

台灣「中國因素」：民主及其不滿

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(初稿未經允許請勿流通引用)

「自主、開明及多元是小地方讓自己可以不卑不亢地存活下去的唯一方法，跟大國們幻想自己有自由、平等、博愛是不一樣的。……小地方必須學習自主，讓小地方的人不要整天被大國牽著鼻子走，有時間與空間去積存小地方獨有的記憶、話語、氣味，同時挖掘與面對小地方在大國陰影下，自我感覺經常失調造成的諸般壓抑與自我傷害」(游靜，2014，序)

游靜在《我從未應許你一個玫瑰園》的序〈小地方小政治〉中寫著這一小段話，「小地方」好似香港，也好似台灣，困在沒有頁數、不知往前還是向後的灰色頁面上。面對中國的台灣，總是想著大國夢，如果不是想與他為一份子，就是依著美國，擺出要與中國平起平坐、乃至高高在上的姿態。這篇文章，就是試著講述台灣在「中國因素」論述如何作大國夢的故事。這篇文章，我要處理的問題是，近年台灣知識界面對「中國因素」所提出的《自由人宣言》(即建立在落實主權確立下的憲政民主，以保障人權作為兩岸協商的架構) 的可能侷限與問題。這套以普世價值為基礎的新的兩岸關係框架，主要建立在兩個要素：一是確立國

家主權為民主體制的前提，二同時將國家主權延伸至普世價值的人民主權（體現在公民社會），作為兩岸關係對話的基礎。面對台灣過去本土認同與國族統獨論述對立逐漸失效、以及因應「中國因素」兩岸局勢變化下民進黨亟欲發展新的本土論述的脈絡，這套論述的提出，試圖回應過去本土論述的問題與不足，嘗試將建立在台灣本土身分認同的民主想像，轉向至建立在現代國家主權認可的普世價值與公民社會實踐。然而，這套以現代國家主權為前提的普世民主觀，以他者化香港成為台灣未來的反面例子，恰恰形成建構台灣自身相對於中國的民主想像，反而取消了其欲超越、打開的第三種、民主的中國想像。

何謂台灣的「中國因素」？

台灣的「中國因素」成為媒體與社會流行的用語，始於2012年的反媒體壟斷運動，當時其一訴求是要求台灣政府對「中國因素」干預台灣新聞媒體自由進行表態，並提出具體應對方法。¹運動中的「中國因素」，係指如旺旺中時集團

¹ 參見「反媒體巨獸青年聯盟」Facebook 介紹：

<http://www.facebook.com/idontwantwant/info>，2013/03/08 瀏覽。官方網站：

<http://www.idontwantwantleague.blogspot.tw/>，2013/03/08 瀏覽。

的跨海峽兩岸大財團及其親中意識型態，在台灣壟斷媒體、侵害言論與新聞自由。然而，運動主要針對的議題是台灣內部媒體改革的問題，「中國因素」除了是標的旺旺中時集團這個運動反對的對象，並以此象徵來召喚群眾之外，內容上並無在兩岸關係層次上針對中國因素提出分析與訴求。「中國因素」的內涵，主要是由台灣知識界所提出，以吳介民與其所參與的「台灣守護民主平台」等自由派學者為代表。「台灣守護民主平台」的組成主要是政治、法律、社會學等學者，政治立場上主要屬自由主義、統獨立場偏向獨立，但對國民兩黨操作藍綠族群對立感到不滿，其成立緣起則是因聲援2008年聲援野草莓學運抗議馬英九政府侵害集會遊行權利所連署集結而成。²

那麼，對他們來說，何謂「中國因素」？吳介民在其《第三種中國想像》(2012)將之定義為由中國政府、國民黨與親中跨海峽大資本財團所形成的「跨海峽政商聯盟」，他並進一步指出，「中國因素」已經從過去由過去國民黨威權代表的「中華道統」與反共意識型態，隨著中國在東亞與世界政治與經濟的崛起，對台灣而言，成為實質、迫近的政治現實，也造成台灣民主化的難題。而「中國因素」對台灣民主化的影響，吳介民借Juan Linz與Alfred Stephan的觀點指出，「主權國家是現代民主政體的前提」，所以台灣「由於中國因素逐漸由外而內影響到臺灣

² 「台灣守護民主平台協會」介紹請參見「台灣守護民主平台協會」網站，

<http://www.twdem.org>，2013/4/23 瀏覽。

的政治生活，導致主權爭議與國族認同兩者糾結不清。……台灣民主發展的種種危機，反映了『主權受挑戰國家民主化』的難題。」（吳介民，2012：76-77）

基於此觀點，吳特別指出，「困擾我們[台灣]多年的『藍綠爭議』」的國族認同問題，不僅僅是內生，也是「『主權受挑戰國家民主化』的一個副作用」（80-81）。

其他「中國因素」對台民主化影響的例子，還包括隨著2008年國民黨馬英九當選總統後，國民黨2008年接待海協會會長陳雲林來訪，限制群眾集會遊行抗議，同時也與中國簽訂兩岸經濟貿易的ECFA，以及2012年總統大選台商表態支持國民黨九二共識，左右了台灣選舉的結果，讓國民黨繼續執政等，都是在「中國因素」影響下，使台灣主權受挑戰因而引發的民主化難題（83-87）。

所以，面對「中國因素」有二個因應之道。第一個是主權獨立，因為「主權完整是民主的前提」係作為理解中國因素對民主政治侵害的框架，最明顯的例子是香港缺乏主權所以民主化受阻，因此，台灣不僅僅需要保衛主權，同時因為香港作為中共一國兩制的試點，台灣的主權獨立也有助拉大香港民主化的空間（吳介民，2012：134-137；林濁水，2012）。另一個是發展公民社會。吳介民從過去台灣對抗國民黨威權所流行的民間社會論（民間社會對抗國家），提出「跨海峽公民社會」作為對抗「中國因素」的因應之道，而台灣的角色則被視為以其民主化經驗，扮演了華語地區民主發展的「說三道四」的領頭角色（吳介民，2012：55-60）。同時，為了超越過去台灣民主化與本土化過程「民間」社會所形成的族群對立，再次強調公民社會中「civil」的「公民性」（civility）與政治「文明

性」(publicness)，以發展理性溝通的公共領域 (206-214)。這種超越族群與統獨，即吳介民所謂的「第三種中國想像」。

在兩岸政治架構層面上而言，2013年4月「台灣守護民主平台」則提出「自由人宣言」，以高標準理想的政治路線圖，強調台灣／中華民國的主權屬於台灣人民，以「主權在民」、人權憲章，取代兩岸既有一邊一國九二共識的新的規範性框架，並作為介入馬英九任內希望推動的兩岸和平協議簽署。在此基礎之上，呼籲兩岸政權在憲政主義所強調的人權保障基礎上(自由人)各自發展並發展友誼關係，進而建立政治互信、展開與東亞各國之間政府與公民社會的對話，以政治文明為基礎，建立東亞區域的和平。³簡言之，該宣言所預設的兩岸政治框架，是建立在落實國家主權確立下的憲政民主與人權保障，兩岸並依此作為之後彼此外來政治結盟的架構。

