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THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

LEE YU PAN

MPHIL

LINGNAN UNIVERSITY

2009

THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

**by
LEE Yu Pan**

**A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences
(Political Science)**

Lingnan University

2009

ABSTRACT

The Security Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations

by

LEE Yu Pan

Master of Philosophy

Even though economic relations between China and Japan have improved in recent decades, their security relations raise the prospect of clashes due to the perceived incompatibility of their interests, as manifested for example in territorial claims and rivalry for energy resources. This thesis analyzes the two states' security relations using the "security-dilemma" and "constructivist theories" of international relations.

The security dilemma is a condition in which states' attempts to increase their own security, out of the mutual fear and suspicion, results a decrease in security for all. The constructivist theories suggest that the identities of actors, social norms, states' interests and government policies are inter-linked in both domestic and international politics; each component thus shapes and then reshapes others. International relations should not be understood by merely analyzing material capacities.

In order to understand the security relations between China and Japan, it is imperative to investigate the threat perceptions of various actors within both states, including the general public, the political leadership, the military, the academics and other sub-state actors.

By employing the mentioned theories, it is found that the general public in both states are the key sources to consider the other as a security threat. Fear or resentment among states, which might initially be constructed by the behaviors or policies of other actors, would in turn further shape or limit other actors' perceptions and interests. The public also put constraints on their governments' freedom to maneuver diplomatically and to adopt policy choices, it thus affects the security relations between states. The thesis concludes that deepening interactions between people in both state and carefully conducted diplomatic behaviors, such as choice of

wording in reconciliation actions and joint action by states' leaders at symbolic occasions or locations etc, can be the key of preventing the security dilemma from escalating. As a result, in the case of Sino-Japanese relations, the security relations cannot be improved by deploying military means.

DECLARATION

I declare that this an original work based primarily on my own research, and I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been dully acknowledged.

LEE Yu Pan

October 2009

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL OF THESIS

THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

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ABBERRVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CASS	Chinese Academic of Social Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CICIR	China's Institute of Contemporary International Relations
CMC	Central Military Commission
EU	European Union
G7	Group of Seven
IRBM	Intermediate-range ballistic missile
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
KMT	Kuomintang
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MoD	Ministry of Defense, Japan
NHK	Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SDF	Self-Defense Force
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

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research. I cannot express their importance through words and thus dedicate this research to them.

1. Introduction

On March 20 2005, the UN (United Nations) Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an effort to revitalize the United Nations, proposed a series of reforms to the organization's structure. One of the proposed reforms was to expand the number of permanent members in Security Council, from five to eleven, with one of the likely candidates being Japan (Hoge 2005). A few days later, 22 million Chinese signatures were collected by several popular websites in China. These signatures expressed their opposition to include Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council; this was possibly the largest grassroots campaign in the People's Republic of China to date and would possibly apply some pressure on how the Chinese government would vote on the issue (Kahn 2005). The anti-Japanese movements did not stop at petitioning the U.N. In the following weeks, anti-Japanese gatherings and protests occurred in many major Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai. The organizers of those movements utilized modern technology such as the Internet and mobile phone text messages to inform people and encourage them to go on to the streets (BBC 2005; Yardley 2005). Those movements resulted in rocks and bottles being thrown at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and the Consulate in Shanghai, and attacks on Japanese related businesses. It was believed that these incidents were not merely the reaction to prevent Japan from gaining a seat of permanent membership on the Security Council, but a mixture of issues such as: the junior school history textbook dispute; territorial claims over island and undersea gas reserves; Chinese submarine incursion to Japanese waters; and, Japan's potential joint defense of Taiwan with the United States (French & Kahn 2005; Kahn 2005; Onishi 2005). The Sino-Japanese relationship had already experienced the toughest years since the normalization between the two countries, and these issues made the situation worse.

During the Junichiro Koizumi Prime Ministership, the situation, in May 2005, became increasingly bad that a planned meeting between Koizumi and China's Vice Premier Wu Yi was called off. The opposition of Japan's bid for UNSC permanent membership, while support India for doing so, was only one of the exemplifications of China's resentment to the way Koizumi was handling Japan's relations with China (Lin 2009, 293). A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman considered it "basically unbelievable" for the Chinese police to be unable to take more steps to protect Japanese diplomatic buildings (Kahn 2005); implying that some of the protestors' actions were under the acquiescence of the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nobutaka Machimura's call for an apology for the Chinese protestors' behavior, towards the Japanese people, faced a cold response from his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing (Kahn 2005). Additionally, the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi then attempted to defuse the tension by expressing his "deep remorse" for Japanese wartime behavior at the Asia-Africa Summit, which was held in Indonesia (Greenlees 2005). These demonstrations thus upset and frightened many Japanese people and some believed it was a systemic setup, under the approval of the Chinese government. However, no matter what the truth was, as one writer pointed out, this series of events exemplified "the deep anger, distrust and resentment on both sides" (Johnston 2007, 119-120).

These events also characterize a common pattern of recent Sino-Japanese relations, in that the history-related issues often become apparent during bilateral relations. The memory of wartime history is often closely linked with current issues, producing an interwoven lock between past and current events, and making some issues tough to handle. In this case, Japan's bidding for UNSC permanent membership, which is a current issue, was opposed by China with justification that

Japan could not reflect enough for its past aggression, a historical legacy. Therefore, China views Japan as being unsuitable to become a permanent member of the UNSC, as this position would develop Japan into a leading power in world affairs (Lind 2009, 165). Whether this is the real reason for China's opposition in the debatable, but is an example that historical legacies are often brought up when current issues are discussed.

What is notable is that, while their political relations seem to have been declining, the economic ties between China and Japan have become closer than ever before, with large flows of trade and investment between the two countries (Brooke 2005). And, many writers have already pointed out that the two countries live with each other as "both a vital economic partner and a political rival" (Katzenstein 2008, 23). Also, it is important to understand why years of close economic relations have not spilled over into political aspects and have not helped through the improvement of political relationships, at least in helping to get rid sentimental rhetoric.

As Drifte points out, "[f]rom a constructivists perspective, the discourse of the Japanese on China and that of the Chinese on Japan is clearly shaped by their shared historical experience;" thus, history effects current security relations because many issues are handled against a context of historical experience (Drifte 2003, 14-15), and the security relationship is especially "sensitive to perceptions of intentions and to manipulations of these perceptions" (Drifte 2003, 15). Additionally, one writer suggests that there has been a growing distrust among the Chinese leadership, public, and analysts of Japan, which has meant that Japan has become China's primary security concern since the end of the Cold War (Jian 2007, 129). On the other hand, Japan has also become wary towards China in terms of military security; for example, China's military transparency and the Taiwan Strait issues are mentioned in the

so-called “2+2” Joint Statement of the United States and Japan, in February 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005); this shows that China’s security behavior is one of Japan’s main concerns. However, as the two leading powers in the region, China and Japan have important roles to play in managing the stability of Northeast Asia; therefore, their security relations should be managed with extra caution.

Additionally, some actions carried out by certain actors in the two states show a lack of trust in each other, such as the anti-Japanese articles posted by Chinese internet users and advocates of the “China Threat Theory” in Japan. What especially deserves our attention is whether or not and to what extent, the security aspects of their relations are affected by perceptions of actors in the two states. And, using theoretical terminology in international politics, whether their current security relations can be understood using the concept of “security dilemma” – a situation in which both states engage in the building-up of arms due to the uncertainty of each others’ current and future intentions. By doing so, all involved state security is reduced rather than increased, even though no state has the aggressive intention. If so, how can an escalation be prevented?

1.1 Objectives of the research

The aim of this thesis is to analyze security relations between China and Japan, using the international political concept of “Security Dilemma” as a base. The end of the Cold War brought about many fundamental changes to world politics, and the timeframe for this research focuses on the post Cold War era, especially on the late

1990s and early 2000s. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the security relations between the two countries, the researcher will look beyond the rationalist's approach of international politics, namely the realism approach; which regards materialistic capabilities of states and states' interests to be given exogenously by the system (Wendt 1991, 391). By exploring how perceptions and misperceptions, and identity and shared understanding exists between the two states, as well as how these have emerged and transformed, it is hoped that this thesis will provide an alternative way of understanding Sino-Japanese security relations. And, in addition, help to foster a more stable long-term relationship these between these two countries. For the purpose of deconstructing how two countries understand each other and how these understandings change, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be mainly drawn from the constructivist school of international relations theories; but, some elements of other theoretical schools will also be used to complement the analysis. Therefore, it is hoped that a more convincing result can be achieved through a combination in the strengths of the different approaches.

1.1.1 Anarchy and the security dilemma

As one assumption is that there is no central authority having "the legal competence and the material resources" (Rittberger, Schrader and Schwarzer 1999, 109), which can govern over a state's behavior in the international system, the realist school of international politics believes a state as an actor needs to rely on self-help (Rittberger et al. 1999, 109). There is no guarantee that other states will remain friendly or at least refrain from hostilities towards others, thus states are responsible for their own safety. However, this self-help behavior may result in a dilemma in developing security policy; the dilemma is: "not arming [themselves] may place the

country's security at risk in [the] short run, [yet] increasing defense spending can trigger arming by neighboring states which can result [in] a net loss of security for all states in the long run" (Rousseau 2005, 753).

The security dilemma can result from perceptions or misperceptions caused by history or past relations between states, which often contribute to how countries understand and perceive one another. Therefore, mixing these perceptions (misperceptions) with recent events, a country's domestic civilian opinion, its national security posture, and foreign relations approach will be shaped. Security dilemma theories have suggested that what seem to be irresolvable predicaments can be the product of mutual misperception and suspicion of others' intentions. Misperception yields misled judgment and further leads to counterproductive policies. This is especially dangerous when misperceptions come into play in the security aspect of bilateral relations, because military conflict and war may result. Many take the current antagonism between China and Japan for granted, considering it as a deadlock from which one can hardly see any light for potential improvement.

The objective of this research is to analyze the Sino-Japanese security relationship using the concept of security dilemma. This is primarily a security case study which will examine the security aspects in Sino-Japanese relationships and the nature of current or potential security dilemmas, in this relation, by exploring the threat perception of various sub-state actors in both countries; and also analyze whether there is a way to mitigate and prevent the security dilemma.

1.2 Security dilemma

1.2.1 Detailed definition

In short, the “security dilemma” in this thesis can be summarized by Alan Collins, as follows:

“[W]hen states take defensive measures to protect themselves, they can inadvertently signal to neighboring states that they might harbour expansionist goals. The scenario represents a deteriorating relationship based upon misperception, where, because the statesmen must provide for their states’ own security, a spiraling process of tension and arms procurement occurs. It is a tragedy, neither intends the other harm but, because they do not know this, their relationship deteriorates” (Collins 1997, 23).

Generally, the security dilemma is, in a raw realist definition, “the search for security on the part of state A [that] leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security [and] leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A” (Baylis and Rengger 1992, 9); this is under the assumption that there is no “global sovereign authority” in the “international system” (Booth and Wheeler 1992, 32). Therefore, the security dilemma is a tragedy because no involved parties will deliberately seek to threaten another, and no one wants to initiate a conflict.

However, the security dilemma may not necessarily be triggered unintentionally. In distinguishing the intentionally or unintentionally types of security dilemma, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler identified that the security dilemma could be caused by inadvertent actions, as mentioned above. Besides the “inadvertent” type, there is also another type of security dilemma which is created through deliberate actions called the “deliberate security dilemma”. This type of security dilemma can be further divided into two sub-types. The first sub-type contains a defensive state that poses an

offensive military posture, in order to deter others from being aggressive; while others may be misled to that such a defensive state is actually a revisionist state due to its military posture contradicting its declared intent. The second subtype of “deliberate security dilemma” is through an aggressive state pretending it wants to keep the status-quo. By doing so, other states may be lured in to believing the revisionist state and thus loosen their defensive posture this type is especially dangerous (Booth and Wheeler 1992, 31). Both the “inadvertent security dilemma” and “deliberate security dilemma” could lead to disastrous results, as the former security dilemma poses an obstacle to cooperation between states. Or, in a worse case scenario, it could drag the two states into an unwanted and costly conflict, while the latter would lure the “target state” into a dangerous trap of exploitation through a misperception of false security. Therefore, two terms which warrant clarification are “revisionist state” and “status-quo state,” because the definition of these terms is important to defining the security dilemma. The definition used here is that a revisionist “state seeks to alter the existing international territorial, ideological and power distribution to its advantage” (Plano et al. 1995, 9). It may “commit acts of aggression or declare war in its effort to change status-quo[...] Revisionist states tend to view diplomacy, treaties, international law, and international organization as means for gaining advantages in the power struggle rather than for ameliorating conflicts and resolving issues. For example, Nazi Germany [...] threatened and launched undeclared wars against considerably weaker governments” (Plano et al. 1995, 9). While status-quo means “maintaining the existing international territorial, ideological, or power distribution” (Plano et al. 1995, 9).

Regardless of the type of security dilemma, it is an issue which could bear significant consequence and pose a serious threat to the welfare of the population of

the involved states. Since the introduction of this concept, the security dilemma has become one of the important issues of security studies.

1.2.2 Development of security dilemma in security studies

The concept of having security dilemmas between non-aggressive actors, in international relations, emerged as early as the 1950s. It is believed that this dilemma originated in human nature in a condition of anarchy. Herbert Butterfield illustrated a scenario in his work regarding a situation, where the factors leading to human conflict are an “irreducible dilemma” (Butterfield 1951, 19).

He suggested that, even the assumption is made that involved parties in the international arena, for example the statesmen of two states (or group of states), are virtuous men who bear reasonably high moral standards. Due to their morality, those statesmen do not pursue their national interests excessively, and would not want to resort to force when pursuing national interests. However, despite the fact that no one wants war, there is still what Butterfield called a “tragic element in human conflict”, which will come into play. The “tragic element” essentially refers to the “devils of fear and suspicion” towards the intentions of opposing states and groups. Both sides have a fear of the other while they fail to understand the “counter-fear” of their counterpart. With faith in their own good wishes and their rage at the others’ imagined-malign agenda, some states will have no other choice but to resolve their relations through conflict. No aggressors need to be involved in this type of conflict but the end result could still be devastating. As a result, the whole scenario is caused by what Butterfield terms a “system of self-righteousness” (Butterfield 1951, 19-20). This system is essentially a condition in which one state (or one group of states) is only able to acknowledge its own fears, fails to consider others having similar fears,

and regards others' subsequent reactions to those fears as signs of aggression. In short, one considers itself as the only righteous party in the anarchic international environment. Thus, Butterfield concludes that this irreducible dilemma is the root cause and basis of all human conflicts and tensions between states (Butterfield 1951, 20).

While Butterfield pointed out the tragic element of international relations, John Herz was credited as the first one to coin the term "Security Dilemma," in his book *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Collins 2000, 3). He argued that although life will come to an end inevitably, humans nevertheless want to extend it. However, one cannot destroy all of one's potential enemies, which are other human beings capable to "inflict death upon him" (Herz 1951, 3), and thus we must be dependent on others in order to obtain "necessities of life." This created a situation called "security dilemma," in which individuals seek to find security against potential dangers brought upon by others around them, while also seeking cooperation from them. Using Herz's own words, "man is at the same time foe and friend to his fellow man." However, Herz suggested that the rise of such a dilemma has nothing to do with human nature. Whether human nature is inherently peaceful or aggressive, it does not bear much connection to the "security dilemma." Competition for power is not driven by "power instinct," it is more accurate to say it is driven by the "instinct of self-preservation" because of uncertainty about others' intentions. In other words, it is a social condition. Unless humans consider life as "nothingness" or believe it merely as part of the process, then such "security dilemmas" will ever be present (Herz 1951, 3-5). He also argues that the feeling of insecurity will grow from the individual to larger groups (Herz 1951, 13). Therefore, the implication of Herz's argument lays down the foundation of the interstate-level security dilemma.

John Herz not only explored the concept of “security dilemma,” he also suggests that the “power and security dilemma,” which exists in all relationships between all groups, is most prominent, dramatic and brutal in the realm of international relations; in which no existing supervising power units are above state governments (Herz 1959, 232-233). Also, one of the earliest works on this topic, in the context of international politics, is from Robert Jervis.

In his work *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, similar to John Herz’s assumption, Jervis also claimed the security dilemma has little to do with psychological factors and the nature of human beings. His view on the security dilemma underlies the anarchic nature of the international system. In a process he called the “Spiral Model” (Jervis 1976, 62), because of the lack of central authority in the international system, individual state will rely on their own capability in order to survive, because there is no guarantee for friends to remain friendly. Jervis argues that, in the extreme case, certain states may even consider expansion and attacking as a means to ensure their own security. Thus, the dilemma is caused by the increase of a state’s self-defensive capabilities, because this will be simultaneously “too much and too little.” It will be too much because it is hard to define whether weapons are offensive or defensive in nature, and increasing the amount of weapons, even for self-defense purposes, will give a state the capability to carry out aggressive acts; this is why it is considered “too much.” On the other hand, by increasing armaments, other states will likely react and acquire arms themselves, in order to ensure their own security. This means the first state will never have enough weapons in a relative sense, and is why acquiring weapons is “too little” because it can never enhance one’s security enough (Jervis 1976, 64). This concept underpins the word “dilemma”. In its traditional meaning, “dilemma” means that all choices in a given

situation are undesirable and no option is satisfactory. For example, if a state pursues a policy such as buying more weapons to enhance its own security, then the other state will most likely respond by counterbalancing policies; thus, the first state will still feel insecure, meaning this policy option is undesirable. Meanwhile, if that state decides not to pursue security-seeking policies, then it may run the risk that other states look to exploit it; for example, to take advantage of the first state's military inferiority. As it is difficult to be certain of others' current or future intentions, not pursuing certain security policies is also an undesirable choice, because it could lead to undermining the first state's security. Therefore, no matter whether a state pursues security policies or not, the end result could still be insecurity of the state and thus a "dilemma" (Collins 1997, 14).

As a result, states fall into a never-ending loop of competing to increase their own capabilities, for example through arms races. The key feature of this "Spiral Model" is that states which are involved may not bear aggressive intentions. Despite states competing for more power, it is not their "power instinct" driving the security dilemma, but their "instinct of self-preservation" causing it. Jervis suggested that this model is more like the Prisoner's Dilemma in which the pursuit of "narrow self-interest with a narrow conception of rationality," by states, will not yield the best outcome (Jervis 1976, 66-67).

Booth and Wheeler further divided the security dilemma into two levels. In this interpretation, the security dilemma consists of two dilemmas: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. The dilemma of interpretation is the first stage of a security dilemma and is caused by "irresolvable uncertainty"; decision-makers need to determine whether other state's "military development is for defensive or self-protection purpose only [...] or whether they are for offensive

purpose” (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4). After the intention of any others is decided, the problem turns to the type of response that decision-makers should take; thus, decision makers may choose to deter or reassure. If the decisions are based on an incorrect perception of the other’s motives, either through misplaced suspicions or trust, the consequences could be disastrous, because unwanted conflict or risk of being exploited may occur. A situation called “security paradox” would happen if a “spiral of mutual hostility” is created, when no involved parties actually want it (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, 5). Furthermore, Booth and Wheeler defined another term “security dilemma sensibility”, which they used to describe a measure of “an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role the fear might play in their attitude and behavior, including, crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 7).

1.2.3 Definition of security dilemma used in this research

Comparing the different versions of the security dilemma, Alan Collins summarizes there to be a shared presence of three features which is necessary in order to make a situation a “security dilemma.” First, it is the intention of all actors to only be a benign one, for it is said that no involved parties want to be the aggressor; the second feature is the uncertainty of others’ intentions, as it is extremely difficult to understand another’s mind or intent; the third is equally unsatisfactory policy options (Collins 1997, 23-24).

The presence of a second feature suggests that, despite the existence of mutual fear and suspicion, no one carries an aggressive intention (the first feature), so the

mutual fear and suspicion comes from the inability of the involved parties to understand whether each other are benign or not. In short, the “irresolvable uncertainty” of international politics gives rise to the security dilemma (Collins 1997, 23-24).

As a result, this will lead to the third feature, where statesmen often face a choice of equally undesirable options while they are not, or unable to be, aware of the undesirability of the options. If a state chooses to “play safe” and conduct some policies to safeguard their security, then this could lead to a self-defeating result, mainly because other states could react by employing counter-measures, such as increasing their arms to nullify the effects of the first state’s actions on their own security. The end consequence is a decrease in security which can result in an arms-race. It can be seen that, what is perceived to be an appropriate policy of prudence for the first states will not be a desirable choice for all-knowing outsiders; however, if statesmen of the first state do nothing to safeguard their security in the world of uncertainty, they could be at risk of being taken advantage of, as they may present a window for others to exploit any weaknesses. This shows the dilemma that statesmen could face when choosing a security policy. Also, Collins argues that the three above features are necessary conditions for a security dilemma (Collins 1997, 23-24), and that these are the key conditions with which this paper will determine whether a situation is a security dilemma.

Despite realists’ claims that the security dilemma has no relation to psychological factors of humans, and that this dilemma almost certainly exists in an anarchic international system, this view is subject to challenge.

1.3 Research questions

The research questions are:

1. Does a security dilemma exist in Sino-Japanese relations?
 - Do elements in Sino-Japanese relations show the characteristics of a “security dilemma?”
 - To what extent do theories of a security dilemma help in understanding Sino-Japanese relations?
 - If there is a security dilemma, then why? What are the sources of the security dilemma?
2. Is there any way to mitigate, prevent it from escalation, or even escape from it?
 - According to different international relations theories, what could be the possible solutions to prevent conflict between China and Japan, due to a security dilemma?
 - What are the practical policies or measures which can be recommended?

1.4 Review of theoretical literature

As mentioned previously, there are several well-established theoretical approaches to studying world politics and international relations. This thesis will focus, in particular, on two approaches: realism and constructivism.

1.4.1 Realism’s assumption of world politics

Realism is considered by many to be an important theoretical school of international

relations. Realists suggest that the world is “a dangerous and insecure place” (Burchill 1996, 70), and violence is unavoidable even though it is undesirable (Burchill 1996, 70). In other words, realism believes essentially believes that a long lasting peaceful international environment is a favorable but unattainable goal.

As this thesis adopts an alternative view to refute the inevitability of violence and confrontation, in a bilateral relationship in the international system, which contrary to realists’ assumptions, it is useful for us to have a brief overview of some basic assumptions of realism before discussing the question from an alternative perspective.

A number of variations in realism share a prominent assumption that the international political system is categorized by anarchy, the difference is on how each version views the importance of this feature in explaining state behavior. For classical realists, it is the “will to power” in human nature and desire to dominate others which is driving states in a power struggle (Mearsheimear 2001, 17, 19). It can be said that international politics, in the eyes of classical realists, is “evil” (Elman 2007, 12).

Defensive realism or structural realism, on the other hand, treats the anarchic environment of international politics as a security-seeking struggle between states and power, as an essential part of the international political system. This is because it is important for a state’s survival but does not claim that human nature causes the power of such politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 19). Thus, defensive realism considers power to be a means but not the end in world politics, because defensive realists believe that having security is the prerequisite of all other goals and power is merely a route to gain security. Therefore, states seek security but not necessarily power and security should be achieved by self-help in the absence of a central governing

authority (Waltz 1979, 111, 126). Defensive realists also oppose states that acquire excessive power as long as security is achieved, because there is no incentive for them to do so, and if they do not want to attract balancing from other states. John Mearsheimer proposes another version of realism, offensive realism, and remarks that states will not stop acquiring power, because maximizing power is the best way to ensure a state's own security; and states would not feel safe by merely maintaining status-quo, thus the ultimate security environment of a state cannot be achieved short of becoming the hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 20, 21).

Despite the detailed differences in these realism variations, they share certain core elements, one being that all forms of realism highly regard material power as a central analytic element of international politics; which is because this type of power they refer to is essentially material power. Another important feature is the chaotic nature of anarchy in the international political system. Due to the inherently competitive nature of the international system, states are, at best, rivals if not enemies. As states take a self-centered view, even though co-operation is possible, this would only be done out of short-term rationalistic consideration for their own self-interest, rather than out of trust or good-will. Also, because states are forced by the structural environment and do not completely trust one others' intentions, merely the act of accumulating material power by one state is labeled as harboring a malign intention.

After this brief overview of various realists' assumptions, it is little wonder why realists consider the security dilemma to be a structural problem that originates from the anarchic condition of international politics. Just as Robert Jervis argued that psychological factors of people play little part in this predicament (Jervis 1976, 62). Also, the security dilemma seems to be difficult to mitigate and prevent, due to

the zero-sum nature of highly competitive international relations.

Nevertheless, not all schools of international relations theory hold this zero-sum view, as constructivism holds a different view on international politics, by seeing the highly competitive and hostile nature of international politics as “what states make of it” (Wendt 1994, 388). The different identities and interests that a state carries when interacting with another will shape the nature of relations between two or more states, whether this is friendly or hostile is not fixed (Wendt 1994, 388). Therefore, constructivists consider that the security dilemma might not necessarily be difficult to prevent or mitigate as realists have predicted, because the international environment is not necessarily hostile and zero-sum.

1.4.2 Constructivism: culture, norms, identity & interest in the construction of international relations and security issues

As discussed in the previous section, the security dilemma seems to be “irreducible,” as the dominant school of realism, in international politics, has assumed; especially in the peak of the Cold War era. However, new perspectives in analyzing this matter have gradually developed from other schools of international relations theory, and these new perspectives have challenged the irreducibility of the security dilemma. Other theoretical schools emerged to analyze the security dilemma because many suggested that the realist school tends to focus on a more narrow sense of power politics. In fact, overly emphasizing on one theoretical school or “insistence on received paradigm” may prove counterproductive when attempting to understand Japan and Asian-Pacific security affairs; therefore, more “eclectic theorizing” is required (Katzenstein & Okawara 2002, 168).

One of the alternative theoretical schools is constructivism. Constructivists

argue that “the behavior of individuals, states, and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules, and cultural practices” (Mingst 2004, 50). Alexander Wendt points out that there is insufficiency in rationalist schools, such as realism and liberalism, through explaining a number of aspects of international relations. He admits that the rationalists’ assumption that anarchy in world politics is one of the possibilities, but he further argues that “an anarchy of friends is different from one of enemies” (Wendt 1994, 388). The problem of rationalists’ theories is that they assume the interest of states is constant and exogenously given; meaning there is little room for interest to transform and change (Wendt 1994, 384). In opposition, he claims that “the contents of national interests was in part a function of these structurally constituted identities (as well as of domestic ones)” (Wendt 1994, 386); and identities and interests are the dependent variables which are endogenetically hinged on interactions between actors (Wend 1994, 387). Martha Finnemore shares a similar view, as she considers states’ interests not to exist outside the objective world waiting to be discovered, but are constructed out of social interactions. She also points out that, contrary to the classical realism assumption, power is merely an instrument for pursuing other things, how to wield them is dependent on what interests states have, and what states want will be socialized by international society (Finnemore 1996, 2).

Wendt argues that the *identification* process, with others, presupposes whether states would define the interest with or without regard to others. In other words, states with a negative identification of others’ views, will view others as merely for an instrumental purpose without considering the other’s welfare. The tendency of rationalist views, that states are totally self-interested, is due to a lack of positive identification with others (Wendt 1994, 386).

Wendt also suggests that the formation of state identities and interests are endogenous and happen through interactions, and with such a process it is not merely the behaviors of states which will be affected (Wendt 1995, 394, 399). To initiate more than behavioral cooperation, change to existing identities is an important step. This is the reason why constructivists have a role, as they view the construction of identities and interests as more interesting.

