitable. (See Figure 5.1) Actually, conflict cycle is similar with conflict spiral, the two models contain the same stages, suggesting that conflict will go through these stages from the beginning to the end. However, the difference between the two models is that, in the conflict cycle, it seems that the end of a conflict may become the basis for a renewed struggle in a short time. However, for sometimes, the end of a conflict is enduring, whatever the temporary end. The conflict never returns to the same circumstances or intensify as before the struggle began; surges and pauses in the struggle have their indelible consequences. Therefore, a spiral is a more suitable image to simulate how a prolonged conflict is operating by suggesting that each linked sweep (contained with **Base, Manifestation, Escalation, De-escalation and Termination**) varying in the degree of escalation and occurring in a different historical setting.




Figure 5.1 Conflict Spirals

(Source: Kriesberg, 1998)

Starting from the first stage, Base, it is underlying condition that can become source for an overt struggle, thus, in other words, it is the bases for the emergence of a conflict. It included factors within one or more of the adversaries firing their members to contend with others, as well as aspects of the relationship between possible adversaries that tend to produce a sense of grievance and the formulation of antagonistic goals. For the conflict in Aceh, the strong ethnic identity, culture and religious background of the Acheneese acting as the Base of the conflict at the initial



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stage since all these factors contribute a sense of grievance that the Indonesian central government should not incorporate them as part of the Republic.

However, one thing we should be aware, is that the presence of the underlying condition does not equal the emergence or manifestation of the conflict. The conditions for an infinite number of conflicts are always present; yet relatively few conflicts become manifest, and even fewer become really a conflict. Therefore, the second stage, Manifestation is very important in whether a conflict will emerge or not.

A conflict is said to be manifest if four conditions are present. First, at least one protagonist has a sense of its identity, distinguishing itself from other parties, second, members of one or more of the adversary parties believe they are a grievance, some aspect of their situation being unsatisfactory and unjustified. Third, members of one or more sides, believing that their grievance would be reduced by a change wrought by another person or group, formulate a goal to bring about the changes in the other side so that their grievance will be reduced. Fourth, those asserting the goal must believe that they can act to help attain it (Kriesberg, 1998). In fact, the underlying conditions in the first stage, Base provide the foundation for the above four conditions to emerge. A conflict has become manifest as those underlying conditions in the Base change and become more conducive to the eruption of a struggle. In the case of Aceh, the formation of GAM in 1976 was a good example of manifestations of the conflict, since one side of the adversaries in the conflict expressed the four conditions on the manifestation by mobilizing supporters and directly trying to affect the opposing side so as to achieve their goal. As suggested by Kriesberg, there is no need for all the adversaries to explicitly articulate the four conditions, if one side acts in these terms,

the other side will likely see itself as engaged in a struggle (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.58-92). So, since that time, the secessionist movement in Aceh has become a manifested conflict.

After a conflict has become manifested, as times go, it will move on to the next stage, Escalation. Conflict escalation generally refers to increases in the severity of coercive inducements used and increases in the scope of participation within a conflict. Increased severity of coercion includes greater threats as well as harsher negative sanctions that actually impose, and increasing the scope of participation generally refers to increases in the number of parties or peoples engaged in the struggle. Change in these two dimensions often occur together as more people are mobilized for a fight, they are able to take sides in the conflict to try to attain goals by intensifying the means used in rallying support for its cause. In Aceh, as mentioned in this chapter before, during the period of mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the conflict was still in the stage of manifestation, but from the late 1980s, with the assistance from Libya, the GAM began to escalate the conflict as making attacks on military and police posts.

According to Kriesberg, three variables will governing the process of escalation in a conflict, and they are, first, the internal change of development of each adversaries second, the change in relations between adversaries or the Interaction of the adversaries; third, the involvement of other parties in the conflict,. So, the main reason behind the escalation in the late 1980s was due to the involvement of Libya in the conflict, which help to change the balance of resources between the GAM and the Indonesian government, thus, indirectly escalating the conflict. The better resources in practicing more coercive means for the GAM make it believe themselves to be

winning and overreaches itself, it gives little attention to the interests and concerns of the opposing sides. This tends to stiffen the resistance of the opponents and increase their sense of desperation. Intensifying the means by one side does make a change in the relations between the adversaries. If one party is harmed or even threatened by a rival, it is more likely to respond with hostility rather than acquiescence. That hostility is then reciprocated, after which the parties may come to feel that revenge and damaging the other side have become goals in themselves. So, it will be not hard to explain why the Indonesian government side is using a military and inhumane-way in response to the violent action by GAM. From now on, both sides have taken a step up the escalation ladder that was not intended.

The hard-line approach on military suppression during the DOM period (1990-1998) by the Indonesian government side had transited the conflict to the other stage, that is De-escalation. The conflict at that time has temporarily de-escalated because the GAM did not have enough ability to sustain resistance to the Indonesian government. At that moment, the conflict in Aceh seemed to come to the end, and reached the final stage of a conflict, Termination. However, although, de-escalation refers to the decreases in the severity of the means used and/or in the number of parties/ peoples engaged in the struggle; those decreases are not always a prelude to a conflict' s ending (but when a conflict does end, de-escalation has generally preceded it). In fact, as suggested by the Conflict Spiral model, the situation in Aceh during the late 1990s had just come to the end of a sweep; but not the end of a conflict. The conflict is still carried on as the termination of one sweep becomes the base for a new sweep. The in humane treatments during the DOM period, and the continuous economic exploitation of the natural resources of Aceh became the base for another way round of escalation of the conflict. Of course, the external factor of the change

in leadership of the Indonesian government (the fall of Suharto) also provide with a scenario for the conflict to be escalated again. But, for this time, as the conflict is prolonged, the escalation has become more intensified and serious than before.

It will be not hard to explain such a change if we can follow the three variables suggested by Kriesberg in studying the process of escalation.

First of all, as the conflict has been prolonged, there will be an internal change to the development of the adversaries in the conflict through the Social Psychological processes and the Organizational Development. Under social-psychological process, Cognitive dissonance theory, Entrapment and Selection perception can be use to describe and explain on why the process of escalation has changed as times going on.

Cognitive dissonance theory suggested that individuals seek consistency between what they do and what they think they should do. Consequently, once having committed an action, they seek to justify it in their own minds. As persons expend resources to hurt or support injuring other humans, they tend to regard the cause for which those actions were taken as more and more important. As the cause becomes more valued, ever more harmful acts are justified. Entrapment also act as the other factor in contributing to the conflict escalation. This concept refers to “a decision making process whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, course of action in order to justify or ‘make good on’ prior investments” (Kriesberg, 1998, p.153). In addition, people always tend to notice phenomenon that fit their expectation, and that is referred to as selective perception. It also occurs in many ways that contribute to conflict escalation, for example, once a struggle has entered a stage of mutual recrimination and

contentiousness, even conciliatory conduct by the adversary is likely not to be noticed or, if noticed, be discounted and considered deceptive (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.150-157).

As in the case of Aceh, the social-psychological process did made changes to both the GAM and the Indonesian government side; the effect of cognitive dissonance and entrapment become more intensify as times goes on. The sense of belonging to a larger entity engaged in a struggle provides meaning and significance to the lives of those participants in the conflict; it also provided with a livelihood, a sense of identity as well as a vehicle for power and influence, thus, the struggle itself creates a vested interest for some people to continue the fight. This can help to explain why the TNI still have a strong intention in using a hard-line approach on the secessionist issue in Aceh. Moreover, the process of entrapment tends to lock some people in the conflict into persisting in a course of action. A prolonging conflict seems to justify what has already been expended in honor, in blood. And that was the case for some of the members of GAM. As time goes on, the unfavorable factors in the conflict instead of being erased will accumulate, which makes it more difficult for both sides in the conflict to escape from the process of escalation due to the effect of the social-psychological process. In fact, this will also affect the organizational developments of the adversaries as well. Since leaders generally represent their constituents in conflicts with outsiders, they are predisposed to become identified with the group's already established oppositional goals and the means chosen to pursue them, if the conflict cannot settle down within a short time, it will be prone to becoming more entrapment for the leaders as well as the parties themselves since the costs are particularly high for them to admit that the course of action being pursued is a failure. Admitting that their conduct has been mistaken by the leaders and the

parties may be regarded as acknowledging that the opponent's course was correct, and that may appear to be catering to the enemy. So, it will be not hard to understand that why the leaders of GAM and Indonesian government side always have an incompatible goal between them. As the conflict has prolonged, it will be more difficult for either side to modify or change its goals, thus, more easily to result in conflict escalation.

Secondly, beside the internal change to the adversaries within the conflict, as a conflict erupts and becomes prolonged, there will be changes in the relations between adversaries as well, which also contribute to the escalation of conflict. The most dangerous phenomenon within this aspect is the self-fulfilling prophecies by the two sides in the conflict. It refers to the situation that as adversaries exchange contentious behavior, each reasonably expects that the other will increase its pressure if it is prevented or deterred by greater coercion. It is dangerous because it makes hostility become reciprocate. If one of the parties commits coercive acts, the other side will respond in the same way. Take the case in Aceh. The GAM took a more violent approach in the late 1990s due to the inhumane treatment by the TNI during the DOM period; the inhumane treatment deepens the antagonism and the desire to continue the struggle or even to seek revenge by both sides. President Instruction Number 4 by Wahid is a good example of the reciprocity in hostility. In addition, as the conflict emerges, develops and escalates, the adversaries tend to become increasingly isolated from each other, which reduces the opportunities in communication, this is also part of the reasons of why the humanitarian pause finally failed.

