Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggesting that intentionality ascription can be affected by moral factors. I argue that the explanation for these phenomena lies in the workings of a tacit moral judgment mechanism, capable under certain circumstances of altering normal intentionality ascriptions. This view contrasts with that of Knobe (), who argues that the findings show that the concept of intentional action invokes evaluative notions. I discuss and reject possible objections to the moral mechanism view, and offer arguments supporting the model over Knobe’s account on grounds of simplicity and plausibility.
Copyright © 2008 The Author
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Nado, J. E. (2008). Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4), 709-731. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axn035