超越「民間社會VS.國家」的普世民主

這套由自由派學者所提出的「中國因素」論述與兩岸政治框架，不僅只是因應反媒體壟斷運動訴求突然而生的政治論述。這套政治論述的出現，一方面對台

³ 台灣守護民主平台協會，2013/04，「《自由人宣言》—以《人權憲章》重構台灣與中國之關係(完整版)」，台灣守護民主平台協會網站，<http://www.twdem.org>，

2013/4/23 瀏覽。

灣內部政治而言，是想試圖超越本土族群對立的政治路線與兩黨政黨政治的惡鬥，強調「民間社會」到「公民社會」意義的轉變。另一方面，是在民進黨2012年總統大選蔡英文落選、重新恢復中國事務部，為尋求新的中國政策的政治脈絡下，對台灣民進黨兩岸政治論述的一種批判與補充。

就台灣內部政治而言，過去的民主化路線主要是「民間社會 VS. 國家」(*civil society VS. the State*) 的路線，以強調民間社會的民間，對抗國民黨黨國威權的官方。其中，以民進黨為首的普選代議政治發展與本土化 (台灣人) 的社會文化，是兩條主要的方法，一方面政治上以發展代議政治與普選，來挑戰國民黨的專制威權，另一方面以社會文化上的「本土化」來對抗國民黨的「大中國」意識型態。這條路線的成功，以 2000 年民進黨陳水扁 (台灣之子) 成功透過全民普選選上總統為代表。

然而，民主化過程中的一個政治文化問題，在於這「民間社會」的族群對立越來越深，尤其是在國民兩黨為了選票操作族群對立、以及陳水扁執政後期因貪污案訴諸台獨基本教義派政治路線以確保自身正當性，因而形成了本土族群對立的民粹化政治。因此，台灣過去主要強調「民間社會VS.國家」的自由派學者，引介「公共領域」，試圖在論述上建立能超越民間社會族群民粹政治的公民社會，(李丁讚、吳介民，2008)，其中所謂「公民」意指發展「公民性」與政治「文明性」(吳介民，2012；曾國祥，2012)。同時，在政治行動上，2007年「第

三社會黨」⁴ (要參與2008年的立委選舉) 的成立，就是希望以「第三社會」，以公民社會的公共性與文明性，超越第一民間與第二民間社會之間的族群民粹政治。在這自由派知識分子的政治路線脈絡中，面對「中國因素」及其對台灣族群對立的間接影響，發展超越民間社會的「公民社會」於是成了當中主要的一個對應之策。

另一方面，「自由人宣言」這套以「主權在民」的兩岸政治架構新提法，同時呼應了民進黨在中國兩岸政策上的困境。這困境在於，面對本土認同與國族統獨作為政治操作逐漸失效，同時中國也不僅僅只是族群與國族認同，而是政治經濟實體，民進黨缺乏新的兩岸論述。這困境尤其在 2008 年國民黨馬英九當選總統後，問題更為明顯。2012 年總統選舉，民進黨候選人蔡英文的敗選，就象徵著以過去民進黨以國族認同的對中路線，被視為「逢中必反」，無法因應中國對台經濟發展的影響，而強調兩岸政治穩定與經濟發展正是國民黨主打的策略。所以，有媒體分析，就是因為民進黨反對國民黨強調的一中各表「九二共識」與中台的經濟協定「ECFA」，操作不穩定的兩岸關係，所以引來企業家與部分民眾對於

⁴ 關於第三社會黨介紹，可參考維基百科「第三社會黨」：[http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/](http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/第三社會黨)

[第三社會黨](#)，2013/03/10 瀏覽；或第三社會黨部落格：

<http://society3party.blogspot.hk/>。

經濟不穩定的恐懼疑慮，因此將票投給國民黨。⁵因對中政策進退失據，選舉失利的民進黨重新恢復中國事務部宣稱要重新認識中國⁶，青壯派也於「自由人宣

⁵ 報導可參見葉志堅·2012/01/14·「看大選」蔡英文敗選 陳文茜：反 92 共識所致」，
《Now News 今日新聞》，

<http://www.nownews.com/2012/01/14/11756-2776546.htm>，2013/03/10 瀏覽。

企業家包括最有名的手機大廠 HTC 宏達電董事長王雪紅，特別在大選前是否存在「九二共識」爭議時，出來表態支持「九二共識」，她認為因為有「九二共識」兩岸才能和平發展，其公司也因而得以在 2008 年至 2012 年可以在兩岸和平的基礎上發展創新，相關報導可參見吳佳穎·2012/01/13·「王雪紅表態 支持九二共識」，《中央通訊社》，<http://tw.news.yahoo.com/王雪紅表態-支持九二共識-091239088.html>，

2013/03/10 瀏覽。

⁶ 蘇貞昌接任黨主席，即提出民進黨應該加強認識中國，並聲明重新恢復民進黨黨中央的中國事務部。同時他也接受香港《陽光時務週刊》第 26 期採訪表示，兩岸關係複雜，中國變化快，必須要「知己知彼」，並提出要了解「庶民中國」的概念，即對中國民間有多些互動，同時批評國民黨從反共到經濟上親中的轉變，也替民進黨的兩岸政策辯護，提到民進黨並非如國民黨所言逢中必反，也不反對貿易往來，執政時期與中國經濟貿易也是正常往來，不過，他也提出民進黨的底線是堅持主權，他說「台灣本身的價值、存在是最重要的」，不能完全依賴中國。訪談內容可參見「專訪蘇貞昌：未來兩岸，國共皆不復主流」，張鐵志採訪，《陽光時務週刊》第 26 期，2012/10/11 出版。除

言」發表之下的下一個月，即 2013 年 5 月，推出《台海人權決議文》，並於 2014 年 1 月召開多場華山會議，希望擬出新的兩岸政治路線圖。

此之外，曾任行政院院長、民進黨黨主席與民進黨總統候選人的謝長廷，也於 2012 年 10 月 4 日以民間團體國際調酒協會國際顧問的私人身分訪中國，並在 10 月 1 日行前記者會指出面對國共聯手，民進黨對中不能再一成不變，同時訪中過程提出兩岸要面對差異，並主張「憲法共識」（憲法各表）取代「92 共識」（一中各表），其訪問當然也引起討論與民進黨偏台獨派矮化的批評，相關內容可參考 2012 年 10 月 9 日公共電視《有話好說》的「謝長廷訪問中國！民共交流大破冰」專題，

