Title

绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性

Alternative Title

Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

上海交通大学学报 = Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

Publication Date

3-1-2004

Volume

38

Issue

3

First Page

463

Last Page

465

Keywords

动态博弈, 动态一致性, 重复博弈, 供应链, Dynamic consistence, Dynamic game, Repeated games, Supply chain

Abstract

以博弈理论为工具,构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明,在单阶段博弈中,受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料,从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中,长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用,只要贴现因子满足一定条件,供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言,最终实现经济与环保的"双赢"。

The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.

DOI

10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034

Print ISSN

10062467

Funding Information

国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70172002)。 {70172002}

Publisher Statement

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

陈杰、屠梅曾、孙大宁 (2004)。绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性。《上海交通大学学报》,38(3),463-465。doi: 10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034

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