Title

Likelihood and consilience : on Forster’s counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophy of Science

Publication Date

12-2015

Volume

82

Issue

5

First Page

930

Last Page

940

Publisher

University of Chicago Press

Abstract

Forster presented some interesting examples having to do with distinguishing the direction of causal influence between two variables, which he argued are counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. In this article, we refute Forster’s arguments by carefully examining one of the alleged counterexamples. We argue that the example is not convincing as it relies on dubious intuitions that likelihoodists have forcefully criticized. More important, we show that contrary to Forster’s contention, the consilience-based methodology he favored is accountable within the framework of the likelihood theory of evidence.

DOI

10.1086/683342

Print ISSN

00318248

E-ISSN

1539767X

Funding Information

This research was supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong under the General Research Fund LU342213. {LU342213}

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Additional Information

Paper presented at the Meeting of the Philosophy-of-Science-Association (PSA), Nov 06-09, 2014, Chicago, Illinois.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

Zhang, J. & Zhang, K. (2015). Likelihood and consilience: on Forster’s counterexamples to the likelihood theory of evidence. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 930-940. doi: 10.1086/683342

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