Title

Against scientific realism : new arguments from inconceivability

Document Type

Presentation

Source Publication

Workshop on Modal Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science

Publication Date

9-12-2013

Publisher

University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

There are several existing arguments against scientific realism which rely on the notion that key alternatives are (synchronically or diachronically) inconceivable. But there are other such arguments which have remained unarticulated. In this paper presentation, Rowbottom would chart the possibility space of such arguments, and outline some promising novel arguments for anti-realism.

Recommended Citation

Rowbottom, D. (2013, September). Against scientific realism: New arguments from inconceivability. Paper presented at the Workshop on Modal Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, Odense, Denmark.

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