Besides the changes in internal development among the adversaries and the

interaction or relations between the two sides in the conflict, the involvement of other parties also contributes to the conflict escalation. The assistance from the Acehese businessman in the 1990s was one of the factors for the more coercive type of behavior by the GAM in late 1990s.

Generally speaking, after the fall of Suharto in late 1990s, the secessionist movement in Aceh has entered into a new sweep of the conflict, the Termination stage in the previous sweep becomes the Base for the new sweep under the model of conflict spiral. For most of the time in the post-Suharto period, at least until the early 2002, the conflict in Aceh was in the stage of escalation. Although, it seems that there were some non-coercive measures, like dialogue and political concessions in dealing with the conflict, it still did not reach the stage of de-escalation since the three aspects needed for de-escalation have not changed during this period. Instead, as explained in the previous paragraphs, the process of escalation has been more intensified as the conflict is prolonged. The effect of selective perception is so large that the conciliatory conduct by the Indonesian government side is not likely to be noticed by the GAM. The situation becomes even worse for, as one of the parties makes a conciliatory gesture or responds less aggressively than anticipated, the other may interpret that as a sign of weakness. The weakness, however, serves as an invitation to escalate demands and pressure. This can explain the phenomenon of an inconsistent approach on suppression and conciliation by the Indonesian government and finally fosters the conflict into the stage of De-escalation at the early 2002. The military action by the TNI under the Megawati administration has weakened the ability of the GAM to sustain the resistance, which makes a change in the relations between the adversaries. Moreover, the death of Abdullah Syafii that brought change to the internal development of GAM; a new way of thinking may have a

chance to appear since Abdullah Syafiie represented the more radical approach of GAM in the past.

Since that time, the secessionist movement in Aceh has been moved to the stage of Termination again. The second sweep within the conflict have just temporarily ended. However, it may become the Base for the new sweep again in the future, therefore, the secessionist movement in Aceh as a conflict will still be carried on.

For the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya, it also quite similar to the case in Aceh. It can also be defined as a conflict between the secessionists (basically the OPM and the community leaders in Irian Jaya) and the Indonesian government side; with an incompatible goal among each other. The secessionists aim at independence from the Republic of Indonesia, while the central government tries to maintain the integrity of the country.

We can make analysis of the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya also with the guiding of the Conflict Cycle model. Again, as in the case of Irian Jaya, the conflict spiral may be more appropriate in illustrating the situation there since the secessionist movement is still continuing nowadays.

The Base for the conflict in Irian Jaya was related to the historical background of this place, as mentioned in this chapter before. Basically, the underlying conditions for the conflict to emerge were the difference in ethnicity of Irian Jaya with the rest of Indonesian (mainly Javanese) together with the dissatisfaction with the Indonesian rule.



The conflict become manifest or in other words, the conflict arises as those underlying conditions change and become more conducive to the eruption of a struggle. When the OPM was formed in 1970s, the four elements of manifestation becomes apparent as the supporters in achieving their goal.

The conflict had become escalated since the OPM began to carry out attacks on Indonesian posts and practiced the forms of guerrilla activity during the 1970s. Due to the self-fulfilling prophecies, in responding to the more coercive action by the OPM, the Indonesian government under Suharto began a hard-line approach in dealing with the conflict. The escalated action by the OPM lead to the more coercive action by the Indonesian government side.

Basically, with the unsymmetrical military ability between the two parties, the conflict soon entered the stage of de-escalation as the military campaign by the Indonesian government side change d the relations between the adversaries. The ability to sustain resistance to the other side by the OPM has been weakening. The conflict in Irian Jaya had been moved to the stage of Termination as by the mid-1990s; the conflict seemed to cool down temporarily.

So, the conflict in Irian Jaya had been completed one sweep as suggested by the conflict spiral during the Sukarno and Suharto period. The conflict is still carrying on in the post-Suharto period, with the termination in the previous sweep (the coercive elements done by TNI, such as the case in Mapuduma district) becoming the base for a new sweep in the conflict spiral, just similar to the case in Aceh.

The level of the escalation in the new sweep becomes more intensified due to

the changes in the internal development of each party in the conflict by the effect of entrapment as well as the cognitive dissonance. As time goes on, more coercive elements were beginning to accumulate, so it makes it difficult for both parties to escape from the escalation ladder. This can help to explain the happening of the case in Wamena, when the Indonesian government side escalated the conflict by interrogating key Presidium leaders and congress organizers after the Mubes meeting, as well as the increasing troops present in Irian Jaya. Just a minor action of lowering the “Morning Star” flag by the central government was viewed as a serious action by the secessionists and triggered out a violent event.

However, the case in Irian Jaya contained some differences from the one in Aceh. Generally speaking, the GAM received more support and assistance from other external parties than the OPM. This will affect the Internal development of the groups during the process of escalation; the result will be shown in the different level of coercive activities. Thus, OPM conducted less coercive activities in comparison with the GAM. The less violent performance by the OPM makes the stage of escalation not so explicit, thus the stage of escalation and de-escalation was not so clearly cut in the second sweep of conflict spiral of the case in Irian Jaya. Escalation and de-escalation seems to occur at the same time during the post-Suharto period; they were linked by ‘anticipation’ and ‘feedback’. “Anticipation” refers to the matters of conjecture, each adversary in the conflict tries to influence the other’s views about what will happen if the other side takes particular steps. “Feedback” refers to those experience or information that have received within one stage of the conflict affects ongoing conduct in the same and the previous stage of conflict (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.339-371). In other words, earlier decisions and actions are reinterpreted in the light of new experiences and these new interpretation impact on

future conduct. The conciliatory approach to the conflicts in Irian Jaya by the central government during the post-Suharto period, such as the permission for flying the “Morning Star” flag and the support in the Mubes meeting, seems to have transited the conflict into the stage of de-escalation since the Indonesian government side seemed to be weakening in its resolve to sustain the resistance. Such a wrong perception was received by the secessionists in Irian Jaya as “Anticipation” and “Feedback”, which made them reinterpret their position and strategy again since the Indonesian government side now treated them more humanely than they have anticipated. Therefore, this can explain why delegates in the Mubes meeting have raised out such a radical statement. Their wrong interpretation soon became the seeds for the escalation on the conflict later on. Thus, the conflict in Irian Jaya during the post-Suharto period was in between the stage of de-escalation and escalation because future stages of conflict affected the earlier ones through the backward linkage of “anticipation” and “feedback”.

The conflict in Irian Jaya nowadays has still not yet reached to the stage of Termination because neither side has shown weakening resolve in sustaining the resistance or trying to abandon the goal. The secessionist movement in Irian Jaya is still in between the stage of escalation and de-escalation within the second sweep in the model of conflict spiral.

The conflict cycle model can act as a framework in guiding us to see how a conflict is actually carried on through out different stages; it provides information for us on how a conflict is being shaped by other factors. However, the more interesting question for the secessionist movements in Indonesia is does terrorism exist in the secessionist movements?

Terrorism is a kind of strategy for the contending party to attain its goals once the conflict has become manifested; in other words, strategy is a means for the contending parties towards a desired goal. Therefore it will be interesting for us to study what kinds of factor are governing the choice of the conflict strategies. But before going in depth into this question, we should come across the nature of terrorism as a conflict strategy first; and then analysis will be given to the case in Aceh and Irian Jaya to see whether the conflicts there already contain terrorism.

As suggested by Kriesberg, the differences between different conflict strategies are in terms of three basic inducements, which is coercion, reward and persuasion (Kriesberg, 1998, p101). Terrorism is a conflict strategy with highly coercive inducement. "It aims to intimidate others, whether to force them to yield power or to conform to the power of authorities." (Kriesberg, 1998, p114). Therefore, did the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya have such a high coercive inducement element?

### **Existence of Terrorism in Secessionist Threats**

From my point of view, terrorism has already existed in the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya. It is because the practices of the secessionists had clearly demonstrated the elements of terrorism which stated in chapter one.

Take the example in Aceh, where the attacks on military and police posts in 1989, the attacks on Exxon Mobil facilities in 1998, the hijacking of the company's vehicles, included buses which were carrying employees, during the late 1990s, and the ethnic expulsion on non-Acehenese through massacre and destroying their properties in early 2000s by the GAM can reflect the presence of terrorism in the

secessionist movement. All the above events can be contained within the six elements of terrorism (refer to chapter one). For example, in the attacks on Exxon Mobil facilities and the hijacked company buses, the GAM members clearly demonstrated their purpose in creating and instill fear to a wider “target audience” (the government side). Before the action, the GAM members were clear that the psychological effects would be much more crucial than the immediate effects to the victims(s) or object(s), therefore, not many people were hurt during these events. They just wanted to create fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit for power on influence on political change (an independent Aceh). In addition, the case in Lhoksari village, West Aceh on May 2001 was also a good example of terrorist attack by the GAM. This attack truly reflects the threat of violence through the creation and exploitation of fear. It is because after burning six houses of Javanese in this village, the GAM members had ordered all Javanese to leave within three days or they would be killed, one by one. It is not an ordinary criminal event since it had conveyed with a “message” and the psychological effect is far reaching beyond the incident itself or the immediate victim(s).

