Title

Legitimate deficit : competitive bidding in a residual and semi-democratic welfare society

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations

Publication Date

2014

Volume

25

Issue

5

First Page

1214

Last Page

1234

Publisher

Springer New York LLC

Keywords

Competitive bidding, Policy instrument, Policy network, Welfare NGOs, Hong Kong

Abstract

Competitive bidding for public subsidy allocation for welfare services has been widely applied in established welfare states since the 1980s. Studies conducted in these countries have inclined to understand competitive bidding as a financing initiative and use an array of “failure theories” to explain its challenges and failures. In contrast to these studies, the present study focuses on Hong Kong, a residual and semi-democratic welfare state, and investigates competitive bidding as a governmental policy instrument designed to increase the legitimacy of subsidy award decisions. Based on an analysis of submissions in a recent policy review and a review of existing policy documents, we suggest that the government may have increased its decision-making power over NGOs, resulting in little advancement, neither regarding welfare mix, nor concerning the legitimacy of resource allocation.

DOI

10.1007/s11266-014-9499-1

Print ISSN

09578765

E-ISSN

15737888

Publisher Statement

Copyright © International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2014. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Wen, Z., & Chong, A. M. L. (2014). Legitimate deficit: Competitive bidding in a residual and semi-democratic welfare society. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 25(5), 1214-1234. doi: 10.1007/s11266-014-9499-1