Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives : observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values
Advance online publication
Unconceived alternatives, Kyle Stanford, Anti-Realism, Science, Scientific realism, Scientific progress, Underdetermination of theories by evidence
Stanford’s argument against scientific realism focuses on theories, just as many earlier arguments from inconceivability have. However, there are possible arguments against scientific realism involving unconceived (or inconceivable) entities of different types: observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. This paper charts such arguments. In combination, they present the strongest challenge yet to scientific realism.
This paper was supported by: the Research Grants Council, Hong Kong (‘The Instrument of Science’, Humanities and Social Sciences Prestigious Fellowship); and also by the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University, in association with the European Union (COFUND Senior Research Fellowship).
Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Rowbottom, D.P. (2016). Extending the argument from unconceived alternatives: Observations, models, predictions, explanations, methods, instruments, experiments, and values. Synthese. Advance online publication, 1-13. doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1132-y