For the cases in Irian Jaya, it is also quite similar to the cases in Aceh, the Wamena incident is also a good example of the presence of terrorism in the secessionist movement (for details, please refer to previous pages).

Generally speaking, I would argue that terrorism was coexisted with the secessionist movement as the strategy adopted by the secessionists in achieving for their goals. It is still in the type as “traditional” terrorism in terms of the nature of the groups (for GAM and OPM, they are relatively more cohesive in structure with defined set of political objectives); level of lethality (relatively low except recently)

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and the practice of claiming credit for attacks.

However, as the process of escalation is carried on in both the cases of Aceh and Irian Jaya, more and more coercive inducements will accumulate and present in the conflict. There will be a greater tendency for New Terrorism to be transformed as the conflict strategy. A very good indicator was the case in Lhoksari village on May 2001 in West Aceh and the case in Wamena on October 2000 in Irian Jaya. These two cases happened in nearly the same time frame and the level of violence has been increased in relative to the case before, which induced an increase in lethality (one feature of New Terrorism). The target or the casualties for this time included more innocent personnel, which are not well targeted (the security force) as before. The implication behind this phenomenon is that the objectives of the secessionist groups become more amorphous than before, which is one feature of New Terrorism.

So, we have come to the other question here, that is, what kind of factors in governing the contending parties in adopting the different conflict strategies? Why sometimes is there a greater tendency for the adversaries to choose a more coercive mode of strategy?

As suggested by Kriesberg, the goal(s) of the contending parties, the resources of the adversaries and the social context behind the conflict all contribute in shaping out the strategy that the adversaries will adopt. First of all, Kriesberg stated that "The greater the perceived incompatibility of the goals in a consensual conflict, the greater the tendency for the adversaries to choose conflict modes with major coercive and even violent components". (Kriesberg, 1998, p125).. The goal(s) for the secessionists in Aceh and Irian Jaya and the Indonesian government side is clearly an example of

high incompatibility in goal(s). Second, resources are a critical factor in governing the adversaries in choosing the conflict strategies. An asymmetric balance of resources between the two sides in a conflict may foster the coercive and violent component. It is because with such a resources pattern, the dominant group (the one which has more resources) tends to overestimate its own ability and gives little attention to the interests and concerns of the opposing side. Thus, the resistance of the opposing side will be intensified. In order to win the game under such a situation, the opposing party may adopt a conflict strategy which can maximize the cost for the dominant group. (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.132-139, 343-345). "This is often the rationale used by the challenging party for resorting to violence, even terrorism." (Kriesberg, 1998, p344). The GAM, OPM and the Indonesian government side were in such an asymmetric resources pattern. Finally, the social context behind the conflict provided norms and prevailing ways of thinking to the members of the social system. The contending parties are also members of the social system which share general understandings about what are the appropriate means to be used in pursuing and settling conflicts; this will constrain the adversaries' choice of conflict strategy (Kriesberg, 1998, p.141). If there is a change in the social context, such as the emergence of New Terrorism in Indonesia (refer to chapter four), the conventional norms or understand towards the conflict strategy will also be affected; the barriers in the past may be crossed and a much higher level of antagonism may be reached and sustained.

The above factors serve well in explaining why the adversaries in a conflict will adopt a conflict strategy with coercive inducement; but it still does not point out why terrorism will have a strong tendency to be adopted as the conflict strategy among the other kinds of coercive strategy. Martha Crenshaw has suggested two reasons as

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the direct cause for the emergence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981).

The first one is the “existence of concrete grievances among on identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority” (Whittaker, 2001, p.15). A social movement is then developed with the aims of redressing these grievances and gain either equal rights on a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this broader movement.

The second one is the “lack of opportunity for political participation” (Whittaker, 2001, p.16). The dominant regime that denies access to power for the subordinate regime and persecutes dissenters will create dissatisfaction that cannot be diverted by other proper and legal means, for example, the legal expression of sound opposition. Terrorism may become the way for releasing the dissatisfaction.

In referring to the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, they matched with the conditions suggested by Martha Crenshaw. Therefore, it is predicted that the secessionist movements in these two places will be moving towards a more coercive way of strategy and with a higher tendency to be emerging as a form of terrorism.

### **Why difficult to tackle**

Secessionist movements is one of the most serious threats to the national security of Indonesia, for over 50 years, and the Indonesian government has still not yet completely settled down this security threat due to the incompatible goals between the secessionists and the Indonesian government. It seems that there is no room for both sides in the conflict to have a compromise with each other. It is



because for the Indonesian government side, it still has a strong view that if it lets one of the provinces in the country separate, the whole Republic of Indonesia will disintegrate, and, for the secessionists, they just try to achieve nothing but independence.

The other factor which makes it difficult for the Indonesian government in tackling the secessionist movements is the influence of TNI. As mentioned in chapter three, the TNI see the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya as “projects” were “money is made, reputations are built and promotions gained” (Huxley, 2002, p.45). Because of such an interest the army holds a strong position against the secessionists which will contribute to the escalation of the conflict. In fact, the poor performance of the army acts as a barrier to the de-escalation of the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya, just as Rabasa and Chalk have stated:

Economic exploitation would probably not have been strong enough to generate overt separatist sentiments, for much of the 1980s, GAM experience relatively little popular support, with most Achenese merely calling for more autonomy and control over natural resources. It was only during the last decade that these sentiments began to change, largely as a result of anger generated by military excesses (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.33)

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya still act as a threat to the national security of Indonesia due to the increasing level in violence or coercive elements in the conflicts. In addition, the higher tendency for terrorism to be present as a strategy in the conflict could even make the situation become more

worse. Although the conflicts now seem to be temporarily settled down, as suggested by the conflict cycle model, it has just completed one sweep; the conflict will still carry on.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Darul Islam (literally House of Islam) is the name given to a rebellion that was launched on western Java in 1948 and that continued until the 1960s. The revolt was sparked after Islamic rebels refused to recognize the authority of the Indonesian state after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949 and spread from Java to north Sumatra and south Sulawesi during the 1950s.

<sup>2</sup> Acehnese historian Isa Sulaiman estimated that 500 to 750 Acehnese were trained in Libya in the late 1980s.

<sup>3</sup> For example, around one million Acehnese support the Independence rally in Banda, the provincial capital in Aceh, which was the largest single demonstration of public sentiment in Indonesian history.

<sup>4</sup> Indonesian intelligence sources put GAM's current armed membership at between 500 and 800.

<sup>5</sup> Indonesian intelligence officials suspect that most of the weapons are smuggled from abroad, principally from Cambodia, via the Thai-Malaysian border area while Aceh rebels claim that many of their weapons are procured directly from soldiers and police desperate to supplement poor pay.

<sup>6</sup> President Habibie went to Banda, Aceh on March 1999 for the apology for past abuse in Aceh

<sup>7</sup> President Habibie announced on January 27, 1999 that East Timorese would be given the opportunity to choose between increased autonomy and separation from Indonesia.

<sup>8</sup> In the first months after the pause took effect, violence declined sharply. As violations by the Indonesian side increased, however, attacks by GAM on military and police also escalated.

<sup>9</sup> The measures like "special autonomy" legislation and Telephone hotline between GAM and TNI commanders.

<sup>10</sup> The instruction stated that efforts at resolving the conflict through dialogue with "armed separatists" had produced no results and that violence on the part of the latter were increasing. The government had therefore decided to adopt a more comprehensive approach, and to address the political, economic, social, law and order, security, and information and communication aspects of the problem.

<sup>11</sup> A new "Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law" (OKPH) was formed under the overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander, Yusuf Manggabarani. Aceh's chief of police, Chairul Rasjid; and army commander, Zamroni, were given equal responsibility for command of the operations, which were envisioned as being under police authority, but with full army back-up.

<sup>12</sup> Law No.18 2001

<sup>13</sup> The details were: First, the provincial government's share of oil and gas revenues would increase from 5% to 70%; second, there would be direct elections for the provincial governorship and other local-government posts; third, the governor would possess veto rights over senior military appointments in Aceh; and, fourth, the provincial government would be allowed to introduce elements of sharia law.

<sup>14</sup> Indeed, GAM's control of rural areas seemed likely to delay or even prevent the implementation of many of the new law's provisions.

<sup>15</sup> They were largely hand-picked by Jakarta and constituting far less than 1% of the Papuan population at the time.

<sup>16</sup> Irian Jaya contains a significant share of the country's natural resources, including the world's largest gold and copper mining operation. This area also has one of the largest gas fields.

<sup>17</sup> Irian Jaya, the name it was given after the Indonesian annexation. The name of Papua was finally bestowed officially with the state of regional autonomy on January 2002.

<sup>18</sup> A traditional chief who had served as a Golkar member of the provincial parliament.

<sup>19</sup> Satgas Papuan was initially formed in the Jayapura area to provide security for the Mubes and

congress. In many cases the Satagas Papua units served as an outlet for expression of Papuan pride; in others, however, members turned to gangsterism, intimidation, and extortion, often targeting small business run by migrants.

<sup>20</sup> Wamena, the capital of the Jayawijaya district with a population of just over 100,000, is the largest town in the central highlands of Papua.

