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### Editorial

## How to Bring Peace Back to the World

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11 tells us that, notwithstanding all the advances in technology and in social institutions, humanity is not as civilized as we thought. We still have people lurking among ourselves who would kill innocent people for their selfish ends. While the killers themselves might think that they were serving a noble cause, the real cause was that they foolishly believed that theirs was a heroic act that would qualify them to enter "heaven" and to enjoy "eternal happiness."

Certainly terrorist acts will not be condoned by any true religion. A true religion must promote peace. A true religion must ask its followers to lead a peaceful life, to respect life, and to banish hatred and to espouse loving kindness. Islam respects Jesus as one of its prophets, and Jesus would not hate even those that persecute him. An Islam web page says clearly that Islam believes that God will reward those who show loving kindness to a dog. There is no doubt that all the great religions of the world, including Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, among others, would ask us to live peacefully with one another and to eschew hatred.

One cannot but be impressed with the parent of one of the victims who died in the September 11 tragedy. He

pleaded against vengeance. He would not add oil to fire. He said that his beloved son only happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. I do not know what faith he espouses. But whatever it is, he is a truly religious man.

This is the time when the leaders of the world's religions should come together to convey a clear message to their followers. True religious practice requires respect for life. The respect for life is basic and is really the essence of true religious practice, regardless of the denomination followed. Humanity should learn that our historical religious figures arose in different parts of the world and performed their missions in their different cultural and historical contexts. But true religious practice must transcend cultural, geographical, and political boundaries. We must all learn to tolerate and to respect other religious traditions.

As of today, the US and its allied forces have already embarked on a military attack on Afghanistan, which is believed to have harbored the terrorists. The military attack appears to have been unavoidable, but it must not be an act of vengeance, and every effort should be made to avoid hitting civilians. More important, the US and its allies should make concrete steps towards bringing peace to Middle East. To achieve peace in the Middle East, Israel must respect the rights of the Palestinians. Without this crucial step, grievances will turn into hatred, and hatred will turn into fighting. If a war is on, innocent people will be killed. The world cannot have peace when the fires of grievances and hatred are burning.

## Japan: Dilemmas of A Pacifist Ally

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### 摘要

對日本而言，9月11日恐怖襲擊和其後的反恐怖戰爭造成了頗尷尬的局面。一如十年前海灣戰爭，日本正苦於尋找在支持其盟友的同時能免受戰火慘痛回憶下內心煎熬的方法。日本首相小泉純一郎小心翼翼地承諾以自衛隊為美國反恐戰爭提供情報和後勤支援。未來數月內自衛隊的表現將決定日本今後是否能在國際政治舞台上扮演一個更正常的角色。

How to stand up and be counted? The tragic events of 11 September, the US declaration of a war on terrorism, and the subsequent military attacks on Afghanistan have raised significant dilemmas for the United States' premier ally in Asia, Japan. Immediately after the 9-11 tragedies, prime minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed shock and sympathy, but then found himself confronted with the problem of what to do next, as the Bush administration began to construct an international coalition to eradicate terrorism. Koizumi, who had come to office four months earlier vowing to strengthen the Japan-US alliance, promised to do as much as possible to support the anti-terrorist campaign but then added the caveat of having to act within the constraints of the Japanese peace constitution. Aware that this could be interpreted abroad as a recipe for inactivity, Koizumi clearly wanted to do more, but he has had to face up to two debilitating legacies.

The first – which I call the 'yen not men syndrome' – provides a strong sense of *déjà vu*. In 1990, after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, the United States constructed another multi-national coalition, on that occasion to liberate Kuwait. Hamstrung by constitutional niceties, a well-intentioned but weak prime minister, and a still strongly pacifist population Japan hedged and ducked for cover. It did contribute a very substantial amount to the costs of that Gulf War campaign, but sent no troops. Minesweepers were sent to clear Persian Gulf seaways, but only after all the fighting had finished.

The second millstone is Japan's own history of military action in Asia and the sensitivities of neighbouring countries about any sign of what might be considered as a revival of 'militarism'. Although some right-wing politicians did and still do hark back to the earlier days of 'rich country, strong army', the majority of Japanese have no wish to return to the aggressive attitudes of the past; if anything, the desire to disengage from anything involving force has become pre-eminent. Unfortunately, the Japanese tendency to try to settle the past by at best by-passing it and at worst by ignoring it has only helped to keep it alive. Unlike the seemingly more penitent postwar German approach to Europe and Israel, the sincere but often convoluted Japanese governmental apologies have not had sufficient resonance for aggrieved Asians.

