Intuitions about disagreement do not support the normativity of meaning
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Dialectica
Publication Date
3-2016
Volume
70
Issue
1
First Page
65
Last Page
84
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Abstract
Allan Gibbard (2012) argues that the term ‘meaning’ expresses a normative concept, primarily on the basis of arguments that parallel Moore's famous Open Question Argument. In this paper I argue that Gibbard's evidence for normativity rests on idiosyncrasies of the Open Question Argument, and that when we use related thought experiments designed to bring out unusual semantic intuitions associated with normative terms we fail to find such evidence. These thought experiments, moreover, strongly suggest there are basic requirements for a theory of meaning incompatible with Gibbard's ultimate goal of providing an expressivist account of meaning-related concepts. I conclude by considering a possible way in which meaning could be normative, consistent with the intuitions about disagreement; but this form of normativism about meaning appears incompatible with Gibbard's expressivism.
DOI
10.1111/1746-8361.12133
Print ISSN
00122017
E-ISSN
17468361
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2016 The Author dialectica © 2016 Editorial Board of dialectica. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2016). Intuitions about disagreement do not support the normativity of meaning. Dialectica, 70(1), 65-84. doi: 10.1111/1746-8361.12133