Alexander Wendt argues that international politics is also the result of social relationships; he further explains that “shared knowledge, material resources, and practices” are the three principle elements in social structures (Wendt 1995, 73). He argued that “social structures are defined by, in part, shared understanding, expectation, or knowledge. These constitute the actors in a situation and the nature of their relationships, whether cooperative or conflictual” (Wendt 1995, 73). Wendt decides that the security dilemma is the result of intersubjective cognition making states which are suspicious of one another because of their worst assumption in others’ intentions. Secondly, Wendt does not consider materials themselves will bear meaning on their own, but will be through the actions and shared knowledge of human beings which offers them meaning (Wendt 1995, 73). Finnemore also makes a similar claim that materials alone have little meaning, and the meanings of materials are the products of “human cognition and social interaction,” which is why “my defensive measure is your security threat; my assault on free trade is your attempt to protect jobs at home” (Finnemore 1996, 6). She suggests that different meanings can be given to the same materialistic facts and the result of this not only differs in behavior but also produces confrontation. Therefore, the usefulness of any attempt to give meaning to materials alone, without considering other factors, is very limited (Finnemore 1996, 6). These assumptions exemplify why Japan is not afraid of the

United States (a nuclear armed state), but feels wary towards the North Korean nuclear project. This is because Japan considers North Korea as a hostile state but not the United States. We could see that Japan has an entirely different attitude towards nuclear armed countries; giving meaning to nuclear weapons does not help us understand the deeper picture behind though; and this suggests, assuming Japan would hold the same attitude to all nuclear-armed states would not be helpful in any analysis.

Wendt asserts that “social structures exist ... in practices” and those practices “depends on shared knowledge,” with constructivists asking “why does one social structure exist[?]” (Wendt 1995, 74) One element that is produced by this “shared knowledge” is a *norm*. Norm is “likes rules that define the identity of an actor” and have “constitutive effects” to identify what actions are expected under a particular identity by others. On the other hand, a norm is a standard for framing what the “proper enactment” is of an established identity, thus having a “regulative” effect. In short, norms define collective expectations of specific actions under a specific identity (Katzenstein 1996, 5). Katzenstein uses an interesting example to illustrate how collective expectations can shape one’s actions:

“We can easily conjure up the image of a the image of a column of 50,000 tanks stretching from Cleveland to Seattle that tells us something about the size of the Soviet military at the end of the Cold War. It is harder to fathom what force what force caused Governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic candidate for president in 1988, to dress up in military fatigue and ride around on a tank – looking foolish in the process – to demonstrate his toughness on the issue of national defense. Collectively shared expectations of the American public about military toughness of presidential candidates are what made the governor behave the way he did”

(Katzenstein 1996, 7).

Such out of place behavior was undertaken to fulfill what Dukakis perceived to be American public expectation, and in this case through military toughness. Despite Dukakis's tank-riding coming out as a public relations failure and used by his opponents to criticize his softness on defense (Schulte 2008), this example shows that political actors' decision-making can be driven by a collective expectation which is shared by the public; even though these decisions can be considered unwise or irrational when viewed from another angle.

For national security policy, Katzenstein argues that there are two social determinants: the cultural-institutional context and collective identity.

The cultural-institutional context emphasizes the process of self-reflection; it can be understood that this is a process in the emergence of new norms through communication between actors. Such a process can be spontaneously evolving, consciously promoted, deliberately negotiated, or a combination/mixture of both types (Katzenstein 1996, 21). In fact, Wendt argues, in his earlier article that, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" that "identities and interest[s] are the dependent variable" and "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them" (Wendt 1992, 394, 396-397). Through the transformation of identities and interest through practices, new institutions will be formed. Power politics, which realists believe to be the product of the anarchic structure of international politics, is not the certain outcome of a state system because "social threats are constructed, not natural" (Wendt 1992, 405). Based on a "process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "social acts" and begins the process of creating intersubjective

meanings” (Wendt 1992, 406). Through this process, despite the difficulty of the change, it would be “constructing and reconstructing” the “intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.” Constructivists thus propose that identities and interests are the product of “expectation produced by behavior” (Wendt 1992, 407, 416).

He also argued that it was possible a “predator” in the international state system could be the result of being a victim in past events and thus could be socialized into being less aggressive in behavior through social interaction (Wendt 1992, 409). Despite hardly being qualified as a highly aggressive state, China’s unfriendly attitude towards Japan, in security issues, may be the result of its past as a victim of imperial Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Arnold Wolfers also makes similar claims, stating that those sensitive to security threats are victims of recent past attacks or those which have enjoyed a high degree of security but have been surprised by the sudden change in security environment (Wolfers 1962, 151). However, there are two constraints, the first is that it is an “incremental and slow” process and second, that “actors do not identify negatively with one another.” The two preconditions of such a change in self-identity are that “new social situations [.....] cannot be managed in terms of preexisting self-conceptions” and the costs of change must be less than the rewards (Wendt 1992, 418-419).

There is one point worth noticing; it is the institutionalization of new identities and interests which can generate both cooperative and conflicting relationships between actors, but one should not take institutions as the same thing as cooperation (Wendt 1999, 399). Intersubjective shared understanding can also create a condition for violence and exploitation, because there is no guarantee that shared understanding is “ethically ‘good’ or will lead to peaceful behavior” (Finnemore

1996, 6). However, Wendt suggests that if the aggressive behavior of a state was due to it having been a victim in the past, then there is better chance to turn it into a less conflicting actor if future social interaction is carried with certain measures, both carefully and appropriately (Wendt 1999, 409). Therefore, it is to say that states' interests and identities should not be taken as a constant, and the process through which they are formed and changed is worthy of investigation.

1.5 Main frameworks of the thesis

This thesis utilizes two frameworks proposed in Peter J. Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt's work for analysis. These are based on the causal-relations pathway between states' norms, identities, and interests within a state, which are suggested in *The Culture of National Security* (Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt 1996, 53); and, the codetermination of institutions and process (Wendt 1992, 406), suggested in the article *Anarchy is what states Make of it*, with which the interaction between two states is explored. This thesis will attempt to combine these two frames in order to investigate the intra-states interaction within actors and the states, and inter-state interactions.

Relations between the environmental structure (cultural and institutional elements, such as “norms”), identity, interests and policy of the state are shown below.

Figure 1. Causal relations between norms, identities, interests and policies (Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt 1996, 53).

Figure 1 shows the relations in how norms shape identity, interests and policy, and how identity further shapes interest, policy and norms in return (Katzenstein 1996, 53). The term “norms” means “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” or “rules defining an identity;” for example, anti-militarism norms have made it hard for the Japanese and German governments to employ certain “assertive” security policies (Jepperson et al. 1996, 53). Identity here has the following meanings: “(a) the nationally varying ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose (“nationhood” or “nationalism, for short”), and (b) country variation in state sovereignty, as it is enacted domestically and projected internationally (“statehood,” for short)” (Jepperson et al. 1996, 59).

The following figure shows how identities, intersubjective shared knowledge, and interests are transformed.

Figure 2. The codetermination of institutions and process (Taken from Wendt 1992, 406).

This thesis mainly utilizes the framework shown in figures 1 and 2. The relations shown in figure 1 are used to argue inter-relationships between sub-state actors, and how their identity and interest shapes and reshapes one another. The framework shown in figure 2 demonstrates the inter-state shaping of identity and interests which occur, and with which international relations can be defined and understand.

1.5.1 Ambiguity of weapons

Jervis argues that the security dilemma might be aggravated or mitigated by a changing military posture and by the change of advantage of defensive and offensive.

First, he contests that being defensive has an advantage and the security dilemma would be much lessened with war being less likely. He used the interwar period as an example to illustrate this: the leaders of the allies expected the cost of war to be too high for Adolf Hitler to launch his venture and they reached this conclusion because of the memories of a defensive World War One. They decided the German threat was not that serious (Jervis 2001, 192-194). However, the outbreak of World War Two showed that this assessment, which was based on past wars, may not be accurate, because deploying different tactics with the same weapons could yield different results. Another issue which arises from judging the degree of security, from the nature of the weapon deployed by others, is that even though a defensive operation has an advantage and is easier than an offensive operation, statesmen might still want to bear the risk. This is because it takes more than merely evaluating the easiness between offence and defense, when deciding whether to use the military as a way to solve the security problem (Collins 1997, 52). There were cases that states chose to go to war, even though they were clearly not strong enough or had a low chance of winning – Jervis believes some states “value fighting [in] itself” and for various reasons (Jervis 1990, 103). As a result, one state may never feel assured or safe by simply evaluating others’ arsenals or military strength.

Moreover, one of the major obstacles in convincing other states over one’s intention of building arms, for defensive purposes, is the ambiguous nature of weapons. It is usually very difficult for statesmen to discern whether or not another state holds aggressive intentions, simply by examining their military hardware alone. This is because many weapons can be used both as offensive and defensive weapons. Booth and Wheeler exemplified this by suggesting “a gun can be the source of food for a family in a hunting community, or it can be used to spray bullets across a school

in a mad killing spree[...] What about everyday objects such as kitchen utensils, candlesticks and cars? Normally they are the things we use to make our lives fuller, but in some circumstances they are used to kill, as readers of crime fiction know well” (Booth and Wheller 2008, 43). In fact, there is seldom a weapon that can clearly be placed into the category of offensive or defensive alone.

Therefore, we can understand the dilemma that statesmen face when discerning other states’ intentions and in their difficulty of mitigating the mistrust between other states by restructuring their weapons composition alone. In fact, some weapons which were viewed as having an explicit defensive nature could be treated as an offensive weapon. Even an obviously defensive weapon, such as an anti-aircraft weapon, can be perceived as a part of an offensive plan; just as a battlefield with good air-defense made the Egyptian attack on Israel possible, at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Jervis 2001, 203). Such a demarcation in perception could also be exemplified by a recent event, when Japan tested a Standard-3 missile in collaboration with the US Missile Defense Agency. The intercept successfully shot down a ballistic missile on December 18th 2007, as part of an effort of creating a missile shield. This missile defense system will be installed on four Aegis Destroyers of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. It is widely believed that Japan speeded up the joint development project with US after the 1998 North Korean missile fire test, in which one Taepongdong-1 missile flew over Japanese territory (BBC News 2008). Related efforts to establish a comprehensive missile defense included launching satellites to create a global surveillance system and carrying out an exercise to assess the possibility of deploying a missile shield in Tokyo (BBC News 2008).

Although it is understandable from Japan’s point of view to have a policy for such

a system, in order to safeguard national security and given the shock of North Korean missiles flying over, China has shown its reservation and concern about the missile shield. While a Japanese government spokesman, Nobutaka Machimura, said the Standard-3 missile test is “very significant for Japan’s national security,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed this after the test, by saying “We hope that the actions of Japan are beneficial to the peace and stability of the region and conducive to mutual trust of the countries in the region” (BBC News). Therefore, it seems as though China’s and Japan’s other neighbors tend to see the potential harm to their national interests, which are brought about by this system in a number of other scenarios. For China, whether this missile defense will be used to defend Taiwan or to devalue the Chinese missile deterrent is most probably of utmost concern (Lovell 2003, 132-133). In fact, the original Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) was termed the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) by the Japanese government, because it was their intention to have a missile defense to defend itself and not use it as a general regional missile shield (Hook et al 2001, 142). It seems that the Japanese government wants to isolate such a system from being used in any other scenario, except the defense of Japan. China, nevertheless, viewed this as an indication Japan may assist the US in fighting China’s forces in the future, and the missile defense will be used to deter the use of China’s missile force (Hook et al. 2001, 233). In other words, the Japanese missile defense is a tool to undermine Chinese security and is not merely a defensive weapon. Just as Gideon Akavia points out, an effective defensive position can be used as the shield to cover other offensive operations (Akavia 1991, 45); because in some cases, establishing a strong defense is the pre-condition of acquiring offensive capabilities. This is why neighbors around a strongly defended state may not necessary feel safe (Jervis 2001, 202).

On the other hand, it could be said that even weapons with a clear offensive character are, sometimes, viewed as a defensive tool of national security. Taking China as an example, the country possesses a considerable amount of medium-ranged (MRBM) and short-ranged (SRBM) ballistic missiles, and it is believed to be the one of the key components in deterring Taiwan from independence. This is because the ballistic missiles, and especially the short-range ones, would play a role in a certain estimated choice of actions (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 32). Giving the tremendous concern over territorial integrity, due to the humiliating past, reunification with Taiwan is still China's "fundamental aspiration." As a sign of national dignity, Reunification with Taiwan has become a nationalistic one and a primary function of the PLA (McDougall 2007, 124,174). With this objective as a national core interest, China's government may consider it their right to prepare for the worst case scenario regarding Taiwan, and to use whatever means necessary to defend such interest. Thus, it fails to see why deploying and stockpiling more ballistic missiles would be perceived as offensive for those states that do not have an agenda on Taiwan's political status. Whenever the core interest of a state is being infringed and threatened, whether it is unintentional or not, policy-makers may consider whatever measures they deploy as a defensive reaction. The above discussion underlines one of the main ideas of this thesis: that, due to the difficulty of distinguishing the nature of weapons, the possible dual purpose of weapons, and the differences in understanding what should be categorized as defensive weapons, changing the composition of states' arsenals or military posture would be ineffective in the mitigation security dilemma. The fundamental solution to this issue still lies not only in the material force but in normative terms.

It seems that what can be defined as defensive weapons, policies and measures,

will vary with the common belief and knowledge of a state. Just as constructivists suggest, whether increasing material capabilities (weapons) would induce fear among other states is varied, with the perception these states have of the arms-stockpiling state. Weapons themselves do not bear any significance in examining the security dilemma, if other psychological conditions and values are not included in the assessment.

As analyzing the weapons alone does not have much usefulness to understanding the security dilemma, constructivists' views on international politics throws light on the analysis, by integrating other normative factors into the analysis.

1.6 Level of analysis

Typically, there are three levels of analysis which are commonly used in international politics research. This method of separation is thought to have been proposed first by Kenneth Waltz, when he suggested that the three levels to be: the individual, the state, and the state system (Singer 1960, 454). Although the naming of each level varies slightly in different literatures and some scholars alternatively propose four or even five levels, these three levels are the three main approaches in current international political research. Each level has its own strengths and weaknesses; and the choice of level used in this research will be justified.

One of the assumptions from the realists' view on international politics is that, as Wolfers identifies, "states are conceived of as the sole actors in the international arena. All units in the system behave essentially in the same manner; their goal is to enhance if not maximize their [own] power, each of them must act with a single mind and a single will..." (Wolfers 1962, 82). Under this assumption, many realists do not

believe it is necessary to divide a state into sub-state actors, when analyzing motives behind diplomatic policies and behavior; it is taken for granted that the statesmen represent the collective will of their respective population in each state. This approach focuses on how each state, as a unitary actor, interacts in the international system, and how the system constricts and regulates the behavior of states. Therefore, this is the international system level of analysis. This perspective is useful if we merely want to know what a state's actions are and use those as a basis to infer how others would respond. However, this approach only informs us of the "correlative" relationships of an event at best (Singer 1969 23); it does not become that useful or sufficient if we want to understand why and how states' interests, and their views on others' behaviors generate, in order to deduce more deep causes of a state's actions. Another problem arises from taking the international system as the main level of analysis, where it assumes that national actors' behaviors are more or less the same, thus diversities between different states are often neglected. "[N]ations may differ widely in what they consider to be the national interests, and we end up having to break down and refine the larger category" (Singer 1969, 23).

However, the constructivism school of international politics holds a view about how actors and systems mutually constitute one another through social interaction. Just as Alexander Wendt suggests, constructivists believe that the world is socially constructed and how the state perceives its interest and relations to others, is based on shared knowledge. Although Wendt's arguments focus mainly at the systemic level, namely states as the main actor, he does suggest that domestic factors can play a part on the formation of new identities and interests (Wendt 1992, 388). Despite his claims that states are still the central unit of study, states themselves are entities which are composed of many sub-state actors; and they all contribute to the

construction of states' identities, interests, and the perception on themselves and the outside world. As a result, it is essential to look into the internal sub-state actors, if we seek to understand the sources of mistrust and fear with which the security dilemma is caused.

The imperative of sub-states' actors will prompt the use of a nation-state level of analysis, as the main level of this thesis; because this level will raise the question of "goals, motivations, and purpose in national policy." Also, this level "investigate[s] which national goals are selected, [and] the internal and external factors that impinge on those process[es]..."(Singer 1969, 25). In fact, Barry Buzan provides a clearer definition of the different levels of analysis. He further divides three levels into five levels, which are: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, and individuals (Buzan 1998, 5-6). By employing this definition, the original nation state-level of analysis is then divided into two levels – the unit itself and subunits within units, and this division provides a clearer fashion to employ this research. By understanding the subunits, we may then understand the outcome at unit level (Buzan 1998, 6). Therefore, it is fair to say that the unit- and subunit-levels are the focus of this thesis. Of course, the state as a whole would be still a useful unit of analysis, but because the state is constituted by various domestic forces, certain selected domestic actors and their views on Sino-Japanese relationship will be taken into account.

Therefore, the main level used in this thesis is the subunit-level and unit (or nation)-level of analysis, supplemented by other levels when needed. By reviewing the different interactions and perceptions between sub-state actors (subunits) in China and Japan, such as the interaction between China's military and Japan's military, the Chinese government and the Japan government, and how each civilian

society views the other, the sources of fear can be identified.

1.7 Mitigation of security dilemma

Realism traditionally holds a fatalistic approach to the security dilemma, with traditional theorizing and suggesting that this dilemma is inherent from the anarchic environment in international politics.

However, the security dilemma could be mitigated, and there are several relevant approaches to the question concerned. One key feature of the security dilemma is the uncertainty and misunderstanding of another's intention, even if it is a benign one. Thus, it is imperative to see whether these "clouds of suspicion" can be removed or lessened if the security dilemma is to be mitigated or removed (Collins 1997, 45).

1.7.1 Costly signaling theory of reassurance

Costly signaling theory was based on the assumption that mistrust and suspicion, between actors in international politics, can be mitigated through sending a "costly signal." Those signals are costly, as the name suggests, because one who does not sincerely wish to reassure others, or be trustworthy, will not send them. First, the "costly signal" must be indeed "costly;" any attempt which does not bear any significant loss in certain capability (for example, significantly reducing the offensive strength of their military) would be considered as "cheap talk" and will thus be unable to build trust. Another criterion to this approach is that the "trustworthy type" value focuses more on making peace than towards the risk of being exploited (Kydd 2000, 326).

Andrew Kydd modified such a model in the reassurance game, which simulated the scenario that both actors are uncertain of the trustworthiness of each others, but one will take “a lesser initial round” to build up initial trust, which will then be followed by a second round. The flow is shown in figure 3.

Figure 3. The Reassurance Game (Taken from Kydd 2000, 333).

Kydd used this theory to explain why the Cold War ended; he did not suggest this to be the only factor contributing to the end of Cold War, but argued that this approach was part of the reasons. At the beginning, the reform-minded Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev failed to reassure the West about his intention to improve Soviet

relations with them, by suspending nuclear tests and ending the deployment of more SS20 IRBMs in 1985. The West considered this to be cheap talk, because it did not profoundly alter the strength of the Soviet's nuclear capabilities. The change of the Soviet's image and increase in trust of Gorbachev came from several dramatic moves, including: advancing the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) without posing conditions on the United States concession on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and 500,000 troops cut from the Soviet's armed forces – indicating the change of military posture to a defensive one. US President Ronald Reagan expressed his change of view in the Soviet image at the Moscow summit in 1988. All of these dramatic steps successfully changed many views in the West, even amongst conservatives.

The above illustrates how the costly signaling theory can be used to lessen suspicion and gain trust by a series of steps.

1.7.2 Symbolic reconciliation action led by high profile figures

The security dilemma is rooted in how states perceive one another and their perception of others' intentions, but not necessarily out of genuine threat or danger posed by others. One way to pave the way to lessen animosity is through symbolic gestures of friendship, conducted by highly respected and popular high-level figures. One author uses Franco-German reconciliation as an example; French President Charles de Gaulle and the German Chancellor concluded the Elysees Treaty in 1963, by setting the course of the Franco-German reconciliation (Cheow 2006, 37). This was a dramatic act symbolizing the reconciliation between Germany and France, which happened on September 22nd 1984, when French President Francis Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stood in front of the charnel house in Verdun,

one of the fiercest battlefields in World War One. Holding hands for a number of minutes in the rain (Cheow 2006, 37; Today in History), this move is highly dramatic and symbolic, and the German press deemed the picture of the moment “will go down in history” (Today in History). Cheow suggested that the Japanese Emperor Akihito and Chinese fourth generation leader Hu Jintao are well-suited for this role, as they have little mental connection to the war itself (Cheow 2006, 37).

For Sino-Japanese relations, the symbolic gesture should bear more weight than it currently does. China and Japan have already signed a formal document to promote friendship and reconciliation, in 1978, through the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. However, there has not been a symbolic occasion which has been similar to Verdun, between Chinese and Japanese leaders; this gives the impression that Sino-Japanese relations have not moved from their superficial instrumental nature to genuine cooperation.

Of course, it is not appropriate to conclude that Franco-German reconciliation was only out of emotional or moral reason, for the Elysees Treaty was signed under common security concerns (Wetterqvist, 1990 59). And, the “hand-holding” between Mitterrand and Kohl in 1984, were both aimed towards increasing the bond between France and Germany; which was out of concern over arms-control and promoting Franco-Germany military dialogue in response to the Soviet’s SS-20 missile deployment (Wetterqvist, 1990, 59-61). However, high level figures displaying symbolic or even dramatic acts would bring more psychological impact, which would bring about the air of reconciliation to people in both states, even if only for instrumental purposes; this is because a lessening of suspicions could increase cooperation between the two states.

1.8 Summary of the basic assumption of this thesis

Here I will summarize the basic assumptions which provide the basis of this research, as mentioned above.

1. Sub-state actors, as constituting units of states, are important analytical units if we seek to understand how perceptions emerge and how they can be transformed.
2. Interstate relations are influenced by perceptions or misperceptions between states, which are constituted by actors within states such as the general public, politicians, and academics; and it is those actors, within the states' identities, interests and intersubjective knowledge, who are forging those perceptions and misperceptions.
3. Material capabilities alone do not explain relations between the two states.
4. Identities, intersubjective shared knowledge, and interests are not fixed and can be transformed.
5. There are three conditions for a security dilemma to exist:
 - A. Irresolvable uncertainty over whether current or future intentions of the other state are benign or malign.
 - B. Neither of the involved parties will harbor actual malign intentions.
 - C. There is no desirable or satisfactory policy choice because all policy options lead to some undesirable or negative consequence; no policy choice can handle the issue without also contributing negative side effects.
6. The security dilemma is a condition created by perceptions and misperceptions between actors within states; thus, it is possible to mitigate or prevent it if those perceptions and misperceptions are changed.

This chapter explored the definition and development in the security dilemma concept, and the main argument and assumptions of the constructivism, which is the main theoretical basis of this thesis.

2. Overview on Sino-Japanese relations

Japan is the first Asian power to modernize, joining the club of the advanced economies in the 1960s and overcoming setbacks in its economy. However, the country experienced a long-term economic recession in the 1990s; therefore, there has been some doubt over the country in both its regional and global role. China's colossal economic growth, resulting from 30 years of economic reform, has been the main engine for the country to gain influence and weight in world politics; this is despite facing challenges and obstacles, including the current global financial crisis; and, the momentum seems as though it will remain strong for the foreseeable future. China is now considered to be one of a number of countries which will bring significant impact on the global situation, should the current trend continue. China could also surpass Japan to be the world's second largest economic power and become a major military power by 2025; while the consumption of imported natural resources and pollution, which will be caused by this rapid development, will also be significant. Meanwhile, Japan will face reconstruction of its domestic and foreign policies, in order to maintain its position as an upper middle ranked power, while also combating its various internal challenges (National Intelligence Council 2008, 33).

China, with its large population, rapidly growing economy and rising influence on the diplomatic stage, is an actor playing a strong role among its neighbors, and it currently has more power that it could use to wield international relations. China is considered as strong as other major states in the region if its power is measured in "absolute terms," because its military budget was ranked third among all the states in 2003, after adjusting the buying power of the RMB on a "parity purchasing power"

(PPP) basis, which has been rising steadily since. The People's Liberation Army's military doctrine, after absorbing the experience of high-tech warfare conducted by the United States in the 1990s, has shifted from a "people's war" to a "limited war under high-technology conditions" (McDougall 2007, 61). The latest annual U.S. Congressional Report "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007," describes China's current military doctrine as being able to reform the PLA into a force which is capable of fighting a "local war under conditions of informatization," and the result of the reform is largely "impressive" but actually yet to be tested (U.S. Department of Defense 2007, 15).

Also, it is interesting when exploring whether their earlier history has brought about an impact on their current identity, as neither state are considered remarkably weak. In the following section, some major events of Sino-Japanese relations will be explored.

2.1 Overview on early history of Sino-Japanese relations until World War Two

China and Japan have had centuries of interaction; the first recorded diplomatic relations can be traced back to as early as the 7th century. Japan, under the rule of Empress Suiko, sent an envoy to Sui Dynasty in China in the year 607; this was the beginning of the first diplomatic relations between the two countries. However, diplomatic relations did not end when the Sui Dynasty ended, as the successor of Sui, Tang Dynasty, maintained the relations with Japan. This was also the period when Chinese culture had considerable influence on Japan, and Japan sent students and monks to China in order to learn. Since this time, the Japanese political system, economies and education are believed to have been under the influence of Chinese culture (Cheng 2001, 1).

As interaction deepened between the two countries, some major events occurred; some of which have greatly impacted on later generations. Kublai Khan of the Yuan Dynasty sent two expeditionary forces to Japan, in order to force submission to Yuan's rule. Both of these failed due to the fleets being damaged by typhoon. However, after these two attempts, the Yuan Dynasty never again attempted to conquer Japan by any means (Cheng 2001, 82-86).

Another major event was the intensification of the Wokou (Japanese pirates) raid on the coastal area of Ming China in the mid-1500s. However, the name of Wokou (or Japanese pirates) can be misleading, because these raiders did not exclusively consist of individuals from Japanese origins. It is believed that some raiders had Chinese renegade members, even though, at the time, Ming asserted Japanese involvement in such activities (Grygiel 2006, 153). The word Wokou can be referred to how the Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Portuguese who harassed the coastal region of China (Cheng 2001, 121). The reason the Wokou were such a problem was partly due to the Hai-Jin (Ocean Forbidden) of Ming Dynasty and economic aspirations of some Japanese individuals (Cheng 2001, 122). In 1555, the Ming government declared sea-going in a large, single mast boat as a crime, yet the Ming's naval fleet declined this at the time (Kane 2002, 28). With seafaring being forbidden, a neglect of naval power being made by the Ming navy and naval skills being non-existent, the Ming government had to rely on some rather ineffective passive defensive measures (Grygeil 2006, 153). However, Wokou activities declined to a great extent by the end of the 1500s, following improvements in military tactics and equipment, permission to sea trade by Ming, and the unification of the Japanese allowed it to commit to improve domestic economic (Cheng 2001, 129). However, the Wokou made a significant impression on the Chinese. Although many of the

Wokou members were not Japanese, Japan is sometimes associated with the word Wokou. Additionally, one interesting example is that a China website, which has various news and information about Japan, has the domain name “www.wokou.net.cn”. This is an example of how Japan is associated with this word and with explicit negative meaning (Jin ru Riben).

The Ming Dynasty’s successor, the Ching Dynasty, did not establish formal relations with the Japanese Shogunate, but interactions at civilian level were still frequent (Cheng 2001, 2). Since the Meiji Restoration of Japan in the mid-1800s, Japan had achieved much technological modernization compared to its neighboring countries. In the famous article, *Datsu-A Ron* published 1885 (An argument for leaving Asia), Yukichi Fukuzawa believed that China and Korea could not revitalize themselves in the face of Western power; he suggested Japan should join the league of Western powers (Cheng 2001, 286-287). He also proposed that Japan should stay away from the Asian countries and learn to be a western-style power (Boyle 1972, 347). The relatively advanced Japan and traditional China finally clashed in the first Sino-Japanese war from 1894 to 1895. The cause of this war was over the control of Korea, as Korea had important strategic value to both China and Japan (Lindberg, Todd 2002, 80-81). The Ching government suffered fatal blows from Japan, including the loss of the Beiyang Fleet in the Battle of Yalu and eventually signed the humiliating Treaty of Maguan/Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th 1895. According to the treaty, China ceded land to Japan, including Taiwan and the Laiodong Peninsula; they also paid 200,000,000 Kuping taels to Japan as war reparation and opened several cities for Japan to trade (Zheng 2006, 64-67). Japan then remained in possession of Taiwan until the end of World War Two.

