Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophers' Imprint

Publication Date

11-2016

Volume

16

Issue

19

First Page

1

Last Page

24

Publisher

University of Michigan * Library

Abstract

Modal realists face a puzzle. For modal realism to be justified, modal realists need to be able to give a successful reduction of modality. A simple argument, however, appears to show that the reduction they propose fails. In order to defend the claim that modal realism is justified, modal realists therefore need to either show that this argument fails, or show that modal realists can give another reduction of modality that is successful. I argue that modal realists cannot do either of these things and that, as a result, modal realism is unjustified and should be rejected.

E-ISSN

1533628X

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2016 Dan Marshall. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Marshall, D. (2016). A puzzle for modal realism. Philosophers' Imprint, 16(19), 1-24.

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Philosophy Commons

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