<http://talk.news.pts.org.tw/2012/10/vs.html>，2013/03/10 瀏覽。另外，蔡英文的財團法人小英教育基金會也成立《想想論壇》，邀請各方針對時事撰寫評論的平台，其中一個專欄為「中國觀察」，同時《想想論壇》發刊辭上，她便點出當台灣越來越依賴中國時，更需要好好想想如何面對台灣與中國的關係，她寫道：「我們要跳脫過去談論中國問題總是聚焦在兩岸關係的既定架構，要把新觀點、新視野注入到我們對中國的理解當中。不只要了解世界如何看待中國，也要了解中國如何看待世界、如何看待台灣。除此之外，我們還要深入瞭解中國的政府與人民，我們也需要想想現階段台商的處境。」

詳細可見蔡英文於《想想論壇》的發刊詞「蔡英文：想想台灣」，

http://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/public/welcome/site_info，2013/03/10 瀏覽。

如同「自由人宣言」發表研討會上，曾為蔡英文總統選舉幕僚的學者姚人多，便指出過去在台獨論述在現今兩岸關係上備受挑戰，因此必須思考更進步、能被台灣社會多數接受的方案。⁷因此，當民進黨尋求新的兩岸論述與政治框架的同時，「中國因素」論述與「自由人宣言」的提出，我認為是試圖介入目前國民兩黨，尤其是民進黨的兩岸政治論述。在兩岸政治層面，以自由主義的民主人權高

⁷ 因應媒體與獨派認為姚人多暗示「台獨沒市場」一說，後續姚人多更進一步發表聲明其立場：「我主張，民進黨應該要跳脫過去傳統的獨派論述，提出一種不是「逢中必反，逢扁必挺」的新中國論述。新中國論述必須同時包含四個面向：主權、人權、賺錢、尊嚴。一言以蔽之，就是要讓台灣人活得像是一個有國家的人。」再次強調民進黨兩岸關係論述上的困境與跳脫傳統獨派論述的必要性，參見姚人多，2013/04/29，「針對『自由人宣言座談會』發言稿之澄清」，《想想論壇》，<http://www.thinkingtaiwan.com/public/articles/view/757>，2013/04/29 瀏覽。此外，同樣出席《自由人宣言》研討會的民進黨前立委、「台獨理論大師」林濁水，也肯定這宣言的意義，而且民進黨中國事務部主任洪財隆也認為該宣言具有時代與戰略意義，民進黨在兩岸關係上的困境，將與民間的《宣言》有著競爭與合作的關係，另外民進黨政策會執行長吳釗燮也表示會盡量吸納民間進步主張。相關內容可參見台灣守護民主平台協會，2013/04/23，「【會後新聞稿】《自由人宣言》研討會—兩岸人權總路線的提出」，台灣守護民主平台 Facebook 網頁，www.facebook.com/tdw2008?hc_location=timeline，2013/4/23 瀏覽。

度，一方面對內想擺脫建立在國族認同對立、「逢中必反」的限制，另一方面對外又呼應了台灣自身對於其「民主」的想像，即捍衛台灣「民主」：主權獨立與公民社會，對抗中國政治的統一與政府威權。

因此，放置於此脈絡中，台灣的「中國因素」論述與「自由人宣言」作為兩岸政治框架，與其是知識上的分析性概念，反而更是具備政治上的象徵規範性意義，一方面，招喚著對中共政治對台灣自由民主侵害的政治逼迫感。另一方面，則重新建立主權獨立的正當性，以普世價值與國家主權接合了本土身分與國族認同，將過去建立在對抗國民黨威權的台灣本土身分認同與國族獨立，轉向至建立在對抗「跨海峽政商聯盟」的現代國家主權、及其認可保障的普世價值。同時，發展公民社會的重要性，以主權確立下、具備文明性與公共性的公民與公民社會，取代過去訴諸族群認同情感的本土民間，並依此經驗來發展跨海峽公民社會連結。

在台灣社會經歷過政黨輪替、對兩黨政治的族群對立感到失望、同時又對國民黨不滿、疑懼中台不明關係的政治處境與社會情感下，這套論述對台灣社會欲創造或召喚的效果是，以國家主權、及其延伸的人民主權與普世價值的高度，再次打造相對於中國與國民黨的台灣自身進步的民主想像與認同。

第三種中國想像的新道德？

這套以主權作為民主前提、發展憲政民主，最後以跨海峽的公民社會連結作為應對「跨海峽政商聯盟」的「中國因素」的解方，雖然試圖開啟了不同於統獨與經濟的兩岸對話面向，然而這套強調主權在民、普世價值的公民社會發展，對於民主的理解是建立在同質線性的現代性邏輯之上，即要有完整的主權作為基礎，在主權下落實憲政保障人權，而公民社會則是在個人與國家之間重要的中介基礎，在台灣的民主政治脈絡中，過去民間社會中不文明、不民主的台灣人需要排除，以公民社會文明公共的公民作為現代民主的主體；而國族認同的獨立，則以民主體制前提的國家主權取代。

正是因為這套論述所服務的政治脈絡，這種以主權為基礎的憲政民主作為未來兩岸協商可能的框架，在看似允諾了兩岸理性、公共的民主未來，可能無法進一步回應現在的兩岸政治經濟與社會現狀，作為改變與推動的物質基礎，只是重述「台灣有民主、中國無民主」的老調，成為一種以現代普世民主自滿的「新道德」，構成了其三個基本的侷限。

第一個侷限，雖然「中國因素」提出「跨海峽政商聯盟」定義了目前中國政治經濟與兩岸關係的基本格局，但如何理解「跨海峽政商聯盟」，基本上仍侷限在自由民主對抗國民黨國家威權政權的象限上。如同陳柏謙指出，資本因素才是「中國因素」背後的關鍵，他批評台灣過去對抗黨國資本主義的民間社會觀點，就是缺乏階級與資本主義的分析，因此即便黨國資本主義瓦解了，在過去民主化的過程中，財團卻仍舊大行其道，所以他進一步批評，當吳介民以公民社會對峙

「跨海峽政商聯盟」，類比過去民間社會對峙黨國資本主義，不僅缺乏階級的分析，更無視現在中國快速資本發展下的工人主體，這種缺乏階級視野、訴諸抽象民主的公民社會論與中國因素分析，難以解決兩岸紛雜的分治狀態與認同，反而應該做的分析，是要能夠把握資本在兩岸中的動態、以及工人與弱勢階級的相似處境，在此基礎上發展對於中國的想像與無產階級連結。⁸因此，從這套「中國因素」論述挪用進化台灣解嚴初「民間社會對抗國家威權」的政治路線藍圖，其目標就是只針對當下政權，並未進一步分析與批判，從過去冷戰體系美國主導的兩岸對立歷史與台灣作為「自由中國」的角色，乃至全球資本流動的新自由主義下、改革開放中國轉型過程中中國政治與資本權力的治理模式運作轉變，以及這轉變對兩岸政治與台灣政治經濟的影響。簡言之，「中國因素」論述在其歷史與當下政治脈絡的認識中，缺乏足夠對「美國因素」與「資本因素」對「中國因素」交互影響的視野。