In 1900, shortly after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion took

place in various regions in China. This rebellion had an anti-foreigner nature, which was partly due to resentment towards Western imperialistic adventure and Christian activities in the country (Cheng 2001, 377-379; Li and Li 2006, 149-151). Some conservative factions within the Ching Court believed the Boxer could be used to expel any foreign influence in China, so Empress Cixi did not order effective measures to put it down. And, it is suggested by many that the Ching even encouraged the Boxer movement. After, the Boxer Rebellion eventually led to the invasion Alliance of Eight Nations (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with the justification of protecting their citizens and property, and the occupation of Beijing on August 14th 1900. The Ching government was forced to sign another treaty, the Boxer Protocol, with eight nations. This treaty further humiliated the Ching government and struck another fatal blow to the already weakened sovereignty of China. Among the 47,000 troops dispatched by eight nations, 22,000 were Japanese soldiers; Japan received 7.7 percent of the total 450 million taels and enjoyed other benefits stated in the Boxer Protocol (Cheng 2001 383-390, 394-395; Li and Li 2006, 208-213).

Nevertheless, Sino-Japanese relations witnessed a bitterer and bloody chapter in the first half of the 20th century. After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan acquired several rights from Russia, including the lease of the Liaodong Peninsula, access to the railroad between Port Arthur and Harbin, and mining rights in the Liaodong Peninsula (Cheng 2001, 449). China's sovereignty was further damaged as it failed to regain its influence of the Shandong province from Germany; instead, Japan expanded its influence to the Shandong and acquired several interests which were enjoyed by Germany before World War One (First World War.com 2002). Later, in 1928, the influential warlord of Northeast China, Zhang Zuolin, was assassinated by

an alleged Japanese Kwantung Army plotter, by planting a bomb on the railroad to blow up his train. This assassination was believed to be part of the attempt to separate three provinces in the Northeast region from China (Cheng 2001, 586-587). Japan's aspiration to expand its influence to three provinces of Northeast China finally succeeded in 1931. In the 1931 Mukden incident, the Japanese Kwantung army occupied Mukden in the name of self-defense, after a failed bombing attempt on a Japanese troop train in the north of Mukden (Perkins 1997, 110). Then, Japan established a puppet regime, Manchukuo, in the Manchuria after the incident.

The full scale warfare of the second Sino-Japanese war started from the Marco-Polo bridge incident. This incident occurred on July 7th 1937, when a Japanese Army unit, which was stationed in China, attacked the town of Wanping to find a missing soldier from a military exercise the night before. The Japanese unit claimed it was the Chinese garrison, stationed near the town of Wanping, who captured the soldier in the brief exchange of fire the previous night (Perkins 1997, 126). This war was bloody; one major incident was the Nanjing incident (also called the Nanjing Massacre, the Rape of Nanjing or the Nanjing Atrocities), which was a controversial topic in both Japan and China. The official number of casualties proposed by China was 300,000, while the number of casualties estimated by Japanese scholars ranged from around 50,000 to 200,000 or more (Askew 2002; Dahl 2008, 249). The war lasted for eight years until Japan surrendered in August 1945; this war was devastating to both China and Japan and has had a long-term impact on the relations between the two states.

The legacies left by the war and previous events in the late 19th and early 20th centuries remain one of the most discussed and debated issues among the people, elites and politicians of the two states (Lind 2008, 160-163). One example

suggested by David Askew is that events such as the Nanjing incident have been important in shaping the “modern identity of China” (Askew 2002). Furthermore, the geographical proximity between the two countries makes both of them the source of important mutual geopolitical concerns for the other. However, despite their ever-growing trade and investment record (Wan 2006, 46-55), some believe they are going to compete in many arenas. Issues such as energy security, rivalry for regional and global political influence, and territorial disputes mark a sharp distinction between the politically-cold portion and the economically-hot in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Mixing these concerns with the nationalistic pride experienced by individuals in both countries, means that the relations between China and Japan appear difficult to improve substantially; this is mainly due to the existence of fundamental incompatible core interests (Scott 2008, 145-150).

Nevertheless, it is still too assertive to judge that geostrategic competition between these states must result in rivalry or conflict. For example, Germany and France have long been major competitors for the dominance of the European continent in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, but they eventually genuinely reconciled into a European community in the Post-War era. Apparently, it takes more than geostrategic concerns to push two states into deep animosity. In the following section, the major events after the normalization of relations between China and Japan will be explored, in order to identify what historical legacies and contemporary events have come into play in recent decades.

2.2 Overview on major events in the history of Sino-Japanese relations since normalization of the relations

In this section, there is an overview of the major events in the Sino-Japanese

relationship since its normalization, with a focus on the post Cold-War era.

2.2.1 1970s

The rapprochement between China and the US, in the 1970s, brought Sino-Japanese relations into a new era. Given the changes in international order in Northeast Asia, Japan adopted to change as well. In fact, the attempt to re-establish contact with mainland China can be traced back to much earlier. When Shigeru Yoshida, the Prime Minister of Japan in the immediate post-war period, together with his colleagues, engaged in an interest to re-establish ties with the mainland Chinese government and were not prepared to completely isolate the newly born People's Republic of China (Rose 2005, 43-44). It is worth noting that Yoshida's idea of building contacts with the mainland government did not necessarily mean "contact" with China was a formal diplomatic relationship, as Japan had formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China concerning Taiwan. The idea of contact was also not because of sympathetic feelings or other personal political preference; rather it originated from a more traditional pragmatic consideration, as Yoshida's idea was linked to traditional Japanese economic interests on mainland China. Yoshida was poised to take a rather ambiguous attitude towards the issue of recognition of which government legally governed mainland China (Drifte 2003, 14). Another reason for avoiding bad relations with the mainland was that Yoshida believed he had predicted the potential deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship, and considered it was an unwise decision to have a complete breakdown of any relationship with the Beijing (Iokibe 2007, 57). However, such an idea was unable to be put in motion under U.S. pressure; Yoshida was left with little room to maneuver, except to recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China itself (Rose 2004, 44).

As seen above, Japan was a major ally to the U.S. in the region and the management of its relations with China largely followed U.S. direction in much of the Cold-War era. Its normalization of the relationship with China needed to be under the consent of the U.S. (Kokubun 2006, 23). Following the “ping pong diplomacy” in 1971 and the “Nixon shock” in early 1972, voices promoting the normalization of relations with China emerged in Japan; and, following Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s decision to visit China, a survey conducted by the NHK in August 1972 showed that more people liked China than disliked it (18% of interviewees liked China while 4% disliked the country) (Wang 2008, 232-233).

It was only after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s expression of his willingness to have rapprochement with China that Japan began to seek normalization as well. The path to normalization was further paved by several reiterations through the waiver in demand of war reparations from Japan, by PRC leaders such as Zhou Enlai. This subsequently included a Clause in the 1972 Joint Statement, in which the PRC government “renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.” Nevertheless, the wording used by Japan, regarding their invasion of China, used by Tanaka during his visit in September 1972, marked the beginning of the wording and ways of apology debate which would arise later in the 1990s. That Tanaka first “causing trouble” on September 1972, using an unclear apology wording which resulted in upsetting China, he clarified and issued a clearer wording on the following day (Rose 2005, 47-49). However, the Joint communiqué was eventually signed and formal diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan were severed; Japan accepted the PRC government as the “sole legal Government of China” and Taiwan as the “inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Despite the fact that the war reparation issue was

denounced by the PRC government, certain issues such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were left unsettled, in order to speed up the normalization (Hook et al. 2001, 166). Henceforth, the two countries' diplomatic relations were normalized.

Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the negotiation for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship took much longer because Japan was reluctant to include an anti-hegemonic clause, which was directed at the Soviet Union; while the Chinese government wanted such a clause to be included. Japanese resistance was largely due to the country having little gain, in security terms, through the addition of such a clause; this was because its security had been secured by its alliance with the United States (Wan 2006, 21, 92). Nevertheless, the treaty was eventually signed in October 1978.

The normalization of the diplomatic relationship, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, can also be understood to mean that China accepted close security ties in the form of an alliance between the U.S. and Japan; which was through formal relations being established with Japan (Kokubun 2006, 23). During the Cold War, the common strategic concern of the U.S. and China against the Soviet Union, also affected Chinese perceptions of Japan. The Chinese considered the rearmament of Japan as having a helpful role "against Soviet hegemonism." However, the strategic security importance of China for the U.S. declined with the détente in the Soviet-US relationship near the end of the Cold War. Therefore, China viewed Japan's military build-up in a negative way because it considered Japan as a future competitor (McDougall 2007, 146-147).

2.2.2 1980s

Sino-Japanese relations in the 1980s can be characterized as a period of

“strengthening,” while also seeing several ups-and-downs due to a number of different disputes between the two countries (Hook et al. 2001, 168). One of the more constructive developments between two countries was the beginning of government loans which were offered by Japan to China. In December 1979, Japan’s Prime Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, promised the first ever government development assistance (ODA) to China, in order to facilitate the economic reform of China through strengthening the infrastructure of the country (Iokibe 2007, 142). The second batch of government loans came during Nakasone’s visit to China in 1984; this batch of loans was worth 470 billion Yen (Iokibe 2007, 162). The third government loan package, in the form of an ODA, was promised by Noboru Takeshita during his visit to China in August 1988; he promised a 700 billion Yen loan to China which was to be completed in a six year period, from 1990 to 1995 (Hook et al. 2001, 169).

Despite the overall friendly atmosphere in the previous year, Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 was a setback to bilateral relations. Yasukuni Shrine was a shrine built in Toyko to enshrine dead soldiers of Japan’s past war. The controversy was that Japan’s Bereaved War Families Association (*Izokukai*), a political influential group, had moved the memorials of several class-A war criminals of World War Two into the shrine (Johnston 2007, 120-121). Since then, the Yasukuni Shrine has become the equivalence of a shrine for war criminals of World War Two. China expressed its concern on this matter in the regular Japan-China foreign minister meetings (Iokibe 2007, 162), and this event marked the beginning of China’s concerns over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which kept happening back in the future.

Another outstanding issue in the late 1980s which casts a shadow on the

bilateral relationships between the two countries was Kyoto University's Kokaryo Hostel for Chinese students. The Kokaryo was originally built and owned by the Nationalist government of China (Wan 2006, 355). However, the Taiwan government attempted to consolidate ownership through a series of legal actions. Finally, the Osaka high court delivered a verdict in favor of the Taiwan authority, in February 1987 (Iokibe 2007, 163; Shimada 1999, 339; Wan 2006, 355). The PRC government argued that the hostel should belong to the People's Republic of China. This was based on the fact that PRC was the sole legitimate government of China and considered the verdict of the Osaka high court to be in violation of the 1972 Joint Communiqué and the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Peace (Hook et al. 2001, 160; Shimada 1998, 339). Deng Xiaoping even warned that the "Kokaryo issue is a "two Chinas" verdict and reflect[s] the tendency of resurrection of militarism" (Shimada 1998, 341).

Another important issue, which started in the 1980s, was the "textbook controversies," first emerging in June 1982. The media reported that the Japanese Ministry of Education was accused and criticized by the governments and various pressure groups in Asian countries (including China), because certain amendments and revisions to Japanese school textbooks were distortions of historical fact. With the most controversial revisions including terms that regarded Japanese military activities, in other Asian countries, being changed from *shinryaku* (invasion) to *shinshutsu* or *shinko* (an advance) (Hook et al. 2001, 168). Subsequently, China cancelled a scheduled visit by the Minister of Education in August 1982, as a show of anger towards the issue (Iokibe, 2007, 151). Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki later said, in late August, that "It should be left to historians of later generations to judge on the war-time activities of our country, however, it is true that international society,

including China, has made harsh criticism and rose the historical understanding issue on our past “invasion”, as a government, we should have a full acknowledgment on that” (Iokibe 2007, 15); then, in September, he promised to look into the issue (Hook et al. 2001, 168). The textbook controversy was thus settled, at least for the time being. However, a further textbook incident occurred in 1986, as a new history textbook, named *Shinpen Nihonshi* (A New History of Japan), generated more controversy (Ross 56, 2004). The textbook was edited by *Nihon o mamoru kokumin kaigi* (National Conference for Defending Japan) and this volume successfully gained the approval from government for its publication. The textbook was considered to be an achievement for rightists and was the first time in the post-war era that a rightists’ written textbook had been published (Beal et al. 2001, 178-179). The criticized contents of this textbook included: claims that Japan civilians were unaware of the rape of Nanjing until the post-war era, and the truth of this event needed to be further investigated (Shimada 1998, 332). Also, the book claimed the killings in Nanjing were not on a substantive scale, were by no means a “holocaust,” and the actual death toll was still in debate (Beal et al. 2001, 182). It also suggested the Marco Polo Bridge/Luguoqiao Incident and the subsequent Sino-Japanese war in 1937, were due to Chiang Kai-shek’s order of full mobilization and Chinese communists joined forces with Chiang’s. It then categorized the Pacific War as a war of liberation for Asian people, from the hands of a European-American hegemony; and it was only with Japan’s effort and enormous sacrifice, despite being eventually defeated, that the Asian countries had been freed from European oppression and was “the turning point of world history” (Shimada 1998, 332).

Near the end of the 1980s, Sino-Japanese relations were challenged by another event. Following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China attracted a series of

condemnations and sanctions from major western countries. Japan faced a dilemma of whether to choose to follow the stance of its western allies to condemn and sanction China harshly, but avoid damaging Sino-Japanese relations by doing so. Eventually, the path chosen by Japan was to maintain a rather soft attitude towards China, comparing it to other major powers such as the other G7 countries. Japan, despite imposing sanctions such as suspending loans, preventing high-level official exchanges, and issuing tourist warnings, was among the first countries to re-contact China after the Tiananmen Square Incident; by resuming the Second Yen loan and lifting the business travel ban near the end of 1989 (Drifte 2003, 29-30). Japanese reluctance over imposing serious sanctions and using harsh wording against China was exemplified in the G7 Summit in July 1989. Japan's Prime Minister, Sosuke Uno, called on G7 members to include content over not isolating China in their joint declaration which condemned China. Later, China showed its appreciation to Japan's attitude in handling this matter (Jin 2008, 182). Although certain sanctions remained in place, Sino-Japanese relations were soon improved by a series of measures such as high-level official exchanges and economic aid and agreements (Li 2007, 27-33; Shimada 1999, 366-367, 369-371). The relationship between the two countries was fully restored Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's and the Japanese Emperor's visit to China, in August 1991 and October 1992 respectively (Drifte 2003, 30; Sutter 2008, 224). On his visit to China, Kaifu said that the third batch of Yen loans would be provided as promised and then proposed a broadening of bilateral relations as a "Japanese-Chinese relations in the global community" (*sekai no naka no Nitchu kankei*), by exploring bilateral relations on the global community level in order to strengthen dialogue and cooperation on international issues such as arms control and the environment (Drifte 2003, 123; Feng et al. 2006, 454).

Generally speaking, the Sino-Japanese relationship, in the 1980s, witnessed both cooperation and disagreement. Although there was progress of their bilateral relationship, certain issues, especially those relating to their past history, became prominent in the 1980s; some of which would continue to affect the Sino-Japanese relationship in the 1990s and 2000s.

2.2.3 1990s

In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War marked the end of more than five decades tension between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, an end came to the rivalry between the two countries; the United States then enjoyed a superpower position which had previously been unprecedented.

The Sino-U.S. relationship was more or less shaped by the context of the Cold War before the 1990s. Since the 1970s, the U.S. rapprochement to China showed common strategic concerns of both countries to restrain the Soviet Union. Yet, Sino-U.S. relationship, in the 1970s and 1980s, can be categorized as a “strategic partnership.” The example of close relations between the two countries was exemplified in the wake of formal relations with the Republic of China, in 1979; America sold arms to China in the 1980s and various cooperative events were proposed in the 1980s (McDougall 2007, 116-117). Although it has been argued that China, as a strategic weight, became less important during the Reagan administration than during his predecessors (because of Reagan’s assertion of establishing a huge military), it enjoyed a “pivot” position due to the worsening of U.S.-Soviet relations (Yahuda 1996, 78-79).

The Soviet Union as the “common target” for the United States, China and

Japan was no more, following the collapse of the Soviet Union which marked the end of the Cold War. As a result, their strategic commonality has since been lost (Kokubun 2006, 24). As economic issues were given a higher priority in the post-Cold War period, China and Japan enjoyed relatively warm relations in the early 1990s because of their increased economic interdependence. In history, there were some positive developments as well, for example, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, the first non-LDP Prime Minister, admitted that World War Two was a mistake, apologizing for Japan's invasion and "war of aggression" in World War Two, which he also did during his visit to China. However, it was reported that he was shot and wounded on May 30th, 1994 (but was no longer Prime Minister), because of his statements on World War Two (Hook et al. 2001, 171; Jin 2008, 191; Ross 2003, 101). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama gave a statement of apology for Japan's war of aggression "on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war end," and expressed this by saying:

"During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan).

His statement was then thought to be a benchmark to judge any apology attempts later attempted by Japan (Rose 2005, 102-103).

Despite the signs of a warming of bilateral relations which were witnessed in the early 1990s, the change in mindset following changes in the strategic environment (the end of the Cold War), marked changes in security concerns for both China and Japan; with several events illustrating this change. Without the Soviet Union as a key security concern, for Japan, China seemed to become one. A Japanese scholar, Tomohide Murai, wrote an article “On the potential threat of China” and discussed China as a potential enemy in terms of comprehensive national strength (Ateba 2002, 3; Li 2007 86). This article was one of the first signs of the approaching discussion over the “threat of China.” China’s leaders also realized that the “threat of China” or “China threat” had become a hot topic and took measures to counter this wind of discussion; thus, a series of diplomatic actions were taken by China in the early 1990s, in an effort to counter this issue (Drifte 2003, 35).

Meanwhile, China became more sensitive and gave increasingly negative comments on any potential Japanese movement to expand its role and diplomatic sphere, especially through participation on security issues. In the post-Cold War era, issues emerged such as a lighthouse built by the Japanese on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which was criticized by China as a “brazen invasion” and “resurgence of the ghost of Japanese militarism” (Ash 1991, 209). China also seemed to have more negative views on how Japan was potentially expanding its role in security. When Japan sent 500 hundred personnel and six minesweepers from the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), to assist in minesweeping operations after the Gulf War in 1991 (Zhang 2002, 144), China’s official Xinhua News Agency expressed worries over such an agenda and questioned whether it would set a bad precedent; they

remarked that: "...If mine-sweepers were sent now, what [...] was to stop submarines or cruisers from being dispatched in the future?" (Ash 1991, 674)

Later, in 1994, the Japanese government defined the term "neighboring area," which is mentioned in the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, to include the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea (Wang 2007, 145). Thus, Chinese concern regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance developed in subsequent years.

Due to historical and practical reasons, China was deeply concerned by the Japanese defense policy in the post-Cold War era. The U.S. and Japan issued a new "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security" in 1996, which marked the first step in the revision of the decades-old Security Alliance. Later, in September 1997, the final version of the revised defense guidelines mentioned that Japan could become militarily (in terms of logistical and humanitarian support) involved in assisting the U.S. if there are "situations [...] in the areas surrounding Japan" (Drifte 2003, 92). This worried China, as it suspected these guidelines would be applicable to a future Taiwan scenario and even a Spratly Island one.

To make matters worse, later interpretation by the U.S. and Japan failed to comfort China, and added even more confusion and suspicion (Drifte 2003, 91-93, 97-99). The use of ambiguous terms was intended by the U.S. and Japan, in order to settle China's beliefs that it was a direct target of the guidelines. Nevertheless, Japan failed to comfort China by clarifying the new guidelines in a way China desired. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said the guideline was a situational but not a geographical concept, it does not define any specific area, but he did not make it clear the areas excluded Taiwan (Jin 2008, 201; Mathur 2000); which is why China has never felt easy with this new definition. However, such an approach failed to convince China. One Chinese scholar pointed out that the revised guidelines for the

U.S.-Japan alliance heightened China's distrust and alert over Japan's future intentions on the Taiwan issue as well as the country's strategic goals; the feeling was reinforced because the newly-defined alliance seemed to change the nature and role of Japan from "the protected" to "an active participant," and its strategic doctrine was edging from "internal defense" to "maintaining peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific;" from "defensive" to "offensive" (Jin 2008, 200). Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that this new definition of alliance also produced some Japanese concern over whether a more regionally-defined arrangement would drag Japan into conflict, where Japanese soil may not be attacked directly. This fear caused opposition from the Communist, Social Democratic and Democratic parties in the Diet in 1999, when the law for implementing this guideline was discussed (Katzenstein 2008, 106 - 107).

For Japan, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 was one of the triggers for the revision of the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Drifte 2003, 64). In this crisis, China attempted to use missile tests and military exercises to influence the Taiwan presidential elections, and to show it would not allow any attempt for Taiwan to gain independence (Hook et al. 2001, 221-223; Iokibe 2007, 191). It should also be noted that the site of the missile test, in March 1996, was close to Japanese territorial waters, with one of the closest points being 60 kilometers from Okinawa (Hughes 2004, 166-167). Japan's reaction during the crisis was quite restrained; Prime Minister Hashimoto decided not to send the MSDF to the area near Okinawa, even though there was request from the people of Okinawa for him to do so. He decided it would be a move that would increase tensions between Japan and China. Despite the overall restraining attitude of the Japanese government, the Chinese military exercise raised (or re-confirmed) the dangers of China as a rising power in the minds

of the Japanese public, elite and academics; and, even pro-China politicians found the exercise unacceptable. In short, China's exercise produced Japanese concern over China's future behavior and long-term goals (Drifte 2003, 65, 67, 69). Another effect after the 1995/1996 exercise was damage to China's image amongst the Japanese public. A public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, in 1996, found that 51.3% of Japanese people thought: "I do not have friendly feelings towards China," which overtook thoughts of "I have friendly feelings" (45%), for the first time.

The missile exercise may also have led to another development – the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) – which some interpreted to mean the emergence of Japan's interest to join this project was partly due to the 1995/96 exercises that alerted Japan to China's missile threat; but, these were along with other reasons such as the 1998 North Korea missile test (Drifte 2003, 94). Japan's National Security Council first approved joint technological research with the U.S. in 1998 and the Japanese cabinet formed an agreement: "Exchange of Notes Concerning a Programme for Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Technologies with the U.S." (Hughes 2002, 69); therefore, this marked the beginning of Japan's official involvement in the TMD program. China's primary concern over a potential missile defense system operated by Japan was that the system would provide a potential missile shield to Taiwan, and thus encourage Taiwanese independence. One key method the Chinese had of deterring Taiwan from moving towards independence was through the large number of short- and medium-range of ballistic missiles, including the M9 and M11 (Hughes 2002, 76; Katzenstein 2008, 110; Mathur 2000; Wan 2006, 37). Another Chinese concern was the potential transfer of such a technology to Taiwan from the U.S.; if the project was a success (Hughes 2002, 76), then the transfer of missile defense

would develop the current informal relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan into a “quasi-alliance.” Therefore, this would mean Japan would then need to commit or be involved in defending Taiwan if such a conflict arose (Christensen 2002, 13-14). Another of China’s concerns was that, even though Japan was not a nuclear-armed state, its missile defense would be robust enough to defend against Chinese nuclear and conventionally-armed missiles over the East Sea; thus, undermining its capability of deterrence (Mathur 2000). Additionally, the TMD technologies could also have a “spillover effect” to other defense programs (Katzenstein 2008, 110).

Nevertheless, the U.S.-Japan Alliance had been useful for China, as the Chinese leadership believed that such an alliance would mean that Japan had no reason to become a military power in its own, when the U.S. shares a considerable part of Japan’s defense. Also, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region could lead to a power vacuum which Japan would be drawn into. However, the alliance would only provide short-term benefits in terms of hedging Japanese military resurgence and therefore, may cause more harm than good, should the content or nature of the alliance change from China’s perspective (Ong 2007, 170). And, when the revised and redefined alliance in 1996/97 came, this worry seemed justifiable.

Giving the delicate history and geopolitical relations between China and Japan, Sino-Japanese security relations are deemed to be sensitive in nature. Japan, being a U.S. ally, could be at risk of being “be caught in the middle of a “tug of war” between the US and China,” implying that Japan would find it hard to stay isolated from any potential Sino-American conflict (Hook et al. 2001, 172). China is also concerned about the strength of the Japanese military and economic potential, viewing it as the main competitor in East-Asia. China’s attitude towards the U.S.-Japan alliance is mixed; this alliance is viewed as both a measure to restrain

Chinese influence in the region and a way to prevent Japan from developing militarism. However, what role the U.S.-Japan alliance plays in the Taiwanese issue is another Chinese concern. China's antagonism to Japan, playing a large security role, was exemplified when Japan attempted to contend for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In early 2005, China strongly opposed this move and asserted that Japan had simply not done enough to reflect on its war guilt, which meant the country was unsuitable to play a larger role in the Security Council (McDougall 2007, 155-156). Another concern from China is the apparently growing trend of rightist movements and voices within Japan, calling for Japan to be a "normal country." In 2005, the 2+2 meeting (The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting between Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director General of Defense Agency and the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense) created new controversy as the joint statement included "the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue," as one of its objectives. China was again concerned with this statement because it considered the Taiwan question, because China's internal affairs and foreign powers had no right to comment on it (Takagi 2006, 122-123).

Another example, in recent years, was China's frustration over Japanese ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. This was an issue that already occurred in 1985, when Nakasone visited the Shrine as Prime Minister; and, Ryutaro Hashimoto visited in 1994 and 1995 before becoming Prime Minister (Ross 2003, 110). In July 1996, Hashimoto also visited the shrine in his capacity as Prime Minister of Japan, and his visit received much protest and criticism both within and outside Japan; this resulted in him not to visit in any subsequent years (Feng & Lin 2005, 4; Ross 2003, 113). What was remarkable about Hashimoto's visit was that he became the first

Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine after Nakasone (Togo 2005, 152). Meanwhile, Japan was frustrated by persistent Chinese demands for an apology over its wartime crimes against China. In fact, the historical issue is considered to be a source of concern and distrust between Japan and China, since more Japanese politicians continue to visit to the Shrine (He 2006, 78). The frustration over an apology of war time behavior can be exemplified during President Jiang Zemin's (China's President) time in Tokyo at a summit in 1998. The Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, decided not to offer Jiang an "explicit public apology" (Goldstein, 2005 165), which he had given earlier to South Korea's President Kim Dae-jung. Instead, Obuchi simply expressed his regret for Japan's wartime behavior. According to Avery Goldstein, Obuchi made this decision based on the fact that China refused to give him a guarantee that an explicit public apology would be the final chapter of the ever-recurring apology-demand from China, yet South Korea made this guarantee. Also, Japanese leaders had been continually providing an apology and expressing regret/remorse in a number of statements to China, but China did not seem to be satisfied and often raised the matter when they thought it would be useful. Therefore, Obuchi decided not to entertain China as, in his eyes, it was not beneficial to do so (Goldstein 2005, 165). Jiang responded to Obuchi's refusal to issue an official "written apology" by repeatedly mentioning the wartime history on several occasions during his visit, including his speech at the Imperial Palace. Unsurprisingly, such moves attracted and heightened much resentment in Japan and most possibly damaged any benefits gained from this visit (Drifte 2003, 17, 79-80; Iokibe 2005, 202).

However, it is worth thinking about whether history itself is truly the concern of the Chinese CCP leadership, or whether they merely "play the card" in a

diplomatic arena; using it as an excuse and smokescreen to hide its true agenda. Drifte concludes that the frequent usage of “the history card” by China was to distract other Asians from paying attention to its own “unfriendly security policies” (Drifte 2003, 183-184). However, such an approach by China could be counterproductive.

