The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Metaphysics, Animalism, Brain-transplant scenarios, The corpse problem, The remnant-person problem
I argue that a form of animalism that does not include the belief that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal has a dialectical advantage over other versions of animalism. The main reason for this advantage is that Phase Animalism, the version of animalism described here, has the theoretical resources to provide convincing descriptions of the outcomes of scenarios problematic for other forms of animalism. Although Phase Animalism rejects the claim that ‘human animal’ is a substance-sortal, it is still appealing to those who believe that our nature is continuous or of a similar kind to that of other physical entities.
This paper was fully supported by a Grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU23400314).
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Sauchelli, A. (2017). The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person. Philosophical Studies, 174(1), 205-218. doi: 10.1007/s11098-016-0677-4