⁸ 該文分為上下兩集登出。陳柏謙，2013/01/17，「資本因素下的中國因素與中國因素中的資本因素（上）」，台灣立報，

<http://www.lihpao.com/?action-viewnews-itemid-125859>，2013/03/25 瀏覽。陳

柏謙，2013/01/24，「資本因素下的中國因素與中國因素中的資本因素（下）」，台

灣立報，<http://www.lihpao.com/?action-viewnews-itemid-126106>，2013/03/25

瀏覽。

第二個侷限是缺乏對社會底層邊緣主體的視野。強調公民性與文明性的公民社會，預設了運動主體的階級與情感位置，是要能夠進入掌握公共領域、具備政治文明的理性主體。但是，該公民主體打造與社會上的群眾、乃至底層邊緣的關係是什麼？一方面，以公民社會為理想的民主觀，如何能夠理解何以過去建立在本土族群認同的民間社會，對於社會與民主運動產生的強大動員力？這意思是，被認為不現代、不進步的民粹力量，在過去台灣民主化的軌跡被抹去，那麼試圖建立以普世價值的公民性與文明性的群眾運動基礎又在哪裡？因此，第二個問題便在於，這套框架假設了民主政治的主體是主權國家下的公民，不僅缺乏階級面向，也未能貼近群眾自身以展開的抵抗或實踐。

第三個侷限是將中國與香港他者化、乃至否定。如同前述吳介民提出台灣看待中國，要排除全然擁抱中與全然反對中國，發展出能夠理解中國蓬勃民間社會發展的第三種中國想像，但這套以憲政民主的主權確立並隨之來而的公民權利與公民社會發展的同質線性民主觀，如何發展第三種中國想像？能否掌握中國社會主義的歷史、現階段中國的狀態？在《自由人宣言》研討會上，中央研究院人社院副研究員陳宜中、以及前民運人士目前清華大學人社院客座助理教授王丹，都指出要能夠理解中國民主派人士與公民社會的想法思維，台大政治系副教授黃長玲也提出，《自由人宣言》預設了兩岸的對稱性，但實際上各自人權與民主發展

並不對稱，各自都有需要面對的問題。三者的建議即提醒這套兩岸架構，可能忽略了中國民主發展的脈絡與方式的差異。⁹

同時，這不僅僅對中國仍缺乏足夠的理解，我也認為對主權作為民主體制前提的強調，反而是透過否定香港，來打造台灣自身相對於中國與國民黨的進步的民主想像與認同。例如，2012年8月發表《台灣「香港化」？中國統治香港模式的啟示》專題¹⁰，吳介民在「台灣，為什麼不是香港？」一文，就以「主權未

⁹ 參見台灣守護民主平台協會，2013/04/23，「【會後新聞稿】《自由人宣言》研討會—兩岸人權總路線的提出」，台灣守護民主平台 Facebook 網頁，

www.facebook.com/tdw2008?hc_location=timeline，2013/4/23 瀏覽。

¹⁰ 吳介民一文也同時收錄在吳介民《第三種中國想像》(2012)一書，在《台灣「香港化」？中國統治香港模式的啟示》(2012)專題中，吳介民一文該專題總論，而林濁水一文則為結論。《台灣「香港化」？中國統治香港模式的啟示》專題係由台灣新社會智庫學會於2012年8月出版，專題陸續刊登於網站上，台灣新社會智庫學會前身係民進黨新潮流派系，該專題除了邀請吳介民與林濁水撰寫總論與結論，也邀請了香港學者從香港的觀點來撰寫香港經驗，而吳林二文扮演了台灣如何參照香港經驗的作用，關於香港經驗包括了中英談判與中共統戰方式、香港民主政體、北京政經影響力與香港身分認同問題、回歸後新聞自由狀況等面向。各篇文章可上台灣新社會智庫學會「政策報告」的「兩岸國際」網頁查閱，日期從2012/09/10至2012/12/11陸續上傳網站，共

決的民主化難題」的概念，指出港臺民主共通的問題係主權的問題。一方面他指出，香港因為缺乏主權，所以民主化之路受阻，另一方面他強調：「台灣民主獨立，無形中拱衛了香港的自由生機。由於中國對台灣的圖指，使得中共對香港的壓制有一定的顧忌，畢竟香港是鄧小平所擘畫的『一國兩制』示範區。」(吳介民，2012：134)但從香港的經驗來看，「如果台灣的國家條件發生流失的狀態，則將危及台灣的民主政治。」(137)同樣地，「台獨理論大師」林濁水在「台灣香港化 / 香港台灣化」一文中¹¹，也強調香港是中國示範給台灣的一國兩制試點，那麼「不被統一」的台灣只要能保持「異於香港的民主」，就能「拉大了香港追求自由民主維持主體性的戰略縱深」。二者皆透過香港缺乏主權而面臨的民主化的「借鏡」，一方面證成國家主權對於民主體制建立的重要性，另一方面將實質主權的保衛，視為促進民主的戰略。

六篇，

http://www.taiwansig.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=37&Itemid=117&limit=5&limitstart=10，2013/03/10 瀏覽。

¹¹ 林濁水，2012/12/11，「台灣香港化 / 香港台灣化」，《台灣「香港化」？中國統治香港模式的啟示》，台灣新社會智庫學會，

http://www.taiwansig.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4778&Itemid=117&userid=92&content_type=article，2013/03/13 瀏覽。

此處，看似描述香港處境的客觀事實，其實卻冒著將香港他者化的問題。一方面，香港與台灣同樣地都經歷過殖民以及回歸給祖國的過程，但同時作為母國的祖國，與經歷殖民的港台之間，有著日常經驗乃至國族認同的落差，如同香港學者周蕾（1995）在「殖民者與殖民者之間」一文指出，香港不同於印度等後殖民國家，以本土文化作為一種反抗殖民者的建構，香港的本土既是要面對英國殖民文化，同時也要面對中國民族主義的支配性文化，所以香港回歸後要從所謂相異於殖民者英國文化的「本土文化」內部之間香港次主導文化與中國主導文化之間的鬥爭。因此她指出香港的例子，是許多後殖民國家回歸本土文化祖國來對抗帝國主義文化的反常例子，這反常具體地「突出和強調了在其他後殖民文化中，因為民族尊嚴而一向被壓制著的「血統」或「根源」（origins）這問題」（95）。也就是說，對於香港來說，香港的民主抗爭，總是在這種始終缺乏主權的政治狀態下，建構自身的主體。

