Title

Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel

Publication Date

6-1-2017

Volume

45

Issue

2

First Page

717

Last Page

734

Publisher

Springer Netherlands

Keywords

Dispositions, Metasemantics, Philosophy of language

Abstract

In previous work (Johnson & Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.

DOI

10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1

Print ISSN

00483893

E-ISSN

15749274

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Johnson, M., & Nado, J. (2017). Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics: A reply to Andow. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 45(2), 717-734. doi: 10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1

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