Territorial disputes re-emerged in the 1990s as another source of Sino-Japanese argument. In 1996, when Japan included Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in its territory, several Japanese rightists asserted that the islands belonged to Japan and built a lighthouse with a flag. However, Chinese nuclear tests, in 1995 and 1996, also brought a shadow over bilateral relationships; this was because the tests linked in with Japan’s reduction in economic assistance – however, economic assistance was then resumed in March 1997 (Murphy 1996; Hughes 2004, 93; Togo 2005, 152). It is the potential of these remote islands providing an energy source, through gas and oil, which makes them the center of concern (Sutter 2008, 230).

Many factors contribute to the ever-increasing security concerns of both countries towards each other. In fact, many consider a military conflict between Japan and China to be a likely scenario and ones that needs to be addressed. For example, one scenario, which was developed through recent research by the RAND Corporation, focused on a naval skirmish around the Diaoyu Island (Congressional Research Service 2006, 19).

In the Sino-Japanese relationship, it is interesting to note that whatever the troubled issue is, history is often mentioned. It is undeniable that history (or respective interpretation of history by the individual country) has been an important part in the shaping of perceptions and opinions over Sino-Japanese relations; and, policies may be formed against the context of historical legacies. On the other hand,

history may not simply be rooted in problems in its own right, as history-related animosity could also be a by-product which is generated from the methods used by both governments, when dealing with their current internal problems and contesting diplomatic objectives (Heazle and Knight 2007, 7). Therefore, it can be understood that historical issues are both the reason and result of certain policies and approaches taken by the two governments.

Japan, despite being eclipsed by China in economic growth in recent years, is still not an actor to be overlooked. Since the signing of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in April 1952, Japan has been the main Asian ally of the United States, and the alliance with the U.S. has been intertwined with the main pillars of Japan's security. Despite Japan relying on the U.S. to provide a security umbrella, Japan itself has established a powerful Self Defense Force (SDF). Also, despite the SDF lacking in numbers, the SDF's equipment is far more advanced and modernized than its neighboring counterpart (Drifte 2003, 85). Furthermore, Japan upgraded its Defense Agency to the Defense Ministry in January 2007, and the Chinese government have stressed that Japan should still follow the path of peaceful development. Moreover, a professor at the China Institute of Foreign Affairs claimed the upgrade was a significant move by Japan for increased freedom over international affairs and to become a key military power (Le 2007).

As mentioned previously, one key aspect of the Sino-Japanese relationship is through issues over their history. The different attitudes toward history are one of the major reasons fueling mistrust between them. A clear example was China's frustration over the Japanese Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Meanwhile, Japan is frustrated by persistent Chinese demands for Japan's apology in wartime crimes. In fact, historical issues have consistently been a source of concern and

distrust between Japan and China, since more Japan politicians have visited the shrine (He 2006, 78).

Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeatedly visited the shrine in the mid-2000s, which angered China and brought Sino-Japanese relations to a new low. The next Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was quite vague about his attitude on Japan's war history – he expressed certain controversial comment on those matters before he became prime minister. Nevertheless, he did not visit Yasukuni Shrine and made an effort to improve Japan's relations with China, such as his visit to China shortly after taking office. After the resignation of Abe, his successor Yasuo Fukuda showed his willingness to foster a more cooperative relationship with China; remarking during his visit to China, in December 2007: "I had in-depth discussions with Chinese leaders and agreed that Japan and China can do more if they co-operate than each can do single-handedly," and said that he would not visit Yasukuni Shrine (BBC News 2007).

Signs of an improvement in these relations have been apparent so far, but whether such a trend is sustainable is another matter. Given the usually relatively short duration in office of Japanese prime ministers, there is a possibility that each new Japanese prime minister will adopt a new direction and perspective from the previous one. For Chinese leaders, concern was through the moderate line of former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda towards China, in that such a moderate line may not pass onto his successor and that a new hardliner conservative could come to office. In fact, the current Prime Minister, Taro Aso, was known for making hard-line comments about China as a security threat (Takahara 2005) before he became Prime Minister. Also, Chinese leaders may consider it safe for them to prepare for another Koizumi-like leader, or indeed a more hostile Japanese leader. China's government

would never be too comfortable with the Japanese attitude toward history issues because of the frequency of a new Japanese prime minister. Thus, it seems a difficult task for trust to be built upon between the two countries over this issue.

Both China and Japan have substantial economic and military power, so any clash between them would have devastating consequences to the world's economy. Whether tension between these two states originates from the mistrust, which is rooted from history, or is for other strategic reasons isn't clear; but, their security relationship needs to be handled carefully and should be examined and investigated thoroughly. Furthermore, it is hoped that a solution can be sought which could help prevent a potential conflict that could cost the welfare of billions of people.

In this section, a number of major events of Sino-Japanese relations, covering the past three decades, has been presented. The following section will discuss the perceptions of various actors that have been formed over recent years within the two states.

3. The perception of actors within the two states

A constructivist argument is that identities and interests will lead to “relations of enmity” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 94), but that these are subject to change by “new understanding of ‘self’ and ‘other’” (Booth & Wheeler 2007, 94). Thus, it can be understood in the way that, in Sino-Japanese relations, whether each state or actors in each state view and understand the other state as a threat or not contributing to the presence of the security dilemma. It has been argued that emotional factors, including fear, are the main driving force of the security dilemma, rather than other structural factors (Crawford 2000, 119).

For example, although the U.S. seems to be the most powerful military presence in East Asia, China, to some extent, would rather to have the U.S.-Japan alliance than the withdrawal of the U.S. in the area. This is irrational if one believes a stronger military power means a larger threat, as Beijing should welcome the dissolution of the U.S.-Japanese alliance; however, this is not the case. China has a profound distrust in Japan for various reasons, but mainly due to the dissatisfaction and distrust over how Japan has handled certain historical issues. As a result, and even though Japan is a weaker military power than the U.S., Japan seems to be trusted less and more disliked than the U.S. in the eyes of China (Christensen 2003, 27-28). Japan’s perceived attitude in handling historical issues is believed to attract suspicion from other Asian countries, and often leads to speculation on the future direction Japan will go in (Montaperto, Ming 1999, 76). One may believe it to be illogical and irrational for China to trust or fear a strong military power rather than the weaker one, if material military strength is considered the absolute condition in

determining whether a state is a threat. Therefore, it seems in this case that other factors such as threat perception play a larger role than material strength.

Therefore, the research focus of this thesis is to investigate if a security dilemma exists in Sino-Japanese relations. Although the threat perception may not be an exclusive reason to determine if a security dilemma exists in international relations, this thesis chooses threat perception as the main research focus of the investigation.

Therefore, identifying these emotional factors is a crucial step in understanding international relations and whether a security dilemma exists. Constructivism, convinced that internal image is a driving force of a state's foreign policies, argues that Asian countries would be relatively more competitive in nature due to their diverse identities, including democracies, non-democracies and states with different religious beliefs, when comparing to a less diverse region such as Europe (Nau 2003, 216).

In the following section, several groups of sub-state actors in both states will be the focus of discussion. They are the general public, military, scholars, younger generation, and political leaders. The business sphere was initially planned to be included in the discussion; however, resulting materials were found insufficient to formulate a meaningful analysis. As a result, business research and analysis is not included. Information for some groups is rich, while others are relatively less due to availability of information.

3.1 General Public

3.1.1 Form both sides

In 2006, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey: “Publics of Asian Powers hold negative views of one another.” Judging from the title, the result from this project identified that several Asian countries hold a negative view of neighboring countries. Some of the findings of this survey, regarding China and Japan, will be illustrated below.

The researchers from Pew conducted face-to-face interviews with 2,180 Chinese adults, aged between 18 and 60 years of age, who lived in six Chinese cities and surrounding rural areas, being: Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Xinxiang, Jinzhong, and Luzhou. However, most of the interviewees were from urban areas. The Japanese interviews were conducted by telephone, with target respondents being adults of 18 years of age or over; there were 500 successful Japanese interviews conducted. It is noted that using the telephone as the method of contact does mean that only households with a telephone service can be reached (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 10).

The research found that 71% of Japanese respondents disliked China, while 70% of Chinese respondents expressed negative views towards Japan. It is also noted that the ratio of Chinese having negative feelings is the highest toward Japan, when compared to their attitudes towards other Asian countries such as India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, only 21% of Japanese respondents favored the Chinese, showing a decreasing trend from 55% who showed favorable views in 2002 (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 1, 3). The reason for holding unfavorable opinions toward Japan shows that history was the main factor, as 81% of Chinese respondents believed Japan had not reflected enough for its World War Two behavior; while only

44% of Japanese respondents believed they had not apologized enough. The Chinese also believed that Japan had not been totally freed of militaristic roots and was exemplified by Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, an action that 78% of Chinese respondents opposed (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 1-2, 16). Another interesting finding is that, while an overwhelmingly 95% of Chinese see the growth in China's military strength as a positive development, the same overwhelming 93% of Japanese saw it as a bad thing (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 1). Another common shared feature by both Chinese and Japanese respondents was that they tended to see each other with negative characteristics, while positive characteristics had gone unnoticed. They associated each other as competitive, greedy, selfish, and arrogant; while very few saw the other as honest and generous. Also, 65% of Chinese and 50% of Japanese respondents believed their counterparts were violent, and the majority viewed each other as nationalistic (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 2, 13-14).

It is worth noting that 71% of Japanese individuals said they had "not too much confidence" or "no confidence at all" in Chinese President Hu Jintao's ability to handle world affairs; with no one remarking they have "a lot of confidence" in him. Also, 58% of Chinese respondents lacked confidence in Prime Minister Koizumi (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 14). Furthermore, 39% of Japanese individuals considered China to be their greatest danger (the highest percentage among all choices), while 58% of Chinese respondents named the U.S. as the greatest danger (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 14). Additionally, 33% and 34% of Chinese respondents believed Japan was an "adversary" or "a serious problem" respectively; while more than half, 53%, of Japanese interviewees said the Chinese were a serious problem, and 31% believing Chinese was an "adversary"

(The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 4, 15). On a positive note, 68% of Japanese interviewees considered China's economic prosperity to be beneficial to their own country (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 15). Also, 67% of Japanese respondents opposed the amendment of Article 9 in Japan's Constitution, facilitating the change in nature of the Japanese military; therefore, it seems that pacifism is still seen in the majority of the Japanese population (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 5, 16). The Pew also conducted another project "The 2008 Pew Global Attitude Survey in China: The Chinese celebrate their roaring economic, as they struggle with its costs – near universal optimism about Beijing Olympics." This project consisted of 3,131 face-to-face interviews with Chinese adults, who were 18 years old or above and in eight major cities: Beijing, Changsha, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Harbin, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Xi'an; as well as rural areas and smaller towns in the eight provinces. When asked the question, "Overall, do you think of Japan as more of a partner of China, more of an enemy of China, or neither?" Those who answered "more of an enemy" consisted of 38% of total respondents, which was slightly more than those who answered neither and much more than "more of a partner" (11%). Also, 76% of respondents said that Japan had not apologized enough, which has slightly decreased from 81% in the 2006 result (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008, 21, 43, 46-47).

Given the growing economic strength of China, the cold political relationship seems to worry some professionals in the business sphere. This worry seems to be exemplified by a reduction of approximately \$2billion worth of high-speed train connection because of an internet movement opposing China's railroad being placed in the hands of the Japanese (Brooke 2005). A Japanese business leader, Toyoo Gyohten, even made a comment saying that "I [...] believe that [Japanese] should

apologize as many times as possible” (Brooke 2005). Gyohten was the President at the Institute for International Monetary Affairs and held several important business related positions in several organizations, including special adviser to Japan’s Prime Minister (Council of Foreign Relations; BusinessWeek).

Another survey, conducted by the BBC World Service, also seems to exemplify the negative view the Chinese public hold on Japan and vice versa. This annual service, which began in 2005, asked people in several countries about how they view the influence of other countries, and whether they believe such influence to be positive or negative.

The world public generally views Japan’s influence as well received and it is one of a few countries that are viewed in positive light on a continuous basis in surveys during 2006 and 2009. A persistent trend is that China is among the few countries where respondents have a negative view on Japan’s influence. In a 2007 report, it was said that China, along with South Korea, were the only two countries that had more respondents holding a negative view than a positive one on Japan’s influence. This result is consistent with the finding of the previous year, with a slight drop in negative views of respondents, from 71% to 63% (BBC World Service 2007, 9). In the 2008 survey, China remained one of the two countries, out of 24, that considered Japan’s influence as negative; however, the percentage of those holding this opinion was down from the previous year, 63% to 55% (BBC World Service 2008, 10). In the 2009 poll, Chinese respondents were still one of two countries (although the other was now Turkey) where the number of people giving a negative view on Japan’s influence outweighed those with a positive one; although this number dropped further from 55% to 50% from the previous year (World Public Opinion 2009).

On the other hand there is Japanese opinion on China's influence; where 78% of Japanese respondents hold a negative view of "China becoming more powerful militarily" (PIPA & Global Scan 2005, 3). However, there is no data in the 2007 report over Japanese opinions of China. Japan was then included in the 2008 edition, but it became apparent that Japan was the country with the highest percentage of respondents providing a negative view of Chinese influence; where only 12% of respondents considered China's influence to be positive (BBC World Service 2008, 14). However, there was no data available for the 2009 edition; with a statement remarking that the global view on China has seen a general decline (World Public Opinion 2009).

Another survey, conducted by Genron-NPO in 2007, provides more interesting information. The survey researchers interviewed 1,000 Japanese and 1,609 Chinese individuals (Genron NPO 2007), and found the overall perception between the two countries had improved. Multiple answers to the question "Which countries or regions do you think are a military threat to Japan or China?" resulted in 35.4% Japanese respondents saying that China was a military threat, second to North Korea (81.4%); while 41.1% of Chinese respondents named Japanese as a military threat, second to the U.S. (55.6%) (Genron-NPO 2007, 27). For the question "reasons why you feel Japan is a threat for China," resulted in the following answers.

Why do you consider China to be a threat? (for Japanese respondents)

Chinese military power will likely continue increasing, becoming a threat in the near future.	56.2%
China often trespasses into Japanese waters.	46.0%
China has nuclear weapons.	44.9%
Chinese military capabilities are already powerful.	40.7%

China doesn't exclude the possibility of using military means to block Taiwan's independence.	25.4%
There is little information about Chinese military capabilities.	23.7%
Other	1.1%

Source: Genron-NPO Third, China-Japan Opinion Poll p.28 (http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/20070817_e_press.pdf).

Why do you consider Japan to be a threat?

Japan had wars of aggression in the past, and some people want to revive militarism.	61.8%
Japan's military capabilities are already powerful.	40.3%
Japan follows the U.S. strategy.	39.4%
Japan is actively involved in international security and peacekeeping operations, and strengthens its military capabilities, trying to become a military superpower.	32.1%
Worsening China-Japan relations.	17.2%
No answer/ Don't know.	1.7%
Other	0.3%

Source: Genron-NPO Third, China-Japan Opinion Poll p.28 (http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/20070817_e_press.pdf).

3.1.2 Japanese public's view on China

In recent years, the intimacy and favorable feelings of the Japanese public toward China have been on the decline. In the 2008 edition of the annual Public Opinion Report, completed by the Japanese Cabinet Office, this trend showed true. The 2008 survey researchers interviewed 1,826 people, consisting of 839 males and 987 females. Responses to the question “your affinity feeling with China?” were

31.8% of all respondents said they do “feel affinity” or “somewhat feel affinity”; and those who felt affinity were made up of 7% of respondents. Of the 66.6% saying they had “no affinity”, over half (34.2%) said they did not feel any “affinity” at all. If we examine past trends, then it is shown that these are the lowest percentages of respondents who feel affinity to China, in all of the years since the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship; this figure is even lower than the result taken in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square Incident (51.6%). It is interesting to see the age group that has the highest ratio of people answering “I feel affinity,” which was individual aged between 20 and 29. The group aged 60 to 69 had the lowest ratio of feeling close to China and more male respondents expressed affinity than female respondents (Government of Japan Cabinet Office, 2008).

In the same survey, when asked to rank “current Japan-Chinese relationships,” 23.7% of respondents gave a positive rating; however, only 2.5% remarked that current relations were excellent, while 21.1% said it was probably good. The ratio of those providing a negative assessment was quite overwhelming, as 71.9% of respondents ranked this negatively. This has reached a new high when compared to the previous year and is the highest of all the years where the respondents of negative opinion surpassed those of positive a positive one. Of all the people providing negative assessment, 42% said that current relations between the two countries were not good in some aspects, while 29.9% thought they were completely negative. Additionally, it is interesting to note that people living in urban areas seemed to provide a negative ranking to the Japan-China relationship (Government of Japan Cabinet Office, 2008).

It is not surprising that those people who had affinity feelings with China tended to view the current Japan-China relationship more positively than those who

did not feel affinity; however, there was still less than half (46.7%) among the former group who had affinity feelings. On the other hand, those who did not have an affinity feeling to China, overwhelmingly viewed current bilateral relations negatively (83%) (Government of Japan Cabinet Office).

Other polls were conducted by Yomirui Shimbun and Gallop, in 2005 and 2006 respectively. In the 2005 poll, 76% of the respondents remarked they “feel threatened by China,” while 44% of respondents said China was a security threat in the 2006 poll; this was second only to North Korea. Yasuhiro Matsuda considers a “threat” as bearing a similar meaning to “fear” and “concern,” and the source of this fear came from the judgment that a non-democracy, with growing military and economic strength, is deemed to be dangerous (Matsuda 2007, 3).

Another survey also indicated that China is considered to be a long-term threat by Japanese public opinion. In 2006, a version of Japan’s Cabinet Office survey on the Self-Defense Force and Defense Problem, which has been conducted every three years since 1969, a “modernization of Chinese military and maritime activities”, of 36% out of 1,657 valid questionnaires, is chosen as a concerning to be most concerned issue of question “attentive areas for Japan’s Peace and Security,” behind the “Korean Peninsula Situation” (63.7%) and “Activity of Terrorist Organizations” (46.2%). It is noted that the 2006 survey is the first time that “modernization of Chinese military and maritime activities” was included as a choice (Japan Cabinet Office 2006, Lee 2007, 135-136) and swiftly occupied third place. It was also ranked higher than other issues such as “managing and reducing WMDs and Missiles” (29.65%), Russian related issues such as “U.S.-Russian relations” (11.7%) and “Dispatch Russian Army in the Northern Islands” (14.2%) (Japan Cabinet Office 2006, Lee 2007, 136). It is interesting to note that both China and Russia have

territorial disputes with Japan, but China is considered the larger military threat, over Russia, by the Japanese public.

3.1.3 China's public's view of Japanese

Here there will be three polls used which have been conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies at the China Academy of Social Science, to illustrate the Chinese public's opinion towards Japan in recent years. The polling project, which was released in 2002, 2004 and 2006, were all led by Jiang Lifeng, who was the director of the institute at the time. The aim of these projects was to provide a systemic investigation on China's view of Japan, since similar researches lacked the time required (Jiang 2002). The sizes of the valid samples were 3,157, 2,987 and 3,915, for the 2002, 2004 and 2006 polls respectively. In all three polls, 60.5% or more of the respondents had an education of college level or above (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006).

In the 2002 poll, 43.3% of respondents said they were "unfriendly" or "very unfriendly" toward Japan; this proportion increased to 53.6% in 2004 but decreased to 52.9% in 2006. On the other hand, those saying they had a "friendly" or "very friendly" feeling toward Japan were 5.9%, 6.3% and 7.5%, for 2002, 2004 and 2006 respectively; which showed a slight increasing trend. The proportion of those who said "neutral" was 47.6% in 2002, 35.5% in 2004, and 37.6% in 2006 (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). The reason that most people chose as affecting their feeling toward Japan was that "Japan [had] invaded China not long ago, and it has not reflected enough on it" in 2002 and with 63.8% of total respondents. In the 2004 and 2006 polls, the reason given by respondents were further divided into more items, and the reasons given were collected separately with those saying "friendly" and "unfriendly." As a result, for the negative opinionated individuals, 26% gave the

reason that “Japan invaded China not long ago” and 61.7% criticized Japan for “not reflecting enough for its war of aggression” (roughly equal to 47.09% of all respondents). While in 2006, 27.3% of those choosing “unfriendly” said the reason was “Japan invaded China not long before,” 63.5% criticized Japan, by remarking “it has not reflected enough for its war of aggression” (roughly equal to 48.01% of all respondents). There were positive aspects such as the “two countries have had [a] long history of friendly interaction” or “Japan provides economic assistance to China,” but these failed to be a reason affecting individuals’ thoughts toward Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). It should be noted that 10.8% in 2002, 3.7% in 2004 (computed by the researcher) and 2.8% in 2006 (computed by the researcher), of the respondents, chose the reason “Japan has formed [a] military alliance with [the] U.S., threatening the security of China” as the reason of being unfriendly toward Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006).

It should be noted that among all of the criteria set by the researchers that the groups “can understand Japanese language and have interaction with Japan” and “Chinese residing in Japan” are the groups which have higher proportions of respondents choosing the “friendly” or “very friendly” option. It is suggested that direct interaction is a very important way to improve the impression of Japan amongst the Chinese (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006).

3.1.4 Discussion on public opinion

The popular opinion poll results which have been cited above clearly identify two features. First, at least from the polling samples, the public from both China and Japan generally hold a negative view of the other. Second, people generally hold a low opinion of the military and security aspects on the other side.

3.1.4.1 Japanese public

As mentioned above, the various polls, conducted by Pew Research Center, BBC World Service and Japan's Cabinet Office (2006-2009), all showed a negative view toward the China by Japanese respondents. The annual Cabinet Office poll has steadily shown a declining trend of the Japanese's "affinity feeling" toward China. The percentage of respondents saying "no" or "completely no affinity" reached a new high in the most recent 2008 edition; this figure even surpassed the percentage of similar answers in the 2005 edition, which was completed several months after a series of anti-Chinese riots in China. Therefore, it seems that the warming of bilateral relations between China and Japan, after Koizumi stepped down from office, have not changed the Japanese public's opinion on China. But, this deeply rooted negative opinion could be as a result of other factors.

図10 中国に対する親近感

(Taken from <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-gaiko/images/z10.gif>. Japan's Government Cabinet Office Website.)

Not only did Japanese respondents not feel "affinity" to China, 71.9% of respondents

considered the current Sino-Japanese relations as overwhelmingly negative; the most negative assessment in terms of proportion over all recorded years, as shown in the following chart.

図12 現在の日本と中国との関係

(Taken from <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-gaiko/images/z12.gif>. Japan's Government Cabinet Office Website.)

The Pew Global Opinions also identified China to be the most disliked country for Japanese respondents in 2006, where 71% percent of individual said they disliked China and increasingly less people had a favorable opinion towards them; the Chinese were associated with some negative personality qualities. Also, most respondents did not trust the Hu Jintao leadership and no one had confidence in his ability to handle world affairs. The BBC World Service also showed Japan to be the main country having the most negative feelings toward China.

In general, Japanese public opinion has been overwhelmingly negative in recent years; as opinions fell sharply during the Koizumi cabinet and have not recovered, even with a change of Prime Minister. It is possible that the series of negative events, together with the Chinese government and public reaction to

Koizumi, during Koizumi's cabinet, caused the rise of negative opinion in China. However, do these unfavorable feelings mean they fear China as a threat? The following data may provide us with some answers to this.

The same Pew Global Attitude Project asked how individuals viewed growing of China military power, 93% said it was a bad thing and 3% thought it was good. Also, 39% of respondents considered China as a great danger to Japan, suppressing concerns over North Korea (35%) as the greatest threat (The Pew Global Attitude Project 2006, 14). Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallop, in 2005 and 2006, found that many Japanese considered China a security threat, as well as another poll by the Cabinet Office on the Self-Defense Force and defense problems which identified similar opinions. In this poll, 36% of respondents chose "modernization of Chinese military and maritime activities," which ranked as the third most important issue concerning individuals (Japan Cabinet Office 2006; Lee 2007, 135-136). And, this ranking is lower than the North Korea issue but higher than the Russian territorial dispute. The Genron-NPO also identifies China as the second military threat to Japan, with main reasons including the growth in China's military strength, Chinese ships trespassing into Japanese territorial waters, possession of nuclear weapons, and China already having a powerful military (Genron-NPO 2007).

It is apparent that the result from these various polls not only shows that the Japanese public has a general negative view toward the Chinese government and Chinese people, but also that they consider a growth in the Chinese military to be a threat to them. However, these polls are unable to determine the actual reason that has created such fear because poll data has failed to answer "why" the fear first came about. Matsuda has provided one explanation that, the Japanese public, who live in a democratic society, do not trust a militarily powerful non-democratic state (Matsuda

2007, 3). Also, as the MoD Defense White paper suggests, the lack of transparency of the Chinese military influences the Japanese public to become uncertain on any intentions the Chinese may harbor. As Rosemary Foot points out, despite numerous efforts by the Chinese government to establish a peaceful image, it will take much more effort to assure Japanese public opinion. It is difficult to develop a benevolent image while also modernizing a military and significantly double digit annual growth on the country's defense budget, even though such military developments seem to be mainly targeted at Taiwan (Foot 2009, 143-144). For the Japanese, this worry could be deepened by behavior that seems to be directed toward Japan, such as the show of naval force in 2005 near disputed territories, and the continuous criticism of Japan on historical issues. However, in contrast to China's general approach of a "peaceful development," Japan stands out as one of the few to receive less favorable treatment.

In general, it would be fair to say that the majority of the Japanese public do not have a positive attitude toward China, economics aside, but they are also quite afraid of the Chinese military and future intentions.

3.1.4.2 Chinese public

Public opinion data regarding thoughts of the Chinese public is significantly less than that of the Japanese. Nevertheless, by reviewing these data, it is possible to gain an overview of how the Chinese view Japan.

One of the larger scale surveys covering Chinese public opinion was conducted by the China Academy of Social Sciences. The three editions showed that the Chinese were generally dissatisfied over Japanese apologies and reflection regarding their past aggression and nearly half or more of respondents chose "not reflecting enough for its war of aggression" or "Japan invaded China" not long ago

was a reason for disliking Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). Similarly, and in some instances more overwhelming, was an observation from the editions of the Pew Global Opinion poll; some Chinese respondents held the view of “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” toward Japan and this generally consisted of 70% or more of respondents. Also, this was something which peaked in spring 2007, when 78% of respondents said they had a negative opinion on Japan (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008).

If the data shown indicated the Chinese have overwhelming bad feelings toward Japan, then do they fear Japan as a military threat or as an enemy? The difficulty in finding data to this question is considerably hard. However, there is some relevant but limited information identified below.

The Pew Global Project Attitude found that 33% of respondents considered Japan an adversary and 34% considered Japan a serious problem; also, 22% of individuals said that Japan was the greatest danger but was second to the U.S. (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006, 4, 15). The 2008 Pew report also suggested that the Chinese, who chose Japan as an enemy was the largest group among all choices, even though it was hardly overwhelming and the majority in terms of percentage (The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2008, 47).

The three CASS surveys also included Chinese individuals, although a relatively small percentage compared to the Pew reports, who considered Japan as a security threat because it is an ally with the United States. Despite this small percentage the CASS researches, one should note that “this security threat” choice was ranked as the second and third most chosen option, which were higher than “this choice is a war of aggression in recent history” and “not reflecting enough for wrongdoing.” As a result, the Japan-U.S. alliance, as a security threat, was the

number one non-history related issue to be considered as a reason for disliking Japan (Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). The Genron-NPO also shows Japan was considered to be the second major military threat to China, with main reasons including worries of a resurgence of militarism, Japan already possessing a powerful military, Japan following U.S. Strategy, and Japan's attempt to be a great military power (Genron-NPO 2007, 27-28).

However, it is too assertive to claim that the Chinese public absolutely consider Japan as a security threat or fear Japan's military. However, even though identified data were limited, they did give the impression that a certain proportion of the Chinese population did have some concerns over the military and security issue. Therefore, the conclusion of this is that the majority of the Chinese population dislike Japan, but it can only be concluded that they are quite afraid or suspicious toward Japan's military and not completely certain.

3.2 Military

The following section will focus on official defense white papers which have been issued in recent years by the two country's ministries, such ministries are in charge of the respective national defense forces and they will be analyzed to identify if they contain comments on security issues.