進一步來說，香港與台灣不同的地方是，台灣與中國的關係隨四九年之後是切割的，而台灣過去的本土派，在民主化的過程中，更嘗試建立一個以本省台灣人為共同體、否定國民黨大中華文化身分的新的國族認同與國家主權，同時隨著國民黨本土派與民進黨進一步取得政權，更進一步打造本土的國族身分內涵與文化。可是，在香港的例子中，無論過去英國殖民或現在移交給中國，的確是沒有主權，也缺乏完整的民主體制（例如普選），與中國的關係也從未完全切割，國家主權、國族認同、民主發展都是處在不完全疊合的緊張關係中。也正因為如此，

如葉蔭聰描述，香港並未發展出如台灣本土的新國族框架，反而一直與國族主義和殖民主義進行之間來往協商，發展香港自我的意識（葉蔭聰，2011：104）。也因此，香港的主體意識與民主政治實踐，是貫穿了冷戰經驗，與經歷國共兩黨民族國家權力的角力，也是國際地緣政治下與中國打交道的資本主義擴張前線，難以被劃分歸屬任一陣營與國族國家，如葉蔭聰引用羅永生的分析指出：「香港的戰後發展……貫穿了冷戰經驗，她無法歸屬在任何一邊的陣營，亦沒有再造自身的國族國家框架，也無法併合在任何國族國家之中，而是在國族國家權力之間，錯綜複雜地發展出自己的政治社群意識。」（葉蔭聰，2011：105；羅永生，2007：72）。

所以，當香港缺乏主權所以無法民主之路難行，作為證成「主權未決的民主化難題」的觀點，是將香港視為中台兩岸關係的地緣政治投射，並無法理解上述香港在跨越各種勢力交會與難以劃定的（無）國族身分處境下，如何嘗試在尋找自我身分主體與自我政治主權的民主實踐。那麼，以確立憲政主權並發展公民社會連結的訴求，對於香港來說，又能意味什麼？換句話說，這樣的提法能夠讓我們對香港有多少的認識？能夠連結香港的基礎在哪？反之，這套「中國因素」論述與「自由人宣言」所提出的「第三種中國想像」，其實只是藉著香港作為台灣的否定，不斷地重複唱頌著台灣的民主，將這套以主權獨立、落實憲政民主保障人權，並以台灣為領頭角色的兩岸理想政治路線，變成一種由上而下的、單一線性的民主現代化，也就是政治文化上的道德律令。這套道德律令，只是確立了台

灣作為相對中國與香港進步的民主想像，可是卻將這套建立在「自由人」本來所欲打開、超越的民主可能性，再度封閉起來。

結論

其實，類似「自由人宣言」面對「中國因素」的論調，從民進黨陳水扁政府時代至國民黨馬英九政府時代從未少過。在陳水扁第一任政權時，他即提出「人權立國」的口號，而馬英九政權則允諾簽署聯合國兩公約，但是無論「人權立國」或簽署兩公約，其中最主要的關注是台灣如何藉此取得國際外交政治上的認可，並保持易於中國的民主位置，進而同時對內取得其政治統治的正當性。因此，如同鄭巨良曾指出，「人權立國」、簽署兩公約，也變相只是在維持台灣的國族國家想像，從台灣反人口販運的議題來說，卻清楚地看見這套以人權之名的立國想像，如何對移民、移工、性工作者構成一套國家治理與社會排斥(鄭巨良, 2012)。從台灣性 / 別運動的視野，更清楚所謂民主化如何同時形成了反民主。例如，甯應斌與何春蕙便分析國家權力與 NGO 如何協同治理 (governance)，擴大了對於社會異端與性少數的社會排斥 (social exclusion) (何春蕙, 2005; 甯應斌, 2005)，而且近年台灣社會與民主運動看似風起雲湧，但同時間也以自滿 (conceit) 的政治正確與道德正義，將各種邊緣、不現代、不進步的實踐，進行歇斯底里地排除與打壓，形成了一股「新道德主義」(甯應斌, 2013)

那麼，究竟面對「中國因素」，我們如何不落入可能的道德律令，並展開其他的「第三種中國想像」呢？不同於政治科學與政治論述試圖提供一個完美理想的解答，從文化研究的角度來看，或許首要的是打破這套以主權確立進而落實憲政民主、發展公民社會的單一同質的進步民主想像。中港台皆經歷不同的現代性歷史，也各自面對不同的問題與產生不同的實踐。就台灣而言，一方面台灣從冷戰到民主化政治論述，究竟如何建構其中國想像、以及自身相對之的民主想像，才構成我們現今理解「中國因素」的視角與民主想像？另一方面，如同 Partha Chatterjee 在《被治理者的政治》（*The Politics of the Governed*）（2004）一書中揭示印度後殖民處境中在「政治社會」（political society）的各種非現代抗爭，我們如何從日常生活的鬥爭實踐中，發展出屬於這鬥爭的中國想像？或許，從玫瑰園背後的歷史積累與日常實踐的裂縫，才能找到台灣這個小地方改變並自主的空間。

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Taiwan's "China Factor": Democracy and its Discontent

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The notion "China Factor" in Taiwan, emerging as one of the causes in the anti-media monopoly movement in 2012, refers to a cross-strait media monopoly impeding the press freedom and the freedom of speech. At the same time, liberalist intellectuals further defined "China Factor" as the approaching political impact of "Cross-strait politician and capitalist alliance" on Taiwan's democracy, and proposed the idea of "a third way of imagining China" beyond nationalist independence of Taiwan and reunification with China (Wu 2012). "Freeman Manifesto" was also proposed as a new political cross-strait framework. However, as a political signifier rather than a conceptual analytic term, Taiwan's "China Factor" reproduces Taiwan's imaginary democracy vis-à-vis China through negation of Hong Kong and displaces the existing cause for the nationalist independence with the popular sovereignty. With its emphasis on importance of sovereignty as the essential way to Taiwan's democracy in relation to China, the third way of imagining China—namely the development of civil society and the proposal of "freeman" spirit—may not be as promising as it hopes to be, but lead us once again to face the same predicament that it tries to go beyond: independence and reunification.

Two dark sides of democratization

The winning of the presidential election by the first oppositional party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000, also regarded as the success of the party alternation, witnesses the achievement of democratization of Taiwan since the late 1980s, following the KMT's (Kuomintang, Chinese Nationalist Party) highly political oppressions on political dissents from the 1950s onwards and a series of demonstrations and political reforms¹² since the late 1980s. The model of "Civil Society VS. the authoritarian State" was the main political opposition paradigm along with the process of democratization. Within it, major forces against KMT's authoritarian regime are the socially grass-rooted Taiwanese ethnicity identification, culturally localization in opposition to the great China ideology, and politically Taiwanese national independence in opposition to Republic of China represented by KMT. Taiwanese to be the master of this island through the success in achieving the political regime in the representative political system hegemonized all various and different oppositional forces, and DPP is the representative and leading political force.

