To thine own self be untrue : against the cable guy paradox
The 2007 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association
University of Bristol
In a recent paper, Hájek presents the following alleged paradox. You are certain that a cable guy will visit you tomorrow between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. but you have no further information about when. And you agree to a bet on whether he will come in the morning interval (8, 12] or in the afternoon interval (12, 4). At first you have no reason to prefer one possibility rather than the other. But you then realise that if you bet on the morning interval, there will certainly be a future time (in the morning and before the cable guy's arrival) at which you will (rationally) assign higher probability to an afternoon arrival than a morning one. You are also sure that nothing similar will happen if you bet on an afternoon arrival, so it appears that you ought to do so.
Rowbottom, D. P., & Baumann, P. (2007, July). To thine own self be untrue: Against the cable guy paradox. Paper presented at the 2007 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Bristol, United Kingdom.