The '9-11 attacks' have, paradoxically, at the same time both resuscitated the debate within Japan about contributing actively to the maintenance of international order (a debate briefly stimulated by the Gulf War but which subsequently lapsed into semi-dormancy because of the preoccupation with prolonged economic recession) and dampened the suspicions – or perhaps it is more accurate to say the expression of suspicions – of neighbours about such contributions.

In trying to respond to US demands that Japan make 'visible' contributions to the new anti-terrorist campaign,

Koizumi at least has four advantages that did not exist for his hapless predecessor in 1990-91. Firstly, he has tremendously high personal support amongst the Japanese. Although his party still has to rely on two coalition allies to ensure legislation passes through parliament and the economy is sinking further into recession, he has managed to project a new style of governance which strikes a chord with a population desperate for a revival in Japan's fortunes. Secondly, the pacifist-based parties of the political left have withered over the past decade to be replaced by less-ideologically driven centrist ones. Thirdly, whereas Kuwait seemed to be an oil-rich country far away, the dramatic television pictures of the crumbling World Trade Centre towers and the deaths of some Japanese in them have made this crisis seem much more real to the Japanese. Public opinion polls show more than 70% of the population supporting new legislation to allow the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to participate more actively in the US-led campaign.

Finally, all the neighbouring Asian nations, including most importantly China, have expressed sympathy and support for the US-led campaign against terrorism (although some have expressed reservations about the US military retaliation). Since they themselves are contributing in various ways – ranging from intelligence and financial monitoring through to logistical and medical support – they can hardly complain openly about Japan too moving forward with its support. At the same time the fact that even China, which had been previously going through a sticky patch in its relations with the new Bush administration, is becoming actively involved meant that Japan could not afford to be left behind.

In fact, the Koizumi government has been acting in a cautious but positive manner. Under the recently-passed new legislation, the scope of the SDF's activities have been widened, allowing it to dispatch ships to the Indian Ocean and to provide transport and logistical support for the US-led forces. This time around, Japan is contributing less yen but more men. Japan will doubtless play a leading part financially in the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, but the sending of the SDF at this stage of the campaign is an important step forward. Low-key but positive actions by the SDF can, in turn, prove reassuring to Asian neighbours.

President Bush has described this as the first war of the twenty-first century. For Japan, certainly, it is the first major challenge it has faced since the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. How it discharges its assumed responsibilities in the coming months will be an important marker as to whether Japan can really become accepted as a 'normal' state in the international system.

## Some Questions in the Wake of September 11

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### 摘要

911 事件帶出了很多問題。我們在哪裡取得關於這個世界的訊息？這些訊息是否可靠？911 是否象徵了這個時代的國際關係？911 對美國的外交政策又顯示了什麼？美國發起的反恐怖戰爭是否西方世界與伊斯蘭世界交戰的序幕？「反恐怖戰爭」是否需要？我們應如何理解 911 事件和其後的事態發展？

The events of September 11, 2001 raise many questions, all of them interesting for students of international affairs, but also in many ways very disturbing and worrying for every conscientious person. Here I would like to ask a few of the many questions potentially raised by the events of "9/11," and at least suggest some possible answers (without claiming to have *the* answers). Merely raising these questions may at least provoke serious contemplation, if not agreement. It will of course be important for us to undertake open dialogue to find answers to these and other important questions arising from 9/11, and to act accordingly.

What does this event tell us about university students in Hong Kong? Their relatively muted reaction suggests that they do not care as much as perhaps they should about events abroad—even when those events are so atrocious. It also suggests that they are generally not interested in international news (with those of us who lecture in this area able to attest to this phenomenon), despite the very close connections between international events and conditions in Hong Kong. Certainly it shows that their knowledge of international affairs is very limited. Their resulting opinions are too seldom based on careful contemplation of events, instead often parroting spurious reports in the popular press. (Much the same might be said of students elsewhere, of course.) This shows how crucial it is for those of us in the academy to spark the curiosity of our students and to help them become independent, analytical and critical thinkers—not merely fashionable consumers of popular propaganda. Lingnan University, with its liberal arts mission, is especially well suited to this daunting task.

