Title

Knowledge is not enough

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Publication Date

1-15-2017

Volume

Advance online publication

Publisher

Routledge

Keywords

experimental philosophy, intuition, metaphilosophy

Abstract

Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.

DOI

10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959

Print ISSN

00048402

E-ISSN

14716828

Funding Information

The work described in this paper was fully supported by a Grant from the Research Grants Council ofthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU 359613).

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2017 Routledge. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Nado, J. (2017). Knowledge is not enough. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Advance online publication. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1273959