<sup>21</sup> The special autonomy law allocates the province 80% of revenue from forestry and fisheries and 70% from oil, gas and mining, provides for a Papua people's council to protect the rights of indigenous inhabitants; and confirm the change of name to Papua.

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## Chapter Six

### Ideological Challenge from Islam

Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim nation with over 85% of the population adhering to Islam. With such a background, it might be assumed that Indonesia should be in the form of an Islamic state. However, in 1953, Sukarno gave his rationale for making Indonesia as a secular state by saying that, "If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, will secede". (Wee, 2002, p.5). Suharto followed the same rationale during his New Order administration. As mentioned in chapter three, in order to keep the newly independent state in a unitary form, Pancasila was entrenched as the state philosophy, effectively eclipsing the alternative vision of Indonesia as an Islamic state, or even as a state where Muslims were subject to Sharia law. This situation continued until the fall down of Suharto in 1998. But since the relaxation of political constraints after 1998, Muslim political movements have proliferated and expanded, and some have challenged the secular basis of Indonesia's statehood, acting as a threat to the national security of Indonesia.

In this chapter, the main focus will be on the ideological challenge by Islam, which has been defined as one of the security threats to Indonesia under the Post-Suharto period. In fact, the nature of this security threat is a tension between strictly observant Muslims seeking a more Islamic form of governance and moderate Muslims or new Muslims who prefer the secular status quo. This tension has challenged the social and political stability of Indonesia, with significant implications for national cohesion. Unlike the secessionist threats that

have been mentioned in the previous chapter, the ideological challenge by Islam will be divided into two aspects for the convenience in analysis. It is because although this security threat or conflict contained the same elements in terms of nature, there were different goals for the different groups involved in it. The main distinction comes from the ultimate aim of what Indonesia should be. For one side, they want to keep Indonesia as a unitary state, such as the practice of Laskar Jihad (LJ). However, for the other side, they want to make Indonesia as part of a larger Islamic state which encompassing other Islamic areas, such as Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore; this was the aim for JI. Although the nature of the conflict for both sides was the same, namely trying to challenge the secular status of Indonesia, but unlike the secessionist threats (contained with the same goal in separate form from Indonesia), this conflict contains different aims by different groups. Therefore, in this chapter, we will first focus on the conflicts associated with LJ and then on the ideological challenge brought by JI. Similar to the structure of chapter five, a brief description will be given on the cases first, followed by an application of the conflict cycle model to the findings. After that, we will examine whether terrorism is present in the conflicts already. Finally, a discussion will be provided on how difficult it is for the Jakarta government in tackling it.

### **The case of Laskar Jihad**

Laskar Jihad (LJ) was established in January 2000 by Jafar Umar Thalib, a young religious teacher who had once fought in Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>. The aim of founding LJ was strongly related to the communal conflict in Maluku, in which Thalib wanted to protect the victimized Muslim community and fight against the

Christians (described as *Kafir harbi*, which is belligerent infidels) by declaring a Jihad after the outbreak of the conflict in Maluku. Thalib was a hard-line Muslim leader with a strong will to establish an Islamic state; he has once said that, “We don’t like Pancasila because it means that Islam is the same as other religions. This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest religion and the best.” (Abuza, 2003, p.69) Therefore, LJ was a radical militant Muslim group. The aim of this group is to recruit Muslim militants to wage jihad in Maluku and Sulawesi and they believe that Indonesian Muslims are required to defend Islam against unbelievers by means of jihad<sup>2</sup> (Abuza, 2003, pp.69-72; Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, pp.84-87). Since there was a strong linkage between LJ and the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi, it will be worth while for us to go through the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi first.

### **Communal conflict in Maluku**

There were several roots for the emergence of this conflict, but basically, as Crouch has defined it, it was an inter-communal conflict between the Muslims and Christians due to a combination of causes (Crouch, 2002). The change in demographic composition<sup>3</sup> brought by the transmigration programme and spontaneous in-migration, together with a higher birth-rate of the Muslims, has changed the demographic composition from almost exact balance between Muslims and Christians in 1991 to Muslims constituting 57% of the population. With such a background, Muslims increasingly dominated the provincial bureaucracy, holding three-quarters of the top 38 posts by 1999 (Huxley, 2002 pp.56-57). As the educational level of the Muslims improved, they began to compete for the jobs within the bureaucracy and in the professions that had

historically been dominated by Christians. The economic downturn after 1998 even intensified the competition. Besides the economic competition among the two groups, the decentralization policy offered by the central government together with the power vacuum created by the fall down of Suharto has heightened political competition for control of local natural resources, budgets and patronage, which in turn fosters the antagonism between the Christians and Muslims.

All the above factors contributed to the outbreak of conflict in Ambon, central Maluku in January 1999, which was triggered by an altercation between a Christian bus driver and two Muslim passengers at the Ambon bus terminal. Fighting spread widely to neighboring islands in central and southeast Maluku (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, pp.91-94), and later spread to northern Halmahera in north Maluku.

Violence escalated from some small fight or riots between the two groups to the massacre of at least 500 members of the Muslim minority in the Tobelo district in Halmahera in December 1999<sup>4</sup>. This atrocity against Muslims induced revenge attacks on Christians remaining in northern Halmahera by local militant Islamic group. In one such attack in June 2000, 4000 –5000 Muslim fighters rampaged through a Christian settlement, killing more than 100 villagers.

The conflicts became more intensified after the presence of LJ in May 2000. The arrival of 6000 well-armed members of LJ from Java changed the balance of power, and Christians found themselves on the defensive. From the second half of 2000 until the end of 2001, the conflicts in Ambon were shaped into an

occupation of discrete areas within the city by the two groups, with Christians occupying one end of the town and Muslims the other. In March 2001, Thalib declared the establishment of Islamic law in the Maluku (Abuza, 2003, pp.70-71). There were still some fights, bombings and shootings during this period, especially at the end of 2001. In February 2002, government-sponsored peace talks resulted in the two sides agreeing to end their violence and surrender their weapons. However, renewed violence in April 2002 not only threatened to undermine this settlement, but also prompted the government to arrest the leaders of LJ and the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM)<sup>5</sup>. The government also vowed to expel LJ's remaining forces from Maluku and to disband the FKM. Up to this moment, the communal conflicts in Maluku seem to have come to an end; this conflict has left around 10000 people dead and created 500,000 refugees in a population of 2.4 million (Huxley, 2002 ,p.56).

### **Communal Conflict in Sulawesi**

Beside the conflict in Maluku, a similar case has occurred in Poso district in the central Sulawesi. The roots of the conflict were almost the same as the one in Maluku, which is the influx of Muslims from other islands changing the ethnic and religious make up of the region which triggered economic and political competition between the Muslims and Christians in an area which had been dominated by Christians before; for example the competition to be bupati (district head) and sekwilida (district secretary). This imposed a power distribution in the district administration (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.6-10 ).

The conflict in Poso first emerged in December 1998 with a fight between a



Christian and a Muslim, but was finally controlled by local officials and without spreading (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp14-15). However, large scale violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in April 2000; after a brawl between a Christian and a Muslim youth from Lombok and Kayamanya and Sayo (A Muslim youth claimed to have been attacked by Christians, and showed cuts on his arm as proof). Violence spread out this time for several days after the brawl, with angry Muslims attacking Lombok (a Protestant neighborhood) and burning houses, churches and schools. Several Christians were reportedly pulled from cars and killed. During this period, the two sides began to use colored headbands and armbands to distinguish themselves. The Christians fighters became known as the red group and the Muslims as white group. To conclude, the first stage of the conflict was attacks by Muslims on Christians.

The second stage of the conflict just started three weeks after the end of the first stage, dominated by a wave of retaliatory attacks by Christians on Muslims. There were direct clashes between the red group and white group, but also the kidnapping and killing of non-combatants during this period, for example, the case in Sintuwu Lemba village (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.17-20). On May 28, 2000, a group of Christians surrounded this village and attacked it. Many villagers were killed by guns and machetes, whether or not they surrendered; women and children were captured and some women even being sexually assaulted. 39 bodies were later discovered in three mass graves. The attack on Sintuwu Lemba village was just one example of the serial attacks made by Christians, for they also attacked the villages of transmigrates from Lombok and Java in a similar way.

The conflict took a new turn in July 2001 with the involvement of LJ in the conflict. As the Human Right Watch Report stated that “The continued failure of a series of military and police operations to prevent violence or hold perpetrators accountable opened the door to the arrival of the radical Muslim group Laskar Jihad” (Human Rights Watch, 2002 p.20). LJ declared a jihad in Poso and began to dispatch hundreds of fighters to the district. The LJ and Muslim irregulars launched a scorched-earth campaign, destroying dozens of Christian villages, for example, the Sepe village, the villages in Pinedapa, Sayo and Kayamanya (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.25-27). During the days of late November and early December 2001, eight villages in Poso Pesisir and Lage subdistricts were largely burnt to the ground<sup>6</sup>; nine to fifteen dead and thousands fled to the mountain towns of Napu and Tentena. The LJ members were well-armed with automatic weapons.<sup>7</sup> The situation became more stabilized after the central government sent two battalions of soldiers and police to Tentena. There were rumors of a full-scale attack on Tentena (Protestant center) by LJ which raised the international awareness of this issue since the international community believed that Al-Qaeda may be seeking for such a chaotic conditions in Indonesia (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.27-28). Due to such external pressure, a Security Restoration Operation was launched with the aim in restoring peace in Sulawesi.