3.2.1 Chinese military

3.2.1.1 China's white paper on national defense

The biannual white paper is issued by the China State Council, which is under the Central Military Commission (CMC). The CMC is supposed to be the most

important organ in terms of the Chinese military and has the “authority and all decision-making power to deploy China’s armed force” (Shambaugh 2003, 111), and is currently headed by the Chinese President, Hu Jintao.

2002

The paper briefly mentioned Japan in the context of ASEAN+3 cooperation, resuming military exchanges in Japan, meetings with the Japan Defense Agency, and urging Japan to defuse and remove chemical weapons left behind in northern China by its invasion force of World War Two. And, most of the content is of a descriptive nature covering security cooperation and military interaction (China State Council 2002).

2004

This year’s edition includes similar wording to the 2002 one, with some more detail and new additions. It reviews Japan’s possible amendment to the constitution in order to take a larger role in deploying military overseas, to jointly develop missile defense with U.S.; and it also mentions increased SDF military activities overseas. The paper also uses several major powers’ defense budgets, including that of Japan, to show that Chinese defense expenditure is not higher than world standards (China State Council 2004).

2006

This year’s edition is similar to the previous two, with some change toward more explicit phraseology. It also remarks that: “Japan seeks to revise its constitution and exercise collective self-defense. Its military posture is becoming more

external-oriented.” Giving more details on how to handle the chemical weapons left behind by both countries (China State Council 2006).

2008

This year’s edition is almost the same as the previous one, but mentions some positive developments such as the first naval vessel visits and the first consultation over the establishment of a maritime liaison mechanism between the two countries.

3.2.1.2 Other sources

As early as 1997, the former deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Xu Xin suspected that the new U.S.-Japan defense gridline was to target China and would bear more aggressive intentions (Zhang, Montaperto 1999, 75). Michael J. Green, the Japan chair and senior advisor to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, commented in an interview that the PLA feel wary about the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan’s improvement of its internal defense capabilities and participation in the development of a missile defense also generated much resentment within the PLA. Green suggests that the PLA uses historical issues as a basis to “demonize and mobilize against Japan” (Green 2006); and he believes it is difficult for the civilian leadership to restrain the PLA in anti-Japanese attempts (Green 2006).

Other sources regarding the Chinese military or indeed related personnel, on their threat perception of Japan can be found in articles in the People’s Liberation Army Daily (PLA Daily), the official newspaper of the Chinese Central Military Commission (China Military Online 2004). The articles found in this paper provide an opportunity to understand some individual viewpoints within or reflect the

thinking of the PLA. It seems that the PLA are especially sensitive or even suspicious towards some of Japan's intentions and actions. An article in 2005 suggested an attempt by a number of Japanese politicians, including Prime Minister Koizumi, to pave the way to play an increased global military role; providing legal grounds for intervening in the "situation surrounding Japan" and nourishing the enlargement of military development. The article questioned whether Japan would stay on course and continue to be a pacifist, if Article 9 of the constitution was amended (Sheng and Zhao 2005). The U.S.-Japan alliance was also the target of criticism. Japan was blamed for attempting to strengthen its alliance with the U.S. and to "internationalize the internal affairs of other states" (Xie and Sheng 2005). It was said that Japan wanted to use the alliance with the U.S. to upgrade to the status of Asian leader, but the attempt was futile and led to its isolation (Xie and Sheng 2005). Also, Japan was often thought to be using "China's military threat" as a justification to encourage Japanese people to support a high military budget to strengthen the capabilities of the SDF (Wang 2005). Wang suggested that, since China had clearly expressed it would not be a threat to any country, Japan had no grounds for maintaining such a high military budget or upgrading SDF capabilities; he even criticized a SDF advertisement, in which the images of the SDF seemed to be "bellicose and murderous," as an exemplification of Japanese military ambition (Wang 2005). The upgrade of the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense was another source of worry; the PLA Daily suggested that this upgrade would "loosen the tie on the SDF" and allow Japan to become a great political and military power. The upgrade of the Defense Agency was also considered to be preparation for amending the Peace Constitution; the writer said that it was right to worry about the potential amendment of the Peace Constitution, as Japan had not thoroughly reflected on its historical

issues (People's Liberation Army Daily 2007).

Meanwhile, there was some positive coverage. For example, the PLA Navy Destroyer Shenzhen visited Japan and was reported with details of various related activities. Also, this visit was said to be an important step toward improving Sino-Japanese relations (Si and Ding 2007). The PLA Daily conducted an interview with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy, on how that particular visit would benefit Sino-Japanese relations (Si, Ding 2007).

3.2.2 Japanese military

3.2.2.1 Japan's Defense White Paper

The Defense White Paper is an annual document published by the Defense Agency, recently renamed as the Ministry of Defense (MoD) of Japan, to explain the general defense policies and military security of Japan. It contains chapters focusing on Japan's neighboring countries and countries which relate to the defense of Japan. Recent editions (2005-2008) of this white paper will be discussed, in order to understand the official opinion of the Ministry of Defense toward China.

2005

In the 2005 edition of the white paper (all versions discussed here are the translated English version), the Defense Agency (former body of the current Ministry of Defense) expressed their concern over China's "Anti-Secession Law," which had been enacted in March 2005. JDA considered the law to add uncertainty and destabilizing effects to the security environment of the Taiwan Strait relationship, and one which caused worry to Japan (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 11). The paper acknowledged the Chinese had been promoting "RMA with Chinese characteristics"

“aggressively” and advancements in modernizing PLA in various aspects (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 12-14). It also expressed dissatisfaction and concern on the official defense budget announced by the Chinese government, claiming that significant military related spending such as purchasing weapons and R&D expenses were not included in the official figures (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 12-13). The paper highlighted an incident in which a Chinese Song-class nuclear-powered submarine was discovered in waters near Japan’s territory, in order to exemplify the increased activity by China’s naval and research vessels near Japan’s maritime territory (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 14).

Part of the strategic goals, stated in this white paper in regard to China, were to “develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally” and “encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs” (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 35).

2006

In the 2006 edition of the Defense White Paper, when reviewing China’s relations with Taiwan, “The Anti-Succession Law” was once again mentioned but, unlike the previous year, the passage covering the negative effects from this law had been removed (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 40).

In terms of military transparency, this edition of the white paper once again urged China to increase transparency of its defense policies and capabilities, in order to reassure other countries about its intentions. The paper had clear indications over which aspects of China’s military lacked transparency, including: equipment status, progress in improvement, force composition, records of military activities and

exercises, and a more detailed defense budget. On the other hand, the paper praised China for issuing its own defense white paper as a right step to improving military transparency. Although, the paper did express dissatisfaction over the details included in that white paper and recommended further improvements by adding more detailed information in future versions (Japan Ministry of Japan 2006, 44).

The 2006 white paper again expressed concern over the accuracy of China's defense budget, as it had in the previous year; but, it also predicted that should China's defense budget be maintained at the same level as the past 18 years (as of 2006), then it would overtake Japan's budget by 2008. The paper also identified China's budget increases were two fold every five years, with an overall 10% annual growth rate (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 44).

The 2006 white paper included more detailed illustrations of China's military strength in comparison to the previous 2005 edition. It includes a more detailed description of China's nuclear arsenal and delivery means, along with graphic illustrations covering actual range (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 46-47). In the section regarding China's air power, it explicitly suspected that frequent activities of Chinese aircraft near the vicinity of Japan, were an attempt to gather intelligence "against Japan," and that such activities should be closely monitored (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 47-48). Another remarkable event mentioned was the successful mission of the first Chinese manned spaceship "Shenzhou V" and its military implications (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 47). This edition mentioned the Chinese maritime activities near Japan too; and once again mentioned the 2004 Chinese submarine incident and recent observations of suspected Chinese research vessels operating near the Shirakaba/Chunxiao oil gas field. Also, other Chinese naval activities in other sea regions where China has territorial disputes with other

countries were also present. The white paper suggested “attention should be paid” to Chinese maritime activities (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 49).

Generally, the white paper indicated a general improvement on China’s military capabilities, in terms of hardware and training and the development of personnel (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 45-48).

2007

In the 2007 white paper, the same concerns were expressed as in the previous editions, such as lack of military transparency, potential use of growing military capabilities other than for Taiwan issues, and doubts over the Chinese defense budget (but without mentioning the predicted time at which it would surpass Japan’s) (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 53-54). Another event marked in the paper was China’s anti-satellite weapon in January 2007. Japan demanded that China clarify the purpose and intention of such a test, but the reply given by Chinese authorities cannot reassure Japan (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 53). The section covering the Chinese military strength was similar to the previous year but with some additions; it mentioned China’s interest in obtaining/building an aircraft carrier to further develop a “blue water navy.” Also, China’s air force acquisition of S-300PMU-2 Surface-to-Air missiles and Il-76 from Russia, in order to enhance its air-defenses and develop air-refueling capabilities were questioned (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 57). However, there was an additional section in the 2007 white paper regarding the “trends in Education and Training,” this section reviewed the shift in training of PLA personnel to adopt a new doctrine and skills. And, it was hoped that the PLA would be informationalized by 2020; which is a new project for

nurturing talented people for an informationalized armed force and warfare (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 58).

Besides certain issues mentioned in the previous year, this edition highlighted an incident in which a Chinese Navy Song-class nuclear submarine emerged near the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, near Okinawa. Nevertheless, there is some positive indication over military exchanges and exercises with several countries, including the first joint exercise between the Chinese and U.S. navies in 2006. However, not unlike the previous year, increasing maritime activities of the Chinese Navy are to be closely monitored (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59).

2008

The contents of this year's edition are more or less similar, in terms of subject matter, as the previous years; yet there are several additions. First, China refused to allow the USS Kitty Hawk to enter Hong Kong on a scheduled day, but then allowed it to enter after revising the date in November 2007; this move raised concerns over the "decision-making and behavior of China's military." This edition once again urged China to improve transparency of its military and defense related issues, if it wants to lessen the concern of other countries over its growing military power (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 50). This edition also included a more detailed section on China's nuclear and ballistic missile force, in comparison to previous years. This was the first time a white paper implied China had been conducting research on the development of aircraft carriers (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 54). Another event illustrated was the incursion of China's Air Force Hong-6 bomber into the air defense identification zone near the median line, between two countries over the East China Sea. The paper suggested carrying out surveillance on Chinese Air Force

activities. (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 54) Nevertheless, several efforts by China to enhance military exchanges with other countries, in 2007, were also recorded. Although having such positive development, establishing facilities and the increase of maritime activities near Japan, were also suggested to be put under close monitoring (Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 56).

The general tone of Japan's white papers, discussing China's military and defense development, has become more specific in recent year, rather than simply making general comments.

Taking the 2005 edition as an example, we can see that this edition merely mentioned a single incident of Chinese submarines being submerged in Japanese waters in 2004, while not providing much of an account over other maritime related issues/incidents. In the 2007 and 2008 editions, the 2004 submarine incident was again mentioned and it was mentioned that such action was "violating international law" (Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 56); however, this accusation was not found in the 2005 and 2006 editions.

Generally speaking, there are increasing details to be included since the 2006 edition. There is a section specifically about the Chinese missile force since 2007 and a number of detailed graphic illustrations (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 46-47). Also, the discussion of maritime related issues has been in greater detail since 2006. Rather than merely informing of the general trend of Chinese naval development, the editions since 2006 explicitly identify certain disputes between the two countries, such as the East Sea oil gas issue and Chinese maritime activities in other sea regions such as Spratly Island. And, all three recent editions advise that Chinese maritime activities need to be observed and closely monitored (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006, 48-49; Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 59; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008,

55-56).

The concern over the Chinese defense budget is a persisting topic over the Chinese military. In all of the editions examined, the doubtful attitude on Chinese official figures of its defense budget is clear; the general comment is that the overall figures are understated. Charts have been added in the three recent editions to provide illustration of the growing trend in official numbers (Japan Defense Agency 2005, 12-13; Japan ministry of Defense 2006, 44-45; Japan ministry of Defense 2007, 54; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 50-51).

Since 2006, there has been a discussion over China's military transparency, and the overall dissatisfaction and criticism is expressed in all of the white papers. The Japanese MoD has not found the Chinese level of transparency to be enough to reassure others over their military intentions and has suggested that more steps should be taken for the Chinese government to improve on this aspect (Japan Ministry of Defense 2006 44; Japan Ministry of Defense 2007, 44; Japan Ministry of Defense 2008, 49-50).

Overall, all versions of Japan's Defense White Paper have expressed a suspicious attitude towards the Chinese military.

3.2.2.2 Gen. Tamogami's essay incident

The then Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, General Toshio Tamogami, published an essay in 2008 over his views on the Pacific War. This was published for a competition and to celebrate a book named "The Shocking Truth about Modern History." However, he was quickly dismissed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The reason for his dismissal was because his opinion was "inappropriate" and inconsistent with the view of the Japanese government (BBC

2008). In his essay, Tamogami suggested that the “Greater East Asia War” should not be considered as a “Japanese invasion” (Tamogami 2008, 1). This was because the Japanese Imperial Army in Asia entered based on a number of treaties – namely the treaties signed legally after the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War – in order to protect its rightful interests over its Asian neighbors. Tamogami considered that, even though those treaties were signed by the Chinese, it was nothing out of the ordinary because such practice is normal for a country signing a treaty under pressure. He also accused the provocation and aggressive acts from the Chinese side as the cause which led to the outbreak of war, and it was the Japanese intention to co-exist peacefully with its neighboring countries (Tamogami 2008, 1, 3). He also praised Japan’s relatively generous rule over its colonies, comparing this to other colonial powers at the time. This was because the Japanese government allowed people from its colonies to become well-educated, developed the infrastructure and economies of its colonies, and tried to integrate colonial people into Japanese society (Tamogami 2008, 2-4). He then concluded that some Asians view this particular war positively and believe “it was certainly a false accusation to say that our country was an aggressive nation” (Tamogami 2008, 6).

This essay quickly attracted criticism from the Chinese, as the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Jiang Yu, said she was shocked that a high-ranking officer made such comments denying and glorifying past aggression, and that it was an “undeniable historical fact” that Japan’s invasion brought pain to Asian people (Klamann 2008). Also, the incident ignited comment from Chinese website and internet users; Zhang from the Hong Kong newspaper “Wenweipo” commented that a cautious mind has to be maintained in order to be alert of the potential rise of Japan’s rightists, as many historical and academic discourses relate to current politics.

Comments made by Japan's rightists could well be an indicator of whether Japan would indeed maintain the path of peaceful development (Zhang 2008). Another newspaper, the "International Herald Leader" suspects the Tamogami incident could be merely "a tip of an iceberg" in denying Japan's past aggression, because 40% of 235 contestants in the competition were officers of the Air Self-Defense Force. Also, the competition was held by the AGA Group, a real estate developer, and the boss of the company holds some rightist's views on history, according to the newspaper (International Herald Leader 2008). China.com.cn also cited an article from China Youth Online, saying that Tamogami was a role model-like figure within the SDF; and, many of his colleagues admired him because he was "optimistic, ambitious and smart" and this could prove that his views might be remarkable and also dangerous among SDF officials (China Youth Online 2008). Additionally, there are plenty of other critics in the Chinese media, journalists, and internet users, and some of which are fairly radical. For example, one internet user's comment has gone so far as to say that there is no hope for reconciliation, and Japan should be attacked and destroyed if it acquires nuclear weapons (China Youth Online 2008). Of course, this is by no means saying that this type of opinion represents mainstream opinions of the Chinese, but it does show the sensitivity of some historically related issues.

The Japanese government quickly responded to this incident by sacking Tamogami, changing the curriculum of history at the Air Self-Defense Force Academy and replacing two lecturers, who were considered to have rightists' views on history (China News 2008).

3.2.3 Discussion on military perceptions

3.2.3.1 Discussion on Chinese military perception

It is almost impossible to deduce meaningful inference by examining China's white paper on National Defense alone. This is because the white papers lack detail and seem to have a tendency of reporting "good news," yet largely downplaying "bad news"; they do not include much content on how they view other countries' military, or which aspects of security behavior concern them. The part covering Japan contains a few words on a potential amendment of the constitution of Japan, an increase of SDF overseas activities, and on the World War Two chemical weapons left in China. For the overall pattern of the white paper, these three issues were the exception and the only "concerns" which were expressed. First, it can be interpreted that the revision of the Japanese constitution and future role of the SDF is indeed a concern of the Chinese military, or at least they would be attentive to those issues within the white paper. Second, China wants to remind others that the issues left behind after World War Two have not yet been settled. This included as an example of Japan's debt to China and as a sign for reminding Chinese people to safeguard against Japan as a security threat.

Also, it is true that the "People's Liberation Army Daily" does not exclusively report on the negative aspects regarding Japan. However, it is often shown to be quite sensitive to any Japan defense and history related activities, such as the Peace Constitution (Sheng and Zhao 2005), the status of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Xie and Sheng 2005), and visits to the Yauskuni Shrine by the Japanese Prime Minister (Sheng and Xin 2001). The paper often expressed suspicion and criticism of Japan's intention or attitude over handling these issues and urged Japan to reflect and rethink how those actions have affected people and what damage has been caused. There are two possibilities for the paper to do so; first, the PLA Daily may be a mouthpiece for the Chinese government to pursue "history card" tactics whenever necessary; or,

secondly, it reflects PLA personnel or the groups' mistrust and resentment of Japan, serving both purposes. Either way, it seems the PLA see Japan as one of the most likely future threats, and thus will need to be cautious and alarmed over certain security actions by Japan, which they feel are directed towards China. The event, similar to the Tamogami incident, may further impact on the perception that PLA personnel have of the Japanese military. As David Shambaugh concludes, anti-Japanese emotions can be observed from PLA personnel of all levels and generations. Not only do they detest the implication of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but they also consider Japan to have its own ambition to be a great power, and be independent of its alliance with the Americans. Generally, PLA personnel do not trust Japan and often hold wary views of its intentions; they are only restricted from being anti-Japanese explicitly by current constraints (Shambaugh 2002, 300-301).

3.2.3.2 Discussion of Japan's military perception

The main sources of analysis in this section are based on official documents such as the Japan Defense White Paper, with the recent four papers being used in this discussion. The overall impression of these white papers is through the growing worries of the Defense Ministry of Japan over the Chinese military. Two of the foremost concerns are Chinese maritime activities and the lack of transparency by the military. The combination of the two is especially worrisome because Japan, as an island country, relies on clear and safe sea lanes to import resources and necessities for its state-survival.

It can be seen that most of the topics of concern surround maritime security, such as the Chinese submarine incursion incident, which is mentioned in all four examined editions, and further comments such as "violating international law" in the

2007 and 2008 editions (Japan Ministry of Defense 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). The gradual increase in toughness of words shows the seriousness of the incident in the eyes of the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fact, this incident was the first time since 1999, when two North Korean ships intruded Japanese maritime territorial waters, that the Japan Maritime Defense Force was put into high alert. Therefore, the seriousness of the two events can be seen as quite comparable (BBC 2004). Submarines, in the time of military conflict, are an extreme effective force in controlling sea lanes and setting up blockades, due to their stealth-like nature; for example, the Russian-imported Kilo-class diesel powered submarines are well-suited for this purpose as they have an extremely quiet nature (Goldstein and Murray 2004). Similar incidents have occasionally happened, when an object was believed to be a Chinese submarine was detected within Japanese territorial waters, resulting in diplomatic interactions being initiated between the two governments (Przystup 2008, 116). This is why the Japanese Ministry of Defense is sensitive to the Chinese submarine force.

The lack of transparency in the military budget yields another major concern. Japan's White Paper argument is that the Chinese official defense budgets have not provided a detailed breakdown on how the money was spent. Meaning this problem generates a significant amount of suspicion over the intention of China's military modernization; the concern comes from being unable to know exactly how much money has been spent on military and hardware. Even though it is not unusual for a country to conceal its military profile, the Japanese MoD fear it especially justifiable because there are other suspicious and not-so-friendly activities allegedly carried out by the Chinese. This includes an intensification of activities near Japanese air space by Chinese military aircraft. It is reported that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force

scrambled aircraft 105 times to intercept PLA aircraft in 2005 alone, marking a sharp increase from less than 20 cases in 2004 (Matsuda 2007, 7). Also, there has been an increase in activities by Chinese vessels in the disputed maritime region, as well as within the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Japanese Ministry of Defense 2007). With plenty of potential conflicting elements with China, such as territorial disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the East China Sea energy competition, a lack of transparency in China's military budget and posture, the Japanese MoD wants to ascertain the true long-term intention of the Chinese military and why it is being so secretive.

As a result, the Defense White Paper, an official standpoint on the Japanese military security situation, reflects the MoD's growing fear of Chinese military intention; this has been shown through the increasing number of pages regarding the Chinese military and an increase in the amount of illustrations over incidents requiring the reader's attention.

Therefore, it is clear that the Japanese MoD has a genuine and legitimate fear concerning Chinese security intentions towards Japan.

3.3 Scholars' opinion

3.3.1 Japanese scholars' perception

In this section, some Japanese scholars' opinions are cited in order to illustrate some commonly held views among Japanese academics' perceptions of China.

Generally speaking, Japanese scholars, regardless of how they view China in terms of security, consider China as an important neighbor having significant impact

on Japan.

Japanese Tomoyuki Kojima, a professor at Keio University and renowned China expert, published an article in the January 2007 issue of the magazine “Gaiko Forum” in which, he states that Sino-Japanese relations have entered into “strategic mutual beneficial relations.” He suggests that this relation is permanent, not temporary, and these relations will be influenced not only by China and Japan, but also by many other states. However, he also points out some uncertainties which may hinder the development of Sino-Japanese relations. These uncertainties include: the decrease of Japan’s economic strength in relative terms, the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese, and a decline of affinity feelings toward China from Japan; the latter development over historical disputes, the Taiwan issues, East Sea energy competition, China’s domestic politics, and whether China seeks hegemony or to become a cooperative great power. Kojima states that in order to prevent the failed experience of the past, namely having “cold” political relations, both states will need to manage any uncertain factors through cooperation which is desirable for both (Xinhua News 2007). In fact, Kojima pointed out these uncertainties as early as 2000, and at the time he advocated a “partnership for peace and development” by smoothing out certain problems existing in Sino-Japanese relations (Kojima 2000, 10-12, 16). However, that “partnership for peace and development” was considered failed by 2007, because cold political relations between the two states influenced historical problems and added new uncertainties (Xinhua News 2007). Judging from his comments, Kojima acknowledges that there are plenty of issues to be managed and/or settled before Sino-Japanese relations can move in a new direction. It is believed that, even though there are many obstacles to be overcome, building constructive cooperative relations will be essential, because these will be beneficial

to both states, the East Asia region, and the rest of the world.

Professor Akihiko Tanaka at Tokyo University made a speech in 2003 and identified that the role of China, in the eyes of Japan, has changed since the end of the Cold War. China has somehow become an ideological antagonist of Japan and the United States, despite its growing economic weight in the world. However, Tanaka stresses that the so-called “China threat” is nothing compared to the “Soviet threat.” This is because the United States has absolute military primacy; China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not completely reject western liberalism by promoting its own ideology to the world. Despite having many conflicting factors, Tanaka concluded that, even though it is impossible to eliminate conflicts entirely, the cost of allowing the conflicts to spiral out of control was too high for both states to bear; this was because of the intensity of interaction between China and Japan. He even suggested it was good for the two states to engage in virtuous competition for leadership of the regional economic regime, like ASEAN because this would only deepen free trade, through which peace and prosperity will be ensured. However, he did point out that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was still necessary in preventing China from enjoying military superiority in the East Sea, as there is still the possibility that China would use military force in a scenario, such as Taiwan (Tanaka 2003).

After all, Tanaka considers it necessary for Japan to express that “China is not a threat, a strong China is good for Japan” and the “Japan-U.S alliance has to be maintained.” He states that both principles are not contradictory because China is no longer a threat to Japan’s physical survival and ideology, but that Japan will also need to ensure military balance in the region, in case unexpected situations occur. Overall, he considers developing economic relations to be the primary objective, but the ultimate goal of bilateral cooperation would be to enhance security and rid

mutual suspicion (Tanaka 2003). He further re-instated, in a speech in December 2008, the necessity for the U.S.-Japanese alliance to be maintained and adjusted, in order to cope with the shift in military balance, which has occurred in the face of a rise in Chinese military strength (Bajoria, 2009). However, he also stresses that he does not consider China as a threat to Japan. Japan and the U.S. should see China as a partner in global affairs rather than a problem, because China is already on the road of “peaceful rise.” Nevertheless, as there are still some uncertainties over China’s military, political, and societal development and international behavior, the U.S.-Japanese alliance will be important to encourage China to reduce some of those uncertainties. Meanwhile, he suggested that an engagement such as human interaction is equally important and Japan should socialize with China as a responsible member of the international community (Tanaka 2008).

Both Kojima and Tanaka possess similar attitudes toward China, despite the difference in detail; they were both cautiously optimistic over Sino-Japanese relations and acknowledged plenty of obstacles existed, yet recognized opportunities existed. However, both hold some reservations over security issues in the face of a rising China, but insist on the development of Japan’s cooperative relations with China rather than seeing China as a threat. As a result, it seems they may not be completely convinced of China’s intention but do not consider China as an immediate and clear threat; the enhancement of cooperation and interdependence is possible to achieve and through which the security in the region will be strengthened.

Another Japanese scholar, Okabe Tatsumi, who was a member of the New China-Japan Friendship Committee for the 21st century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1998), once said he opposed Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine because this action would lead to people in China and Korea interpreting it as revenge for the

defeat in World War Two (People's Daily Online 2004). In fact, he opposed anyone visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in the capacity of Japanese Prime Minister, before receiving China's understanding and acceptance (Feng, Okabe 2008, 30). He even commented that Koizumi was a "layman to diplomacy and international relations" (Obake 2006), as he was not aware of how important China was as Japan's neighbor (Okaba 2006). He further suggests that Sino-Japanese relations should not be based on "emotionalism" but on "shared interest" (Feng, Okabe 2008, 32). Mainly because Okabe considers China and Japan to be on the path of cooperation in a global context (Feng, Okabe 2008, 34), but the "deeply rooted mistrust among the people of the two countries" is an imperative issue which needs to be handled (Feng, Obabe 2008, 32).

One way he deemed able to improve Japan's impression on China was to improve its transparency regarding its military buildup, especially naval capability (Feng, Obabe 2008, 33). He also does not see that there is a scenario in which China and Japan would engage in an all-out war, but a small-scale military clash is still possible. The damage done by such a clash to their relations would be hard to repair, so even such a conflict needs to be prevented by increasing mutual trust between the two (Feng, Okabe 2008, 35). Overall, he does not see the "China threat theory" to be an unsupported argument for the current international situation (Obake 2006).

Professor Takashi Shirashi commented that Japan should support China to ascend peacefully, because China's influence on other nations is on the increase. He suggested a concept that is similar to the stakeholder argument by the United States, where countries are encouraged to play a more important part in the international community by helping to address global issues. He also called for China and Japan to

work together to “map[...] out some norms and rules” (Shirashi 2006, 2), and for China and Japan to cooperate in the international community. He believes that an institutionalized high-level trilateral meeting between the U.S., China and Japan is one way to put this idea into practice. By utilizing this practice, China will be encouraged to rely less on unilateral actions and will then be able to contribute more to the international community (Shirashi 2006, 3-4).

