Title

Managing careers in organizations

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Labor Economics

Publication Date

1-1-2018

Volume

36

Issue

1

First Page

197

Last Page

252

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Abstract

Firms’ organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to usepromotion-basedincentives.Wedevelopa frameworkfor identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences.We show that firms manage workers’ careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers’ careers.

DOI

10.1086/693871

Print ISSN

0734306X

E-ISSN

15375307

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Ke, R., Li, J., & Powell, M. (2018). Managing careers in organizations. Journal of Labor Economics, 36(1), 197-252. doi: 10.1086/693871

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