Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Bulletin of Economic Research

Publication Date

4-1-2002

Volume

54

Issue

2

First Page

189

Last Page

196

Abstract

A joint venture with market power benefits from restricting its output which, in turn, requires the partners to restrict the supply of their inputs. However, since each partner benefits only partially from restricting its input, both over–supply their inputs from the viewpoint of the optimal use of market power. We show that this pecuniary negative externality in the partners’ input decisions mitigates the standard under–provision problem that arises in joint ventures. We also show that the degree of this problem declines as demand becomes less elastic.

DOI

10.1111/1467-8586.00147

Print ISSN

03073378

E-ISSN

14678586

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research 2002

Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Lin, P., & Saggi, K. (2002). Under-provision of inputs in joint ventures with market power. Bulletin of Economic Research, 54(2), 189-196. doi: 10.1111/1467-8586.00147