However, there are two main predicaments in democratization. The first predicament is the growing ethnic and national opposition between the collective will of being Taiwanese in opposition to Mainlander and national independence in opposition to reunification. Such an ethnic and national opposition became the common manipulative tactic adopted by KMT and DPP's politicians, particularly during election period. While the opposition became more serious after the President CHEN Shui-Bian, who is regarded as the "Son of Taiwan", resorted to the Taiwanese nationalist fundamentalism to rescue his last reputation and legitimize his regime during the suspicion of his corruption, the major social and cultural effect results to populist politics. For

¹² These reforms include the lift of the Martial Law in 1988, the abolition of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion in 1991, the reforms of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan in 1991 and 1992, the amendment of the article 100 of the criminal law that criminalizes political dissents in 1992 and the direct election of the President in 1996.

liberalist intellectuals, it is important to create “public sphere” beyond such a populist opposition (Lee ed. 2004). They reflect the problem of the “civil” in the “Civil Society VS. the State”, which only resorts to the ethnic populism, and they suggests its meaning should be transformed into the meaning of civility (Lee and Wu 2008), and the meaning of “civility” refers respectively to “civilization” and “publicness”(Tsang 2012, 23).

On the other hand, such ethnic identification and its opposition also constitute the Taiwan’s political view toward China, either independence or reunification. However, China is not only an object for ethnic and national identification but also a political, economical, social and cultural entity, particularly after the rise of China and the growing cross-strait interaction. For KMT, its main China policy is to facilitate more political and economic interaction and cooperation under the framework of “One China with respective interpretation”; however, such a path also arouses concerns on China’s infringement of Taiwan’s democratic achievement. For DPP, Taiwan’s political relation with China basically should maintain Taiwan’s autonomy from China’s taking over or reunification. However, politically it lacks policies to address the rise of China and its growing political and economic influences, so it also seeks new political discourses to compete with KMT. Therefore, it also becomes a crucial issue for society, politicians, intellectuals and activists to maintain Taiwan’s current democracy and to develop an alternative perspective towards Taiwan’s relation with current China beyond the culturally ethnic and national binary opposition and beyond political independence and reunification. It is a very short context of the emergence of the notion of “China factor”, which I will elaborate later in the following sections.

Besides the above predicament, the second predicament in Taiwan’s political culture is the growing “new moralism” along with populism in the name of democracy. For example, in the state level, both DPP regime and KMT regime try to build up and enforce human rights protection implementation in

order to construct Taiwan's international democratic image vis-à-vis China as way of seeking international recognition, but paradoxically both regimes continuously impeded human rights of migrants and sex workers in the name of human rights protection, as what Cheng (2012) observed in Taiwan's anti-human trafficking policy. In the society level, both Ning (2005) and Ho (2005) pointed out the formation of the exclusive civil society and exclusive society in Taiwan when they discussed how the women's NGOs and the state form a new way of governmentality and heteronormativity on sexual minorities. After KMT returned to the state power, people's growing discontent with the government can then be seen at more and more various demonstrations and protests on issues of the urban renewal, media monopoly, military trainings, sex offenses and so on, from radical to conservative, grassroots to middle class. However, among these protests, controversies on morality and justice (such as sex offenses and abuse of a military soldier) particularly arouse people's discontents. While more and more people are engaging themselves with civil society and the political issues, there is also a tendency of conservatism in which people hardly tolerated social and cultural deviants in the name of justice. This is the constitution of a more civilized and fragile citizen subject who excludes those uncivilized dissents (Ho 2013). Such tendency toward conservatism in the name of civilization and universalistic democracy, is called new moralism, which upholds the singular universalistic progressivism and despises pluralism and uncivilized subjects with its conceit (Ning 2013).

If the former predicament is the growing populism, then the latter is not only the continuum of populism in its morally and culturally homogeneity but also the reaction to it in its call for civilization to suppress uncivilized. Then, if the development of that alternative perspective on the cross-strait relation, a major political and social concern in Taiwan, is to go beyond populist binary opposition and to develop a thorough and comprehensive view toward the

current China, the critique of new moralism reminds us of “the fragile conceit”(Ning 2013, 11) of being more modern and more democratic. This implies that the alternative may not lie on transcendence of the existing political cross-strait framework but lie on what we usually exclude and neglect.

Under these two understandings of the predicaments in political culture in the process of Taiwan’s democratization, the following sections will try to explore the cultural implication of “democracy”—that is, democracy not only as an political mechanism but also as an political value and cultural imagination of Taiwan—that the political discourse of “China Factor” manifest in social movements and intellectual discourses. Meanwhile, I will also discuss the limitation the notion “China Factor” may have.

What is “China Factor”?—A perspective from “Civil Society VS. State”

As mentioned, the notion “China Factor” emerges from two contexts: how to understand the rise of China as a political and economic entity which has closer interaction with Taiwan, while at the same time what is the alternative way beyond the political reunification and independence and populist political culture. The notion of “China Factor” and its alternative then also follow the political idea of “Civil Society VS. the State” as well as the readjustment of “civil” in “civil society” to “civility” and “publicness”. The idea can be seen from this perspective in the anti-media monopoly movement in 2012 which first brought it up as one of its causes in the society and the liberalist intellectuals proposal, which includes WU Jieh-min’s definition on the term “China Factor” and the following proposal of the new cross-strait political framework of “Freeman Manifesto” by the Taiwan Democracy Protection Platform (TWDEM).

The widely use of the term “China Factor” originates from the anti-media monopoly movement. The anti-media monopoly movement “I don’t Want Want

League”, also named the “Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance”(反媒體巨獸青年聯盟), proposed the term in one of their movement causes to require the government “to express its attitude and make policies toward “China Factor”, besides its other appeals.¹³ This movement, led by university students, opposed the “Want Want China Times Group”(Want Want), one of the major media group which owns print media and television outlets and since 2011 has attempted to bid to buy CNS, one of the major cable TV services, in Taiwan. What aroused public concern is not only “Want Want” as a media monopoly but also its political stance leans to the Communist Party of China. During the protest, “Want Want” also discredited protestors with unconfirmed news resources and sued students for sharing “Anti-Want Want” logo on Facebook. Thus, if “Want Want” merged with CNS, the anti-media monopoly protestors were worried that the pro-China political attitude of “Want Want” would suppress the freedom of speech, one of the democratic achievements in Taiwan.

The coordinator of the Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance LIN Fei-Fan (林飛帆) pointed out in one episode of a TV political talk program “Talk News”(有話好說) by Taiwan Public Television Service on Sept 4, 2012, “We[Taiwanese] are used to the air of freedom. If the myth created by the Beijing government is imposed on us, it is unacceptable for us.... [The media monopoly] is the issue about control of thought, because the cross-media monopoly will control

¹³ Introduction of “Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance” on its Facebook page: <http://www.facebook.com/idontwantwant/info>, available on 2013/03/08; its official website: <http://www.idontwantwantleague.blogspot.tw/>, available on 2013/03/08.

different opinions and sacrifice minor voices.”¹⁴ Thus, “China Factor” in this movement then refers to two things: first, the monopoly like “Want Want China Times Group” which locates itself in China, makes money from China and has influences on Taiwan’s economics and politics; and second, its economic influences can bring political consequences such as the more pro-China political ideology that will control the freedom of speech. “China Factor” in the movement is a symbol of the cross-strait monopoly “Want Want China Times” and its potential infringement of Taiwan’s democracy.

