Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Publication Date

6-1-2011

Volume

72

Issue

2

First Page

574

Last Page

582

Publisher

Elsevier

Keywords

Nonparametric identification, auctions

Abstract

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011

Print ISSN

08998256

E-ISSN

10902473

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

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Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 574-582. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011