Title

Trade wars and the slump

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

European Review of Economic History

Publication Date

4-1-2007

Volume

11

Issue

1

First Page

73

Last Page

98

Abstract

Simulated optimum tariff policies to achieve plausible government targets show objective reasons for the failure of international trade cooperation during the Slump of 1929 to 1933. For the largest players, the US and UK, benefits from foreign cooperation were small or negative. France and Germany would have been the principal beneficiaries of international cooperative policies. Since cooperation on one issue, tariffs, was difficult, cooperation on many - through the cross-issue bargaining attempted at the 1933 London Conference- was well nigh impossible. Optimum coordination across policy instruments within one country, on the other hand, would have yielded high returns for policy. A corollary is that lack of internal coordination (poor domestic policies) was a more important cause of the Great Depression than failure to harmonise policies internationally.

DOI

10.1017/S1361491606001882

Print ISSN

13614916

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2007 Cambridge University Press. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

Foreman-Peck, J., Hallett, A. H., & Ma, Y. (2007). Trade wars and the slump. European Review of Economic History, 11(1), 73-98. doi: 10.1017/S1361491606001882

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