Extensive philosophical agreement and progress

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Metaphilosophy

Publication Date

1-1-2017

Volume

48

Issue

1-2

First Page

47

Last Page

57

Publisher

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Keywords

agreement, disagreement, expertise, metaphilosophy, philosophical progress, scientific progress

Abstract

This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, it comments on the significance of the agreement and (potential) progress.

DOI

10.1111/meta.12227

Print ISSN

00261068

E-ISSN

14679973

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2017 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

Frances, B. (2017). Extensive philosophical agreement and progress. Metaphilosophy, 48(1-2), 47-57. doi: 10.1111/meta.12227

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