The verdictive organization of desire
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Publication Date
1-9-2017
Volume
47
Issue
5
First Page
589
Last Page
612
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Keywords
Desires, practical reason, practical rationality, self-knowledge, Humean theory of reasons
Abstract
Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than a question about what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. The paper argues that one’s judgment about one wants most will sometimes play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants, and so making itself true.
DOI
10.1080/00455091.2016.1278149
Print ISSN
00455091
E-ISSN
19110820
Funding Information
This work was supported by Research Grants Council of Hong Kong SAR, China [Grant Number LU342612, ‘Autonomy as Self-Interpretation’]. {LU342612}
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2017). The verdictive organization of desire. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47(5), 589-612. doi: 10.1080/00455091.2016.1278149