This in turn begs the question of where Hong Kong students get their information. Comments and questions from my students' following 9/11 suggest that they are being misinformed and fed anti-American propaganda by the Hong Kong media. For example, many students think that the American government itself—or, just as bizarrely, Israel's secret services—perpetrated the terror attacks on New York and Washington (and presumably the

subsequent anthrax attacks). They believe that the U.S. government planned all of this to gain control of unspecified valuable resources in Afghanistan. And, I am told, the Americans have *purposely targeted* civilians there. What is most worrying is that many students are looking for justifications for these perspectives, rather than questioning them and looking for more logical and likely answers. This suggests that propaganda remains a major component of our students' thinking, rather than well-informed critical analysis.

Broader questions are raised by 9/11. For example, are the events of 9/11 characteristic of contemporary "international" relations? The so-called "war on terrorism" is a "war" against all manifestations of an idea. It is a war against fanatics and their followers, sympathetic governments, and the multifarious means they have and could use to perpetrate terror. The terror attacks were operationalized by "religious" zealots hijacking airliners in an effort to promote the will of their self-indulgent, self-interested leaders living in caves, but who use modern microelectronics to communicate with their followers. The instruments used by those opposed to the terrorists and their friends include warplanes, ships, and commandos, but also sophisticated intelligence technologies, banking systems, ethical exhortations and humanitarian assistance. As such, 9/11 and subsequent events show that borders are much less meaningful and that governments have lost much of their sovereignty—even as they remain important actors. It shows that the important world actors are now almost countless and utterly disparate. It indicates that globalization is contrasted in some people's minds with a preferred Dark Ages or, perhaps even worse, an imaginary Utopia that is (yes, let's admit it and confront it) believed by too many misguided Muslims to come from killing *any* Jew or *any* American. Thus 9/11 reminds us that contemporary international affairs are a mixture of complex physical and empathic forces affecting countless state and non-state actors. The relatively simple days of a bipolar cold war between democratic capitalism and communism have been replaced by a dizzying and uncertain "war" between civilization and those who seek to destroy it through the bloody demoralization of innocents.

What does this 9/11 tell us about global perceptions of the United States? Much hatred of the United States and the West is pathological; no amount of public relations will destroy it. To be sure, we should not overlook the U.S.'s own neglect of much of the world and its unwillingness to share more of its wealth with the world's poor. We should not stop questioning its too-frequent unilateralism, especially lately. But we have to look at the facts of 9/11. In my mind, those facts require free thinkers to at least consider siding with the United States and its allies, and to actively oppose—rather than apologize for—the perpetrators of terror and their sympathizers. We must encourage the United States to use just means to achieve its aims. We should join with it,

when it acts justly, in opposing those who reject the civilized world.

Is this war going to be one between the West and the Islamic World? Hardly. The United States—many Muslims' Great Satan—has come to the aid of Muslims on many occasions in recent years. It spent its treasure and spilled the blood of its soldiers to feed people in Somalia; it defied a United Nations arms embargo to aid the Bosnians; it acted alongside NATO allies to protect Albanians in Kosovo. So many people want to ignore these events, or rationalize them using the most contorted logic to support their anti-Americanism. This gets us nowhere. It will not persuade the United States to do more on behalf of Muslims. Indeed, it might have the opposite effect. As things stand, the Americans are damned if they do (help Muslims) and damned if they don't. No wonder George W. Bush (wrongly) decided to ignore the Palestinians. Just like individuals, nations sometimes do the right thing, and sometimes they do not. We can hope for the United States to be special, to do the right thing all of the time. But we should not be surprised when it does not.

Should and can there be a just war on terrorism? Despite the horrible nature of the terror attacks, everyone should agree that the campaign against terrorism must be a just one. The United Nations and almost every civilized nation, including America's traditional enemies and antagonists, support a campaign against terrorism. But doing war in a just manner is not easy, smart bombs notwithstanding. What is heartening in recent events is that everyone fighting the terrorists, including those Americans now dropping the bombs, embraces the principles of just war. Civilians, while not immune to the effects of the bombing, are not being targeting – something that distinguishes the American combatants and their allies from their enemies in this conflict. The principles of just war will be hard to apply, but that the superpower is trying to do so is a sign of profound historical progress in international affairs.

What rules can we follow to understand and react to such events? Alas, there are no hard and fast rules. We must look at the details. Even those of us opposed to war may find ourselves supporting U.S. actions, at least as long as we think the Americans are doing their best to make those actions compliant with the very principles of justice consciously and purposefully rejected by the terrorists. Indeed, were they to have a more accurate picture of 9/11 and its implications for Hong Kong and its values, I suspect our students would earnestly join most of the Western world in supporting the campaign against terrorism—at least within the limits of civility and international justice.

