Title

An analysis of intrinsicality

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Noûs

Publication Date

2-5-2015

Volume

Advance online publication

Abstract

The leading account of intrinsicality over the last thirty years has arguably been David Lewis's account in terms of perfect naturalness. Lewis's account, however, has three serious problems: i) it cannot allow necessarily coextensive properties to differ in whether they are intrinsic; ii) it falsely classifies non-qualitative properties like being Obama as non-intrinsic; and iii) it is incompatible with a number of metaphysical theories that posit irreducibly non-categorical properties. I argue that, as a result of these problems, Lewis's account should be rejected and replaced with an alternative account, which also analyses intrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness, but which avoids these problems.

DOI

10.1111/nous.12087

Print ISSN

00294624

E-ISSN

14680068

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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Recommended Citation

Marshall, D. (2015). An analysis of intrinsicality. Noûs. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1111/nous.12087