Title

Institutional ownership stability and risk taking : evidence from the life–health insurance industry

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Publication Date

9-2011

Volume

78

Issue

3

First Page

609

Last Page

641

Publisher

American Risk and Insurance Association

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main results are obtained. First, stable institutional ownership of is associated with lower total risk of LH insurers, supporting the prudent-man law hypothesis. Second, when investors are sorted in terms of stringency of the prudent-man restrictions, their negative effect on risk holds for all, except insurance companies, as owners of LH insurers. Third, large institutional owners do not raise the riskiness of the investee-firms, as proposed by the large shareholder hypothesis. Regulatory implications are drawn.

DOI

10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01427.x

Print ISSN

15396975

E-ISSN

00224367

Funding Information

Financial support from the Networks Financial Institute at Scott College of Business at Indiana State University and the Shanghai Pujiang Talent Fund Program.

Publisher Statement

Copyright © The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2011

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Additional Information

This article was presented at the ARIA meetings 2009 in Providence, Rhode Island.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Cheng, J., Elyasiani, E., & Jia, J. (2011). Institutional ownership stability and risk taking: Evidence from the life-health insurance industry. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(3), 609-641. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2011.01427.x