Title

Modal fictionalism, possible worlds, and artificiality

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Acta Analytica

Publication Date

12-2013

Volume

28

Issue

4

First Page

411

Last Page

421

Keywords

Modality; Fictionalism; Possible worlds; Modal fictionalism; Artificiality; Integration challenge

Abstract

Accounts of modality in terms of fictional possible worlds face an objection based on the idea that when modal claims are analysed in terms of fictions, the connection between analysans and analysandum seems artificial. Strong modal fictionalism, the theory according to which modal claims are analysed in terms of a fiction, has been defended by, among others, Seahwa Kim, who has recently claimed that the philosophical objection that the connection between modality and fictions is artificial can be met. I propose a new way of spelling out the intuition of artificiality and show that strong modal fictionalism should be rejected.

DOI

10.1007/s12136-013-0186-4

Print ISSN

03535150

E-ISSN

18746349

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2013 Springer.

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Sauchelli, A. (2013). Modal fictionalism, possible worlds, and artificiality. Acta Analytica, 28(4), 411-421. doi: 10.1007/s12136-013-0186-4