The conflicts in Sulawesi seems to have come to an end with the negotiation between representatives of the Muslim and Christian sides in a hill town called Malino, in South Sulawesi. The negotiation was presided over by officials from Jakarta<sup>8</sup>. After the talks on December 19-20, 2001, a ten point Malino Declaration<sup>9</sup> was drawn up and temporarily ended the hostilities. 1000 people had been killed and 80,000 displaced in this conflict.

## The application of the Conflict Cycle Model

In referring to the definition of conflict in chapter one, it is clear that the inter-communal antagonistic activities in Maluku and Sulawesi can be defined as a kind of conflict. It is a conflict between the Christians (the original settlers) and the Muslims (the transmigrants from other part of Indonesia) with incompatible objectives in struggling for the economic resource and political power distribution at the very beginning. Later on, with the involvement of LJ in the conflicts, the nature of the conflict began to transform as a tension grew between Muslims and non-Muslims as to whether Maluku and Sulawesi should be in the form as an Islamic state governed by Sharia or remain as a secular state.

Having identified the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi as a kind of conflict, the conflict cycle model can be used as a guide in illustrating the findings on Maluku and Sulawesi. However, there is difference from the previous chapter. Since the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi appeared quite recently, not like those prolonged conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya, therefore, the conflict cycle will be more appropriate than the conflict spiral in illustrating the communal conflicts. The conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi also go through the stages from **Base** to **Manifestation**, and then **Escalation**, **De-escalation** and finally reach **Termination**.

The Base for the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi were quite similar, generally speaking, the accumulation of religious, ethnic make-up, economic and political factors act as the underlying conditions for an overt struggle, which can fire the adversarial relationship; one side to contend with others. As stated in the

previous chapter, the presence of underlying condition does not equal the emergence of the conflict. The stage of Manifestation is important in studying the “life” of a conflict because whether a conflict will occur or not depends on this stage.

For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, it was quite interesting that the stage of Manifestation in the both cases were triggered out by an apparently trivial incident. For the case in Maluku, it was an altercation between a Christian bus driver and two Muslim passengers and for the case in Sulawesi, it was a brawl between a Muslim and a Christian. The underlying conditions in the first stage, Base, provided the foundation for the four necessary conditions for a conflict to become manifest (please refer to chapter one and five). These seemingly trivial events act as a catalyst that changes the underlying condition in the first stage to become more conducive to the eruption of a struggle. The altercation of the bus driver in Maluku and the brawl in Sulawesi can exploit the four conditions of manifestation and act as an excuse. Or act as a factor for the contending parties (Muslims and Christians) to mobilize supporters and directly try to affect the opposing side, so as to achieve their goal. Therefore, the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi became manifested after these two trivial incidents in January 1999 and April 2000 respectively.

Once a conflict became manifested, as time passes, with the increases in the severity of coercive inducements used and in the scope of participation within a conflict, the conflict has said to be transferred to another stage, the Escalation stage. For the case in Maluku, the process of escalation took place around December 1999 as demonstrated in the Tobelo massacre. The communal conflict

in Maluku was in the stage of escalation only until April 2002. In Sulawesi, the conflict escalated only from the brawl in April 2000 until December 2001. A very good indicator for the escalation is that the contending parties began to distinguish themselves by colors; at this period, it was symbolic of a more “mature” approach to in mobilizing the members for a fight to attain the goals. In fact, the level of violence had been increasing through out the process of escalation in both cases. Starting with some limited small fighting or antagonistic activities and then became massacres and burning of property of the opposite group in the conflict. The change in the targets from combatants to non-combatants in the conflicts can also reflect the increased level of coercive elements.

As stated in chapter five, the internal change in the adversaries, the change in relations between adversaries and the involvement of other parties in the conflict will governing the process of escalation in a conflict. The presence of LJ in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi at May 2000 and July 2001 was one of the major factor in escalating the conflicts. The Human Right Watch Report states that, “there has been a great deal made of the role of Laskar Jihad in exacerbating conflicts in Maluku and elsewhere, and our research confirms that Laskar Jihad’s presence helped fuel conflict in Poso” (Human Rights Watch, 2002 p.2). With the involvement of LJ in the conflicts, on one hand, it had changed the balance of resources between the Muslims and Christians in both the numbers of fighters and types of weapons. The better resources for the Muslim side in practicing more coercive means will intensifying the conflict because it makes them believe themselves to be winning and so overreach themselves; thus, they give little attention to the interests and concerns of the opposing sides. This

will polarize the relationship between the adversaries in the conflict. The contending parties tend to become increasingly isolated from each other. Members of each camp, with little contradiction, tend to reinforce each other's negative stereotypes of the adversary, so further dehumanizing the enemy (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.159-160). Self-fulfilling prophecies will occur under this situation and the hostility becomes reciprocated. In the cases of Maluku and Sulawesi, the patterns of conflict were quite similar with violence started by one side first; and then the other side will respond in the same way. For example, it is clear that the conflict in Sulawesi can be divided into three stages with Muslims attacking Christians first, and then Christians attacking Muslims, and finally with Muslims attacking Christians again. It is a very dangerous process in the relationship between adversaries which make both sides take a step up the escalation ladder unintentionally; the conflict has escalated to a higher level implicitly than either side believed was appropriate for the original subject of their quarrel.

As the conflicts go on, there will also be an internal change to the adversaries in the conflicts through the SocialPsychological process and the Organizational Development. The effect of cognitive dissonance theory and entrapment were present in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi, and the involvement of LJ even fostered these effects. This is because the use of term "jihad" acts as a good reason for justification for the violence that they have practiced; the religious values not only justify the harmful acts but also trap the combatants into a continuing struggle. Hence Thalib announced that anyone who died fighting Kafir harbi would become a martyr. He remarked:

“We founded this movement in order to support Muslims in eastern Indonesia. They were slaughtered by the thousands in Maluku. The government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent governments did not defend them from Christian attacks. In light of this situation, we had no choice but to found the Laskar Jihad organization, to protect our Muslim brother in eastern Indonesia.” (Abuza, 2003, p.70)

The above quotation also reflects the hard-line leadership of the LJ in which it will make an internal change in the Muslim side in the conflicts since organizational development is one of the factor in governing the internal change of the adversaries. Leadership identification with external conflict is one of the elements in shaping the organizational development, so, with a hard-line perspective in the leadership level, the organization tends to become so entrapped as the costs for them to admit that what they are doing now is a failure is so high (as they have publicly claimed the course of action undertaken to be the correct one).

In addition, the poor performance of the Jakarta government in dealing with the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi also acts as an external factor which fosters the process of escalation. The central government failed to effectively respond first of all to the minor incidents, and then to increasingly large-scale attacks, allowing the cycle of retribution to escalate out of control. The lose of faith in the security forces of the government also provided a gap for the presence of LJ as an instrument to ensure the security of the Muslims.

Both the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi entered the stage of De-escalation due to the government intervention. The increase in security forces

presence in Sulawesi , and the arrest of leaders of LJ and FKM, brought internal change to the two side, so that they did not have enough ability to sustain resistance in the conflicts. After that, the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi reached the final stage of a conflict, Termination. The conflict in Maluku seems to have come to an end and the consequence for the conflict in Sulawesi was the Malino Declaration. As stated before, since the communal conflicts in these two areas were not a prolonged conflict, the conflict cycle model will be more appropriate in illustrate the findings. However, the consequence at this moment may become the Base for a new conflict cycle later on subject to any internal or external change for the adversaries or the context behind them. Therefore, the communal conflicts may have a chance to become conflict spiral in the future.

Generally speaking, the means or the strategies that have been used by the two sides in the conflicts were full of coercive elements, particularly at the later stage of the conflicts. So, why is there a greater tendency for the adversaries in adopt a more coercive mode of strategy?

For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, the goals of the contending parties, the resources of the adversaries, the social context behind the conflict and the partisan characteristics all contribute in shaping out the strategy that the adversaries will adopt.

First of all, as stated in chapter five, “the greater the perceived incompatibility of the goals in a ... conflict, the greater the tendency for the adversaries to choose conflict modes with major coercive and even violent



components”. (Kriesberg, 1998, p.125). Moreover, as suggested by Louis Kriesberg, “Goals for members as an entity are more likely to seem to require coercion than are goals for individual constituent members (Kriesberg, 1998, p.125). For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, with the presence of LJ on the Muslim side, the goals became highly incompatible with the Christian sides; and the goals seems as an entity for all the Muslims after the mobilization by LJ of a “jihad” for the conflicts. For the resources, much evidence shows that LJ had received support from military and police, for example, the International Crisis Group notes that the “conclusion is unavoidable that the LJ received the backing of elements in the military and police. It was obviously military officers who provided them with military training...” (Human Right Watch, 2002 p.10). Some evidence even shows that LJ had received support from Al-Qaeda economically, but later on, Thalib had refused it. With the involvement of LJ, the Muslim sides in the conflicts had been increased in strength in terms of the number of fighters and weapons, which allows them to adopt a more coercive strategy. For the social context behind the conflicts, there is a change in the norms and prevailing ways of thinking for the adversaries due to the events of the September 11 incident. It breaks the traditional way of thinking and constraints against adopting conflict strategy; which provided a new perspective for the adversaries. The conventional understanding that acts as a barrier in conflict may crossed, inducing a much more coercive strategy in the conflict.