## Risks, Indeterminacy and A New World Order: Critical Reflections on the September 11 Incident

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### 摘要

911 恐怖襲擊提示現代人要常作反省，一方面我們發覺我們面對的風險其實帶有相當不可知的成份。另一方面我們也發覺在政客義正詞嚴的演說的背後，其實往往隱藏自以為是，妄自尊大等人類共通的弱點。直至我們能互相尊重各方的觀點和文化，恐怕人類互相尋仇復仇的悲劇還會繼續下去。

My first reaction to the news of the September 11 terrorist attack can be summarized in the Chinese saying: “When will these revenges based on endless gripe end?”

Society in late modernity is a world risk society, so says German sociologist Ulrich Beck. The risks of the epoch are unpredictable, immeasurable and seemingly insurmountable. This is part of what I got from my literature review on my Ph.D. thesis *The Daya Bay nuclear power plant debate: Social drama, discourse power struggle and intertextuality*. Suddenly, nuclear power plants return to our attention. The populist demand to relocate nuclear plants away from population centers, denounced as symptomatic of the ‘selfish’ mentality so-called NIMBY (not in my backyard), seems to make a lot more sense. Chinese folklore also embraces such wisdom, evident in idioms like “A gentleman does not stand under a faltering wall” and “Not only can water float a boat, but it can also capsize it.”

All of a sudden, the positivist rationalist belief that risks are calculable, and life is predictable becomes suspect. The modernist discourse that all risks are relative, comparable in mathematical terms, and hence subject to control is open to challenge. The Utilitarian discourse of mathematics and the accompanying worldview handed down from Bentham go bankrupt overnight as insurance companies refused to insure flights. It is no longer appropriate to compare risks residents in the neighborhood of a nuclear power plant entail as a result of exposure to radioactivity with risks like dying from traffic accidents or eating contaminated hairy crabs.

The alternative worldview would be to regard ‘things’ as transient, volatile and ultimately unpredictable. Discourse then becomes contestable, multi-modal and ultimately indeterminate. Life which used to be so much anchored in language suddenly suffers from a poverty of epithets, adjectives, metaphors and language itself. As



society truly turns postmodern, words become postlingual.

i) The modernist complacency on which this and other 'developed', post-industrial societies rest is founded on an unwavering trust in the post-war world order. To a large extent, it resides in a worldview feeding on the continuation of the neo-imperialist, neo-Eurocentric (if we count the U.S. Canada, Japan, Australia, etc. as one big privileged bloc sharing common interests and common discourses) world order neatly mirrored in various organizations and alliances, diplomatic, economic and even cultural contributing to its survival and expansion (witness China's entry into the WTO).

ii) Perhaps it's about time to critically reflect on the self-righteous, almost altruistic discourses justifying the very existence and continuation of this world order. In this climate of indeterminacy, an easy way out would be to go back to tradition, anchoring oneself in the comfort of a New Conservatism. Tony Blair's anti-terrorist speech is impressive and rightly deserves acclaim, but behind the façade built up by universalistic, humanistic appeals lies the brutal reality of a police state knowing no boundaries and no restraint, not to mention self-restraint. The Cold War rhetoric on one side and the 'messianic' anti-Crusades rhetoric on the other are equally futile, and can only engender yet more revenge and counter-revenge.

Altruistic claims from no matter origin are pointless until all voices, all discourses and all languages receive equal attention and equal entitlements to speak. Only then and until then is there any opportunity for enduring peaceful co-existence. Let's condemn terrorism and all forms of aggression, including linguistic aggression.

## 「同床異夢」的中美關係

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### Abstract

China's active involvement in the global anti-terrorism coalition led by the USA is deceptive. Despite being one of the signatories in the Shanghai APEC meeting anti-terrorism communiqué, China's fundamental differences with the US remain unchanged. Even in the campaign against terrorism, both sides may not have the same understanding.

