Title

Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

The Journal of Industrial Economics

Publication Date

12-1-1996

Volume

44

Issue

4

First Page

443

Last Page

449

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing

Abstract

Unlike other types of licensing agreements such as those with output restrictions market division clauses, or output royalties, licensing contracts with only a fixed-fee have been perceived as having no anticompetitive consequences. This paper illustrates that fixed-fee licensing may facilitate collusion by enhancing the lecensee's ability to credibly punish deviations from the collusive outcome on the part of the licenser. Antitrust implications of the result and potential ways of detecting collusion-motivated licenses are discussed.

DOI

10.2307/2950525

E-ISSN

00211821

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 1996 Blackwell Publishing.

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Lin, P. (1996). Fixed-fee liscensing of innovations and collusion. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 44(4), 443-449. doi: 10.2307/2950525

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