Finally, for the partisan characteristics, as suggested by Louis Kriesberg, group ideology drives and channels conflict behavior in many conflicts, thus it is a crucial component in partisan characteristics. (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.126-133). In the cases of Maluku and Sulawesi, it is clear that the communal conflicts had

included some elements of religions; it became more explicit after the involvement of LJ. Religions usually provide a vision of how individuals and communities should treat each other, including when they are in conflict; it is a kind of group ideology provided by a religions to its followers. However, more important is that the ideology also provided a justification for the use of violence; that means the religious beliefs have the ability to justify the use of force. As one of the world religions, Islam can have such an ability. With the presence of LJ in the conflicts, the group's ideology was consolidated, and that reinforced the effect of entrapment and cognitive dissonance. It is because they can now rationalize the practise of injuring and killing others; it will induce a more violent strategy for achieving the goals in the conflicts since the adversaries find a 'reason' for explaining what they are doing now.

To sum up, the above factors have contributed to a more coercive mode of strategy in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi. Is terrorism, as a kind of coercive strategy, being adopted by the adversaries in the communal conflicts? I will leave this question to the end of this chapter so as to have a discussion together with the case of JI at the same time.

### **The case of Jemaah Islamiyah**

JI was founded around 1993 to 1994 by the Arab-Indonesian preachers, Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Baasyir with the aim of establishing a Muslim fundamentalist state in the Southeast Asia region, which included Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Southern Thailand and even Indonesia. Baayir took over leadership of the organization following Sungkar's death in 1999.

Estimates of the organization's current membership vary from 500 to several thousands (Abuza, 2003 pp.125-171). The origins of the JI network are found in Indonesia, dating back to the 1960s. The group has its roots in Darul Islam, a violent radical movement that advocated the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia. The two founders of JI, Sungkar and Baasyir, considered themselves the ideological heirs of Sekarmadji Maridijan Kartosuwirjo (the founder of the Darul Islam). With such a strong ideology in mind, they set up Islamic boarding school in Solo in 1972 with the aim of spreading a hard-line Islamism. Baasyir and Sungkar were arrested by the Suharto regime in November 1978 and they were sentenced to nine years for violating a 1963 subversion law; the two were released in 1982<sup>10</sup>.

The massacre of Muslims protestors by the army in Tanjung Priok in September 1984 was seen by Baasyir as a declaration of war against Muslims, so he stepped up his attacks of the New Order government with a series of bombings in 1984 to 1985. However, due to the judgment of Supreme Court in 1985, Baasyir and Sungkar immediately fled to Malaysia. (Abuza, 2003, pp.125-128)

During the mid-1980s to early 1990s, Sungkar and Baasyir were trying to consolidate their thinking and began to establish their networks with other radical groups, for example Al-Qaeda (please refer to chapter four). At that period, Sungkar confirmed that a violent jihad was needed in order to create an Islamic state. In addition, he contended that the Islamic community had to build up three strengths which are faith's strength (Quwwatal aqidah); brotherhood's strength (Quwwatal Vkhuwwah) and military strength (Quwwatal Mashallah). Generally

speaking, it was a period of consolidation for JI, which was to have a great impact on the organization later. (Abuza, 2003, pp.125-128)

As stated before, although JI was established around 1993-94, it did not conduct its first terrorist acts until 2000. During this period, JI was in the stage of building up its network through recruiting, training, and strengthening technical proficiency. It is clear that the leaders of JI had a long-sighted view of sustaining the JI over time. The JI began to have a formal structure, with Sungkar and Baasyir serving as the group's *amirs* (spiritual) leaders, under whom there were four cells which covered different countries in the Southeast Asian region<sup>11</sup>. The fall of Suharto in 1998 provided a great opportunity for the expansion of JI. Just like hundreds of radical Muslim exiles, Sungkar and Baasyir could now return to Indonesia and demand political space. According to Abuza, "Sungkar and Baasyir threw themselves into the new political environment, feverishly working to build up a constituency of individuals committed to turning the post-New Order government into a true Islamic State" (Abuza, 2003, p141). In mid-2000, Baasyir even established the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI), an organization which serves as an umbrella organization and coordinating body for many militant and hard-line Islamic organizations groups who are committed to the establishment of an Islamic state. The goal for JI become more explicit at this moment as Baasyir said that "the long term strategy is to get Indonesia 100 percent based on Sharia. As long as Muslims are the majority, the country should be rule by Sharia" (Abuza, 2003, p142).

With developments in both the ideology, goals and network in the previous decade, the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi in the late 1990s acted

as a turning point in the JI's operations. The poor performance of the central government on this issue served to embolden the members of JI to act more violently in the future. Moreover, the jihads in these areas also act as a sample for JI and let them gain experience. Therefore, after years of planning, training and even gaining confidence in communal conflicts, JI carried out a series of operations by the beginning of 2000. In December 2000, a wave of church bombings in Indonesia that killed 18 peoples. Asian and US officials say Hambali had a hand in these attacks. In August 2000, the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia was the target of a bombing. The attack was conducted by Indonesian JI operatives. In October 2002, the JI carried out the Bali bombing which would leave 202 people dead (for details, see chapter four). This tragedy produced pressures both internally and externally for the Megawati's administration. The government finally arrested Baasyir and some suspects in the bombing; three were sentenced to death, one was sentenced to life in jail and Baasyir was sentenced to four years in prison for treason and immigration violations. In addition, between 9, December 2001, and June 2003, a number of JI's senior leaders and members were arrested<sup>12</sup>. At this moment, the capability of JI had been deeply affected

However, the trials of the JI leader, Baasyir and the Bali bombers are likely to provoke a strong reaction from JI against the secular side. The car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta on August 2003 was a good example.

### **The application of conflict cycle model**

It is clear that for the case of JI was certainly a conflict between the secular

side with the aim on a united country, that basically is the central government, and the JI. The two sides have an incompatible goal, for the Jakarta government wants to maintain Indonesia as a united and secular country; however, for JI, they want to establish an Islamic State in Southeast Asia with Indonesia as part of that Islamic state. Therefore, it is a conflict between two sides with an incompatible goal. Conflict cycle model can be use in analyzing the case of JI. Since the case of JI is a prolonged conflict with the roots at round 1960s, so conflict spiral model will be more appropriate for this case.

The Base for this conflict was rooted at the Darul Islam movement, in other words, the underlying conditions for this conflict come from the different views towards the nature of Indonesia. Some people think that it should be in the form as a unitary state with secular rule; while some may think that it should be a Islamic state encompassing other Islamic areas. These different views become the source for an a overt struggle later on.

The conflict became manifest after the massacre in Tanjung Priok in September 1974. From that moment, Baasyir, the spiral leader of JI in the the future began to believe that the Muslim side were suffering grievances and that he should try to bring about changes to other side in order to reduce their grievances. The massacre fostered these underlying conditions in the base change and became more conducive to the eruption of a struggle.

The conflict entered the stage of escalation with a series of bombings which were allegedly encouraged by Baasyir in 1984 to 1985. The conflict has said to be escalated since there was a increase in the severity of coercive inducement

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used in the conflict. The conflict soon moved on to the stage of de-escalation after Baasyir and Sungkar had fled to Malaysia in 1985, and then it had entered the stage of termination.

The end of the first sweep of the conflict became the base for the second sweep in the conflict spiral. The suppression by the central government of Sunkar and Baasyir at the first sweep even helped to consolidate their goal of creating an Islamic State and against the central government. Sungkar stated in a 1997 interview:

Suharto, using force, makes it compulsory for the Islamic community to accept Pancasila as the only foundation for the nation, political parties and organizations...his regime still applies the system "detect, defect and destroy" when applied towards the Islamic movement which it distrusts and regards as subversive.

The conflict was again in the stage of escalation during the period from the late 1990s to late 2002. During this period, there was an increase in the scope of participation in the conflict since JI began to develop both in terms of resources and organizational institutions. Such an internal development provided the foundation for the use of more coercive conflict strategies in the future. In addition, the fall of Suharto in 1998 also acted as an external influence at the stage of escalation. It is because the fall of Suharto provided a change in relations between the adversaries and the leaders of JI have a chance to go back to Indonesia. There was an increase in the severity of inducements used in the conflict, particularly 2000-2002, such as the bombing on churches. The escalation came to its height with the Bali bombing in 2002.

Due to the pressures from the internal and external side, the central government took action against JI by arresting Baasyir and other senior leaders and members of JI. The conflict soon moved on to the stage of de-escalation since the JI did not have enough ability to sustain its resistance to the Indonesia government. Then, the conflict reached the final stage, Termination. Up to now, it seems as if the conflict between the central government and JI has come to an end. However, the car bombing in J.W. Marriot hotel in 2003 shown that a new conflict sweep may possibly emerge as some of the JI members may not happy with the result in the second sweep, which was the arrest of Baasyir. The end of the second sweep of conflict may become the case for a new sweep.