亞太經濟合作組織 (APEC) 領導人非正式會議結束後，中美關係似乎重上發展的軌道。江澤民和布殊在會議期間言笑晏晏，大談合作之道。中國問題專家 David Shambaugh 在〈紐約時報〉發表評論文章，認為中美關係到了一個「質變化」的新階段，在這個新階段中，雙方的手法及態度會更加成熟。美國的國家安

全顧問賴斯更加勇猛，她認為中俄美三大國在上海會議所簽署的反恐怖主義聲明，是繼第二次世界大戰時三方結盟之後的第一次再度合作，意義非比尋常，而且可以成為恆久的合作。也就是在這個意義下，美國國務卿鮑維爾認為：不但冷戰時代結束了，而後冷戰時代也結束了。

但是，十分顯然，無論從美國及中國的角度來看，David Shambaugh 及賴斯的論斷都是太樂觀了。事實上，從頭到尾，在 9、11 事件後，中國對於參與美國所親領的國際反恐大聯盟，根本是疑慮重重，態度是「欲拒還迎」的。九月十一事件的翌天，中國外交部發言人所用的字眼並沒「恐怖主義」的字，公開提及的只是美國受到暴力襲擊，其後，當美國意圖組織世界反恐聯盟以及出兵阿富汗時，中國的態度猶豫不決，並且發表貌似客觀的言論，要求有確實證據才可攻打阿富汗，需符合國際法和《聯合國憲章》，發揮聯合國安理會的作用等等。

但是，中國變調迅速，反應敏捷；自九月二十二日，外長唐家璇在美國會晤鮑維爾後，即全面調正自己的立場，積極靠攏美國，以迎合布殊十月的上海之行，於是雙方反恐行動進入具體磋商階段。饒是這樣，當美國首次於十月八日開始空襲阿富汗時，中國外交部的聲明並沒有「具體地」支持美國的攻擊行動，而是「原則性」地支持，表示「中國政府一貫反對一切形式的恐怖主義，支持聯合國的有關決議……避免傷及無辜的平民，希望和平能盡早得到恢復」等。

正因為如此，在經合會議之前的多次公開演講中，布殊從沒有多謝過中國。布殊當選美國總統後，將中美關係的性質從克林頓時代的「中美戰略合作夥伴關係」移向「戰略競爭者」的關係，其實不過是較為準確地描述中美兩大國的後冷戰時代的關係而已。嚴格地說，克林頓時代的所謂「戰略性夥伴關係」根本是一個錯誤的名詞。每次江澤民或朱鎔基與克林頓見面，雙方雖然盡量營造友好氣氛，然而氣氛代替不了實際分歧，特別在台灣問題及人權觀點上。中國使盡了九牛二虎之力，才令克林頓接受台灣「三不」的觀點，但美國並沒有放棄「和平解決台灣問題」這一原則，先進武器仍然源源不斷供應台灣。

布殊政府的鷹派顧問將中國定為「戰略競爭者」，是美國當前的主要矛盾；但是鴿派的鮑維爾也沒有跳入克林頓時期的觀念迷陣，他只是說中美關係不能用一個字眼可以形容，現狀遠比概念複雜得多。鮑維爾既非鷹派亦非鴿派，而是一個現實主義者，在解決現實問題上，他要團結一切可以團結的力量。在反恐怖主義的問題上，美國需要中國的合作。然而，雙方的基本矛盾格局並沒有改變。事實上，布殊在上海和江澤民的會談中，雙方只集中在反恐主義的問題上，而其他的重大問題，如：台灣問題、人權問題、武器擴散問題、導彈防禦體系以及中國參加世貿組織之後的各方面卻沒有論及。在這些問題中，每一方面的談判卻可以是經年累月的。特別在台灣和人權上，美國和中國的立場卻頗為遙遠。在台灣問題上，布殊已經從克林頓時代的「三不」政策倒退回「一個中國」的原則，這方面雖然令中國滿意，但是美國的第二條原則「和平解決」是台灣取得美國先進武器的政策基礎，令中國大為頭痛。人權問題也是雙方面分歧焦點之一。鮑維爾也表示不會因為需要北京合作反恐而減少批評中國的人權紀錄，雙方的爭議將會持續。在建立防導彈系統方面，目前由於反恐的迫切性，布殊也許會暫且放下計劃的進行，但是，長遠來說相信布殊不會放棄這個計劃。恐怖主義的襲擊來無蹤，去無影，沒有固定的戰線；而反導彈系統明顯地是針對中俄以及其他對美國不友好的擁有飛彈的國家。兩類戰爭是不同性質的，以美國之富強條件，當然有能力從事這兩類不同性質的戰爭。當反恐戰事稍為淡化下來時，雙方之爭論可能再次逢起了。

