Title

Stable cartel with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Keio Economic studies

Publication Date

10-1-1999

Volume

36

Issue

2

First Page

1

Last Page

10

Publisher

Keio Economic Society, Keio University

Keywords

Stable cartel, Stackelberg quantity leader, Cournot fringe

Abstract

We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general demand and cost conditions. We also compare by means of numerical examples the size of stable cartels in our model with that in the price leadership model of d'Aspremont et al.

Print ISSN

00229709

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 1999 Keio Economic Society.

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

Konishi, H., & Lin, P. (1999). Stable cartel with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly. Keio Economic studies, 36(2), 1-10. Retrieved from http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AA00260492-19990002-0001

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