The conflict spiral model serve well in guiding the findings on the case of JI; from the analysis right before, we can see that there was an increase in the coercive elements in the conflict, particularly for the Bali bombing. A question arises as to why JI chose to adopt conflict strategies with violence? Just as in the case of LJ, the four factors governing the adaptation of different strategies by the adversaries were: goals of adversaries; resources of adversaries; social context behind the conflict and partisan characteristics.

First of all, it is clear that the goal for JI and the Jakarta government is incompatible, therefore, there will be a greater tendency for the adversaries to choose a conflict strategy with major coercive and even violent components. Second, resources is a crucial factor in determining which strategy can be adopt. With its development during the late 1990s to early 2000, JI had enough ability in practicing conflict strategies with more coercive elements. For the social context behind the conflict, the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi did



break the norms and prevailing ways of thinking to JI, giving confidence to them in practicing a more violent strategy due to the equivocation performance by the Indonesian government on the communal conflicts. Finally, JI provided a strong and consolidated ideology to the members who can use it as a justification for the violent acts. The ability to justify or rationalize the coercive elements in the conflict will reinforce the effect of cognitive dissonance and entrapment, which will foster or intensify the process of escalation in a conflict by making internal changes to one side. This can be seen from the interviews with Amrozi and Imam Samudra, the accused bombers in the Bali incident.

When investigators asked Amrozi why he wanted to bomb the Sari Club he repeatedly told them he hated Americans. Similarly, Imam Samudra made it clear that his main target was the U.S. He said: 'I hated America because it is the real center of international terrorism, which has already repeatedly tyrannized Islam'. 'I carry out jihad', he declared, 'because it's the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so [that] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of Muslim community is not shed for nothing'. He went on to say that he had chosen the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar as targets because he knew they were 'often visited by Americans and even Mossad people'. (Fealy, 2003)

From the above dialogue, it is clear that the effect of cognitive dissonance and entrapment was reinforced by the strong religious ideology. It imparted a powerful sense of mission and purpose to the adversaries in the conflict, which induced them to take part in more violent activities. It is because they just see themselves as fighting a heroic war against evil, but not committing violent acts.

### **Existence of Terrorism in the Ideological Challenge**

So, up to now, we know that for both the cases of LJ and JI, despite the difference in aims, they are conflicts with coercive elements inside it. The question here is does terrorism, a kind of coercive conflict strategy, exist in the ideological challenge by Islam in Indonesia?

For the case of LJ, it seems that the communal conflict in Maluku and Sulawesi was just a civil war. However, I would argue that it is a conflict with terrorism, because the means and tactics used by both sides can fulfill the six elements of terrorism which have been mentioned in chapter one. The two sides in the conflict, the Muslims and the Christians try to create and instil fear to the opposite group through violent means, such as massacre and burning villages. These practices can instil fear to the “target audience” in the hope of expelling the other side from Maluku and Sulawesi. It is clear that the communal conflicts had induced the mechanism of terrorism (see chapter one). Moreover, it was not a civil war because the scale was not as large as a war. In principle, war is subject to rules of international law; while terrorist recognize no rules.

For the case of JI, it is clear that its practice and networking was a kind of New Terrorism in terms of the nature of the group, the level of lethality and the practice of not claiming credit for the attacks (see chapter one).

Both the cases for LJ and JI demonstrated that terrorism perpetrated for religious motives is far more lethal. Take the examples in Maluku and Sulawesi, after the involvement of LJ, which reinforced the element of religious motives. The conflicts thus became intensified in terms of the level of violence. The reason behind it is the different value system, concept of morality, mechanism of

legitimization and justification provided by religions. A good example is the dualism of Baasyir, who viewed the world as divided in two:

Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan..God's group are those who follow Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws and struggle for the implementation of Sharia, that is [Hisbullah]. Meanwhile what is meant by Satan's group is humanity which oppose Allah's law, humanity which wishes to bring pressure to bear upon Allah's law, and wishes to throw obstacles in the path of the implementation of Allah's law...

Because the character of followers of Satan is always opposing Allah.. there is no non-believer who allows the development of Islam, who will allow Islam to be free; non-believer must work hard to threaten Islam and laws thereof. This is the character of non-believers. Non-believers will always expend their wealth to impede the way of God, to impede the law of Islam. Non-believers will expend not insignificant sums to destroy Islam. This is the character of non-believers (Abuza, 2003, p.127)

With such a different perception among themselves (the members of LJ and JI) and their violent acts, they see themselves as "outsiders" of the existing system, and seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This is quite different from those terrorists who are not inspired by religions, and who regard violence either as "a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system." (Hoffman, 1998, p.95) This can help to explain why terrorists with religious motivation are more unconstrained than those who only have a secular mind. As Hoffman stated "This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorists to contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists, and indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category of "enemies" for attack" (Hoffman, 1998, p.95). Also, religious martyrdom increase the ferocity of the

attacks.

Therefore, with the above reasons, it will be not hard to understand why the ideological challenge by Islam in Indonesia has induced terrorism as the strategy in the conflicts. Indeed, such a security threat is quite difficult for the Jakarta government in tackling it due to the internal constraints within the country itself and the constraints on dealing with terrorism.

### **How difficult to tackle**

For the internal constraints, due to the political instability of the post-Suharto period and aware of the Muslim influence in politics, the central government held a regressive attitude towards the ideological challenge by Islam. Their approach to the conflict is just to try to keep large-scale violence from flaring up again, but not to assess to the fundamental factor(s) behind the conflict. Such a rationale has induced a poor performance by the government and the security forces in handling the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi and provided a chance for the involvement of LJ, which in return acted as the main factor in escalating the conflicts. In addition, the security forces also contributed to intensifying the conflicts since they have sold weapons to LJ and allow LJ militiamen traveling from Java to Maluku and Sulawesi (Huxley, 2002, p.60). Abuza also stated that “There is evidence that the military allowed this to happen to discredit the civilian government that has tried to politically emasculate the military...Clearly the LJ benefited from the domestic political situation and the contest of wills between president Wahid and the military” (Abuza, 2003, pp.71-72).

For the constraints on dealing with terrorism, due to the change in the nature of terrorist groups and the easier means to assess the terrorist tactics and means, more “amateurs” had been involved in terrorist acts. This makes it hard for the government to recognize the targets that they needed to deal with, so making it more difficult to track and anticipate. Moreover, the less defined set of political, social and economic objectives for the terrorist groups, which are motivated by a religious imperative, together with the transnational cooperation among the terrorist groups are creating a far more amorphous and diffuse context than before. In the face of such a complicated situation, to which should be added the internal difficulties of the country itself, it is believed that the central government will find it hard in dealing with the threat from the Islamic ideological challenge linked with terrorism.

### **Conclusion**

To conclude, the ideological challenge by Islam may be much more dangerous than the secessionist threat to the national security of Indonesia. It is because religions will provide a strong sense of ideology in the conflict which will make the situation become more complicated. The adversaries in the conflict can justify the violent acts that they are undertaking as a divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. The traditional constraints, such as political, moral or practical constraints on other adversaries may not be a constraint anymore to the adversaries with a religious background. More coercive elements will be appearing during the conflicts.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Jaafar is the grandson of a Yemeni trader who settled in East Java. In 1986, he traveled to Pakistan for Islamic studies and attended a training camp. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, Jaafar returned to Java.

<sup>2</sup> According to Thalib, jihad “does not mean war. In the Quran there are 13 types of jihad. Sometimes it means peaceful struggle. Sometimes it means doing good works. Sometimes it means a fight against Santa, and sometimes it means against infidels.” When asked which type of jihad it was in the Malukus, he answered, “All 13 at once.”

<sup>3</sup> During the Dutch colonial period, Christians were the majority in Maluku’s population.

<sup>4</sup> The conflict in North Maluku was broke out in August 1999, after plans were announced for a new administrative district in northern Halmahera, populated by Muslim migrants from the island of Makian and including a newly-opened gold mine. The clash occurred against the backdrop of North Maluku’s imminent separation to form a new province, and plans for provincial elections in June 2000.

<sup>5</sup> An organization established by Maluku Protestant leaders in mid-2000, which demanded independence for Ambon and surrounding islands.

<sup>6</sup> The eight villages are: Betalemba, Patiwunga, Deuwa, Sanginora, Tangkura, Padalembara, Silanca, and Sepe.

<sup>7</sup> They were well equipped, for example, with AK-47s, grenade and rocket launchers, bulldozers, and tanker trucks.

<sup>8</sup> It was organized by the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Yudhoyono and Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Yusuf Kalla.

<sup>9</sup> The ten-point of Malino Declaration:

- 1) To cease all forms of conflict and dispute.
- 2) To obey efforts to enforce the law and support legal sanctions against lawbreakers.
- 3) To ask the state apparatus to act firmly and justly to maintain security.
- 4) In order to create a condition of peace, to reject the imposition of a state of emergency and any foreign party involvement.
- 5) To dismiss slander and dishonesty against all parties and enforce an attitude of mutual respect, and to forgive for the sake of peaceful coexistence.
- 6) Poso is an integral part of Indonesia. Therefore every citizen has the right to live, come and stay peacefully and respectfully of local customs.
- 7) All rights and belongings have to be returned to their lawful owners as they were before the conflict began.
- 8) To return all displaced people to their respective homes.
- 9) Together with the government, to carry out complete rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure.
- 10) To carry out respective religious laws according to a principle of mutual respect and to abide by all the agreed upon rules, in the form of laws, government regulations, or other regulations.

