Title

How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Philosophical Psychology

Publication Date

2016

Volume

29

Issue

5

First Page

732

Last Page

742

Publisher

Routledge

Keywords

Action, belief, degrees of belief, dispositionalism, in-between belief, shifting

Abstract

People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.

DOI

10.1080/09515089.2016.1146667

Print ISSN

09515089

E-ISSN

1465394X

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Rowbottom, D. P. (2016). How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs. Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 732-742. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1146667