事實上，就算在反恐的陣營中，中美的聯盟也是不穩定的。對於「恐怖主義」的內含，雙方實有不同的理解。中國的外交聲明常常說「反對一切形式的恐怖主義活動」，其中的意義，值得再三咀嚼。其實，在「一切形式的恐怖主義」中，中國將以色列攻擊巴勒斯坦的軍事行動也是列為「恐怖主義」活動的。對此，美國當然不會同意。如果將來中美關係轉壞，這項「一切形式的恐怖主意」的帽子，甚至可以戴在美國攻擊阿富汗的軍事行動上。中國文字之靈活性，實在存乎一心。

在反擊恐怖主義的前提下，中美雙方已經各取所需地賦予「恐怖主義」自己的解釋。中國迅速地將法

輪功、藏獨及疆獨列為恐怖組織，未來更有可能將這項帽子送給台獨份子。而布殊立即對此有所應；在經合會議中，布殊針對性地向中俄提出警告，不要以打擊恐怖主義為藉口而迫害國內的少數民族。

基於以上分析，中國藉加入反恐聯盟而能將取得政治利益，究竟有多少實在成疑。中國政府在國內鎮制異見份子不遺餘力，毫不手軟；然而在國際間，面對政治學者亨丁頓（S. Huntington）所稱的「孤獨的超級大國」（The Lonely Superpower）時，卻是忍聲吞氣、謙謙有禮。然而，套用一句庸俗唯物史觀的語句：歷史的發展不以人們的意志所能轉移，一個國家要維持超級大國的地位，另一個國家要奮力恢復十八世紀前泱泱大國的顯赫，其中文化經濟及政治傳統的分異，就決定了衝突的必然性了。

## 加入世貿組織後口 中美之間的關係發展並不平坦

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### Abstract

The US Congress passed the PNTR bill for China, putting an end to the 20-year history of annual debate and discretion over Normal Trade Relations with China, and preparing China for final entry to WTO contrary to common expectation that this will be the beginning of honeymoon between China and the US, we expect continuing controversy and conflict. The additional clauses imported by the US Congress will continue to haunt US-China trade relations in the years to come.

自從去年5月美國國會通過了與中國進行正常貿易的PNTR法案，結束了過去20年必須年年重復審議中國NTR資格的歷史，掃清了中國加入世界貿易組織的最後障礙之後，許多人都認為，從此之後中美之間經貿關係的發展已經走上了一條平坦之路，其實不然。因為許多人并不知道，就在美國國會通過了與中國進行正常貿易的PNTR法案的同時，還附加了幾項內容。其中有三項內容將會在中國加入世界貿易組織之後的相當長的時間內對中美經貿關係產生重大的影響。對此我們是不能掉以輕心的。

原因之一，在美國國會的附加內容中，其中一項的內容是，要求美國國會和行政部門共同設立中國委員會（CSC委員會）監督中國的人權紀錄，鼓勵中國

法治與民主，并且每年向美國國會與總統提交報告。在這種背景下，我們可以想象，無論是在法輪功問題上，還是在宗教自由問題上；無論是在西藏問題上，還是在新疆問題上，由于中美雙方的價值標準截然對立，所以在中國的人權問題上，雙方都會堅持自己的立場，而不會做出任何妥協。但是美國政府在 1999 年的人權報告中曾經提出過人權全球化的概念，在這種理念的支配下，估計美國國會中的一些議員會尋找機會在中國的人權問題上大做文章，以此幹擾兩國經貿關係的正常發展。在最近中美高層經濟學家的研討會上，美國的經濟學家也坦然承認，在中美兩國經貿關係的發展過程中，美國是不會放棄人權這個武器的。對此我們必須保持清醒的頭腦。

