How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophical Psychology
Publication Date
2016
Volume
29
Issue
5
First Page
732
Last Page
742
Publisher
Routledge
Keywords
Action, belief, degrees of belief, dispositionalism, in-between belief, shifting
Abstract
People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions (such as trembling in fear when their death becomes an imminent possibility, despite earlier professing that “Death is not bad!”). But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief (or degrees of confidence) may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
DOI
10.1080/09515089.2016.1146667
Print ISSN
09515089
E-ISSN
1465394X
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. P. (2016). How might degrees of belief shift? On action conflicting with professed beliefs. Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 732-742. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1146667