Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Ratio

Publication Date

3-2015

Volume

28

Issue

1

First Page

65

Last Page

80

Abstract

Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.

DOI

10.1111/rati.12066

Print ISSN

00340006

E-ISSN

14679329

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Baker, D. (2015). Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason. Ratio, 28(1), 65-80. doi: 10.1111/rati.12066