Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Publication Date

2013

Volume

27

Issue

1

First Page

1

Last Page

21

Abstract

This paper investigates the nature of scientific realism. I begin by considering the anomalous fact that Bas van Fraassen's account of scientific realism is strikingly similar to Arthur Fine's account of scientific non-realism. To resolve this puzzle, I demonstrate how the two theorists understand the nature of truth and its connection to ontology, and how that informs their conception of the realism debate. I then argue that the debate is much better captured by the theory of truthmaking, and not by any particular theory of truth. To be a scientific realist is to adopt a realism-relevant account of what makes true the scientific theories one accepts. The truthmaking approach restores realism's metaphysical core-distancing itself from linguistic conceptions of the debate-and thereby offers a better characterization of what is at stake in the question of scientific realism.

DOI

10.1080/02698595.2013.783971

Print ISSN

02698595

E-ISSN

14699281

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

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Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Asay, J. (2013). Three paradigms of scientific realism: A truthmaking account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 27(1), 1-21. doi: 10.1080/02698595.2013.783971