Title

宽恕政策 (Leniency Program) 与卡特尔的反垄断控制 = Leniency pogram and anti-Cartel enforcement in China

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

产业经济评论 = Review of Industrial Economics

Publication Date

12-1-2006

Volume

5

Issue

2

First Page

1

Last Page

14

Keywords

卡特尔,宽恕政策,反垄断,博弈论, Cartels, Leniency program, Prisoners' dilemma, Deterrence effect

Abstract

世界各国经验证明,建立宽恕政策是防止和侦破卡特尔的一个有效手段。有效的宽恕政策必须满足三个基础条件:严厉的处罚威慑,强有力的反垄断执法系统,和宽恕政策的可预见性和透明度。鉴于卡特尔已在在中国经济运行中大量出现和它对社会的有害性,我们建议中国政府尽快建立明确有效的的卡特尔宽恕政策,特别是引入对卡特尔的刑事处罚,并最好在《反垄断法》立法时同步进行。

By granting amnesty to cartel members who turn themselves in, Leniency Program (LP) helps desist and destabilize cartels. This paper reviews the LP programs in the United States, European Union, and Japan and analyzes how China should introduce such a policy. Three key ingredients are important: high risk of detection, severe sanction, and transparency and certainty. Automatic amnesty and criminalization of cartel should be stated explicitly in the forthcoming anti-monopoly law of China. Suffering from administrative monopolies, China should also establish an independent and powerful antitrust enforcer.

Recommended Citation

林平、马克斌 (2006)。宽恕政策 (Leniency Program) 与卡特尔的反垄断控制 = Leniency pogram and anti-Cartel enforcement in China。《产业经济评论 = Review of Industrial Economics》,5(2),1-14。

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