Taka Fukuyama, a former SDF officer and Harvard University visiting fellow, proposed an imagined scenario of China’s invasion of Taiwan, in a magazine *Syuukan Shinchou*. He suggested that Japan was unlikely to be left out of this conflict because China would infiltrate Japan with special forces prior to the invasion, in order to disturb the U.S. garrison to mobilize and intervene the invasion; as a result, it would be likely that many important facilities in Japan would be attacked (An 2006). Hisahiko Okazaki, a former Japanese ambassador to Thailand and the director of a strategic think tank in Japan, is “infamous” in China for his standpoint on East Asia strategic thinking. He also suggests, in a 2004 article within an influential magazine, that if China is unified with Taiwan, then the national interests of Japan would be damaged because important sea lanes would be under Chinese control. As a result, Japan would need to “find another way out” if such a scenario occurred (China Youth Online 2006). Okazaki often expressed similar opinions over China being a potential strategic threat of Japan and the Taiwan issue (An 2006, Wang 2005, Global Times 2006). Fukuyama’s and Okazaki’s viewpoints were heavily criticized by Chinese media and websites for propagating the “China threat” theory and Taiwan conflict as an excuse to pave the way for Japan to become a great military power (An 2006, Wang 2005). Public opinion of the mainstream Japanese is said to be influenced by considerations that Taiwan is an issue that Japan must get a

hold of (An 2006). Chinese scholars, including the Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies and Jiang Lifeng at the China Academy of Social Sciences, also criticized Okazaki's worries of China, as a potential military threat to Japan, as unrealistic, without evidence and from the Cold War mentality (International Herald Leader 2006).

Nevertheless, not all academics hold a pessimistic or negative view toward China; Akio Takahara, a professor of Chinese politics, suggests that the pro-Japanese sentiment is slowly growing in urban regions of China; and, this is turning into something more positive because the Japanese economy is benefiting from the rapid economic development of China. Another reason for the steady reduction of anti-Japanese sentiment is from results in the advancement of cultural interaction, and one of the facilitators of cultural exchange is the immense popularity of manga (Japanese comic) in China (Shorrock 2005).

3.3.2 Chinese scholars' perception

Japanese developments on defense are a major concern of Chinese academics. One recurring theme is the extent to which Japan would participate in future conflict such as the Taiwan Strait. Despite the moderate welcome to the U.S.-Japanese alliance, as a 'bottle cap' to stop Japan's potential in rearmament and becoming a great military power (Mochizuki 2007, 246; Wang 2006, 54), strengthening and broadening of this alliance is not welcomed by the Chinese government (Mochizuki 2007, 246). China scholars often side with this official line and view Japan as wanting to adopt a large military role.

Citing one author as an example, Dr. Xu Wansheng, an associate professor in the People's Liberation Army University of Foreign Languages, expressed concern

of over strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance since the mid-1990s; and the Japanese government's amendment of laws in order to legalize overseas deployment of the SDF to support U.S. anti-terrorist efforts after 9/11 are seen as a dangerous milestone for Japan become a great military power. This is because Japan has not reflected enough on its military aggression in the past and is not considered sufficient in its efforts toward gaining trust from Asian states. What is worrisome is whether Japan would play a part in "explicitly intervening and provoking China's internal affairs and sovereignty," by "following U.S. footsteps on infringing Taiwan as a holy territory of China" (Xu 2006, 52-53). Wu Jinan, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, also expressed concerns over the increasing military interaction between Japan and Taiwan. Nevertheless, he concluded that current interaction between the two was still limited in scope, but there was the possibility of an intensification of military interaction between Japan and Taiwan. This is one of the reasons for the importance of the Taiwan Strait being part of the sea route, as 80% of oil from the Middle East and raw materials from Southeast Asia, which are imported into Japan, pass through the Taiwan Strait. As a result, it is in Japan's interests to keep Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait out of mainland China's control (Wu 2006, 58, 59). Nevertheless, he foresees their interaction to be restricted to a certain extent as there are some external constraints for deepening military exchanges between Taiwan and Japan (Wu 2006, 63).

These worries or concerns raised by Chinese scholars, over Japan's military future development, defense policies, and attitude over Chinese territory and sovereignty, are too numerous to be cited in this paper. However, no matter how serious these concerns are, it is not common to see them expressing concerns over the possibility of military aggression, or indeed the use of force by Japan in the

future. Around the academic circle, there is expressed criticism over Japan on the issues-based manner, without explicitly stating that potential military conflict seems to be in line with the “peaceful development” approach (Guo 2006, 1-2). A concept developed from Zheng Bijian’s “peaceful rise,” with which China would avoid disturbing stability while rising to a great power status (Zheng 2005).

In fact, the usual pattern of many Chinese academics through discussing Sino-Japanese relations is by mentioning the problems or criticism first, including security and historical issues; then, they will propose policy recommendations, and offer advice and measures while also advising the Japanese to reflect on its position and take a more cooperative scope; but, not to do anything to harm their bilateral relations so they may foster better long-term mutual beneficial relations. This is all done without significant mention of the possibility of more serious conflict. For example, Jiang Yuechun, in his article, names several important uncertainties and disagreements between the two states. But he generally proposes some suggestions for both states for them to settle their disputes and issues, while failing to mention the possible escalation of those differences into a serious military conflict, or even proposing a more hard-line approach to handling the issues (Jiang 2008, 7-11). Taking the following as an example, Zhang Yunling also raises the China-specific challenge of redefining the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and its potential challenges in the rise of China and unification with Taiwan; however, the paths of coping with these issues, which he purposed at the end of the chapter, are peaceful ones which include: attempting to make a U.S. alliance “less harmful” to China, striving to make China-U.S.-Japan triangular relations, having a “multi-winner” approach and to “integrate” the U.S. alliance East Asia security cooperation. It seems that it is only through non-conflicting and non-violence that the future of Sino-Japanese

disagreements can be overcome (Zhang 2003, 225-253). Another example is taken from a journal article on the China-Japan maritime disputes. Although the author heavily criticizes Japan's actions and attitude on various territorial disputes, the strategies suggested will restrict the establishment of bureaucratic institutions on maritime affairs, exploring legal aspects on those issues, and seeking joint development opportunities with Japan. However, he does not include military readiness as a recommendable solution (Liu 2006, 25-34).

Liao Xuanli analyzes the mainland international relations think tanks' attitude on the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, because this alliance is still considered to be a cornerstone of Japanese security; therefore, their attitude on this alliance can bear significance on how they view Japanese security issues as a whole. Liao analyzed that government or military affiliated think tanks considered the newly-redefined U.S.-Japan alliance to bring more negative effects to regional stability. China's Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a research institute affiliated with the Ministry of State Security and one of the largest and most influential think tanks in China (Liao 2006, 57, 76-77), considers the enlargement of the Japanese SDF's role and the expended scope of this new definition, to include Taiwan and encourage pro-independence of the island, as a violation of the Japan Peace Constitution; and, the target of this alliance is now clearly directed toward China, due to the lack of trust between China and U.S.-Japan. CICIR and a scholar from the National Defense University judge that having multilateral dialogue with the alliance would be of more benefit because the bilateral security relations between the U.S. and Japan still dominate the region (Liao 2006, 132-133).

Meanwhile, think tanks, under the control of the China Academy of Social

Sciences and university system, hold more diverse opinions; some researchers share similar negative views to Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group- related, and military related think-tanks, while also considering that the U.S.-Japan alliance has a positive effect on restraining Japan from further developing its military, as well as asserting a more independent stance in the diplomatic arena. However, other groups of researchers are more optimistic, they see that the alliance is defensive in nature and Japan will only develop into a “regional military power” to the largest extent. Japan is also unlikely to enter into direct military conflict with China unless the situation in the Taiwan Strait becomes grave. Due to this more optimistic view, they consider, with the unfavorable strategic environment posed by this alliance that, economic cooperation rather than an arm race will be the right way to solve the problems. They also encourage dialogue with the U.S. and Japan, and consider that China is still able to influence the process if it becomes involved soon (Liao 2006, 133-134). Liu’s conclusion is that there is a growing influence of civilian think tanks on the China leadership and their decision making process; however, the military think tank no longer holds a superior position, which means a signified decline of military influence on the civilian leadership. This conclusion has reflected in a more pragmatic, political oriented approach, but without a more hard-line military means over disputes, which were proposed by military-related think tanks, taken by China’s leadership in handling Sino-Japanese disputes (Liao 2006, 137, 139-140).

3.3.3 Discussion on the scholars’ opinion

3.3.3.1 Discussion on Japanese academics

While the above scholars hold a more balanced view on Sino-Japanese

relations, there are other groups of scholars (some of whom are ex-officials) who consider China as a security concern. Such people as Okazaki and Fukuyama view China as a long-term threat to Japanese sea lane security, while others hold a relatively positive or optimistic view on Sino-Japanese relations. Professor Takahara, of Tokyo University, offered a surprisingly positive yet cautious assessment during the low point of the Sino-Japanese relationship in 2005 (Shorrock 2005). However, to complete a comprehensive evaluation of Japanese academic opinion, on whether the majority view China as a threat or not would be beyond the scope of this thesis. The scholars' opinions which are cited above are merely a tip of the iceberg and is not exclusive by any means. Due to various limitations, such as time and language ability, it is too arbitrary to assert either side of the different views.

Borrowing Reinhard Drifte's assessment, in his 2003 book, it can be argued that there are divided opinions among Japanese writers and scholars; one group considers that China wants to complete for a regional hegemonic position, exerting military pressure on neighboring countries, controlling vital sea lanes to Japan in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and growing naval activities in the sea region near Japan. While another group consider the Chinese military far from being a threat because of their outdated technologies, backward training methods, low industrial levels, and lack of interaction between military and the population. Some skeptics have also suggested that China became a threat at the end of the Cold War due to the loss of other external threats and it is wrong to assume China was inherently dangerous. Nevertheless, the use of force was still possible if changes in the status-quo occurred, especially in Taiwan (Drifte 2003, 81-82). It seems that Drifte's assessment supports the view that there is divided opinion among Japanese

academics. However, his book, which was published in 2003 and analyzed whether the threat perception remained, is worth thinking about. As various incidents occurred post 2003, including: the Chinese submarine incursion in 2004 (Japan Ministry of Defense 2005-2008); the anti-Japanese movement in 2005 (BBC 2005; Yardley 2005); the Chinese anti-satellite missile test in 2007 (Kaufman and Linzer 2007); an increase in maritime activities near disputed sea regions; the acquisition of new military technology such as the J-10 fighters (Yardley and Lague 2007); Song-class submarines being submerged near the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk incident; and rapid deployment and development of new Naval vessels (Lague 2008).

As a result, if Japanese scholars' opinions in 2003 were slightly leaning to negative terms of threat perception, then it is likely that more Japanese academics would lean toward viewing China as a security threat now. This is due to the lack of transparency regarding its long-term intentions, more proactive and suspicious military behavior, and further military modernization. Although China does not seem to have an immediate tendency to be openly hostile toward Japan, there is clearly public expressions from the Chinese leadership that they need to maintain a good relationship with Japan (Fackler 2008). China merely wants to safeguard what is perceived to be its rightful interests such as the oil gas fields and preventing Taiwan from independence; however, suspicious signs of Chinese military activity may still be a source of fear for many Japanese academics, both now and in the future. However, it seems that mainstream scholars presently hold more balanced views of China, encouraging better cooperation and exchange in terms of security, yet they are still cautious over China's military development.

3.3.3.2 Discussion on Chinese academics

As discussed previously, Chinese academic circles generally consider Japan as an important and non-ignorable factor in terms of China's security. Although they often criticize Japan over historical issues, the U.S.-Japan alliance, potential enlargement of Japan's military in term of its size and roles, and Japan-Taiwan relations, it is rare that we see them explicitly mentioning and predicting a military conflict between China and Japan. This pattern gives the impression that writers within Chinese academic circles may try to avoid opposing or accept the Chinese leadership's official viewpoint of "peaceful development" (Guo 2006, 1-2). However, this will add to the difficulty of determining whether a future military scenario is truly unthinkable or inconceivable, or if they have little fear over Japan's military. However, it is difficult to judge whether their writing or opinions are bound under, or indeed conform, to a certain political atmosphere.

Another observation is not surprising. Scholars from the different Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group-related or military related think tanks and research institutes, which include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (Liao 2006, 83), the National Defense University, and the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), tend to express a more hard-line opinion or propose through policies regarding Japan-related security issues. They also hold more pessimistic assessments on Japan-China security relations and are suspicious of Japan's intentions on the Taiwan situation. On the other hand, these think tanks and institutes, under the CSSA or university system, hold more diverse opinions whether optimistic or pessimistic.

Another event also yields some interesting observations. During the low point of Sino-Japanese relations in 2002, there was a "new thinking" idea proposed by Ma

Licheng, a journalist at the 'People's Daily,' this was echoed by Professor Shi Yinhong, a renowned international relations scholar at the People's University. The "new thinking" essentially called for the Chinese to look over historical issues and attempt to analyze diplomatic relations with Japan with a more rational or realistic approach, as many argued that emotional anti-Japanese nationalism would hinder China's image and thus the rise of China in the international community. Ma argues that Japan militarism is unlikely to resurge due to Japan's democratic nature that imposes many constraints on its military. Also, Shi argued that China and Japan should cooperate to balance the U.S. rather than concentrating over historical issues (Jian 2007, 22; Jian 2007, 132-133). However, this "new thinking" ignited widespread debate, and Ma and Shi were labeled as "traitors," were attacked and received death threats (Jian 2007, 22-23). Subsequently, it was reported that a number of Chinese academics agreed with Ma and Shi's ideas (Jian 2007, 29); however, their views received even more criticism, both within academic circles and from the general public (Jian 2007, 132). Nevertheless, Ma and Shi's new thinking did not materialize into any mainstream ideas. Scholars who did not attack the "new thinking" stance also did not accept "new thinking" as a feasible concept (Jian 2007, 136-137).

In general, the negative way in which Ma and Shi were treated, because of their proposal in alternative thinking might hinder others' willingness to propose innovative ideas or comments on Sino-Japanese relations, as they have served as an example of how individuals could be attacked if their idea was not popular with the public; as Ma was forced to resign from "People's Daily" and eventually relocated to Hong Kong (Jian 2007, 23). Also, this identified mainstream opinions within the Chinese academic circles that they seemed to lean to a more pessimistic viewpoint.

And, when they assess the Sino-Japanese relationship, they deem that Japan will not welcome a rising or a strong China, because Japan has the intention to delay or contain this from happening. As Jian argues, many Chinese analysts still believe Japan would somehow be involved in the Taiwan issue, including supporting Taiwan's Independence, competing for energy, and global influence in the long run (Jian 2007, 139-141). Jian Yang concludes that many Chinese analysts "are pessimistic about the relationship in [the] short and medium terms. Some are optimistic about the long term." However, the root cause is a distrust of Japan that is based on a "historical legacy, [...] Japan's military capabilities and its increasing activism in its alliance with the U.S." (Jian 2007, 143-144).

In short, although it is unclear whether or not, or with what reason, Chinese scholars seem to avoid predicting or analyzing a hypothesized military conflict scenario (unlike their Western counterparts), this is not because they do not worry about it happening. On the contrary, it is believed that the majority have some mistrust over Japan's intentions regarding China's rise; that they hold low hopes of a genuine reconciliation with Japan and even have a fear of Japan's potential involvement in intervening in China's core interests, such as Taiwan. Additionally, moderate scholars such as Ma and Shi are not the majority..

3.4 Younger generations

The educational system, either formal or informal, is considered to be a socialization agent through which a political regime can transmit messages to the younger generations. Although it is important to have socialization agents and their part in shaping one's political belief and behavior is still debatable, many political

regimes still consider schooling as a desirable way to deliver messages (Barner-Barry 1985, 89-90).

Japan's former Education Minister, Kenji Kosaka, an advocate of including disputed territories as Japanese territories in school textbooks, expressed it necessary for such texts which were taught in schools to reflect an "official standpoint" (The Chosun Ilbo, 2006). This is one example of schools becoming an agent in delivering official messages and representing an official stance; a clear example showing why some would perceive the school curriculum as an indicator of the government's standpoint. Regardless of whether the schools are truly a mirror of the official position or not, the state education curriculum is a source of debate and concern for both parties in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In both states, textbook authorization procedures have aroused controversy. In the following section, the discussion will focus on how the educational system in both China and Japan can influence and shape younger generations' perceptions and surrounding issues.

It is not uncommon that educational systems are used for instilling patriotic ideas. Providing the bitter history between China and Japan in the 20th century, through a series of textbook "offensives" advocated by some LDP members, the Ministry of Education and right-wing political groups against "biased" history textbooks, as well as the increase in "patriotic tone" throughout the education curriculum, often come under harsh criticism from China (Rose 2005, 55-57). This is because the revision of the textbooks' contents is viewed as a prelude to the rise of historical revisionism, which is sensitive to the Chinese government and its people. Taking a third textbook offensive which started in 1996, the *Tsukuru kai* (an active right-wing group, formed in December 1996) argues that the seven textbooks, which went through a Ministry of Education screening process in 1996, were unable to

help Japanese children feel proud of their nation due the inappropriate approach, portrayal and contents; these included a discussion on the comfort woman, and the Nanjing Massacre (Rose 2006, 136-137). Meanwhile, the group also blamed the Japanese government for not being tough enough against foreign states that put pressure on the textbook issues and its “diplomacy of apology” (Rose 2006, 138). One of the founders of the *Tsukuru kai*, a University of Tokyo professor, Nobukatsu Fujioka, had written several books in which Japan’s aggressive wartime brutality against its neighboring countries and their people was diluted; these books were best-sellers and his views had attracted many different supporters (Kattoulas 1997, Kristof 1997). Meanwhile, the opposition to and criticism of downplaying Japan’s wartime aggression in these textbooks did not only come from neighboring countries; some domestic forces, including one outstanding figure, Professor Saburo Ienaga, filed three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education’s screening of his textbook drafts as he believed they had violated the constitution. In the verdict in 1997, the Supreme Court gave Ienaga a partial victory, saying that censorship from the Ministry of Education should be refrained as far as possible (Kristof 1997). His struggle against Japan’s Ministry of Education has been well-received in China, and it can be seen that the Chinese media praised him in a number of articles posted which mourned his death in 2002 (Chu 2002; Wenwei Po 2002). It should also be noted that Professor Ienaga was continuously threatened by right-wing radicals throughout the three decades of legal struggle over the history textbook issue (Kattoulas 1997).

In Japan, despite right wing groups attempting to promote the use of the controversial textbooks, popularity of them did not develop. This fact is reflected in the market share of some of the right-wing written textbooks; for example, there

were only 0.13% of all 11,134 junior high schools using the *Tsukuru ka*'s production *The New History Textbook* (*Atarashii Komin Kyokasho*) in May 2003. This figure was acquired after more than two years after its approval by the Ministry of Education and an intensive promotional media campaign (Takahashi 2004). The final adoption rate of this textbook was around 0.032% to 0.039% of all schools (McNeill 2005; Takahashi 2004; Shimazu 2006, 142). *The New History Textbook* was expected to have a 10% market share, but the end result was far below initial estimates. Part of the reason behind the low adoption rate of *The New History Textbook* was the result of efforts from pressure groups such as, *The Children and the Textbook Japan Network 21* (Shimazu 2006, 142).

Tsukuru kai's next wave of textbooks offensive subsequently became one of the triggers to the 2005 anti-Japanese mass movement in China. Rather than scaring off the rightists from asserting their objectives, the anti-Japanese movement in China further fueled undesired feelings among some Japanese individuals; this resulted in China being portrayed as a dangerous country and an unfriendly neighbor, using history as a diplomatic instrument and China was thought to be trapped by stereotypical issues. Comments by some Japanese media commentators, including *Japan Times* writer and ex-diplomat Masamichi Hanabusa, considered China to "have long neglected to see Japan's reality and sentiments without prejudice" (Hanabusa 2005). Hanabusa promoted that China had no reason to be afraid of Japan, because Japan had never harbored hostile intentions toward China; and, because Japan had not intervened in China's internal affairs, he believed China should have acknowledged this. He also accused China to be one that was threatening others, by saying "it is China not Japan that possesses a formidable nuclear arsenal and deploys long-range missiles aimed at Taiwan and other" (Hanabusa 2005). The magnitude of

the 2005 incidents terrified many Japanese and generated distasteful feelings (Johnston 2007, 119). However, the 2005 anti-Japanese sentiment was simply a new chapter in the textbook controversies which began in the 1980s; it could be **see** that, even though a textbook had such a low adoption rate in Japan, it enraged some of the Chinese. Despite right-wing thinking remaining to be a non-mainstream discourse in education, Lind points out that “Japanese education was largely unapologetic: [the] discussion of past misdeeds – if not totally absent – were often cursory at best.” Therefore, it should reflect on past wrongdoings and understand the concern of its neighbor on its educational system (Lind 2008, 51).

On the other hand, patriotic education has always been an important measure for the PRC government. With the Education Law passed in 1995, stories of the KMT and Japanese invasion forces have been widely used for patriotic education; for example, there is a story used in the “Thought and Value” (sixiang pinde) course about young resistance fighters led by a boy, who was then executed by the Japanese for refusing to sell out his country (Hughes 2006, 73-74). Stories like this negative shape images of Japan in the minds of the younger generation. When comparing textbooks used in Japan, the texts used in China seem even more polarized; David P. Jänes discovered that *Chinese History, Book 1*, the dominant history textbook used in Chinese middle school by 80% of market, was “polarized” in content by devoting a whole chapter on the Nanjing Massacre. It provided detailed illustrations of the atrocities, such as a “killing game” played by Japanese troops, and implies Japanese students are taught with right-wing texts (Jänes 2005, 1-9, 1-10). However, Jänes points out that the most used Japanese history textbook has its own deficiencies but still provides a more balanced view than the right-wing textbook: The New History Textbook (Jänes 2005, 1-10). Jeffrey Kingston, an Asian studies scholar at Temple

University in Tokyo, comments “Japan was demonized in state education as a way of shoring up the sagging legitimacy of the [Chinese] Communist Party, which took credit for defeating the invaders.” He also points out that Chinese education texts include ideas such as “Guarding against the revival of Japanese militarism and fascism remains one of the most important problems that we face” (Lawrence and Martin 2008). Kristof also suggests that Asian school textbooks, including those of China, are sources of “Unrelenting anti-Japanese propaganda” and even racist (Kristof 1999, 42). Thus Chinese students’ negative views and uncritical blame on the Japanese is believed to be deeply-seated, because they believe their Japanese counterparts do not have enough understanding of their country’s past behavior and therefore, may carry out or have the potential to breed militaristic thinking toward the Chinese. In fact, after the Tiananmen Incident, Japan wartime behavior once again became the focus of Chinese patriotic education, combining other issues such as the growth of the U.S.-Japan security commitment and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by former Prime Minister Koizumi. Additionally, anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese popular nationalism has been heightening since then.

It is not unusual for a country to conduct patriotic education of some form, but there is danger that this type of patriotic education will turn into “blind patriotism.” There is a form called “*pseudopatriotism*,” which results in “blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford 1950, 107). One manifestation of patriotism is through nationalistic ideas such as military and war; and those ideas could often lead to a feeling of “national vulnerability,” a feeling that their national security is under foreign threat, and “heightened distrust of foreign nations and exaggerated vigilance and

preparedness” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 1999, 154-155). Another concern arising from blind patriotism is “cultural contamination” in which “foreign influence erode[s] the homogeneity and distinctiveness of national culture” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 1999, 155). Contrary to blind patriotism, constructive patriotism recognizes internal problems of the nation, rather than having “global and uncritical positive evaluation of the ingroup” (Lavine, Schatz and Staub 1999, 163).

3.4.1 Discussion

Although it is would be unconvincing to say that patriotic education in Japan and China would or has led to the formation of “blind patriotism,” the above discussion shows some elements. First, the Chinese public might not acknowledge or have indeed overlooked the fact that the majority of Japanese student are not taught from right-wing textbooks. Therefore, it is not accurate to conclude that the Japanese have been instilled with rightist views, thus generating resentment toward them. The Japanese, on the other hand, feel confused, upset, fearful and angry due to Chinese hostility and a failure to understand why the Chinese are so anti-Japanese, even though the majority have nothing to do with the right wing or militarism. They may consider the Chinese as unfriendly and untrustworthy, which is through the belief that Chinese are growing in strength, with the state and people being feared.

The above illustration exemplifies the predicament of uncertainty of intentions, as one party assumes the other knows and understands its own intentions, and has no reason to fear itself; therefore, any suspicious moves by the other will be considered unreasonable and even malign. The Chinese younger generation, who are nurtured by lopsided views of patriotic education and the official portrayal of Japan; meaning they may hold a biased view toward their Japanese counterparts and be unable to

develop a more balanced understanding of Japan.

For Japan's younger generation, it is hard to determine whether, and to what extent, right-wing nationalistic ideas will become popularized in the future. As Rose concludes, even though the right-wing nationalistic educational agenda is moving forward, it is far from being mainstream and is not currently accepted by Japanese academics. However, under pressure from patriotic campaigns, many Japanese wartime aggressions were toned down in textbooks (Rose 2006, 147). The continuous lowering in the significance of Japanese wartime wrongdoings may eventually make Japan's younger generations feel that the Chinese persistently ask an apology from Japan, or that reflection is unfair and unjust, and thus will generate negative feelings over the longer term.

Nevertheless, Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments are deemed to be unreasonable, generating negative feelings and a fear of China in the minds of some younger Japanese individuals who have witnessed bilateral relations and disputes with China. Therefore, they may consider China as an unfriendly neighbor and will easily accept the "China Threat" theory.

3.5 Politicians and ruling leaders

3.5.1 Japan

China's growing military is a concern for some individuals in Japan, with a number being prominent political figures. Prime Minister Taro Aso expressed his personal view in December 2005, when he was Foreign Minister, saying that China "pose[s] a considerate threat" because it lacked military transparency and had a

nuclear program. Aso's statement was the first time a minister of Japan said something so explicit over the "China threat." Then, two days later, the Japanese government officially announced it would be one of the developers of the U.S. proposed missile shield project (Marquand 2005). This was not the final statement made on China's growing military by Aso, as he subsequently expressed his concerns on a number of other occasions. Aso told Fuji Television, on April 2nd 2006 that, "It's not clear what China is using the money for. This creates a sense of threat for surrounding countries," when commenting on China's military expenditure and transparency (International Herald Tribune 2006). Not only Aso but another Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who pioneered the "ice-melting visit" to China, agreed with the 2005 Aso's assessment. Aso, as Chief Cabinet Secretary at that time, said "He must have made the comment based on the view that China should ensure transparency over the growth in its military spending," and "There is no major discrepancy in that sense" (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2005).

The growing military strength of China also influenced the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (the main opposition party) to hold similar views over China shifting to the right (Marquand 2005). Seiji Maehara stated China was a "realistic threat" because of its growing military, while on in a trip to the United States in December 2005. He further told the PLA deputy chief of staff, Xiong Guangkai, "when we look into China's military buildup, I cannot but have doubts of its intent" (Przystep 2006, 116). He further made comments on the "China threat" issue when he was back in Japan, pointing out several aspects such as increasing military expenditure, the upgrade and overhaul of its nuclear arsenal and other weapons, and China's plan on the East China Sea energy sources as evidence of the China threat (Takahara 2005).

Shoichi Nakagawa, who held a number of important positions in the Japanese cabinet and LDP, including being LDP's Policy Research Council Chairman, the Minister of the Economy, Trade and Industry, and Minister of Finance, once said "If something were to happen to Taiwan in the next 15 years, then within 20 years, Japan might become just another Chinese province", in a speech. (China Daily 2007, Chang, 2007). He also suspected that the anti-satellite missile test was targeted at Japan. He predicted it was likely that China might rise in a non-peaceful manner after 2010 and urged Japan citizens to focus more on this matter (Chang 2007).

Furthermore, Prime Minister Koizumi said, when addressing a "China threat" question in Diet in January 2006, that in order for a country to become a threat it must have both the capability and intention; China, despite its repaid military modernization, was still on a long road to modernizing its hardware, and he did not consider China as a threat; this was because of the 1972 Joint Communiqué and the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. However, he did not provide a clear answer on whether China was a "latent threat," or its "intentions shift over time" and its military capabilities were the only indication that the country had become a "latent threat" because a military capable country have ability to invade or attack other if it had the intention (Matsuda 2007, 187-188).

