Title

Resolving China's island disputes : a two-level game analysis

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Chinese Political Science

Publication Date

4-1-2007

Volume

12

Issue

1

First Page

49

Last Page

70

Keywords

Diaoyu/Senkaku, Zhenbao/Damansky, island disputes, two-level games, nationalism

Abstract

Although territorial disputes have been much studied, the application of “two-level game” analysis in peace research and conflict resolution is still relatively unexplored. In this essay, I seek to use the analytical propositions derived from this “two-level game” bargaining framework to explain the success, failure, or partial resolution of sovereignty negotiations over China’s island claims to the disputed islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Amur/Ussuri rivers, and South China Sea. This essay will focus on the interaction between governments and domestic nationalist groups, the role of institutions, and the strategies of negotiators to explain the development of the territorial disputes. I will evaluate how different political and social preferences, historical memories, economic priorities, side payments, and institutional constraints affect inter-state bargaining behavior and relations between the government and different segments of society. Basically, I am interested in finding out what significant roles national, sub-national and transnational actors can and do play in aggravating, minimizing, terminating or preventing conflicts over island claims involving China.

DOI

10.1007/s11366-007-9001-7

Print ISSN

10806954

E-ISSN

18746357

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2007, Journal of Chinese Political Science

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Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Chung, C.-P. (2007). Resolving China’s island disputes: A two-level game analysis. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12(1), 49-70. doi: 10.1007/s11366-007-9001-7