<sup>10</sup> A second court upheld the conviction but lessened the sentence to four years. But in 1985, the supreme court overturned the appeals court’s conviction and reimposed the original nine years sentence.

<sup>11</sup> Cell (mantiqi) 1 covered peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand.

Cell (mantiqi) 2 covered Indonesia.

Cell (mantiqi) 3 covered the Philippines, Brunei, eastern Malaysia, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

Cell (mantiqi) 4 was being developed to establish cells in Australia and Irian Jaya (Papua).

<sup>12</sup> There were roughly eighty in Malaysia, thirty one in Singapore, nearly fifty in Indonesia, and a dozen in Philippines.

## Chapter Seven

### Conclusion

Is terrorism becoming a new threat to Indonesia? Probably, it will be the most crucial question in this thesis. However, in exploring this question, more questions on the national security of Indonesia have emerged at the same time. In this concluding chapter, we will come across the research questions of this thesis first, which may act as a summary; then, the question on whether terrorism becomes a new threat to Indonesia will be answered. Finally, can we obtain any implication or inspiration from this study?

In chapter three, the nature of the key security threats has been identified as the secessionist threat and the ideological challenge by Islam (Research Question 1)

Referring to Research Question 2, the nature of the security threats has changed due to the change in political environment. Security threats during the Sukarno and Suharto period had included with the ideological challenge from communism. However, due to the change in international political context, this threat had evaporated. Moreover, for those threats which already existed in the Sukarno and Suharto period, because of the stepping down of Suharto, they seemed to become more intensified than before. The fall of Suharto did made changes in the political environment. A more released political atmosphere allowed the increasing presence of the Islamic organizations in politics; and the favored instrument in dealing with the secessionist threats --- special autonomy seems not work any more. In addition, with the fall of Suharto, the military side has changed, for the differences between

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the civilian government and the TNI has been increased. Central government finds it hard in controlling the TNI side. Beside the change in the political environment, the economic background (particularly the 1998 economic collapse) also acts as a factor the change in the nature of the security threats.

After dealing with the Research Questions which are concerned with the security side, we now move on to examine the questions that focusing on terrorism.

Terrorism in this thesis has been divided into two types, ‘traditional’ terrorism and New Terrorism (refer to chapter one). Generally speaking, ‘traditional’ terrorism had already existed in the secessionist movements and the ideological challenge by Islam. These security threats were a kind of conflict, and ‘traditional’ terrorism act as a conflict strategy in achieving the goal(s) (refer to chapter five and six).

Due to the change in the world context together with the internal change within Indonesia itself, ‘traditional’ terrorism which had been existed in the security threats before seems to have transformed into New Terrorism. The Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel Bombing were the watershed between the ‘traditional’ terrorism and New terrorism in Indonesia.

The increasing level of lethality in the terrorism attacks, the practice of not claiming for immediate responsibility by the terrorist groups after the attacks, the transnational cooperation and infiltration of Al-Qaeda since the late 1980s, and the more obscure millenarian goals and goal(s) with religious imperative were all good indicators to demonstrate the transformation of ‘traditional’ terrorism to New Terrorism to Indonesia.



As mentioned before, terrorism is a kind of conflict strategy that was adopted by the secessionists and the radical religious groups as a means for achieving their aim(s). Therefore, there is a difference between tackling the security threats and terrorism, since the first one is the subject itself and the second one is the mean to achieve the subject.

The limitation on or difficulties for the Indonesian government in tackling the security threats was due to the political instability after the fall of Suharto. There were many constraints on the successors of Suharto, such as the increasing influence of the Islamic side, the influence from the TNI and the external influence from other countries or forces. These kinds of constraints limited the choice and freedom for the central administration to adopting their policy since the government need to keep a balance among different sides. The response to the September 11 incident by Megawati's government was a good example in illustrating how the pressure from internal and external side affected the decision making of the central government (refer to chapter four). Because of such a political instability in the central administration, the government has not had a consistent planning on strategy in handling the security threats. In addition, the TNI also acted as an instable factor to the security threats since some evidence has shown that TNI was involved in the secessionist movements in Aceh and the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi (refer to chapter five and six).

The limitations and difficulties in tackling terrorism, or more specifically, the New Terrorism by the Indonesian government was basically due to the difficulties in recognizing the target. The obscure goals among the terrorists or terrorist groups, the less cohesive structure of the terrorist groups, the presence of more 'amateur'

terrorists with fewer constraints from the central command authority were all factors that have made it difficult for the government to track and anticipate the terrorist acts. Since everyone may have a chance to become a terrorist, it will be difficult for the government to just find a target and hit. With the globalization and the increase in telecommunications and information flow, more and more people may have a chance to access the skills on terrorist acts, such as making bombs. This means there is a higher probability for anyone to be a terrorist. The government will not have enough ability in tackling this.

In addition, the geographical features of Indonesia --- a vast archipelago make it a potential heaven for the transnational cooperation and infiltration among terrorist groups, since such vast and separated boundaries increase the difficulty for the government to search for and hit terrorists.

In answering the question “Is terrorism a recent threat for Indonesia?” I would say “no”, since Indonesia had been faced with the threat from “traditional” terrorism already. However, if the question becomes more specific, let say, “Is New Terrorism becomes a new threat for Indonesia?” Then, the answer will become “yes, it is a new threat for Indonesia.”

Basically, terrorism in Indonesia is now in the process of transformation from the “traditional” one towards the New Terrorism due to the change in international as well as domestic context. New terrorism contains some new features which make it more difficult to tackle than the “traditional” one (for example the use of Weapon of Mass Destruction). Therefore, the traditional way in dealing with terrorism may not be work now, thus, in facing with New Terrorism, Indonesia is facing a new threat

which has not existed before. Actually, there is not a clear cut or distinction between “traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism. The “New” one is building on the “traditional” one, with some modifications fine-tuning on it due to the change in the context. Therefore, as the domestic context of Indonesia has changed (such as the liberalization of political atmosphere after the fall of Suharto) together with the change in international context (such as globalization), the “traditional” terrorism that was adopted by the secessionists and radical religious groups will also transform to New Terrorism. Acting as a new threat to Indonesia’s national security.

Throughout the whole thesis, conflict cycle and conflict spiral model has been used as a guiding on findings. They were good at illustrating the “life” of a conflict. It is valuable and important for us to have some knowledge on conflict because terrorism is just a mean or strategy in the conflict, the fundamental or basis for terrorism is the conflict itself. So, if we can stop the emergence of a conflict, then terrorism will not exist too.

Moreover, it can also help in demonstrate that terrorism act as the last and the most violence strategy for the adversaries (secessionists and radical Muslims/Christians) to achieve their goals. Three factors will generate the adoption of the strategy as suggested by the model. They are goals, resources and social context of the adversaries. All the cases (both the secessionist case, the communal conflicts as well as the case for JI) in this thesis shows that the conflict strategy adopted by the adversaries at first were in small scale and less violent form, however, as the process of escalation goes on; together with the change in the factors mentioned above, for example, the social psychological process will re-assure/re-enforce the goals of each sides in a conflict. Making it much more

difficult for both sides to settle down peacefully. This will, however, induce them to adopt a more lethal strategy in order to achieve the goals.

It seems that the analysis with conflict cycle and conflict spiral model in chapter five and six is quite pessimistic, because once the conflict has started (security threats) it will never end. However, we can still lessen the situation by stopping the moving of the conflict one stage to another stage in the conflict cycle. Even if there are underlying conditions, at the stage of Base, a conflict would not emerge if it has not reach the Manifestation stage. Similarly, even if it has reached the stage Manifestation, the destruction of a conflict can still be managed by preventing it from reaching the Escalation stage. As Kriesberg stated that “We may not escape them (conflicts) all, but we can certainly reduce them and limit them” (Kriesberg, 1998, p.371). To be more concrete, if the Indonesian government really wants to manage those conflicts (security threats) in the country, they should pay more attention to the handling of the grievances of the contending groups. If they have not created a sense of grievance among themselves, the conflict will be less easy to become manifest. The Jakarta government can do it through establishing a formal and consistent rather than spasmodic and chaotic conflict resolution mechanism or institutions, such as negotiation or a official department which is specifically for dealing with the related conflict. Moreover, the central government should deal with the conflicts immediately and so prevent them to become a prolonged conflict. If conflicts cannot be settle down in a short term, the process of escalation will be intensified, more violent elements will be included, thus, turning the conflict into a more destructive way which is more difficult to manage.

To conclude, there is an inter-relationship between national security, security

threats and terrorism. Given that terrorism is a strategy in the security threats (conflicts), then those threats will affect the national security of Indonesia. In the course of doing this research, my studies have induced me into some rethinking about the country of Indonesia. First, the transmigration programme practiced by the Jakarta government during the Suharto period can be considered as a structural and divisive cause of terrorism -both “traditional” and New Terrorism. In such a way a wrong policy by “elites” may create a deep impact on many humans which is far outside their expectations. Second, the original fluidity of Indonesia which Sukarno and Suharto did much to freeze is now thawing. Indonesia's national identity is in question by millions of its citizens. Indonesia is now at the crossroads, and it seems that no one can change this situation in the near future.

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