**原因之二**，在美國國會的附加內容中，另外一項的內容是，要求爲了防範中國的特定產品進口激增而立法，據說目的是爲了避免對美國產業和勞工就業造成傷害。在美國國會的附加內容中並且規定，如果中國的進口激增已破壞美國的市場秩序，美國總統必須與中國政府談判。事實上，美國政府也是這樣做的。例如，在 1999 年中美談判的協定中，美國對中國的某些特定產品制定了保障條款，而且規定此項條款將在中國加入世界貿易組織之後的 12 年之內有效。這項條款的制定，實際上使得中國的優勢產品的出口不會因中國入世而很快增加，例如中國的紡織品的出口就是如此。其實在這個問題上，美國一直沒有鬆口，而是我們的許多人對此抱有太多的幻想罷了。因爲早在 1997 年中美之間達成紡織品雙邊協定之時就規定過，禁止中國向海外其他國家傾銷的條款有效期爲 15 年。由此可以看出，無論是 1997 年的中美紡織品協定，還是 1999 年的中美協定，美國對於中國紡織品出口的防範時限是一致的，沒有根本的變化。原來在 1999 年的中美協定中，曾規定美國對中國的紡織品配額一直到 2008 年 12 月 31 日，這只不過是爲了與美國 1995 年承諾的在此十年之後取消紡織品配額的時限方面對所有國家一視同仁而已，但絕不意味著從此以後美國對中國的紡織品出口可以網開一面。所以許多人認爲中國一旦加入世界貿易組織之後，紡織品之類優勢產品的出口就可以迅速增加，由此會在此產業領域提供更多的就業機會，這其實只是一廂情願。

**原因之三**，在美國國會的附加內容中，還有一項內容是，要求有關方面持續監督中國遵守世界貿易組織的規範，以防範中國不遵守協定。這項內容的規定實質上反映了中美兩國之間的不信任程度。正是在這種背景下，我們看到，儘管在中國入世問題上 1999 年美國同中國達成了協定，但美國對中國仍然保持著高度的不信任感，這方面突出表現在制定了不確定中國是市場經濟國家的條款，此項條款將在中國加入世界

貿易組織之後的 15 年之內有效 (NON -MARKET ECONOMY DURATION)。當然，通過中美的談判文本，我們看到了這樣一個有趣的現象，就是在制定這個條款時，美國談判者的文本原來是規定在中國加入世界貿易組織之後的 20 年之內都不確定中國是市場經濟國家，後來改爲了 15 年之內有效。從中我們可以看出，儘管經過談判，美方把對中國是否是市場經濟國家的“考驗”期限由 20 年縮短爲 15 年，但由于這項條款的制定，爲中美兩國之間今後的貿易摩擦埋下了很大的伏筆，加大了兩國經貿關係之間的不確定性。美國隨時有可能因某些政治目的而舉起懲罰的棍棒，以中國不是市場經濟爲理由而對中國的出口產品設置障礙，從而使得中國的某些出口產品喪失或者退出美國市場。對此我們一定要有足夠的思想準備，因爲只要美國的廠商以中國不是市場經濟爲理由而對中國的出口提出訴訟，美國政府就可以對中國的產品徵收反傾銷稅，或對中國的出口產品徵收反補貼稅，其結果必然會嚴重地損害中美之間的正常的經貿發展。

## 2001 年中國經濟形勢回顧 與中長期展望

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### Abstract

The authors summed up the economic development trends of China, having taken stock of the behavior of the main macro indicators, demand structure, price trends, the employment situation, and regional economic structure. While China's economy is likely to grow by 7-8% in 2002, just as it did in the past 4 years, such a growth rate will not lead to full employment for the country. Because serious unemployment problems remain, a new approach to tackle the unemployment problem is called for.

2001 年中國經濟的增長表現出如下特點：

1. 從經濟增長的總體態勢看，保持了連續的穩定性。中國 GDP 增長率，1998 年爲 7.8%，1999 年爲 7.1%，2000 年爲 8%，2001 年預計爲 7.5%。中國經濟的增長已連續四年平穩地處於 7%—8% 的區間。

2. 從經濟增長的需求結構看，外需的貢獻呈現爲負值，經濟增長完全靠內需拉動。2001 年，在 GDP 增長率 7.5% 中，初步估算，國內最終消費的貢獻爲 4.9 個百分點，國內資本形成（即國內總投資，包括固定資本形成與存貨增加）的貢獻爲 3.6 個百分點，而



淨出口的貢獻為-1.019 個百分點。(見表 1。注意：在表 1 的計算過程中，為歷年可比，均採用 1994 年價格為不變價，而不是採用當年價。若以當年價計算，1999 年和 2000 年淨出口對經濟增長的貢獻已為負值。) 對比近幾年的情況看，1997 年淨出口對經濟增長的貢獻高達 3.6 個百分點，其對經濟增長貢獻的百分比為 41.4%。從 1998 年以來，淨出口對經濟增長的貢獻一直呈下降趨勢。由此看出，1997 年亞洲金融危機以來，特別是 2001 年美國等世界主要發達國家同步陷入經濟下滑，對中國經濟增長產生了一定的影響。而 1998 年以來，內需對經濟增長的貢獻呈上升趨勢。

