Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Publication Date

5-1-2010

Volume

145

Issue

3

First Page

1164

Last Page

1187

Publisher

Elsevier

Keywords

Matching and bargaining, search, double auctions, foundations for perfect competition, rate of convergence

Abstract

We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is τ, the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in τ, which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms. The condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power. The bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power (NBP) mechanisms. Simple random proposer take-it-or-leave-it protocols are NBP, while k-double auctions (k-DA) are not. We find that k-DAs have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate, converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all.

DOI

10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.009

Print ISSN

00220531

E-ISSN

10957235

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

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Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2010). The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(3), 1164-1187. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.009