Against truth
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Erkenntnis
Publication Date
2-1-2014
Volume
79
Issue
1
First Page
147
Last Page
164
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Abstract
I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept.
DOI
10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y
Print ISSN
01650106
E-ISSN
15728420
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Asay, J. (2014). Against Truth. Erkenntnis, 79(1), 147-164. doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y