表 1 中國經濟增長的需求結構

年份	GDP 增長率 (%)	最終消費貢獻 (百分點)	資本形成貢獻 (百分點)	國內需求貢獻 (百分點)	淨出口貢獻 (百分點)
1995	10.5	4.0	6.9	10.9	-0.4
1996	9.6	5.1	3.3	8.4	1.2
1997	8.8	3.3	1.8	5.2	3.6
1998	7.8	3.2	2.3	5.5	2.3
1999	7.1	5.4	0.9	6.3	0.8
2000	8.0	5.1	2.9	8.0	0.015
2001	7.5	4.9	3.6	8.5	-1.019

  

年份	最終消費貢獻所占百分比 (%)	資本形成貢獻所占百分比 (%)	國內需求貢獻所占百分比 (%)	淨出口貢獻所占百分比 (%)
1995	38.1	66.1	104.2	-4.2
1996	53.0	34.3	87.3	12.7
1997	38.1	20.6	58.6	41.4
1998	41.0	29.5	70.5	29.5
1999	76.1	12.6	88.6	11.4
2000	63.8	36.0	99.8	0.2
2001	65.2	48.3	113.6	-13.6

資料來源：1995—2000 年，根據歷年《中國統計年鑒》、《中國統計摘要》的有關資料計算。2001 年為預計數。計算中均以 1994 年價格為不變價。

3. 從經濟增長中的價格走勢看，物價總水平仍處於較低位勢，輕度通貨緊縮的局面尚未完全扭轉。2001 年，居民消費價格總水平比 2000 年略有上升，預計為 1.2%；而商品零售價格總水平預計比上年略有下降，為-0.6%。

4. 從經濟增長中的就業狀況看，城鎮單位從業人員繼續呈減少趨勢。2001 年 1—9 月份，中國城鎮單位（包括國有單位、城鎮集體單位，以及股份合作單位、聯營單位、有限責任公司、股份有限公司、港澳臺商投資單位、外商投資單位等）的從業人員，由上年末的 11612.5 萬人，減少至 11367.6 萬人，比上年末減少 244.9 萬人，比上年同期減少 484.9 萬人。

5. 從經濟增長的地區結構看，工業生產增長較快的主要是東部的一些省區（如北京、安徽、上海、山東、廣東、浙江、江蘇、天津、福建等）；而固定資產投資增長較快的主要是西部的一些省區（如貴州、內蒙古、青海、寧夏、甘肅、新疆、陝西、重慶等）。這表明，中國工業生產的增長主要仍靠東部沿海地區，而在西部大開發中，投資的增長明顯加快。

綜合以上分析，最為顯著的情況是，中國經濟的增長已連續四年保持在 7%—8% 的平穩水平上。2002 年還可能繼續保持這一水平。這一方面表明，近幾年來，在抵禦國際經濟、金融衝擊和克服國內需求不足的過程中，中國政府所採取的擴張性財政政策和穩健的貨幣政策取得了成效；但另一方面也表明，在中國目前的經濟發展階段上，連續保持 7%—8% 的經濟增長水平，並不能有效地解決就業問題，包括城鎮下崗職工的再就業問題和大量農村剩餘勞動力的轉移問題。這是中國經濟增長中一個突出的中長期問題。從近幾年來所存在的通貨緊縮趨勢和所存在的大量城鄉剩餘勞動力的情況來看，7%—8% 的經濟增長率應該說是低於潛在經濟增長率的。這是不是說，為了解決城鎮就業問題，我們就可以像原先計劃經濟體制下曾經有過的那樣，通過計劃機制和軟預算約束，單純地去追求經濟增長的高速度呢？否。我們認為，中國目前仍處於工業化的中期階段，消費需求正處於由“吃穿用”向“住行”升級和由物質需求向服務需求升級的階段。通過新的市場機制，特別是通過金融體制的創新來融通資金，促進四大支柱產業的發展，即促進住宅建築業和相應的房地產業、以資訊技術為代表的高新技術產業和與其有關的服務業、各種交通工具製造業和相應的運輸服務業，以及其他各類服務業的發展，來達到新的高速增長和解決就業問題是可能的。這並不是說，中國經濟明年或後年就可以馬上進入一個新的高速增長階段，而是給出一個方向，特別是為了實現這個方向，就要提前做好有關體制方面的改革與準備。

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