A liberalist scholar WU Jieh-min further articulates the conceptual meaning of the “China Factor” in his *The Third Way of Imagining China* (第三種中國想像, 2012). According to WU, “China Factor” refers to impacts of the “Cross-strait politician and capitalist alliance” among Communist Party of China (CPC), KMT and pro-China cross-strait monopolies after the rise of China economically and politically and the KMT resumption of the regime in 2008. In his argument, one of the major influences of “China Factor” is the unsettled sovereignty issue of Taiwan with China (Independence/Recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty VS. reunification), and the unsettled sovereignty indirectly resulted in domestic conflict on the ethnic and national identity (Taiwanese VS. Mainland/Chinese). Borrowing from two political scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan’s viewpoint, then he argues that the sovereignty is the precondition of democracy (76-77). Meanwhile, as he also points out, after the KMT resumption of the regime and its pro-China policy economically and politically since 2008, impacts of “China Factor” also include: the violent crack down on protestors against Chinese officials visiting Taiwan in 2008, the signing of a free trade agreement, Economic Cooperation Framework

¹⁴ Talk News(有話好說) 2012/09/04, 15:58-16:21 & 40:20-42:42

<http://talk.news.pts.org.tw/2012/09/blog-post.html>, downloaded on 2013/03/03.

Agreement (ECFA), with China in 2010, and its political influence on the Taiwan's presidential election, in which the big Taiwanese companies in China that supported KMT's China policies and helps KMT to win the presidential election again in 2012 (83-87). All these show the predicament of democratization under the unsettled sovereignty caused by "China Factor"

Different from the anti-media monopoly movement's call for the government's formulation policies addressing the influence of "China Factor", WU and the Taiwan Democracy Protection Platform (TWDEM), a liberalist intellectual association in which also WU participates in, actively propose a new cross-strait political framework. In WU's suggestion based on the idea of "Civil Society VS. the State", the "Cross-Strait Alliance of civil society" was proposed. He suggests that Taiwan's democratization experiences in the 1980s and 1990s should play the leading role of democratic civilization in the sino-world and "Cross-strait alliance of civil society" should be organized to oppose "China Factor"(55-60). In addition, he emphasizes that the term "civil" should insist on its meaning of "civility" and "publicness" as an adjustment of the meaning of "popular", that was used in the late 1980s and early 1990s and regarded as the populist emotion of ethnic/national identity opposition (206-214). Through the articulation of "China Factor" as an approaching political reality embodied in the alliance of authoritarian-monopolist (KMT+CPC+Capitalist) that will harm Taiwan's sovereignty and its achievement of democracy, and civil society, particularly the civil with civility and publicness, led by Taiwan, should be the oppositional force.

Thus, in his idea of "China Factor", the democracy that can go beyond the political reunification and independence and populist political culture lies in: the recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty since it is the precondition of democratic institution; and the development of "civility" and "publicness" of civil society. Later in April 2013, the Taiwan Democracy Protection Platform (TWDEM) proposed the "Freeman Manifesto" as the new cross-strait political framework

as such. Its four requests in brief are: Sovereignty of Taiwan/ROC belongs to all Taiwan people; Development of constitutionalism as a way to build up mutual friendship; Human rights protection as a way to build up mutual trust; Peace in East Asian region and cross-strait relation (TW & China) are interrelated.¹⁵ The manifesto emphasizes the importance of sovereignty again; however, such sovereignty is endowed with its important role to implement constitutionalism, which protects democracy and citizenship. Under this classical liberalist idea of democracy, as long as when Taiwan and particularly China can fully enforce such constitutionalism to protect human rights do Taiwan and China then start to constitute a healthier cross-strait relationship.

The aforementioned articulation of the meaning of “China Factor” and the proposal of “Freeman Manifesto” depicts a liberalist vision of democracy of Taiwan in relation to China: first, while “China” is evolved from the KMT’s dominant cultural ideology to the pressing political threat, conceptually the uncivilized populist ethnic based nationalism should be replaced with the civilized public civic based sovereignty; secondly, Taiwan’s unsettled sovereignty with China is thus one of the major problems of Taiwan’s democracy and only with recognition of such sovereignty by China, Taiwan’s democracy can be possibly fully achieved; thirdly, civil society should be the important counter force.

The paradox in the third way of imagining China

Indeed, the notion of “China Factor” gives a new perspective of seeing China (the combination of capitalism and the state power) beyond the ethnic and national identification. The shift of the viewpoint also proposes a civil alliance beyond the ethnic and national populist sentiment, and the

¹⁵ TWDEM, 2013/04, Freeman Manifesto,

http://newtalk.tw/media/allrecord/2013002/ev_2013002_133.pdf, available on 2013/04/23

transcendence from ethnic nationalism (ethnic identity based independence) to civic nationalism (freeman based independence). However, with the emphasis of sovereignty and the proposal of “civility” and “publicness” of civil society, paradoxically it is such an ideal and seemingly new vision of Taiwan’s future democracy in relation to China that becomes “new moralism” and limits new possibilities of democracy. “China Factor” then serves more as a political signifier to only reproduce and reaffirm Taiwan’s imaginary democracy vis-à-vis China than a conceptual analytic term to open up new engagement into creating new vision of democracy.

First, the notion that sovereignty is the precondition of democracy, as an analytical idea, may help us understand the correlation between sovereignty and democracy. However, taken as a political rationale and vision, it forecloses various possibilities of democracy except sovereignty. It is clear that under this perspective Hong Kong is constituted as a negation for Taiwan to reconstitute its imaginary democracy vis-à-vis China. What may missing here is how to see Hong Kong’s vision of democracy and its struggles under the political framework “one country, two systems” with China.

During the anti-media monopoly movement, a common sense that “Taiwan is Hong Kong-ized, Hong Kong is China-ized” was widely shared, and this constitutes and is also reinforced by a sense of imagined community between Taiwan and Hong Kong in opposition to the oppression of “China Factor”. One of the examples is that during the movement, the New Year editorial of “Southern Weekly” (南方周末) in China was forced by the propaganda authorities to glorify the CPC’s “China Dream”, so the Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance released a statement to show its support for the “Southern Weekly” by pointing out, “People in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China today are facing harsher challenges from ‘China Factor’ that has led to political crises such as suppression on freedom of press.... The Chinese government

has influenced Taiwan's politics and society through capitalist forces, while it has also intervenes in Hong Kong people's daily life through both capitalist and state power."¹⁶ The statement further claimed, "[We] insist on universal values and support civil societies in China... to resist our same enemy—... the exploited 'Party-Capitalist Ruling Regime'—behind the current political situation that 'Taiwan is being Hong Kong-nized', 'Hong Kong is being China-nized', and 'China is being tycoonized'." By depicting an image of authoritarian Chinese government's suppression on freedom through its political and economic power, we can see there is an alliance as well among oppositional forces in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China against "China Factor". However, the above statement also constitutes a hierarchy of democracy among Taiwan, Hong Kong and China on the basis of the degree of impediment of freedom by "China Factor".