Meanwhile, there was positive comment. The Secretary-General of Japan's LDP, Hidenao Nakagawa, denied China as a threat to Japan, during his visit to China, by saying "China, which is seeking to build a harmonious society and become an economic power, is not a threat to Japan, and Japan, which is striving to become a political power, also poses no threat to China" (Xinhua 2007). However, Nakagawa is known to be a pro-Chinese politician in the LDP (Masaki 2006). Another former LDP secretary-general, Koichi Kato, was said to be a leading member of the

pro-China group (Kyodo News 2006). He criticized Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine and nationalists' lack of reflection for Japan's wartime behavior. His view, however, attracted some aggressive behavior by radical nationalists, including setting fire to one of his houses in 2006 (Bnet 2006).

3.5.2 China

The previous Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, has personal aspect as after spending his childhood in a Japan-occupied region; also, his uncle was killed by Japanese soldiers during the invasion (Shirk 2007, 154). Therefore, he seems to have a reason for personal resentment toward Japan. However, personal reasons aside, it is believed that he took a more hard line approach, as exemplified in his 1998 visit to Japan, by continually mentioning the history issue in order to gain support from the military and conservatives in China (Rose 2005, 106).

After the transition of power, China's diplomacy style, under the Hu-Wen leadership, was "seeking diplomatic balance and flashing the economic card;" which had the aim of maintaining warm and friendly relations with most of the major powers such as the "EU, ASEAN, Russia, and Japan [and] a nonconfrontational relationship with the United States." And, it would do so by using its flourishing economy to ensure diplomatic smoothness (Lee 2006, 163-164); something which is consistent with China's "peaceful development" doctrine. The essence of "peaceful development" is to "develop by taking advantage of the peaceful international environment, and at the same time, to maintain world peace through its development." This is a term derived from Zheng Bijian's "peaceful rise" idea. However, fearing that the word "rise" would bear a threatening intention to other states, Hu Jintao modified the term to "peaceful development;" a term which has

become the official standpoint ever since (Guo 2006, 1-2).

China's leadership has been quite successful in maintaining a consistent relationship with most of the major powers. Furthermore, its relations with former foes and competitors, including India, Vietnam, Russia and ASEAN members with which China has territorial dispute in South China Sea, have seen various degrees of improvement. However, Japan is an exceptional case, as Sino-Japanese relations have entered a vicious cycle since the beginning of the 21st century (Lam 2006, 166). And, this situation has not improved much over time, even after the "peaceful development" idea was made. One outstanding event was when Chinese navy warships appeared in the East China Sea near the disputed oil gas field in 2005; which was a show of military might. It was believed that China wanted to send a signal of determination just two weeks before the production began (French, Onishi 2005). It is quite remarkable for the current Chinese leadership, which has stressed on maintaining an image of peaceful and benevolent power, to demonstrate such unfriendly behavior. As a result, it is worth acknowledging why Japan is one of the few exceptions to the overall warm foreign relations of China; the question to answer is: why is the Sino-Japanese relationship so special and different?

One common argument is that Japan has much to do with the Chinese leadership's core interests. Since the Chinese leadership turned to nationalism, in order to boost its popularity and legitimacy, Japan unavoidably became a prime target for nationalistic sentiment; mainly because Japan was a memorable aggressor in recent Chinese history, its scaling back of the (and subsequently cancelled) economic aid, and had an overall unwillingness to address historical issues concerning Chinese expectations were frequently sources of resentment among China officials (Sutter 2006, 400-401). In fact, Japanese related questions may have

become more volatile during the Hu-Wen leadership, as they “demonstrated a readiness to be more receptive to public demands as long as the Communist Party’s monopoly on power is not compromised.” Additionally, public grievances and demands over foreign affairs may also need to be addressed under “putting people first” mentality (Lam 2006, 175). And, as a result, tolerance of the current Chinese leadership toward Japanese related issues may be reduced due to public demand.

Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations have recovered from their lowest point during the Koizumi period, being improved by his successors Shinzo Abe (BBC 2006) and Yasuo Fukuda (Lawrence and Martin 2008); and, through the Chinese Premier’s, Wen Jiabao, “ice-melting” visit to Japan (BBC 2007, Onishi 2007) and Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan (Fackler 2008). However, as Ezra Vogel, the former head of Harvard University’s Asia Center, assesses it is still not “at the stage where there is popular support in China for good relations with Japan, or confidence in Japan that relations are stable and completely trustworthy.” And, the improvement of their bilateral relations is still “tentative,” despite noteworthy improvement (Lawrence and Martin 2008).

The current Hu-Wen leadership holds a two-folded view of Japan, at least for the rest of this decade; they regard Japan as a “quasi-superpower” economically, while they also view Japan as a “second-class” diplomatic and military power. This is a pragmatic approach because the Beijing leadership is more willing to forge a closer economic partnership with Tokyo. Also, it can be seen that China, including Hong Kong, has replaced the United States as Japan’s number one trading partner since 2004. While, on the other hand, the Chinese leadership wants to prevent Japan from becoming a “normal country” through political and diplomatic means; therefore, China continues to comment and criticize any steps which might facilitate Japan’s

“remilitarization.” Also, Lam comments that “intense Sino-Japanese mistrust and competition have overshadowed what might have been [a] silver lining on the horizon” (Lam 2006, 201). Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations have yet to go from political-cold to an economic-hot pattern. The deep mistrust from China’s leadership is rooted in how Japan will play a security role in the Taiwan issue. As one writer comments, “the only conceivable issue which Japan and China can be draw into a war is over Taiwan.” Therefore, no matter whether there is the possibility that China and Japan may be pitted against each other in a military conflict with other scenarios, these comments show the possibility of Japan being involved in Taiwan security as a fear of China’s leadership. However, their involvement will be in the form of actual military logistics support to U.S. troops, under the guise of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, or Japanese participation in missile defense research. All of which could pose obstacles to Chinese unification or indeed encourage Taiwan *de jure* independence. However, no matter which is the case, the Chinese leadership does fear Japan as a security threat (Lam 2006, 180-181).

3.5.3 Discussion of politicians’ perceptions

3.5.3.1 Japan

The China threat argument has been mentioned by some senior LDP politicians in Japan, such as Shoichi Nakagawa, Aso, and Abe; all of these individuals were considered to be nationalists and expressed concern on the military threat of China. However, it is hard to determine if the “China threat” is widely accepted in the LDP, as there are various factions in the LDP that are pro-China as well as ones that are anti-China.

Moreover, Abe and Aso have not expressed similar comments in the capacity

of Prime Minister. Ironically, Abe's first overseas visit was to China, rather than a usual trip to the United States. However, which is Japan's true attitude toward China? One speculation is that the role of the Japanese Prime Minister has made them to refrain from expressing their attitude more freely. As the Prime Minister, their responsibility is to make decisions more comprehensively. Also, it can be seen that even Prime Minister Koizumi, a nationalistic LDP who was not scared about upsetting China by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, would not go so far to putting his nationalistic thinking in front of other factors such as economic opportunities with China. Also, it was reported there were Japanese worries over Koizumi's behavior could damage their economic relations with China and therefore, put pressure on him to maintain their business prospects (Curtin 2004). A more recent example of this pattern can be seen when Aso took a pragmatic approach in bilateral relations, rather than making nationalistic comments, on the recent diplomatic dispute over Chinese research ships sailing near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; as Japan needed to cooperate with China to combat the global economic crisis (Zhong 2008; ASTM 2008). It is reasonable to believe that domestic politics and various interest groups have also placed pressure on how and if the Prime Minister should express their own personal view freely, before coming to office.

Another explanation which may be attributable to their threat perception toward China is due to the fact that they are post World War generations; they have not directly experienced or been involved in the World War Two process of normalization of relations with China. Although this may not have had a direct impact on the rise in tension of Sino-Japanese relations, the lack of feelings toward each other may have influenced a more pragmatic view and strategic approach to relations. This is one explanation as to why Koizumi seemed more willing to use the

military as a diplomatic asset. It is argued that older generations, such as Noboru Takeshita, had experienced war and his faction is considered to be pro-China (Wan 2006, 102, 143-144). After all, with the disappearance of special feelings toward China, Japanese politicians' feelings toward China could be subject to other factors. For example, China, as a nondemocratic state, may be an obstacle to developing a benevolent image among Japanese politicians and bureaucracies; just as one Chinese specialist in the Japanese Foreign Ministry commented, "[The] Tiananmen (incident) taught me a major lesson: Communism is communism" (Wan 2006, 163).

Nevertheless, these examples were selected due to the importance of those political figures, as many held important or influential positions in the LDP and the cabinet. It is reasonable to believe that there are a growing number of Japanese politicians who have a genuine reservation on China's long-term intentions, due to the older generation of politicians retiring, even though there are still a number of pro-China camps in the LDP.

The conclusion of this section is that the threat perception of Japanese politicians is that they are "slightly worried on China as a threat but the trend is increasing."

3.5.3.2 China

It seems that the Chinese leadership has a firm stand on certain issues relating to Japan, because those issues are related to the country's core interests – the legitimacy of the regime. It is argued that the Hu-Wen leadership embraces a populist approach in domestic politics, which in turn restrains their own room for maneuvering in foreign affairs due to Chinese popular opinions being anti-Japanese (Wan 2006, 150). However, one Chinese expert, Peter Gries, argues "the CCP is

losing its control over nationalist discourse” (Gries 2004, 180-181).

The true fear in the mind of the current Chinese leadership can be understood from the experience of China’s previous leader Jiang Zemin, as he was criticized within China for his stance on handling the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Hughes 2006, 147). One could imagine what the Chinese public would feel if the issues become more explosive, such as a skirmish near the Diaoyu/Senkuka Islands or Japan providing logistic support to the U.S. in a Taiwan crisis. Therefore, we can infer that the Chinese leadership’s fear over Japan, as a security threat, is twofold. First, it is the rise of nationalistic thinking in Japan and the more assertive actions taken by Japanese leaders against China; including the intention behind the possibility of revising Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. Also, all of the above elements may create some genuine competition between the two states, with the possibility of a military clash in some form. Second, if the threat of losing popular support arises domestically, and is triggered by Japanese behavior on issues which the Chinese public or nationalists have great concern then the Chinese leadership would face a difficult position. They could either appeal to the demands of an increasing nationalistic-thinking public, but this may damage China’s overall international image and effort, resulting in a potential disastrous result for China in the long-term; or, they could choose to ignore public demands and rationally handle the security issue, but may run the risk of losing public support and being trapped in a legitimate dilemma with the public.

Both choices are equally bad for Chinese leaders and the possibility of the above scenarios will increase should Japan become more militarily active and abandon pacifism. An increasingly active security behavior, such as an involvement in missile defense and joining peacekeeping efforts, may trigger concerns over

whether Japan will change or is currently changing its policy on security issues. As a result, the Chinese leadership should be aware of Japan's future security behavior.

3.6 Conclusion

From the information explored in this chapter, it has been found that the Chinese general public dislike Japan and consider it to be a source of security concerns; which is mainly due to how the Japanese government handled history issues. However, the Japanese general public also holds similar fear of China's military strength and does not have a positive attitude toward China, mainly due to the anti-Japan sentiment in China.

China's military, the PLA, is very suspicious of Japan's security intentions, as they believe Japan's security measures, such as strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, joining the missile defense, and upgrading the Defense Agency to ministry level, is directed toward China and holds malign intention. On the other hand, the Japan Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force are also wary about China's military behavior, due to various suspicious behavior conducted by alleged Chinese vessels and aircraft, and a relatively fast-paced military buildup without improvement on the transparency of its intention.

For scholars on both sides, the majority of Chinese scholars have some reservations over Japan's security intentions, while few have mentioned a hypothesized military conflict; and most do not hold much hope of an overall reconciliation between the two states. Scholars who hold a moderate view do exist, but are still in the minority. Mainstream Japanese scholars generally have a balanced view on China, through suggestions of improved cooperation and trust between the

two states. However, they do acknowledge the existence of obstacles, but suggest some attention should be placed on China's military behavior and intentions in case an unexpected situation occurs. Rightists or more radical views do exist, but these views are not shared by mainstream opinion.

The younger Chinese generation has an unreasonable, and sometimes irrational, negative impression of Japan, which is mainly due to the unbalanced and heavily biased educational agenda. Japan's younger generation has received a relatively balanced education on history compared to that of China's, and rightists' educational materials have not entered the mainstream education agenda.

The overall trend of Japanese politicians and their perception of China is believed to show slight concern over China as a security threat, with this belief becoming more popular. This is while China's leadership fears Japanese security behavior will place them in a dilemma of policy choice, either to be assertive and lose international reputation (which China needs), or handling it moderately and losing popularity among its people.

After exploring perceptions of various sub-state actors in both states, the following chapter will discuss whether there is a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations.

4. Is there a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations?

4.1 Discussion

In order to determine whether a security dilemma exists between China and Japan, the threat perception of sub-actors in each state will be discussed, rather than taking each state as a unitary actor. The discussion will be based on information used in the previous section, but this information is by no means exclusive or comprehensive; because the information is only based on availability and how well it represents the opinions of certain groups of actors. The observations deduced from the previous discussion will be summarized as follows.

Figure 4. China's threat perception toward Japan

China sub-state actors	Threat perception toward Japan
General Public	Generally hold an unfavorable opinion and are quite fearful of Japan threatening their security in military terms.
Military (PLA)	Very suspicious of Japan's military intentions and are anti-Japanese.
Academic	Mainstream opinion believed to be worried about Japan as a security threat.
Political Ruling Elite (CCP Leadership)	Afraid that future security issues with Japan will present them with a policy-making dilemma, thus worried about Japan's military intentions and behavior.
Younger generation	Very nationalistic, prone to become anti-Japanese and hold a low opinion of Japan.

Figure 5. Japan's threat perception toward China

Japan sub-state actors	Threat perception toward China
General Public	Hold unfavorable opinion of China, and quite fearful of China threatening their security in military terms.
Military (MoD, SDF)	Suspicious and concerned over China's military behavior and intentions.
Academic	Increasingly concerned about China as a security threat, but mainstream view is still balanced and encourages cooperation between the two states.
Political Ruling Elite (LDP, DPJ)	Somewhat worried over China as a security threat and the trend is increasing.
Younger generation	Mainstream education discourse does not consider China as a security threat; conservative nationalistic education has not been mainstream for some time.

4.1.1 Sources of the Security Dilemma: identities, norms, interests and policies

According to the above investigation, the groups who show more concrete evidence of fearing the other are the general public of both countries. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments may have played a part in creating public opinion, but may eventually be affected by such opinion and have to act accordingly. The following discussion will attempt to explore how public opinions are shaped and how they can be reshaped by other sub-state groups by using the framework in figure 1.

We then need to understand why the Chinese public holds a fear of Japan as a security threat and vice versa, by using the framework in figure 2.

4.1.1.1 Chinese' identities, norms, interest and government policies

As Jeffrey Kingston points out, the Chinese educational system has used Japan as an external threat to develop its own legitimacy (Lawrence & Martin 2008). Long-term effects to Sino-Japanese relationships are brought about by historical narration in history, and anti-Japanese sentiment is then created to distract people from domestic problems (Jänes 2005, 1.9). Indeed, some have argued that the Chinese government uses education and public media as a means to spread nationalistic rhetoric, as a way to maintain legitimacy (Jia 2005, 17). One example was the enactment of “Fundamental Principles on Implementing Patriotic Education” by the Propaganda Department of the CCP in 1994. The CCP also tried to maintain legitimacy by taking the role of defender of “economic development, political stability and national unity” (Chen 2005, 48).

Although Jänes argues the effect of education will take a long time to materialize (Jänes 2005, 1.9), I argue the effect has already emerged in recent years, at least in some aspects. Jia argues that Chinese nationalism has become stronger recently, in several aspects; first, the Chinese are more easily offended by criticism from foreign countries than people in other countries; second, the Chinese have great pride toward China's growing national strength; third, they now employ a realist view concerning international affairs (Jia 2005, 15-16).

As a result, I would argue this represents three elements which form China's identity in many Chinese people's minds; which are: “China is great now” and “it has recovered from a hundred years humiliation and should be respected,” and “it is the leading East Asian power.”

These identities shape norms. The following will illustrate some norms which are derived from these identities. Jia suggests that some of the external factors,

such as bias media coverage from the West and a lack of respect for China's national interest shown by foreign countries, as having an important part in creating strong nationalism (Jia 2005, 15-16). However, how important these external factors are, in contributing to the rise of nationalism, is still in debate. The first point to note is that China has extensive censorship over the internet; many different keywords are sensitive and 85 percent are politically related; these are blocked on searches and many domestic and overseas websites are banned from accessing. This is done in an effort to control "ultranationalism," by banning such words as "Defend the Diaoyu Islands" (Shirk 2007, 91-92). And, it is thought that this process will also prevent the Chinese public from accessing alternative political or historical perspectives from other origins. Second, it is not known how many Chinese have acquired a foreign viewpoint on China, whether this is from foreign websites or media; the reason for this is because Chinese language-based sources, such as newspaper and websites, will still be a major source of information – even though there is growing foreign language literacy. How these Chinese sources select and report information from foreign sources will determine what types of information the Chinese public would know. Just as the Genron-NPO's Third Japan-China Opinion poll in 2007 has shown, Chinese news media (87.8%), books (including textbooks) and TV drama books (40.6%), and special programs and movies (37.2%) were the top 3 channels that Chinese individuals learned about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations. Direct contact with Japanese media was only the choice of 5.8% of the surveyed sample (Genron-NPO 2007, 5).

As a result, how the Chinese media and official information channels portray Japan and the Japanese should be more important than how the foreign media does. It is said that many Chinese consider that Japan has not reflected enough for its

wartime aggression and this is the reason why so many Chinese people dislike Japan and consider it a threat (Genron-NPO 2007, 27; Jiang 2002; 2004; 2006). However, the key question is: have the Japanese truly reflected? Philip Seaton carried out research to compare the number of Japanese Prime Ministers who had apologized against the Prime Ministers who had visited the Yasukuni Shrine. The research identified that, from September 1990 to October 2005, Japanese Prime Ministers have issued an apology, expressed remorse, and reflect their historical wrongdoing in various forms 26 times; while the Yasukuni Shrine was visited by Prime Ministers in various capacities on seven occasions, five of which were by Koizumi. This compares with the ratio of apologies to Yasukuni visits, by Prime Ministers in an earlier period, from July 1972 to August 1990; which were three to thirty-four (Seaton 2007, 88-91). It seems that the frequency of Prime Ministerial visits and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have decreased over time, and Japan's PMs are more willing to apologize for Japan's wartime behavior since the 1990s. However, the wording, phraseology and formality of those apologies can also be a subject in determining if the Chinese are satisfied with them. If a more balanced coverage had been presented by Chinese officials or the media, then the Chinese public would have acknowledged a more balanced attitude on Japanese's reflection of its wartime behavior; for example, Professor Ienaga's effort in fighting for a balanced view on history textbooks (Kristof 1997). However, we should recognize that even though there were numerous apologies in various forms, this will never really represent the standpoint of the Japanese government. As, Prime Minister Murayama failed to persuade the conservative members of Diet to support his attempt of issuing an official apology and, as a result, his apology, despite its sincerity, can at best only represent himself (Dahl 2008, 245). Therefore, this may provide the impression that

an apology by some Japanese politicians can be considered superficial and instructional. Moreover, the Chinese public have been socialized in to believing that the Japanese are steadily taught right-wing militarism through their educational (Jänes 2005, 1-9, 1-11). Another reason which makes those apologies less fruitful may be from the view that the attempts were only done instructionally, in order to boost economic exchange (Dahl 2008, 245). This view will be even more deeply seated by seemingly contradictory behavior by Japan, as Kristof suggests:

“[...]Japan's statements of regret always end up sounding hollow and calculating, as if they come from some committee in the Foreign Ministry. Every August 15, to mark the anniversary of the end of the war, the prime minister reads a carefully worded speech expressing *hansei*—a vague term meaning remorse or self-reflection. Any sense of regret, however, is undermined by the procession of cabinet ministers who march to [the] Yasukuni Shrine, a traditional center of Japanese militarism” (Kristof 1999, 40).

Indeed, there are a certain number of right-wing conservative nationalistic discourses regarding its wartime behavior in Japan, but how deep this thinking penetrates Japan's mainstream society is debatable. It is reasonable to believe that the Japanese public is far less right-wing, let alone militaristic, than many Chinese individuals perceive. However, such contradictory behavior could undermine the effect of an apology by any person representing Japan. Although, it is simplistic to conclude over this, one reasonable explanation could be that the Chinese media or government propaganda channels have overly emphasized negative portrayals of Japan. Whether this is intentional or unintentional it would remind people that the ghost of militarism is still very active. Nevertheless, “anti-Japanese militarism” has

become a major norm in the minds of the Chinese public, and is the reason why they have a biased portrayal of Japan and the Japanese.

Moreover, igniting radical nationalism may not be the Chinese leadership's original intention, as the Chinese leadership have not wanted to utilize "assertive or aggressive nationalism," as such nationalism would do more harm than good for China's international image; something which is important when fostering international cooperation (Chen 2005, 51). However, as China has deepened its contact and involvement with the international community, more domestic problems have followed, such as laid off state-owned enterprise workers. It is also likely that the fourth-generation leadership may need to face the challenge of popular nationalism, which give pressure them to give top priority to China's interest (Secington 2005, 32). A recent example was a negative opinion expressed by some of the Chinese public on the agreement between China and Japan on the development of the East Sea oil and gas field, in June 2008; some individuals expressed their criticism against this agreement on the internet (Huanqiu Forum 2008), criticizing the Chinese government for being too soft on this issue (Ming Pao Daily News 2008). However, some individuals praised the Chinese research ships' appearance near Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in December 2006, with comments such as "[the] Chinese government has finally learnt to be tough," "We Chinese wish to see this kind of expression very much" (Mok 2008). This uncompromising attitude is a manifestation of the identity of "China is a great power," which generates the norm of "[aggressive] counter foreign malign intention and disrespect [...]." Therefore, the Chinese public is prone to use its strength, influence and assertive policies, rather than compromising when dealing with Japan. This could be the mentality resulting from China's past as the victim of Japan's expansionism and aggression, as

Alexander Wendt has argued the current “predator” can be a past victim (Wendt 1992, 409). This exemplifies the danger that public opinion could hijack such decision-making of the Chinese government, and even force the Chinese leadership to become increasingly more assertive, blame the leadership of being ineffective to deal with domestic demand, or even request them to deploy an aggressive strategy over dealing with Japan in the long run. Therefore, it can be seen that Chinese’s nationalistic or anti-Japanese norms may affect and restrict government policies.

Also, because the realist’s world view is widely accepted by the Chinese public, it is apparent that one realist’s core assumption, the “zero-sum world” view, has also become a common norm when thinking about Japan. The uncompromising attitude of the Chinese public cannot be understood, and as a result the combination of the norms forms a “zero-sum world view” and “anti-Japanese militarism.” Using the above energy security as an example, this combination of norms is clear. Using the data from research into university students’ views on Chinese energy issues, which was conducted by Hong Kong UST, 57% out of 944 respondents, having a college or higher level of education, said it is “possible” or “completely possible” that “energy imports will allow other countries to control China.” This shows that they are worried about China’s energy dependence on other states (Zweig and Ye 2008, 289-290). At the same time, around 68% (25% said very likely and 43% said likely) considered armed conflict likely with the other state over energy issues (Zweig and Ye 2008, 289, 291). It seems that many hold a conflicting and pessimistic view on international politics. Although Japan was ranked as the number two rival on energy behind the U.S., when asked which state the respondents were least willing for China to cooperate with, only 3.6% favored cooperation with Japan (Zewig and Ye 2008, 290-292). The respondents also held a hawkish view on Japan

in dealing with the East China Sea oil gas issue; the mean score was 3.9 in a 1-5 scale (5 being most hawkish, 1 being most cooperative). Therefore, their attitude on Japan is much more hawkish than on the U.S. (mean score 2.99) (Zweig and Ye 2008, 290, 293). Generally speaking, the respondents suggested domestic solutions were more important than an external strategic solution, such as military options (Zweig and Ye 2008, 295). However, some hard liners answered the survey's open-ended question by stating that the Chinese government should utilize the East China Sea oil and gas reserves and not overly make concessions for Japan (Zweig and Ye 2008, 296). The above example shows that well-educated people in China do hold a more cooperative stance towards others in energy security, and they seek to have a peaceful means to deal with it; but there is an exception to this attitude when it comes to Japan. By seeing the findings of this research and the Internet comments made by other Chinese individuals, it seems that the Chinese hold a "zero-sum view" of bilateral relations with Japan. And, the Chinese public's hawkish view on Japan may put pressure on the Chinese government, even though it will want to employ a more cooperative strategy when dealing with Japan. Therefore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs will need to re-state that the official stand point on the East China oil gas field has not changed (China Review News 2008).

This might be how the norms "anti-Japanese's militarism," and "counter foreign malign intention and disrespect aggressively," as well as the "zero-sum world view" sublimates from those identities to be internalized in perceptions of the Chinese public. Thus, those norms and identities would in turn leave the Chinese government less room but only to appeal against popular sentiment, by acting as a firm guardian of national interests, which will lead to aggressive and conflicting policies. Consequently, conflict, disputes, quarrels, and arguments with Japan may

increase, causing a backlash from Japanese public opinion which in turn will further provoke Chinese public resentment toward Japan and restart the vicious cycle.

As a result, the Chinese government's fear over Japan as a security threat is partly coming from within (from public reaction) due to security actions taken by Japan; and, these reactions create a policy dilemma for the Chinese government. Therefore, any dramatic or controversial action by the Japanese would create a number of problems for the Chinese leadership; as such problems will stir up public emotion.

As for the Chinese military, the CMC is the center of the command structure (Shambaugh 2002, 111-113) and Hu is head of state of China and the chairman of the CMC. Theoretically, the attitude held by the Chinese military should reflect Hu's leadership perceptions on Japan; however, it is uncertain how the Chinese military work and whether there is overall independent thinking from Chinese civilian leadership. In fact, it is argued that the civilian leadership may find it difficult to control the discourse of the Chinese military (Green 2006), and will sometimes need to please or appease anti-Japanese sentiment within the military and conservatives as Jiang did in 1998 Japan's visit (Rose 2005, 106). As a result, this thesis chose not to speculate over how the general public does or does not affect the Chinese military's perception in the discussion, simply because the military has, on a number of occasions, taken its own view of other states. Additionally, the PLA is believed to be significantly anti-Japanese and it is highly possible the military, through its own publications such as the "PLA Daily" and other magazines such as "PLA Pictorial," has some influence over its readers.

In short, the fear and suspicion by China, over the security issues relating to Japan, can be shown by using the results of figure 4 and placing them into the

framework shown in figure 1.

Figure 6. Interaction between Chinese public identities, norms, national interests, and government policies.

4.1.1.2 Japanese' identities, norms, interest and government policies

For Japan, the general public is also a group with more concrete and negative view of China, and it is identified that they are quite fearful of China as a military

threat.

Since the early 1990s, Japan has experienced the “lost decade” and has witnessed the rapid growing economic power of China; the Japanese have felt an increase in their vulnerability. Events that conform to China’s malign images started to emerge around the end of the Cold War. Events including the Tiananmen Incident, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, numerous appearances in or near to Japan’s air and maritime territories, a persistence of demanding Japan’s apology for World War Two aggression, thwarting Japan’s bid on UNSC, and anti-Japanese mass movements have all added to Japan’s negative image of China (Chen & Bridges 2006, 141-142). Also, some Japanese individuals do not believe they should to be blamed for anything to do with Japan’s past aggression against China. Katsuchi Honda, a journalist dedicated to promoting wide understanding of Japan wartime history, claimed that wartime censorship made many adults ignorant about what their country and government took part in. Although he feels obligated as a journalist to report true stories about the war, “expressing remorse to China is the task of the Japanese government” (Dahl 2008, 250). Indeed, many Japanese know very little on the country’s wartime history. It is reported that a considerable proportion of the Japanese, including many people living in rural parts of Japan and young people, do not feel they had anything to do with wartime behavior and have no need to feel sorry (Kristof 1999, 39, 41). As a result, China has persistently mentioned wartime issues to exploit Japan and the Japanese complain that “They’re like gangsters, always asking for pay-offs, always demanding more. You can never get rid of them! What more do they want?” (Kristof 1999, 42). As many Japanese individuals do not accept the accusations and consider anti-Japanese sentiments as unreasonable, one puzzling fact is the hostility of some younger Chinese individuals who have had no

wartime experience (Kristof 1999, 41) As a result, Japanese people may consider China's mistrust and accusations as unsubstantiated and therefore, view China negatively in return for the perceived unjustified blame.