Instead of looking at the governmentality of the cross-strait state power and the force of capitalism, one major perception of such a hierarchy of democracy and such a description of "Taiwan is being Hong Kong-nized, Hong Kong is being China-nized, and China is being tycoonized" presumes that the degree of the influence of "China Factor" is related to the existence of sovereignty, as what has been already emphasized by WU. For example, in his the *Third way of Imagining China*, the aforementioned liberalist scholar WU Jieh-min explains that the lack of democracy in Hong Kong is the lack of sovereignty. He further comments, "Democratic Independence of Taiwan secures the Hong Kong's freedom. Since CPC's final purpose is to unify

¹⁶ Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance, 2013/01/10, "Statement: "We have the same enemy and we support Southern Weekly"(【青盟聲明】同仇敵愾 聲援南方週末!),

<https://www.facebook.com/notes/我是學生我反旺中-反媒體巨獸青年聯盟/青盟聲明同仇敵愾-聲援南方週末-/389195704508548>

[敵愾-聲援南方週末-/389195704508548](https://www.facebook.com/notes/我是學生我反旺中-反媒體巨獸青年聯盟/青盟聲明同仇敵愾-聲援南方週末-/389195704508548), available on 2013/01/11.

Taiwan, CPC's suppression on Hong Kong will be very careful. After all, Hong Kong is the model of "One Country Two Systems" designed by DENG Xiaoping.... [from Hong Kong's experiences], if Taiwan keeps losing its stateness, its democracy will be endangered."(WU 2012, 134 and 137)

Besides, known for pro-Taiwanese independence politician LIN Cho-shui also argues Hong Kong and Taiwan are the one community of the same destiny in terms of their local identity and their relation to China, and points out that, as long as Taiwan "is not reunified" and keeps its democracy that is "different from that of Hong Kong, and this will strategically help Hong Kong keep pursuing its freedom and democracy."(Lin 2012)

Apparently such a view is Taiwan centric. It cannot explain that in a general sense China as a sovereign state is not democratic but authoritarian, and it also fails to see the political and economic influences of "China Factor". Particularly, such a view represents Hong Kong as a negation of Taiwan (no sovereignty and thus no democracy) under "China Factor", and in turn reaffirms Taiwan's imaginary democracy vis-à-vis China. Therefore, the condition of sovereignty is regarded as the major parameter against which we evaluate the process of democratization, as the descriptive analysis of Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan interpreted by WU Jieh-min as the normative analytical framework to argue the positive relation between sovereignty, constitution and democracy. Although the "Freeman Manifesto" also emphasizes on the popular/civic sovereignty instead of the state sovereignty, the recognition of the former is still under the nation-state framework of the latter. What is problematic then is that we would fail to recognize and understand Hong Kong's democratic practices and struggles without sovereignty, such as the June 4th demonstration, the July 1st protests and various social movements, if one of the major counter forces against "China Factor" is to seek the cross-strait civil society alliance, as WU suggested.

Meanwhile, the constitution of Taiwan's imaginary democracy through its consolidation of sovereignty also implies that with the recognition of sovereignty will result in democracy. The logic here, as the ideal of "Freeman" suggested, is the classical liberalist ideal view of democracy, and it believes that citizenship is recognized and protected by the constitution under the state sovereignty. However, while "China Factor" refers to the alliance of politicians and capitalists and its influences on democracy, how is the recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty be able to address the injustice of economic redistribution under the capitalism and the problem of the Taiwan's existing party politics in which two parties are unable to represent their people? Moreover, here also comes the question of whose state and who are citizens under this sovereign state. Will workers be eligible if the capitalism is not recognized? Will those people with anti-China affection or pro-China affection that are regarded as populist and uncivilized be recognized by this new sovereign state, if the ideal subject in this sovereign state is the cultivated citizens with a sense of civility and publicness?

I am not denying sovereignty may be one of the possible ways of facing "China Factor". However, the ideal model of "civil society VS. 'China Factor'", that is shaped by call for Taiwan's sovereignty and by the citizens with civilization and publicness under this sovereign state, seems to me only a displacement of the existing understanding of democracy (freedom VS. authoritarianism; independence VS. reunification). In this case, rather than being a connection and a reference, Hong Kong's political and social struggles for democracy are easily dismissed and regarded as the negative example of the idea of "sovereignty is the precondition of democracy", in order to prove the validity of the above idea and the importance of sovereignty. Unfortunately, such an understanding of "China Factor" and the democratic proposal may not go beyond the existing paradigm but only keeps reproducing an ideal image of Taiwan as a democratic state vis-à-vis China. The third way of imagining

China is paradoxically trapped by its own moral chanting of this ideal universalistic democracy of “Freeman Manifesto” and by its conceit.

Conclusion

At the beginning I describes two dark sides of Taiwan’s democratization in its political culture: the ethnic and national opposition, and the rise of the “new moralism”. The emergence of the notion of Taiwan’s “China Factor” seeks to go through the first dark side and to develop a third way of facing the rise of China and its influences. It emphasizes the development of “civil society” with its “civility” and “publicness” as a third way beyond the ethnic and national populist sentiment, and also proposes “Freeman Manifesto” as a new cross-strait political framework beyond independence and reunification. However, such formation of the notion of “China Factor” again becomes a political symbol that reproduces Taiwan’s imaginary democracy vis-à-vis China through the negation of Hong Kong. The praise for the universalistic democracy with its emphasis on sovereignty as the precondition of democracy then becomes a “new moralism” which paradoxically hinders possibilities that it aims to open up.

To end my paper, I think the approach of cultural studies may help to re-open up some alternative spaces that the notion of “China Factor” is supposedly trying to create. First, instead of denying the populist past and looking for a bright light future, we may want to explore “history of the present” by looking at the cultural formation of Taiwan’s democracy vis-à-vis China in Taiwan’s political discourses in the history of democratization. Secondly, we may want to further remaking different visions of democracy and their third way of imagining China through pluralistic daily life struggles. In this light, Taiwan’s understanding of “China Factor” and its third way of imagining China are not about the top-down political and economic solution to Taiwan’s dark

side of democracy in relation to the rise of China, but the cultural vision of who we are—the pluralist we—and how we can do from the bottom up.

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