One argument is that Japan's national identity is deeply rooted in its post-war relationship with the United States. The uneasy and distasteful feeling is generated when China and America compete for supremacy in East Asia. Tamamoto claimed "the more China asserts its claim [for supremacy in China], the more Japan will be driven toward the United States to foil and counter" (Tamamoto 2003, 196-197).

Since World War Two, Japan's constitution has borne the label of pacifism and considers itself a democratic state; with this came a norm of distrust in non-democratic countries, especially mistrust of communist countries. This awareness between "we democracy" and "they non democracy" was manifested in the sharp decrease of favorable feeling by the Japanese public toward China in 1989; which was due to the Tiananmen incident, and the Japanese public attitude toward China has never recovered to the level before 1989 (Government of Japan's Cabinet Office 2008). Another variable that leads to a mistrust of China is through a link between the internal and external orientation of states to use force. It is believed by some that states who are reluctant to use force in a domestic situation would externalize this orientation in the international system; thus resulting in being less prone to use force. Therefore, states may use the other states' willingness to use force unreasonably, as an indicator to judge their inclination to use force in order to settle international affairs. Therefore, one would not expect a state that "used force arbitrarily at home against its own citizens to refrain in a principled way from the use of force against citizens of other countries abroad." However, this link between the internal and external orientation of the use of force could be misleading and thus

lead to misperception (Nau 2003, 220). Nau uses two scales, the Political Freedom Rating and the Polity III Ranking to illustrate and determine if the states in East Asia are willing to use force internally. The result was that China scores high on both scales and Japan scores low (Nau 2003, 225-226). This means, according to the scale, China is a nondemocratic state and will be much more willing to use force internally than Japan. As a result, this misperception could lead to a security dilemma. North Korea's nuclear program and missile ambition further fueled Japanese mistrust of non-democracies (Hughes 2004, 87-90). If a relatively poor country such as North Korea was threatening, then they should also be aware of China as a powerful non-democratic state.

The perceived support for strengthening national security, such as the joint-development of TMD and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance, by the Japanese public, has increased since the mid-1990s because of the emergence of various security challenges. The public support of Pacifism has been quite strong. For example, it is believed the discussion on TMD was limited between Japanese ministries before North Korean's launch in August 1998; and support from the public only came after the 1998 Taepodong-1 test-launch (Kamiya 2003; Medeiros 2001). Therefore, the 1998 North Korea Taepodong-1 launch helped shift public opinion to support Japan's participation in the missile defense project (Duan 2000). The Japanese public also voiced their opinion for Koizumi's government to take a harsher approach to North Korea, mainly due to North Korea's new adventure on the nuclear program and its abduction of Japanese citizens. Thus, Koizumi took those demands into account and took a harsher position against North Korea (Kamiya 2003).

It is believed that public opinion has had significant influence over the Japanese government and its position on security issues. It is argued that Japanese

foreign policy has been increasingly affected by the public opinion, which is often under the influence of media and social interest groups (Ni 2002, 74). Also, public opinions have created social norms that Japanese politicians and policy makers “invoke and appeal to.” The media also “express[es] and [...] interpret[s] public opinions [...] creating a political reality that politician[s] and bureaucrats, including leading members of the police and the SDF, cannot neglect” (Katzenstein 1996, 39). Katzenstein suggests that the domestic factor within Japan carries more weight on its security policy than the international balance of power (Katzenstein 1996, 204-205); he also predicted that the revision of the Peace Constitution, bidding for UNSC permanent membership and participation of the PKO in “normal military terms,” would not be urgent issues that needed to be discussed with great seriousness in near future, without dramatic incidents taking place (Katzenstein 1996, 205). However, as he made this prediction in a 1996 volume, there were indeed a series of dramatic incidents; such as the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile which flew over Japanese territorial waters, the 9/11 attacks, and the 2005 anti-Japanese movement in China. In fact, it is evident that Japan’s attitude on participating in security affairs, whether on a regional or global level, has changed. The phraseology used in three important security related acts, passed by the Diet – the International Peace Cooperation Act (1992), the Anti-Terrorism Special Act (2001), and The Iraqi Special Act (2003) – show active involvement from merely joining a UN effort “actively” in International Peace Cooperation Act to “actively and by Japan’s own initiative” in Anti-Terrorism Special Act and eventually to “by Japan’s own initiative and actively” in The Iraqi Special Act. The changes in phraseology show Japan is actively taking a large security role and take it not because of United States pressure (Yamamoto 2007, 139).

Although Japanese public support for a larger security role and strengthening the state's defense is larger, as discussed above, pacifism among the society is a considerable force which Japanese decision-makers cannot ignore. It can be seen that the Japanese public are reluctant to support security actions which are not directly related to regional territories. The public opinion survey, completed by "Yomiuri Shimbun," discovered that 37% of respondents supported the Surrounding Areas Act while 43% opposed it before it passed in 1999. After the Act passed, 33% said it would be good for Japanese security, 28% were worried it could be seen as threatening, and 35% were in between (Yamamoto 2007, 142). It should be noted that the Surrounding Areas Act could pave a way for Japan to support the U.S. in cases where this is needed.

The percentage of people who gave their support for the 2003 Iraqi Special Act were more or less the same as those against; the Nikki Telecom poll showed 43% of respondents supported the act while 41% opposed it before the bill passed. Opinions were reversed after the Diet passed the act, and the Broadcast Studies and Research showed there were 43% of respondents in favor of the act and 48% against it, after the act had passed (Yamamoto 2007, 143).

On the other hand, acts that have more direct relevance to Japanese homeland security would gain wider support. The Anti-Terrorism Act after the 9/11 attacks had 51% of respondents supporting it with only 29% against before it passed, as a "Asahi Shimbun" poll showed. The support remained quite high after the act was passed, with 49% of respondents in favor and 37% against, recorded in a survey by the same news agency (Yamamoto 2007, 143). Even though the geographical scope of the Anti-Terrorism Act included foreign countries, the reason for wider support of the Act could have been from a genuine fear of terrorism, and from the memory of the

1995 Aum Shinirikyo cult attack on the Tokyo Subway with sarin gas, the related activities of the cult discovered later, and earlier activities of the Japanese Red Army (Katzenstein 2007, 76-77, 141-142; Hughes 2004, 202). The quick action taken by Japan was also an expression to show solidarity with the U.S. alliance, the main pillar of Japan's security (Hughes 2004, 202). As a result, the Japanese public might have considered this act to have significant relevancy to Japanese security. However, after several years of the original Anti-Terrorism Special Act being passed, a recent survey suggests that the number of supporters for the renewal or replacing of it has decreased. When asked whether supporting the new bill to support the Anti-Terrorism Act, in late 2007, 36% supported it while 45% opposed the bill (Asahi Shimbun 2007). Furthermore, in August 2008, 50% stated that deployment of the SDF in the Indian Ocean, to support anti-terrorism operations under the Anti-Terrorism Act were unnecessary, with only 37% stating there was such a need (Asahi Shimbun 2008). Another poll, conducted in 2007, also showed 53% opposing the extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Act (Nikki Shimbun 2007).

Further legislation which gained wider supporter was the Armed Attack Act, an act that provided a legal basis for the SDF to react to armed attack or anticipated armed attack (Matsui 2008). The geographic scope of the 2003 Armed Attack Act is also restricted to Japanese territory; the support of this act was a large majority of 66% who thought the act was necessary, while only 21% considered there to be little need for such an act to be passed in the Diet. The support for this act remained quite high after it passed, with 56% in support and 30% against; both polls were carried out by Broadcast Studies and Research (Yamamoto 2007, 143). From the above illustration, it is apparent that the Japanese public were quite reluctant to give support for their country to take a larger security role in activities which do not have a direct

relation to their homeland security. However, they are more willing to support security strengthening measures with more relevancy to the perceived security interests of Japan.

As for the revision of the Japanese Constitution, public opinion may reveal a number of attitudes on this issue. First, it is true that revisions to the constitution are supported by a certain proportion of the Japanese public. In a poll conducted by “Nikkei Shimbun” in April 2005, 54% of 1,553 respondents supported the revision of the Constitution, while 29% thought it should remain the same. If asked “What do you think about the characterization of the Self Defense Force under the Constitution?” 26% of all respondents said it should be mentioned in the Constitution as “Self-Defense Force,” 20% said it should be called the “Self-Defense Army” to clarify that it is military, and 24% said it should not be mentioned in the Constitution. Also, 10% said the SDF should be abolished or reduced in size (Nikkiei Shimbun 2005). It should be noted that the 1947 Constitution does not use the words “Self-Defense Force,” and Article 9 states that Japan should not maintain any armed forces. Another poll carried out by “Yomiuri Shimbun” in February 2007 also showed that 46.2% believed it should be amended, outnumbering 39.1% opposing the amendment. However, the poll included some information from a 2006 poll which suggested 80% of respondents wanted the “renouncement of war” clause, in Constitution Article 9, not to be amended; with 54% believing the clause about “absence of military power” should remain the same (Yomiuri Shimbun 2007). “Asahi Shimbun” also found that 40% of 1,807 respondents supported the national referendum bill, which was part of the procedure of Constitutional change, while 37% opposed it in an April 2007 poll. It was also found that a majority of the Japanese (78%) considered Article 9 of the current Constitution helped Japan with a

peaceful post-war environment, and 58% valued it as contributing to the “peace and stability of East Asia.” Also, 56% agreed to write SDF into the constitution, but 70% disagreed to rename it the Self-Defense Army. 64% allowed overseas deployment if armed force was not used; with 49% opposing changes to Article 9 of the Constitution and 58% said the whole of it should be revised. The major reason for those opposing changes to the Constitution was because “there is a danger that Article 9 might be changed” and the main reason of agreeing to constitutional revision was “to include new rights and institutions” (Asahi Shimbun 2007). In April 2007, in a “Nikkei Shimbun” poll, over half of the respondents (51%) supported a revision of the Constitution, with the reason that “it is necessary to incorporate new ideas;” while 35% suggested it should be untouched, with the main reason of opposing the revision being that “The revision of the constitution may trigger a change on the pacifism” (Nikkei Shimbun 2007). However, support slightly decreased in March 2008, with only 42% supporting and those opposing changes once again succeeded with 43.1%. An overwhelming majority opposed revising the Article 9 clause of “the renunciation of war” and “armed forces and war potential will not be maintained,” with 81.6% and 54.5% opposing it respectively (Nikkei Shimbun 2008). Finally, the percentage of those supporting revisions to the Constitution and those opposing it were 43% and 48% respectively, calculated in another poll in April 2008 (Nikkei Shimbun 2008). All of the above data identifies two clear trends; the supporting rate for revisions of the Constitution has stayed around or just below half. This shows that the Japanese public have been divided over this issue, with the highest proportion of revision support seen in the 2005 results when Sino-Japanese relations were almost at their lowest point; however, there is no clear correlation between these two issues. The second finding shows that

the majority of Japanese individuals consider Article 9 of the Constitution to be good for peace and overwhelmingly oppose any amendment, showing that pacifism is still a strong belief.

With several decades of Pacifist tradition, the Japanese public may not be aware that measures considered to strengthen their security, such as joining TMD or demanding better international standing, or bidding for a UNSC permanent seat, would touch the nerves of China. First, it is suggested that it would be impossible for Japan to be “the Switzerland of Asia” (Katzenstein 1996, 208), as self-defensive measures taken by Japan will be viewed as offensive by others, and could be considered as steps toward “autonomous military strategy.” It may be hard for the Japanese public to understand why China is so sensitive to these defensive measures and policies, and consider their country to be legitimate in deploying such measures, as well as failing to understand why China cannot understand they do not harbor any malign intentions. In turn, however, they may be suspicious over the intentions behind Chinese opposition. Second, because a seat on the UNSC is recognition of a state’s great power status (Katzenstein 1996, 207), Japan considers it a reasonable bid due to the contributions it has made to the UN. Therefore, Japan views China’s opposition as unreasonable, as they believe China should have acknowledged that permanent membership of the UNSC would have no affect on mutual peace. In short, the Japanese public consider China’s assertive behavior against Japan as unreasonable because China should not fear a state in which pacifism has been a major for belief several decades unless they have some malign and believe China is using history and related matters as an excuse.

The results of figure 5 being added to the framework are shown in figure 1.

Figure 7. Interaction between Japanese public identities, norms, national interests, and government policies.

4.1.1.3 The formation and intensifying of the security dilemma

The interaction between key elements of figures 4 and 5 are combined to explain the formation of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations. From these findings, there is no clear indication that either side has malign intentions toward the other.

First, both sides believe what they are doing is necessary to defend their own interests. Japan has expressed more concern over its national security since the late

1990s due to the North Korea Threat and uncertainty over China's intentions. They have also showed stronger support towards playing a larger role in international security activities (Chanlett-Avery 2008, 13-14). For example, the Japanese public considers it legitimate for them to defend themselves by enhancing their defense systems to be ready for potential threats. They have done this by joining TMD and maintaining the security of important sea lanes as manifested by increased maritime patrol, which is in alliance with the United States. Japan also considers its bid for a UNSC permanent seat as a right and just demand for their contributions to the UN. However, many of these actions are perceived by the Chinese public to be a sign of Japan's resurgence to become a great military power and the rebirth of militarism.

On the other hand, the Chinese public considers Japan as a potentially dangerous and hostile country in the long run, which means they do not want to compromise on the East Sea issue and will continue to press on the historical issues. Although the Chinese government may want to take a more cooperative approach in some issues, they will need to respond to public opinion as part of the sources of regime legitimacy which come from regime ability to maintain the continuing rise of the Chinese. They will need to earn international respect for China and safeguard the public's perceived interest, such as pressure to develop the East China Sea oil gas field, put pressure over history issues, and fight for the sovereignty of the Diaoyu\Senkuka Islands and Taiwan. As a result, more assertive and unfriendly gestures will arise. The increase of maritime activities are the action taken to declare those regions as China's territories, and the incursion into Japanese territory for gathering intelligence on Japanese and U.S. military capacities, in order for China to prepare for any potential conflict with them over Taiwan and other disputed issues. The criticism of Japan's attitude on history is to respond to the dissatisfaction shown

by the Chinese public over Japanese's disrespect to what they did in the war. However, it does not seem that the Chinese government has other ambitions towards Japan besides safeguarding its core perceived interests. Yet, these activities are perceived by Japan as unfriendly and hostile; for example, China's incursions are not justifiable in the eyes of the Japanese, as the Peace Constitution is considered more than enough to show that Japan is a pacific country, and thus China's provoking behavior will only yield suspicion and tension.

In short, the mutual suspicion and fear of both states is the result of "irresolvable uncertainty," namely what the other state does as being contradictory to what they proclaim; and the actions taken by the other seem to be malign, as those actions are provoking or damaging to the other country's core interests such as territorial integrity (for China and Japan), undisturbed import of essential resources (for Japan), homeland security (for Japan), and respect for oneself (for China). While political leaders of both states often claiming to be friendly and benevolent toward the other.

As a result, both leaders face a "dilemma of policy choices." Japan's leaders face a choice between increasing defense which triggers suspicion from China through an enlargement of their security cooperation, participation in international security activities, and upgrading military size and quality; or, keeping the defense posture as it is but risking potential hostility from North Korea and damage to many of its national interests, should China turn out to be much more aggressive than was first thought. For China, its leaders face a dilemma of taking aggressive and unfriendly policies or gestures but with increased regional suspicion, mistrust and risk of military rivalry or conflict; or losing legitimacy and popularity with the Chinese people by maintaining a more compromising and cooperative stance toward

Japan.

However, the perceived unfriendly actions and behavior from both sides would further fuel resentment, suspicion and fear of one another for both states' public. Allowing each to demand the their own government take even more provoking or uncompromising responses will ignite a cycle that will intensify the security dilemma.

It can be seen that, in the three conditions there is “no clear malign intentions” presented; “the mutual irresolvable uncertainty” for both sides and “the dilemma in policy choice” for both policy-makers, are present in Sino-Japanese relations. The current Sino-Japanese relations can, therefore, be understood as a security dilemma, with the general public as a one of the main driving forces.

The following figure is an illustration of how the security dilemma would intensify (Figure 8).

4.1.2 Mitigation of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations

Since the key source of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations is the public, other actors are restricted or respond to public opinion and views, at least to a certain extent. The key to mitigate or prevent the security dilemma is to work on the perception of the public.

From the Chinese perspective, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has, to some extent, been a “bottle cap” for Japanese military buildup; however, this view has become obsolete and formed an “egg shell” type function; something which is protected by the U.S. military umbrella when developing into a great military great power (Christensen 1999, 30-31, 34). The above data has shown that pacifism is still strong among the Japanese public, which means that the Japanese people will not accept full-scale security independence in the near future. However, it is believed that the Chinese are sensitive to any content changes of this alliance (Christensen 1999, 34-35). How long the Chinese will feel assured by this alliance, which is supposed to contain the growth of Japan’s military, is unknown. And, it has been witnessed in recent years that security related activities have been ill-received by China. Therefore, I would argue that the U.S., as a factor to stabilize the region’s security, is still somehow effective; but that the U.S., as a stabilizing factor, should not be depended on in the long-term, as it will not be of any great help in the threat perception of the Chinese.

This analysis also suggests that confidence building measures (CBMs) between the Chinese and Japanese leadership and military will help lessen the security dilemma. Indeed, measures, including military exchange and the establishment of hotline for defense issues, will help improve understanding and trust between the two nations (Takeda 2007, 24-25). However, how far these high level

contacts will contribute in lessening the security dilemma is debatable, as is exemplified by the Chinese public's expressed opposition and resentment to a visit by a Japanese destroyer (to Chinese territorial waters) in June 2008. This was after Chinese President Hu visited Japan as a good-will gesture; however, such a visit had to be kept relatively low profile (French 2008). It is apparent that, if substantial improvements between the security relations of China and Japan are to be achieved, then it will take much more than simply conducting high-level interactions.

This thesis has identified that the general public is an important aspect which contribute to the security dilemma between the two countries. For the high-level measures to enjoy their full effect, the deep-rooted mistrust, suspicion and resentment will need to be worked out, alongside other measures conducted at the civilian level.

According to the information presented above, people who have direct contact with one another will hold more objective or friendly attitudes towards each other. Therefore, enhancing the depth and frequency of interaction can be an important step toward eliminating mutual suspicion between the Chinese and Japanese. Using the data from all three CASS surveys, covering Chinese public opinion on Japan, the effect is shown as follows.

Group having unfriendly feelings to Japan

Year	2002	2004	2006
Unfriendly to Japan (%)			
Whole Sample	43.3	53.6	52.9
Understand Japanese language & have interaction with Japan	16.2	18.8	17.3/23.6*
Chinese residing in Japan	11.5	20	12.6

*the option "Can speak Japanese & have interaction with Japan" was further divided into two options "Can speak Japanese" and "have interaction with Japan" in 2006, the number shown represents percentage of "can speak Japanese / have interaction with Japan" respectively

It can be seen from the above table that those groups who have a better ability to understand Japan (by knowing the Japanese language) and closer contact with Japan (by living in Japan) tend to have less negative feelings toward Japan. Also, it seems that these growing interactions will have positive improvements over understanding; closer interaction with each other may help the public to receive first-hand experience, rather than through biased portrayals by the media. Further broadening of civilian exchange channels, such as student exchange and tourists group, may help this aspect in the long-term, and thus helping positive feelings to increase. However, there are preconditions for this improvement to take full effect. Wan shows that the overall atmosphere of having negative views toward Japan in China would make those with good feelings toward Japan hesitant to promote this. Something which would need to be worked towards, because in order for them to express their opinions more freely, individuals will need to be free from a fear of being criticized. The media should take partial responsibility for the creation of this negative atmosphere, through past negative reports on Japan-related issues (Wan 2006, 78, 79). In order to introduce a cycle of positive feeling, existing prejudices and biases will need to be reduced. And, as Wan also points out, negative views in one country would reinforce negativity in the other (Wan 2006, 72). This is when the Japanese affinity to China has seen a recent decline in October 2005 (Government of Japan's Cabinet Office 2008); something believed to be as a result of the anti-Japanese mass movement earlier and increasing worries over China as a military threat (Genron-NPO 2007; Lee 2007, 136).

The Chinese and Japanese media will need to offer a more balanced view on the other country, if a positive effect of growing of people-to-people interactions is to materialize. Preventing biased views such as the portrayal of Chinese citizens as a major source of crime by the Japanese media, or overly stressing Japanese mistreatment to the Chinese, or misbehavior in China by the Chinese media, will need to be reduced (Wan 2006, 72). Education is another important institution too; thus, if any fundamental change of long-term impression of people towards the other country, just as the media, schools should provide a more balanced view on the history and portrayal of the other country, which will be an effective way to foster a friendlier atmosphere between the two countries.

Another way to create a more positive general atmosphere will be to foster a more balanced view on each other through positive symbolic diplomatic actions by the respective leaders. This approach was used by German and French leaders in steps toward reconciliation after World War Two. President De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, chose Reim Cathedral, a spot of countless Franco-German conflicts, as the location of a ceremony where they appear together. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl's friendship ceremony at Verdun, a famous battlefield of World War One, was photographed and has become a historical moment of Franco-German reconciliation (Lind 2008, 191). Therefore, symbolic actions at a symbolic location can show commitment and dedication of both leaders, to "reconciliation and cooperation" (Lind 2008, 191). Despite this, Jennifer Lind claims that this approach may not be as useful in Sino-Japanese relations because there is no strong incentive for both sides to do so (Lind 2008, 193-194). However, I would argue that this approach does have some use in the improvement of relations. In fact, there are a number of incentives, such as the Chinese leadership wanting

freedom of choice over foreign policies, and not to be hijacked by the emotional anti-Japanese sentiment of the Chinese public – something which will damage long-term Chinese development and its international image. While the Japanese government does not want an increasingly strong China to be an enemy in the future. Such a symbolic location could be a historical battlefield such as the Marco-Polo Bridge, and the leaders involved would be should be the top leader of both states: the President of China and Japan's Prime Minister. Such a high profile reconciliation would show that both states are dedicated to building mutual trust, and will also show they do not consider one another a threat. This would hopefully allow both sets of public to forgive past actions and For both states' public, as the Chinese public might consider Japan has fully reflected its past wrongdoings and the Japan public would consider China has let the past passed and fully accept this symbolic action as the final apology, lessening the worry of China showing the "history card" in the future.

Moreover, conditions for such an action may not be present for now because the overall impression of both states' public is negative. In fact, other strategies such as "costly signaling" mentioned earlier (Kydd 2003) – a tactic used by a state leader to initiate reciprocity in order to reduce tension and develop trust – would face opposition from the public as well. However, even though the public in both states, especially the Chinese public, would currently oppose their leader to do this for now, if the portrayal of the other state becomes more balanced, then the overall atmosphere will improve over time.

Additionally, the Chinese government should refrain from continually asking the Japanese for an apology, if it wants to create an atmosphere for reconciliation; as this would cause a backlash in Japan (Lind 2008, 181-186). Even though such a

backlash would be created by a small group of right-wing conservatives, its actions would further fuel anger toward the Chinese, and their hostile attitude would scare off future pro-contribution or pro-reconciliation politicians to take further step to repair the relations. Therefore, symbolic action and costly signaling could be the final blow to this mutual distrust and suspicion. By successfully eliminating mutual distrust and suspicion, it is natural that people will no longer see the other state as a threat. If the effect of this approach is not as effective as it is expected, it should at least prevent the current threat perception of both states' public to make the security dilemma escalating.

5. Conclusion

This thesis attempted to analyze current relations between China and Japan using the security dilemma concept.

The traditional realist perspective of international relations may consider the a change in material capabilities such as an increase military strength, would trigger the security dilemma. However, if we apply the constructivist approach to the analysis, it will take more than material capabilities to trigger a security dilemma. For example, the Japanese government may not be afraid of the United States military, even with the U.S. having a garrison on Japanese soil and U.S. weapons becoming increasingly advanced. China, despite a growing military strength, is still inferior in terms of military technology compared to the U.S. and Japan. Because the constructivist school considers merely examining material capabilities as not enough to understand overall security, this thesis has attempted to examine various sub-state actors which have threatened the perception of the other state; in order to identify whether a security dilemma exists and how it operates.

After exploring the threat perception of selected sub-state actors, including the general public, military (and ministry of defense), academics, politicians and ruling elite, and the younger generation, several groups have shown fear, dislike or suspicion of the other country. The general public was chosen as a central group for analysis, because this group is one which has the most concrete data to support fears on the other state's security intentions. However, it would be too arbitrary to suggest that the threat perception of the general public is the only source of the security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations. Which is not to say that other actors' threat perceptions are completely under the influence of the general public. However, because it is this group which has the most evidence identifying the fear, it is considered reasonable to use this group as central unit; in an effort to understand the

interaction between different sub-state actors, while also avoiding speculation.

By applying the general public as the main unit of analysis over norms, identities, interests and policy, proposed by Jepperson Katzenstein and Wendt (1996, 53), we can identify that norms, interests and identities of the general public may help shape the state's policies; and therefore, the state's policies might thus reshape the general public's norms, interests and identities in return. However, this is also not to say that the general public will dictate government policies. However, even in a non-western democratic state such as China, the government seems to appeal to public demand to some extent, in order to maintain popularity; especially where there is more domestic unrest and a decline of ideologies in recent years. Also, Japan, as a democratic state, has public opinion which could bear more weight in influencing government decision-making.

The second stage of the analysis was to analyze public opinion, identities and interests against both government's policies, forming these in a framework of the codetermination of institutions, proposed by Wendt (1992, 406). By using this framework, we can see how mutual suspicion and fear is generated and heightened.

Returning to the main question of this research, is there a security dilemma in Sino-Japanese relations? The research findings indicated there is a security dilemma, as relations between China and Japan show three characteristics of a security dilemma, according to the definition used in this thesis (Collins 1997, 23-24).

Sino-Japanese relations show the three conditions proposed by Alan Collins. First, no involved states have explicitly expressed or shown evidence of aggressive intention; they simply want to safeguard what they perceived to be their rightful interests. For example, some Chinese actors are afraid of the possible Japanese involvement in Taiwan, while the Japanese side is worried over the growing military

strength of China and its potential danger to their security; this is while neither side has shown obvious territorial ambition towards the other. Second, even though both sides, under their current threat perception, seem to be suspicious toward the other's future intentions, both states are quite attentive to any change of the other's military strength and defensive policies. This means that policy-makers in both states face a dilemma in policy options. As China's leadership is now facing a choice between a domestically popular hard line approach or an internationally popular and moderate approach; both choices are not without their shortcomings. While Japan will need to choose between strengthening its defensive posture, which will alert China or keep its current defensive strength and policy but fail to adopt a security challenge, such as a nuclear threat by North Korea. Therefore, security relations between China and Japan can be described as a security dilemma.

As for the mitigation of the security dilemma, one important prerequisite is to create a friendlier attitude of the public toward the other state, before carrying out other measures such as costly signaling. This is because the overall atmosphere among people in both states is still suspicions and will affect such actions by each state. One important way to improve this overall atmosphere would be a symbolic reconciliation by the state leaders; and, a long term measure would be through the media and the educational system to provide a more balanced view on the other state. Only after the overall attitude of people has changed will the mutual trust be increased.

This research concludes that, even though a security dilemma exists, it can be mitigated, at least to some extent; provided that both states have the determination. It is not suggested this will be easy however; nor will the government and leaders currently have the willingness to do so in current times. In fact, even if the leaders

have the willingness, domestic politics will have a determining factor on any actions. What this research suggests is a long-term effort which will take significant effort and time to materialize. The important factor of this research is that the security dilemma should not be viewed as a fatalistic result of international politics; rather, if this was explored through another perspective, then different results could be reached.

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